On the optimal provision of social insurance: Progressive taxation versus education subsidies in general equilibrium

In this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, but distort the education decision of households. Optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions. We highlight the quantitative importance of general equilibrium feedback effects from policies to relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers: subsidizing higher education increases the share of workers with a college degree thereby reducing the college wage premium which has important redistributive benefits. We also argue that a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation. We find that optimal education policies are always characterized by generous tuition subsidies, but the optimal degree of income tax progressivity depends crucially on whether transitional costs of policies are explicitly taken into account and how strongly the college premium responds to policy changes in general equilibrium.     

Migration and Social Replacement Incomes: How to Protect Low-Income Workers in the Industrialized Countries Against the Forces of Globalization and Market Integration

This paper discusses how an industrialized country could defend the living standard of its unskilled workers against the wage competition from immigrants. It shows that fixing social replacement incomes implies migration into unemployment. Defending wages with replacement incomes brings about first order efficiency losses that approximate the budget cost of the government. By contrast, wage subsidies involve much smaller welfare losses. While the exclusion of migrants from a national wage replacement program does not avoid the distortions in labor migration, the (temporary) exclusion of migrants from a national wage subsidy program makes it possible to reach the first best migration pattern despite the preservation of the welfare state.JEL Code: F15, F22, I38, H5, J61     

Costs of business cycles for unskilled workers

Unskilled workers are subject to a much larger risk of unemployment during recessions than are skilled workers. Moreover, unskilled workers earn less income, which limits their ability to self-insure. We examine how this heterogeneity in unemployment risk and income across different skill groups translates into heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles. We find that the welfare cost of business cycles for unskilled workers is substantially higher than the welfare cost for skilled workers.     

Leverage Is a Double-Edged Sword

We use proprietary data on intraday transactions at a futures brokerage to analyze how implied leverage influences trading performance. Across all investors, leverage is negatively related to performance, due partly to increased trading costs and partly to forced liquidations resulting from margin calls. Defining skill out-of-sample, we find that relative performance differentials across unskilled and skilled investors persist. Unskilled investors' leverage amplifies losses from lottery preferences and the disposition effect. Leverage stimulates liquidity provision by skilled investors, and enhances returns. Although regulatory increases in required margins decrease skilled investors' returns, they enhance overall returns, and attenuate return volatility.     

The rising skill premium and deunionization

During the past 50 years, the US economy has seen a rapid decline in labor union membership and a substantial rise in wage inequality. Since labor unions compress wages between skilled and unskilled workers, a rising skill premium encourages skilled workers to withdraw from the union. If this withdrawal is accompanied by a fall in the productivity of unskilled workers, firms become reluctant to hire the relatively expensive union workers, reinforcing the decline in the unionization rate. Evaluating this hypothesis, we find that the rise in the skill premium explains about 40% of the decline in the unionization rate.     

Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria

As recently argued by Diamond (1998), one of the key factors explaining the progressivity of an optimal non-linear income tax is the distribution of productivity among workers. Migration is one source of changes in the productivity distribution. How changes in the populations ability distribution affect optimal income tax schedules has received little attention. Changing the distribution generally affects both the objective function and the government budget constraint. We first consider the comparative statics of the fraction of highly-skilled workers with maximin and maximax welfare functions (so that only the second effect is present) and a quasi-linear utility function. We also present some results for a utilitarian social welfare function.We then study the interaction between mobility and redistributive taxation. We consider mobility by either the skilled or unskilled population under majority voting where governments take the population as fixed. If individuals choose to relocate independently, having identical ability distributions is always a stable equilibrium when the unskilled are the mobile group. However, this is not always the case when the skilled are mobile. If groups of individuals can choose where to locate, having identical ability distributions across regions is only an equilibrium when the mobile type has an overall majority.     

“GETTING BY” AND “GETTING ON” IN SERVICE WORK: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF ACCOUNTING?

The use of educated labour which can multi-task, make decisions and act responsibly facilitates the real subsumption of labour. By presenting data from an ethnographic study of students working in unskilled service jobs in the UK, we show that such workers are not subsumed totally but exhibit a resistant medium by extending their own frontiers of control and developing self-help policies. As many accounting students will have worked in the kinds of jobs reflected in our study, these experiences have important implications for the future of accounting in the USA and elsewhere where work within and outside the profession has been deskilled and educated labour is increasingly used to undertake lower skilled work     

Immigration,remittances and business cycles

Using data on border enforcement and macroeconomic indicators from the U.S. and Mexico, we estimate a two-country business cycle model of labor migration and remittances. The model matches the cyclical dynamics of unskilled migration, and documents the insurance role of remittances in consumption smoothing. Over the cycle, immigration increases with the expected stream of future wage gains, but it is dampened by a sunk emigration cost. Migration barriers slow the adjustment of the stock of immigrant labor, enhancing the volatility of unskilled wages and remittances. Changes in border enforcement have asymmetric welfare implications for the skilled and unskilled households.     

False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas

This paper develops a simple technique that controls for "false discoveries," or mutual funds that exhibit significant alphas by luck alone. Our approach precisely separates funds into (1) unskilled, (2) zero-alpha, and (3) skilled funds, even with dependencies in cross-fund estimated alphas. We find that 75% of funds exhibit zero alpha (net of expenses), consistent with the Berk and Green equilibrium. Further, we find a significant proportion of skilled (positive alpha) funds prior to 1996, but almost none by 2006. We also show that controlling for false discoveries substantially improves the ability to find the few funds with persistent performance.     

Openness and Wage Inequality in Developing Countries: The Latin American Challenge to East Asian Conventional Wisdom

The experience of East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s supportsthe theory that greater openness to trade tends to narrow thewage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in developingcountries. In Latin America since the mid-1980s, however, increasedopenness has widened wage differentials. This conflict of evidenceis probably not the result of differences between East Asiaand Latin America. Instead, the conflict is probably the resultof differences between the 1960s and the 1980s, specifically,the entry of China into the world market and, perhaps, the adventof new technology biased against unskilled workers.     

劳动力市场性别差距、生产结构转型与人口增长转变

本文从劳动力市场性别差距视角为理解生产结构转型与人口增长转变的互动关系提出了新的理论机制。以脑力劳动密集型生产部门比重提高为特征的生产结构转型将缩小性别工资差距，提高家庭生育养育机会成本并降低生育率，进而增加女性劳动相对供给，这又会进一步提高脑力劳动密集型生产部门比重。直接干预女性劳动定价政策可能会带来女性结构性失业，反而扩大劳动力市场性别差距，且不利于生产结构转型；单方面降低女性生育养育成本政策虽然能够提高生育率，但也可能产生类似不利影响；降低男性生育养育成本政策既可以提高生育率，又可以缩小劳动力市场性别差距，并促进生产结构转型；生育养育成本补贴支出由政府承担的影响比由企业承担更为温和。本文结果表明，促进人口长期均衡发展的政策应与缩小劳动力市场性别差距、推动生产结构转型的政策统筹谋划和协调推进。本文研究为“优化人口发展战略，建立生育支持政策体系”提供了一定的理论依据和参考。     

Short-term termination without deterring long-term investment: A theory of debt and buyouts

The option to terminate a manager early minimizes investor losses if he is unskilled. However, it also deters a skilled manager from undertaking efficient long-term projects that risk low short-term earnings. This paper demonstrates how risky debt can overcome this tension. Leverage concentrates equityholders' stakes, inducing them to learn the cause of low earnings. If they result from investment (poor management), the firm is continued (liquidated). Therefore, unskilled managers are terminated and skilled managers invest without fear of termination. Unlike models of managerial discipline based on total payout, dividends are not a substitute for debt—they allow for termination upon non-payment, but at the expense of investment since they do not concentrate ownership and induce monitoring. Debt is dynamically consistent as the manager benefits from monitoring. In traditional theories, monitoring constrains the manager; here, it frees him to invest.     

Vested interests and technology adoption

The asymmetric ability of different interest groups to exclude non-members and the concentrated benefits and diffused costs of policies favoring vested interests matters for technology adoption. We analyze a political economy model where coalitions of workers in many small industries lobby government for a prohibition on the adoption of superior technologies. For reasonable parameter values, the “smallness” of industry lobbies leads to barriers to the adoption of technologies that would make all workers more productive. Higher government corruption can lead to lower levels of TFP and per capita output. The model can generate TFP growth cycles.     

MIGRATION into the WELFARE STATE: tax and migration competition

Despite big gains from easing restrictions on international labor mobility, liberalizing migration flows is not pursued unilaterally or negotiated among countries in a way that international trade negotiations are pursued. Among several key explanations is the fiscal burden imposed by immigration on native-born. The paper focuses on a central tension faced by policy makers in countries that receive migrants from lower wage countries. Such countries are typically high productivity and capital rich, and the resulting high wages attract both skilled and unskilled migrants. A generous welfare state may attract low-skill migration deter skilled migration, since it is likely to be accompanied by higher redistributive taxes. Assuming that a group of host countries faces an upward supply of immigrants, the analysis demonstrates that tax competition does not indeed lead to a race to the bottom; competition may lead to higher taxes than coordination. There exists a fiscal externality (fiscal leakage) that causes tax rates (on both labor and capital), and the volume of migration (of both skill types), to be higher in the competitive regime than in the coordinated regime.     

Real exchange rates and skills

Recent developments in trade theory strongly emphasize that international trade requires an intensive use of skilled workers. Against this background, we explore in this paper whether labor skills are a key determinant of real exchange rates in the long run. Using panel regressions covering 22 countries over the period 1950–2010, we find that labor skills are indeed a structural determinant of real exchange rates, with a permanent increase of the skilled–unskilled labor ratio leading to a long-run appreciation of the real exchange rate. This finding is robust to the inclusion of several control variables, like those used in traditional analyses of real exchange rates.     

Trade Liberalization and Industry Wage Structure: Evidence from Brazil

Industry affiliation provides an important channel through whichtrade liberalization can affect worker earnings and wage inequalitybetween skilled and unskilled workers. This empirical studyof the impact of the 1988–94 trade liberalization in Brazilon the industry wage structure suggests that although industryaffiliation is an important component of worker earnings, thestructure of industry wage premiums is relatively stable overtime. There is no statistical association between changes inindustry wage premiums and changes in trade policy or betweenindustry-specific skill premiums to university graduates andtrade policy. Thus trade liberalization in Brazil did not significantlycontribute to increased wage inequality between skilled andunskilled workers through changes in industry wage premiums.The difference between these results and those obtained forother countries (such as Colombia and Mexico) provides fruitfulground for studying the conditions under which trade reformsdo not have an adverse effect on industry wage differentials.     

Impacts of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization

This article presents estimates of the impact of China's accessionto the World Trade Organization. China is estimated to be thebiggest beneficiary (US$31 billion a year from trade reformsin preparation for accession and additional gains of $10 billiona year from reforms after accession), followed by its majortrading partners that also undertake liberalization, includingthe economies in North America, Western Europe, and Taiwan (China).Accession will boost manufacturing sectors in China, especiallytextiles and apparel, which will benefit directly from the removalof export quotas. Developing economies competing with Chinain third markets may suffer small losses. Accession will haveimportant distributional consequences for China, with the wagesof skilled and unskilled nonfarm workers rising in real termsand relative to those of farm workers. Possible policy changes,including reductions in barriers to labor mobility and improvementsin rural education, could more than offset these negative impactsand facilitate the development of China's economy.     

Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States

We assess the impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income in the United States. From the 1970s through the 1990s, most states removed restrictions on intrastate branching, which intensified bank competition and improved bank performance. Exploiting the cross‐state, cross‐time variation in the timing of branch deregulation, we find that deregulation materially tightened the distribution of income by boosting incomes in the lower part of the income distribution while having little impact on incomes above the median. Bank deregulation tightened the distribution of income by increasing the relative wage rates and working hours of unskilled workers.     

Cross-border acquisitions and employment policies

Using novel firm-level data on employment quality in an international sample of M&A deals, this paper investigates the cost-benefit trade-off faced by acquirers when providing generous employment policies. We find that shareholders react more positively to deal announcements by acquirers providing generous employee incentives when the deal is domestic, but negatively when the deal is cross-border. These effects are primarily driven by the provision of monetary incentives and are strongest for firms in skilled industries. We argue that generous employment policies increase synergy gains and reduce labor adjustment costs in a domestic takeover. In cross-border deals, however, costs associated with managing employee policies across borders and lack of opportunities for eliminating work duplication negatively affect acquirer returns. Nevertheless, we find that country-specific acquisition experience can mitigate these negative effects. Our results cannot be explained by country-level labor regulations or by target-level employment policies.     

Information content and the contractual nature of hedging derivative incomes

In a sample of 87 banks representing 631 bank-years for the period 1996–2003, we examine whether information content of hedging derivative incomes is predicated on the contractual nature of the derivative. Of particular interest are the different abnormal trading volume reactions to incomes arising from executory contracts (i.e., cash flow and net investment hedges) and incomes arising from nonexecutory contracts (i.e., fair value hedges). We find a positive and significant relationship between two alternative measures of abnormal trading volume and incomes arising from cash flow and net investment hedges. The results are robust in an equity valuation framework. Our findings suggest that derivative incomes are informative, notably those incomes that are related to executory contracts. An implication for standard setters is that the complex rules for disaggregating incomes on hedging derivatives provide valuable information to the market.