Theories of the firm: contractual and competence perspectives

The article compares alternative approaches to the theory of the firm. The two main approaches confronted are the contractual (Coasian) perspective and the competence (evolutionary) perspective. Whereas the firm as a repository of tacit knowledge is neglected in the contractual perspectives, it occupies center stage in the competence perspective. It is argued that the competence perspective is not only applicable an understanding of the sources of firms' competitive advantage, but may also be applied to the issues of the existence and the boundaries of the firm. This means that a distinct theory of the firm can be constructed on the basis of evolutionary theory.     

家族企业制度安排演化的博弈分析

家族企业制度安排是保证其持续成长的内在基础，而缺乏系统的制度安排是目前我国家族企业主要弊病之一。本文运用演化博弈论的基本原理分析了家族企业制度安排的演进过程，具体论证了确立家族企业制度安排的必要性。     

Firms,agency, and evolution

A recent (though controversial) trend in economics has been to appeal to evolutionary theory when addressing various open questions in the subject. I here further investigate one particular such appeal to evolutionary biology: the argument that, since markets select (in a standard biological sense) firms as coherent units, firms should be seen to be genuine economic agents. To assess this argument, I present a model of firm/office selection in a competitive market, and show that there are cases where markets can select for firms/offices as collective units – and thus, as agents of their own – but also that there are cases where they do not. In this way, I try to make the evolutionary argument for the agency-based view of the firm more precise.     

Conventions: An evolutionary approach

Conventions are social institutions that solve recurrent coordination problems. In normative game theory, coordination games are considered problematic because of the multiplicity of equilibria. From a neoinstitutionalist perspective, however, this multiplicity should be an important part of the explanation of real-world institutions. The paper discusses the evolutionary (or “positive”) game-theoretical approach to the emergence of conventions. I note a precise sense in which conventions may be said to minimize transaction costs, but that they need not be efficient. Example applications to language, money, and the theory of the firm are discussed.     

THE (NON)THEORY OF THE KNOWLEDGE FIRM

This paper argues that the mainstream approaches to the theory of the firm do not provide a theory of the human capital‐based or knowledge firm. We examine the neoclassical theory of the firm, the transaction cost model, the incentive‐system approach and the Grossman Hart Moore approach and argue that none of them is able to fully capture the changes to the firm that the movement towards a knowledge economy entails. We also consider the effects of knowledge on the organisation of production. Will production take place within a single large factory, or several smaller factories or even within households?     

What drives innovativeness in industrial clusters? Transcending the debate

The paper throws new light on the debate about the role playedby local knowledge spillovers (LKS) as a driver of regionalinnovative activity. It transcends the regional level of analysisthat has been commonly adopted in the literature so far, usinginsights from the evolutionary theory of the firm. This makesit possible to derive a typology of mechanisms through whichregional agglomeration may stimulate learning and innovationat the firm level. When this typology is brought to bear onthe extant approaches in the debate, the contrasting viewpointscan be reconciled to some extent. The main conclusion is thatlittle theoretical ground for the LKS debate remains.     

Contemporary Economic thought. The Contribution of Neo-Institutional Economics

This article examines the historical developments of the institutionalist theory of the business enterprise since the early 1900s in order to demonstrate its distinctive characteristics that are often overlooked or belittled by some institutional-evolutionary economists and most mainstream economists. I argue that the institutionalist theory is an evolving and emergent theory, which bears a reciprocal, evolutionary, and cumulative relationship between the business enterprise and society. The institutionalist theory is, therefore, suitable for the understanding of the real-world business enterprise as it can be modified and refined along with the evolution of capitalism. The article begins with a discussion of the present state of the institutionalist theory. The following section is devoted to the major contributions to the institutionalist theory situated in the evolution of U.S. capitalism. The penultimate section provides a critical discussion of new institutional and evolutionary approaches to the firm. The article concludes with a brief discussion as to what should be done for the further development of the institutionalist theory of the business enterprise.     

Alfred Marshall's Mecca: Reconciling the Theories of Value and Development*

The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolutionary nature and content of Marshall's theory of value and the relation it bears to his theory of growth and development. In Marshall's work the two theories are inextricably linked, and the subsequent attempt to separate them has not only marginalised Marshall's rich analysis but also made it impossible to appreciate the role he gave to innovation, and its corollary the growth of knowledge and organisation, in the workings of a market economy. At its core is the relation between the growth of firms and the growth of markets, but this is not steady‐state growth theory; rather, it is the different, mutually determined and ever changing growth rates of different groups of firms that is at the centre of attention. Quite how variation is linked to progress is the central topic of this essay, and the elucidation of its central role necessarily means that we must resurrect the representative firm. We conclude that Marshall was correct in stating that ‘the tendency to variation is a chief source of progress’ (Principles, V, 4, p. 355). We develop a set of evolutionary tools to show how and why this is so. But evolution is more than variation; it requires the organisation of firms and the market process to generate that correlation between differential knowledge and economic advance. Most importantly of all, the concept of a representative firm is re‐established as an indispensable element in a Marshallian evolutionary analysis.     

Management and the representative firm revisited: the modern significance of Marshall's evolutionary economics

In an essay written in honour of Peter Swann, it is second nature to discuss some aspects of the economics of innovation, as that is the very challenging area of economic life where he has added so much to our understanding. I will attempt to do this by posing the problem of how innovation fits into the theory of value. Innovation research continues apace, but its broader systemic implications for how we understand the dynamics of capitalism are in danger of being overlooked. But two important economists, Schumpeter and Marshall, have seen the problem differently and built innovation into their theoretical schemes from the start. Marshall's theory of evolutionary change provides a natural focus for our discussion, and this is reflected in his treatment of management, in his use of the representative firm and in the variation-cum-selection dynamics of his open competitive process. We treat each of these topics and show how his evolutionary dynamics can be expressed in the Fisher/Price dynamics of evolutionary change. More generally, the key to economic development is the uneven nature of innovation and it is the uneven nature that gives economic transformation its evolutionary character. This, I suggest, is the proper legacy of Marshalls economics.     

More on alternative objectives of labor-managed firms

This paper focuses on an alternative theory of a labor-managed firm where the main behavioral assumption is profit per laborer maximization subject to an employment constraint, or, alternatively, employment maximization subject to a profit per laborer constraint. This theory and its implications are derived employing a standard duality approach. The results are then compared with those obtained in the theory of the traditional labor-managed firm which maximizes profit per laborer.     

Thorstein Veblen's Darwinian framework and gene-culture coevolution theory

At the turn of the previous century, Thorstein Veblen used Darwinian evolutionary principles to explain the macro-historical evolution of human societies, as well as the institutional structure of the modern pecuniary culture. Even if Veblen had a strong intuitive grasp of the evolutionary forces operating in society, he was not always clear and explicit in developing his ideas towards a full-fledged, consistent evolutionary social theory. This paper argues that a relatively recent theoretical approach, gene-culture coevolution theory, has the conceptual apparatus to remedy this problem and thus make Veblen's ideas an important part of contemporary evolutionary thinking in social theory.     

Towards a non-Darwinian Theory of Institutional Change

The paper emphasizes two flaws in mainstream economics: the failure to understand actual human behavior in many real contexts and the failure to take account of transaction costs. By emphasizing the role of knowledge, institutions, transaction costs and path dependence, new institutional economics has provided a powerful answer to these shortcomings. Nevertheless, a number of questions remain open. In particular, path dependence is far from being a continuous process. Its dynamics and its irregularities are by and large unexplained. Hence, a strong need for a convincing evolutionary theory of environmental change. This article does not deny the validity of the Darwinian view applied to the theory of the firm and of competition in a free-market economy. The paper, however, maintains that the natural-selection process that characterizes the Darwinian approach is ill suited to describe economic evolutionary processes. It is shown that a combination of functional analysis and natural selection may indeed be a better solution, for it solves some of the puzzles raised by public choice theory without violating the fundamental tenets of the new institutional economics approach. Still, although this combined view may well explain why the institutional features are retained by the system, it does not clarify why they are introduced in the first place. A third possibility is put forward in the second part of the paper, where a new evolutionary theory is suggested. Within this framework, agents are assumed to behave according to their preferences within the existing rules of the game. At the same time, new ideas and sometimes new ideologies may influence their behavioral patterns. The combination between needs and ideologies generates environmental change, especially if so-called ideological entrepreneurs are able to transform latent and shared beliefs into an institutional project and enforce it.     

EFFECT OF FIRM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN PRICE FIXING

This article examines price fixing and bid rigging by applying the theory of the economics of crime to explain the calculus of the individual decision maker in the firm. This approach departs somewhat from the traditional approach to investigations of collusion. The latter has emphasized market structure and firm interrelationships while it has ignored the characteristics of the firm itself. But analyses ignoring firm organizational and financial structure are incomplete insomuch as these factors are crucial to the incentives and costs that the decision maker confronts. This paper offers an alternative approach in which price-fixing and bid-rigging offenders' prominent characteristics apparently are mirrored in defendant firms and individuals that the Antitrust Division has prosecuted recentlv.     

A differential approach to input-output analysis

The differential production theory approach is applied to input-output analysis under the assumption that each industrial sector behaves as a homothetic cost-minimizing firm. This yields substitution terms which take a simple form under input independence.     

An evolutionary model of the size distribution of firms

An analytical study of the evolution of the distribution of firm size in an industry is presented. A drift-diffusion model is proposed to express the time-evolution of density of firm size within the industry. The model blends the conventional, more or less static, determinants with the kinds of dynamic considerations introduced by stochastic processes of evolutionary dynamics. The steady-state distribution as well as the dynamic behavior of the model are derived. Parameters in the resulting analytical expressions are then fit to a population of firms in the non-manufacturing service sector. The empirical portion of the paper validates the proposed evolutionary model.     

Neoclassical vs evolutionary theories of financial constraints: Critique and prospectus

Empirical models based on neoclassical theory predict that if investment is sensitive to current financial performance, this is a sign that something is ‘wrong’ and is to be regarded as a problem worthy of a policy intervention. Evolutionary theory, however, refers to the principle of ‘growth of the fitter’ to interpret investment-cash flow sensitivities as the workings of a healthy economy. In particular, I attack the neoclassical assumption of rational profit-maximizing firms. Such an assumption is not a helpful starting point for empirical studies into firm growth. One caricature of neoclassical theory could be “Assume firms are perfectly efficient. Why aren’t they getting enough funding?”, whereas evolutionary theory considers that firms are heterogeneous and that not all firms should grow. This essay highlights how interpretations and policy interventions can be framed by the initial modelling assumptions, even though these latter are often chosen with analytical tractability in mind rather than realism.     

The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism

Darwin uses natural selection in two different senses. Struggle for existence refers to rivalry; survival of the fittest refers to surviving environmental changes. The mainstream vision of economic harmony requires casting natural selection as survival of the fittest. There is no struggle, no conflict. Mainstream economics depicts the selector in the evolutionary game as the firm itself. The mainstream vision requires banishing corporate power and the technological basis of power. For Veblen, corporate power is central. The existence of power implies that among firms, selection assumes the form of struggle. Evolutionary game theory breaks with the mainstream vision; firms are rivals. Evolutionary game theory, however, lacks the "stories" that provide a mapping between theory and reality, something institutionalists are well-positioned to provide. Stories are necessary for understanding corporate power, its origins, its use, and its limitations.     

A corporation’s culture as an impetus for spinoffs and a driving force of industry evolution

We offer a theory of spinoffs that explains some salient aspects of these important market entrants. In infant industries, a great share of new market opportunities is depleted by firms that spinoff from incumbents. A model emphasizing the relation between incumbents’ evolving corporate cultures and the generation of spinoffs explains this regularity in industry evolution. By doing so, we capture different patterns in firm development that finally will help explain the evolutionary paths that industries may follow. We show that organizations reach a critical size that entails the collapse of a cooperative culture and triggers the exodus of personnel founding own firms. Thereby, organizations with a cooperative culture active in a dynamic business environment provide ideal training grounds for potential founders. Moreover, we argue that cooperative firm cultures and processes of “entrepreneurial imprinting” are important sources of spinoffs’ superior capabilities concerning their later market performance. We relate our findings to empirical evidence on developmental patterns in industries, such as genealogies and performance of spinoffs.     

组织结构演化的效率与适应悖论

基于演化理论的观点认为,在企业成长的过程中,组织内部会形成大量的惯例与流程,表现出组织结构惰性。本文认为,这种惰性的实质即企业过于重视内部效率而忽视了对外部环境的适应,结果导致企业战略演化形成路径锁定,而阻碍了战略的及时更新,这时企业陷入了"战略演化陷阱"。本文对组织演化中效率与适应的悖论进行了解释,探讨了组织结构惰性的成因,并提出了一个实证的理论框架。