Analysis of prices in tradable emission markets: an empirical study of the regional clean air incentives market in Los Angeles

The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market is an emissions trading programme, which is expected to help in reducing oxides of nitrogen and sulphur from stationary sources in the Los Angeles area. This paper uses econometric techniques to determine the factors that can explain the development of the price of emission permits. By controlling for various characteristics of the trades, the regression results allow one to isolate the impact of each factor and conduct a detailed analysis of the implications of this factor on price. The results show that the price of permits is affected by institutional factors such as the trading rules and regulations governing the permit programme. The permits are priced higher in the coastal zone, higher for trades recorded in 1997 as compared to 1994 or 1995 and are affected by the trader category. Brokers are involved in well over half of the trades and have acquired a substantial inventory of permits. Facilities buying from brokers pay higher prices than if they buy from another facility. The price of trades beyond 2003 is higher than for current trades, which could be indicative of expectations of high growth rates in the Los Angeles region or due to expectation of more stringent regulations in the future.     

Futures Contracts in Water Leasing: An Experimental Analysis Using Basin Characteristics of the Rio Grande,NM

Providing for increased water demands during periods of persistent drought and climatic variability may require water managers, users and planners to think differently about how water resources are allocated. A water marketing institution that allows water rights holders to reallocate water on a temporary basis could overcome these challenges with minimal conflict. In this paper, a water marketing institution that allows for the temporary reallocation of water rights in a spot and futures market is investigated. The results provide insight into three key questions: (1) how does trading impact the physical system, (2) does the value of water differ by trading agents, (3) how is economic welfare redistributed as a result of trading? Results of experimental treatments display minor impacts to the physical system, that prices differ across the different type of trading agents and the addition of a futures market has the ability to decrease market prices while increasing economic welfare as a futures market allows users to hedge against future water uncertainty.     

洛杉矶的雾霾治理及其启示

1943年美国发生了著名的"洛杉矶雾霾"事件,直到20世纪70年代,该市区还被称为"美国烟雾城"。洛杉矶雾霾夏天主要起因于臭氧,冬天主要是源于细微颗粒物等。洛杉矶在治理雾霾方面的主要做法包括立法、排污许可证制度、推广先进环保技术、建立排污交易机制和成立跨部门专门机构等,其治理工作取得了明显成效:2012年,加州达到"不健康空气"水平的日子比2000年减少了约74%。我国治理雾霾,应更加重视空气污染的长期性预测分析,引入市场机制,成立跨地区的空气污染治理机构,同时,加强中美间环保科技的国际合作。     

A discrete choice equilibrium approach to valuing large environmental changes

This study develops a discrete choice locational equilibrium model to evaluate the benefits of the air quality improvements that occurred in the Los Angeles area following the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA). The discrete choice equilibrium approach accounts for the fact that air quality improvements brought about by the 1990 CAAA will change housing choices and prices. The study also provides new evidence for the distributional welfare impacts of the 1990 CAAA in the Los Angeles area. Findings suggest that the air quality improvements that occurred in the Los Angeles area between 1990 and 2000 provided substantial general equilibrium benefits to households. The analysis reveals noticeable differences between partial and general equilibrium welfare gains, demonstrating that ignoring equilibrium effects will likely misrepresent the benefits of large environmental changes. In addition, we find that the equilibrium welfare impacts of the 1990 CAAA in the Los Angeles area varied significantly across income groups.     

排污权初始分配的一种改进模式

当前排污权交易制度的实践证明了排污权的合理分配会对排污权交易制度的有效运行及环境总量控制目标的实现产生重大影响。单一的排污权分配方式导致了排污权分配机制的低效。如果在排污权初始分配机制的构建中引入累进性的价格机制,使免费与有偿分配有机结合并发挥环保产业的补偿功能,那么分配机制将能有效地界定排污权的价格并防范市场势力,从而实现公正合理的分配,促进排污权交易制度的良性运行。     

Controlling monopoly power in a double-auction market experiment

There is robust evidence in the experimental economics literature showing that monopoly power is affected by trading institutions. In this paper, we study whether trading institutions themselves can shape agents' market behavior through the formation of anchors. We recreate experimentally five different double-auction market structures (perfect competition, perfect competition with quotas, cartel on price, cartel on price with quotas, and monopoly) in a within-subject design, varying the order of markets implementation. We investigate whether monopoly power endures the formation of price anchors emerged in previously implemented market structures. Results from our classroom experiments suggest that double-auction trading institutions succeed in preventing monopolists from exploiting their market power. Furthermore, the formation of price anchors in previously implemented markets negatively impacts on monopolists' power in later market structures.     

Framing Effects,Selective Information,and Market Behavior: An Experimental Analysis

The results of an asset market experiment, in which sixty-four subjects trade two assets on eight markets in a computerized continuous double auction, indicate that objectively irrelevant information influences trading behavior. We find that positively and negatively framed information leads to a particular trading pattern, but leaves trading prices and volume unaffected. The experiment also provided support for the disposition effect. Participants who experience a gain sell their assets more rapidly than participants who experience a loss, and positively framed subjects generally sell their assets later than negatively framed subjects.     

证券市场内幕交易的行为动机研究

2007年中国资本市场进入了全流通时代,全流通下内幕交易可能会比股权分置时更加严重,如何有效防范大股东和机构投资者利用信息优势、资金优势、控制权优势进行内幕交易,是全流通下内幕交易监管防范面临的主要挑战。本文从内幕交易的行为动机及其影响因素展开研究,借鉴Becker(1968)"犯罪经济学"的研究框架及行为金融学的相关理论,选取了相应影响因素的度量指标,架构了内幕交易行为动机模型。然后基于问卷调查的模拟数据,运用结构方程模型对影响内幕交易行为动机模型中各个变量之间的逻辑关系和内在影响机制进行了实证研究,得出富有价值的研究结论,并据此给出相应的政策建议。     

A Portlander's View of Smart Growth

Metro, a regional planning authority, has written and implemented the nation's strongest and most comprehensive smart-growth plan in Portland, Oregon. For a region expected to grow in population by 80 percent in the next five decades, Metro's plan calls for a mere 6 percent expansion of land area; high-density housing in the form of apartments, mixed-use developments, and single-family homes on small lots; pedestrian-friendly design codes; 125 miles of rail transit; and almost no new highway construction. Though smart-growth advocates promise their policies will reduce congestion, clean the air, provide affordable housing, protect open space, and reduce urban-service costs, Metro's plan does the opposite of all these things. Metro planners predict its plan will quadruple the time Portlanders waste sitting in traffic by 2020 and increase smog by 10 percent. The artificial land shortage posed by the urban-growth boundary has already turned Portland from one of the nation's most affordable housing markets to one of the ten least affordable ones. The plan's demand for infill development is sacrificing valuable urban open space to protect abundant rural open space. Rail transit and high-density developments both require huge subsidies. Portlanders initially supported Metro's efforts because they were told that planning would save Portland from becoming like Los Angeles, the nation's most congested and polluted urban area. In fact, Los Angeles is also the nation's densest urban area and has the fewest miles of freeway per capita, making it the epitome of smart growth. This actually led Metro to conclude that its goal is to “replicate” Los Angeles' development patterns in Portland. The result is that Portland-area residents are increasingly hostile to Metro's plans.     

Price Dynamics in a Network of Decentralized Power Markets

In this paper, we model the dynamic behavior of prices in a network of interconnected, but decentralized, electric power markets—an architecture very different from the centralized exchanges and power pools currently being implemented by many state regulators. We estimate dynamic equations of unregulated, wholesale power prices at spot markets scattered over an eleven-state trading region. The results indicate that this decentralized system of power and transmission trading produces prices that are efficient and dynamically stable over this vast network. Price convergence in the power market is similar to what has been observed in the recently deregulated natural gas market.     

New directions in emissions trading: the potential contribution of new institutional economics

Once an arcane topic even among environmental economists, emissions trading systems have substantially increased during this past decade in the USA. Moreover, the implementation of these systems has necessitated increased involvement of professionals in many fields besides economics. This paper reviews the practical experience of the six major types of emissions trading systems, focusing on credit market development, participation and results, including transaction costs. Five more recent applications of emissions trading also are considered, as well as the possibility of inter-pollutant trading. While inter-pollutant trading has been successfully used for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the applicability of this experience is probably very limited. Additionally, it would be highly premature to attempt an evaluation of these newer emissions trading systems, some of which have yet to be even partially implemented. In order to improve these latter and future programs, the paper considers the potential contribution of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) to emissions trading. The NIE is used to develop theoretical insights and a series of predictions about the performance of a range of emissions trading systems.     

Price dynamics in an exchange economy

The pure exchange model is the foundation of the neoclassical theory of value, yet equilibrium predictions and price adjustment dynamics for this model remained untested prior to the experiment reported in this paper. With the exchange economy replicated several times, prices and allocations in most experiment sessions adjust toward the competitive equilibrium in continuous double auction trading, though adjustment is much slower than in previous commodity flow (or perishable good) double auction market experiments. Price adjustment is evaluated by comparing its extent within each market replication (or trading period) to its extent across trading periods. More price adjustment occurs within trading periods than across trading periods, so price adjustment data are evaluated with the disequilibrium Hahn process model (Hahn and Negishi in Econometrica 30:463–469, 1962) of within-period trades. This paper introduces a stochastic version the Hahn process model and demonstrates that a linear approximation to this stochastic model yields an autoregressive process with a near unit root when the adjustment rate is low. In effect, the autoregressive price adjustment model studied extensively by time series econometricians over the past 30 years can be viewed as a reduced form of a stochastic disequilibrium exchange economy price adjustment model. Estimation of the model demonstrates that price adjustment in the exchange economy experiment is considerably slower than in economies without income effects, which suggests that the price discovery process may be a significant factor in the slow adjustment documented by applied econometricians.     

Transaction costs and informational cascades in financial markets

We study the effect of transaction costs (e.g., a trading fee or a transaction tax, like the Tobin tax) on the aggregation of private information in financial markets. We implement a financial market with sequential trading and transaction costs in the laboratory. According to theory, eventually all traders neglect their private information and abstain from trading (i.e., a no-trade informational cascade occurs). We find that, in the experiment, informational no-trade cascades occur when theory predicts they should (i.e., when the trade imbalance is sufficiently high). At the same time, the proportion of subjects irrationally trading against their private information is smaller than in a financial market without transaction costs. As a result, the overall efficiency of the market is not significantly affected by the presence of transaction costs.     

连续竞价市场的股权结构、非对称信息与流动性

本文采用分笔交易的高频数据研究了股权结构对指令驱动的连续竞价市场中流动性和非对称信息的影响。研究表明,机构投资者对股票流动性有正的影响,且机构投资者能够显著减少交易过程的信息不对称程度,从而降低流动性成本。以国有股权和法人股权为代表的公司内部人对股票流动性没有显著影响,但能够降低交易过程的信息不对称程度,对减少流动性成本有积极作用。上市公司持股比例越分散,信息不对称程度越低,流动性成本越低。     

PRESCRIPTIVE PUBLIC CHOICE: APPLICATION TO RESIDENTIAL WATER RATE REFORM

Peltzman's model of price regulation predicts inefficient prices for regulated firms; based on a constraint giving the trade-off between economic profit and the regulated price, the price will be set between a competitive industry price and a monopoly price. This article generalizes the model for application to a wider class of trade-offs, including municipal utilities that are not legally permitted to make a profit. Extending Peltzman's idea of political support functions, this article defines political feasibility relative to economic efficiency. A Pareto superior change with compensation is sufficient but not necessary for political feasibility; the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for political feasibility. The generalization of Peltzman's model of public choice and the concept of political feasibility together explain why Tucson in 1976 and Los Angeles in 1993 adopted efficient water rates during droughts and why, 1 yr later, Tucson rescinded the rates and Los Angeles almost rescinded them. The concept of political feasibility explains why and how, after the drought, the Los Angeles innovations to rate design achieved efficiency and political feasibility, avoiding reversion to the previous, inefficient rates, by separating economic efficiency from political feasibility in both the rate design and the rate reform process. ( JEL D42, D70, H00, L38, L51, L97, Q25, Q28, Q48, Q58)     

辽宁省碳交易市场建设中的问题及建议

日本和欧美等发达国家已经建立了较为成熟的碳交易市场,并通过碳交易取得了显著的环境和经济效益。我国国内的碳交易市场机制十分落后,还没有一个成熟的国际碳交易市场。作为能源消耗大省,辽宁省的碳减排压力指数全国位列第六,辽宁省低碳经济建设任重道远,务实发展碳交易市场是发展低碳经济的首要任务。本文首先详细论述了辽宁省发展碳交易市场的重要意义,指出碳交易市场对辽宁经济建设、财政收入、环境改善及增强企业竞争力都具有较大的推动力。通过对辽宁省碳交易市场发展现状的分析,发现辽宁省碳交易市场建设中存在的问题主要集中在CDM项目、碳交易所建设及自愿减排市场上。根据辽宁省发展阶段的特点,提出了推进碳交易市场建设的相关建议。     

On the Use of the Moving Average Trading Rule to Test for Weak Form Efficiency in Capital Markets

The examination for the possible existence of predictive power in the moving average trading rule has been used extensively to test the hypothesis of weak form market efficiency in capital markets. This work focuses mainly on the study of the variation of the moving average (MA) trading rule performance as a function of the length of the longer MA. Empirical analysis of daily data from NYSE and the Athens Stock Exchange reveal high variability of the performance of the MA trading rule as a function of the MA length and on some occasions the series of successive trading rule total returns is non‐stationary. These findings have direct implications in weak form market efficiency testing. Indeed, given this high variability of the performance of the MA trading rule, by just finding out that trading rules with some specific combinations of MA lengths can or cannot beat the market, as is the case in most of the published work thus far, is not enough evidence for or against the existence of weak form market efficiency. Results also show that on average in about three out of four cases trading rule signals are false, a fact that leaves a lot of space for improved trading rule performance if trading rule signals are combined with other information (e.g. filters, or volume of trade). Finally, some evidence of enhanced trading rule performance for the shorter MA lengths was found. This enhanced performance is partly attributed to the higher probability that a trading rule signal is not a whipsaw, as well as to the larger number of days out‐of‐the‐market which are associated with shorter MA lengths.     

Hazardous Waste Hits Hollywood: Superfund and Housing Prices in Los Angeles

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate concerning the effect of various actions taken by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under CERCLA, commonly known as the Superfund Program, on housing prices. This study uses a housing transaction panel dataset encompassing the five major counties of the Los Angeles Combined Statistical Area to estimate the program’s influence on the local housing market. Using house and time-varying census tract fixed effects, I am able to avoid many of the endogeneity problems seen in previous research attempting to measure the Superfund treatment effect. An estimate of the effect on housing prices is given for each of the major events that occur under a typical Superfund remediation. After controlling for confounding correlated unobservables, I find a 7.3 % increase in sales price for houses within 3 km of a site that moves through the complete Superfund program. The analysis gives evidence of positive price appreciation for housing markets and serves as a lower bound for measuring remediation benefits.     

EFFICIENCY OF THE TAIWAN STOCK MARKET*

This study uses two popular technical trading rules to assess whether the gradual liberalization of Taiwan's securities markets has improved the efficiency of its stock market. The results show that the two rules have considerable predictive power for 1983–1990, they become less predictive for 1991–1997, and they cannot predict the market for 1998–2005. These results indicate that the efficiency of Taiwan stock market has been greatly enhanced by the liberalization measures implemented over the last 20 years.     

DENG XIAOPING'S GREAT TRANSFORMATION

Editor's Note: The First Annual Arnold C. Harberger Distinguished Lecture, University of California, Los Angeles, November 17, I997