The Cambridge challenge to the Ricardian analysis of poverty

The Ricardian economists’ famous model of economic growth employed the Malthusian population doctrine, the law of diminishing returns, and the classical or iron law of wages. This analysis was based on utilitarian moral philosophy. The gloomy Stationary State conclusions of the Ricardian growth model — maldistribution of income and widespread poverty — were challenged by both economists and moral philosophers. A particularly important challenge was that offered by William Whewell (1794–1866), Professor of Moral Philosophy and the dominant figure at the University of Cambridge. Whewell is remembered today for his early contributions to mathematical economics. This article begins with a review of the Ricardian growth model. Next, Whewell’s system of moral philosophy is examined and the scientific and religious basis of Whewell’s antagonism to Ricardian economics is considered. After considering Whewell’s treatment of agricultural progress, economic classes, and rent doctrine, his own model of economic growth is analyzed. Finally, Whewell’s appraisal of the duty of government to those harmed by development is explored.     

Value and exchange in law and economics: Buchanan versus posner

Meir Kohn’s Exchange and Value claims that economics can be organised around two opposed paradigms, the exchange and the value paradigms. In this paper, we apply this dichotomy to characterize the analyses proposed by economists in the field known as “law and economics”. We compare and contrasts the perspectives proposed by two prominent scholars—James Buchanan and Richard Posner—and argue that they, respectively, represent the exchange and the value paradigm in law and economics. More precisely, we show that Buchanan sticks to a definition of economics based on the exchange paradigm, and this leads him to define law and economics in a rather specific, different, narrower than Posner’s way to define law and economics—a definition that corresponds to a conception of economics based on the value paradigm.     

Richard H. Thaler: A Nobel Prize for Behavioural Economics

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of Richard Thaler’s career and the contributions to behavioural economics that earned him the 2017 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. It focuses on his role in exposing and making sense of empirical anomalies in orthodox economics, his analysis of mental accounting, and his work with Cass Sunstein on the notion of libertarian paternalism and the ‘nudge’-based behavioural approach to economic policy. It then considers his contributions critically and explores how, unlike previous behavioural economics, Thaler succeeded in getting his new approach to behavioural economics accepted by mainstream economists.     

What If There Are No Conventional Price Mechanisms?

Inspired by Frederic (“Fred”) S. Lee’s theoretical contribution to institutional-heterodox economics, I make the case that the neoclassical price mechanism is not only flawed, but also irrelevant for the study of actual coordination mechanisms, hence the price mechanism — as a theory as well as a way of thinking — should be discarded. While this position was addressed by early institutionalists, starting with Thorstein Veblen, later institutionalists have not completely rejected the price mechanism. The sympathy for the price mechanism has prevented institutionalists (and other heterodox economists) from fully developing an alternative theoretical framework concerning how actual economic activities are organized. I, therefore, provide an institutionalist-heterodox framework of the provisioning process focusing on business enterprise activities. This framework shows how institutional economics becomes more refined and useful when it is married to other traditions in heterodox economics, in particular, Marxian, social, and post-Keynesian economics. Such an integrative approach is what Fred Lee showed through his work toward producing a better theory and policy for the underlying population.     

Pluralism and Anti-pluralism in Economics: The Atomistic Individual and Religious Fundamentalism

This short paper examines a possible connection between religion and economics in terms of the parallelism between the atomistic individual doctrine and the individual soul doctrine. The paper explores whether resistance to pluralism in economics as a methodological practice might be illuminated in terms of this connection. On this view, resistance to pluralism in economics is not a matter of economists holding methodological views about economics practice that are contrary to pluralism, but is rather a kind of anti-pluralism reflecting an intransigent defense of the atomistic individual view as a kind of core or ‘untouchable’ deep doctrine. Two arguments are advanced to demonstrate the parallelism between the atomistic individual doctrine and the individual soul doctrine.     

Toward an Evolutionary and Moral Science

Thorstein Veblen asked in 1898 why economics is not an evolutionary science; he also proposed a Darwinian paradigm shift for economics. Among the implications reviewed here was his claim that Darwinian principles applied to social entities as well as to biological phenomena. It is also argued that economists have additional reasons for taking Darwinian evolution seriously. Recent work on the evolution of altruism, cooperation and morality show that we are on the brink of developing an evolutionary-grounded theory of human motivation that breaks from the selfish utility-maximizer lambasted by Veblen. This new theory accepts a biological as well as a cultural foundation for moral dispositions. As noted here, the neglected British institutional economist John A. Hobson — who was an acquaintance of Veblen — foreshadowed this approach.     

What are the ethics of welfare economics? And,are welfare economists utilitarians?

Four questions: (1) What is welfare economics? (2) Is it an ethical system?  (3) How do welfare economists differ from one another? And (4), how do they differ from other economic ethicists? Then utilitarianism is discussed. I was taught, and have inferred to others, that welfare economists are utilitarians. They are not. Welfare economics is an atypical form of welfare consequentialism: consequentialist in that whether an act or policy is right or wrong is a function of only its consequences—the adjective “welfare” because the only consequences that matter are the welfare (well-faring) consequences. Most welfare consequentialists are neither welfare economists nor utilitarians. And, most moral philosophers are not welfare consequentialists—neither are most normal folk.     

Why Schumpeter has had so little influence on today’s main line economics, and why this may be changing

While Schumpeter’s broad theory of how capitalist economies worked articulated in his Theory of Economic Development received strong attention in his lifetime, it was neoclassical economic theory that took hold of the profession in the last half of the twentieth century, and today few economists even read Schumpeter. The first part of this essay considers the reasons why Schumpeter largely has been ignored. However, recent developments have increased the interests of economists in innovation and in innovation driven economic activity, and the time now may be ripe for a renaissance of Schumpeterian economics. The second part of this essay provides a sketch of what an economics text-book, written from a Schumpeterian perspective, might look like.     

Understanding Social Market Economy,Francesco Forte and His Interpretation

The social thought which emerges from Francesco Forte’s economic writings proves to be mainly inspired by methodological individualism, though interpreted through a peculiar “personalistic” key. We will analyze the peculiar traits of his thought and the specific contribution that Forte gave to the understanding of a specific economic theory based on the doctrine of “Ordoliberalism” or the “Freiburg School.” In our work, we will show how Forte proposes an interpretation of that doctrine, according to two of his main points of reference in economic and philosophical thought: Luigi Einaudi and Antonio Rosmini Serbati. Finally, we will present an important aspect of Forte’s work: his institutional analysis in the light of the particular civil philosophy expressed by Christian social teaching.     

The sceptic as an economist's philosopher? Humean utility as a positive principle

Whereas in philosophy David Hume was long regarded as a negative thinker to be criticized rather than read, many thinkers interested in social and economic theory from Adam Smith onwards found key concepts, distinctions and problems as developed by Hume useful and inspiring. This applies not only to his seminal contributions to technical problems in economics. It is argued that the way in which Hume employed ‘utility as a positive principle’ (most notably in his ‘experimental’ moral theory) is of pivotal importance in this context. It allows for:

a. distinguishing between internal motifs and external circumstances and constraints; and for

b. making explicit the abstract logic of social interaction structures, mechanisms and processes.

Both are necessary conditions for employing the logic of social situations and mechanisms in the explanation of social institutions and economic processes. It moreover prepares the ground for the use of simplified or cartoon-like models of individual agency in economic and social theory, but also for its critique. On this basis, Hume's influence on various strands of social and economic thought, but also the specific differences with regard to more ‘rationalistic’ approaches (such as Hobbesianism or important versions of neoclassical economics) can be assessed more clearly.     

Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics

In 1999 Gordon Tullock became Professor at the George Mason University Law School. Tullock’s arrival at George Mason brought the economics department and the law school close together. The work that resulted during those years consolidated the methodological foundations for a different way of thinking about the economic analysis of law—the “functional” approach to law and economics. The functional law and economics approach espoused by the Virginia School was not attacking any of the results of the Chicago School or the Yale School, but rather proposing a methodological shift. This paper presents some of the results developed by this school and illustrates Tullock’s controversial positions on trials and on the common law system, through anecdotes, Tullock’s own work and related scholarly contributions.     

"The Reality of the Present and the Challenge of the Future": J. Fagg Foster for the Twenty-First Century

This paper revisits J. Fagg Foster’s early assessment of the relevance of John Maynard Keynes’s theory of institutional economics. In his view, neither institutionalists nor most of Keynes’s followers really recognized the importance of Keynes’s theoretical insights. I examine Foster’s views on economic theory, with a particular focus on monetary theory. I apply Foster’s approach to what is now called modern money theory, an approach developed by heterodox economists working in the institutionalist and post-Keynesian traditions. I argue that this approach is consistent with Foster’s, and it offers a way forward to policy formation for the twenty-first century.     

李嘉图逻辑抽象法及其对经济学方法论的影响——兼论逻辑抽象法与历史描述法的结合

在经济学方法论发展过程中,关于李嘉图的经济学研究方法一直有不同看法,尤其是其抽象法引起了争论。可以说李嘉图对抽象法的运用不仅仅解决了当时要研究的问题,更对西方经济学产生了重要的影响,抽象法已经无处不在。肯定了李嘉图对这一方法的创造,并在此基础上结合抽象法的产生以及经济学方法论的发展,认为经济学研究应该将逻辑抽象法与历史描述法相结合。     

Pigou on philosophy and religion

Abstract

This article discusses a group of essays on ethical issues written by Pigou between 1900 and 1908. It is argued that they contain the foundations of his economic philosophy. Pigou's research on the meaning and content of the good merged into his definition of welfare, and his interest in religion as a subjective experience resurfaced in the subjective framework of his economics. A methodological pragmatism informed his economics as well as his ethics; moreover, the endorsement of interpersonal comparisons of the good in the ethical texts was consistent with Pigou's adoption of utility comparisons in welfare economics. Pigou's philosophical pessimism was reflected in his analysis of the economic evils of society, eventually leading to his advocacy of governmental intervention to foster economic welfare. The article contends that Pigou's philosophy derived not only from Sidgwick, as commonly believed, but also from G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica.     

Sraffa,Myrdal, and the 1961 Söderström Gold Medal

In this paper, we give an account of the awarding of the 1961 Söderström Gold Medal to Piero Sraffa by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (Kungliga Vetenskapsakademien). We highlight the central role that Gunnar Myrdal played in the allocation of this prize to Sraffa and the amicable relationship between these two economists, as well as their views on Ricardian economics. In addition, we provide details of Sraffa's activities in Stockholm, including his attendance at the award ceremony. In our final remarks, we reflect on the significance of the 1961 Söderström Gold Medal for the history of economics as a field of study.     

“Social Freedom” in the Twenty-First Century: Rereading Polanyi

Karl Polanyi’s analysis of the genesis, crises, and institutional transformations of contemporary society is grounded on a theory of the basic features and dynamics of capitalism as a peculiar form of society. This article intends to develop this thesis on the basis of a reading of Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, with references to Polanyi’s preceding and later research. Polanyi’s theoretical and methodological achievements suggest a wide comparative outlook and offer a critique of economics, in addition to being deeply connected with his political philosophy. Polanyi’s approach seems to be nearer to the original institutional thought — from Karl Marx to Thorstein Veblen, from Max Weber to Adolf Löwe and Karl William Kapp — than to current neo-institutional tendencies in economics, sociology, and historiography. The hard problems society presently faces suggest the need to adhere to Polanyi’s radical point of view — that is, to a radical approach to Polanyi’s thought.     

The Industry Council Plan as an Instrument of Reconstruction

This paper looks at the doctrines of ‘Wicca’, or what might be termed as pagan or white magic by its adherents, in terms of the economics of religion. The primary focus of the paper is the issue of the degree of product differentiation involved from established religion in terms of two things: the concept of God (or deities) and the ideas of sin. The main contribution of the paper is that it presents (for the first time ever, so far as the author is aware) an economic analysis of the doctrine of a ‘rebound’ effect of any attempts to do harm to other people through the practice of magic. Some basic microeconomic concepts suggest that the moral force of this rebound law is a difficult one to sustain except under very unreasonable assumptions.     

The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists

There are two institutional economics approaches to law and economics. New institutional economists prescribe that arbitrators foster efficiency in setting economic disputes and original institutional economists focus on creating reasonable values – that is, balancing efficiency and justice. Disequilibrium between desired efficiency and perceived fairness triggers agency and is a source of coevolution of law and economics.     

When Galbraith Frightened Conservatives: Power in Economics,Economists’ Power,and Scientificity

In this article, I first expound John Kenneth Galbraith’s general theory of power. Galbraith always took into account phenomena of power in economics, and shed light on the power of economists in particular. I then show how the reaction of conservatives to the broadcasting of the Age of Uncertainty highlights the relevance of Galbraith’s theory. Letters exchanged by conservative Lords in an effort to fight against Galbraith’s ideas paradoxically illustrate his theory. This leads to questions about the status of economists, popularizers, and experts. Finally, I argue that convictions have a crucial role in scientific production, and that Robert Solow’s distinction between the “serious scholars” and the proselyte economist is irrelevant because of its incapacity to understand how economists produce knowledge.     

Firms and industries in evolutionary economics: lessons from Marshall, Young, Steindl and Penrose

Evolutionary economists have tended to assess firms and industries separately, neglecting the role of their interaction in the process of economic growth and development. We trace the separation of firms and industries to the introduction of population thinking in the discipline of industrial economics, including some broadly evolutionary analyses. If researchers conflate a population of firms with an industry, they introduce “thin” means of relating firms to one another and to industries. Despite his device of the ‘representative firm’, Marshall develops “thick” means of relating firms to industries by means of their internal and external organizations. Penrose avoids the notion of industry by focussing on heterogeneous and potentially mobile firms. Young and Steindl develop mundane explanations of firms’ relations within groups and locate the impetus for economic growth in a poorly understood environment. We conclude that evolutionary economists should revisit firms’ boundaries, not in the sense of explaining the existence of firms but in a relating and communicating sense in which boundaries signify the selective means of firms’ relationships.