Common pool resources and contextual factors: Evolution of a fishermen's cooperative in Calcutta

The CPR school has successfully rebutted Hardin's pessimistic Tragedy of the Commons model. However, in recent years, critics have focussed on the inward orientation and lack of contextual analysis characterising the writings of the CPR school.Oakerson [A Model for the analysis of common property problems. Working Paper R86-13. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 1986] and Ostrom [Governing the Commons. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990] have detailed the list of variables that have to be studied to understand the mechanics of collective action. However, these factors are internal to the community. Recent critics' point out that the actions of individual agents are also influenced by the alternatives embedded outside the system. These variables are collectively labelled contextual factors.In our paper, we have analysed the case of a fishermen's cooperative in the Calcutta Metropolitan District to show how the historic and economic context shapes targets of resource users and affects the feasibility of alternative courses to achieve the target by determining opportunity and transaction costs of actions. This indicates the importance of contextual factors in explaining the formation and evolution of the resource regime.     

A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence

We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources.     

Individual and Collective Choice and Voting in Common Pool Resource Problem with Heterogeneous Actors

In this paper we investigate the effects of heterogeneity in common pool resource (CPR) problems. We examine whether heterogeneity impedes or facilitates coordination on an efficient use of a CPR by proposing and voting on allocation schemes. In a full information design we compare extractions and voting behavior in heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. If the CPR is extracted individually, we find no difference in efficiency between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. However, when groups can vote on allocation schemes, homogeneous groups are more likely to reach an efficient agreement than heterogeneous groups.     

Dissertation abstract: The experimental analysis of the political economics of fisheries governance

This dissertation focuses on the political economy of fisheries governance. The study develops a formal model of fisheries governance by combining the features of the common pool fishery and the political institution of lobbying; designs a laboratory fishery governance institution and conducts economic experiments to test the hypotheses derived from the formal model. Specifically, the study analyzes how fishing firms invest in efforts to influence fishery regulation and management through voluntary contribution lobbying. The study also analyses and compares contribution and effort behavior in the lobbying and the CPR using data from economic experiments. The results indicate that lobbying to change suboptimal fishery regulations was significantly below the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction and contributions to raise the cap were significantly different than contributions to lower the cap toward the social optimum. Study results show that subjects successfully lobbied to raise inefficiently low fishing quotas, but were unable to lobby to reduce inefficiently high fishing quotas. Detailed analysis of subjects’ contribution and effort behavior suggest that despite the interesting benefit-cost duality between pure public goods and CPRs, the pattern of cooperative behavior in these two social dilemma situations was different and the level of cooperation in the voluntary contribution lobbying experiment was lower than those reported in other public goods experiments. To provide external validity to these experimental findings, the study further analyzes and compares lobbying expenditures in the fishery sector with those in other natural resource industries using field data from the United States. A comparison of actual lobbying expenditures as percentage of valued added shows that lobbying effort in the U.S fishery sector is not significantly different than those in other natural resource industries such as mining and electric utility industries, but the pattern of lobbying is different. Whereas fishing firms lobby through associations or pressure groups, firms in other natural resource industries lobby unilaterally. This observation suggests that differences in industrial structure and incentives influence the pattern of lobbying and the lobbying behavior of firms across industries. The theoretical predictions derived from the formal model of fisheries governance are consistent with our experimental findings and with the field data on lobbying in the US fisheries sector. These findings suggest that heterogeneity drives rent-seeking activities in the US fisheries sector and that fishing firms attempt to circumvent political collective action problems by forming and lobbying through associations of stakeholders with relatively homogenous policy preferences. JEL Classification D22, D72, D78, H41 Advisor: Prof. Jon G. Sutinen     

社区共享资源合作供给的信任博弈模型

本文将社区互动结构简化为3种类型,以个体信任的建立和预期的形成为切入点,构造跨期信任博弈模型,讨论影响社区成员共享资源合作供给“共识”形成的有关因素。分析表明,在成员相对固定的社区,通过提高合作供给的预期收益、提升成员的主观贴现因子、降低合作供给的成本,能够形成合作供给习俗;而在成员流动性较大的社区,则需要建立有声誉的组织来发起和维系共享资源的合作供给。     

Head-enders as stationary bandits in asymmetric commons: Comparing irrigation experiments in the laboratory and the field

The emergence of large-scale irrigation systems has puzzled generations of social scientists, since they are particularly vulnerable to selfish rational actors who might exploit inherent asymmetries in the system (e.g. simply being the head-ender) or who might free ride on the provision of public infrastructure. As part of two related research projects that focus on how subtle social and environmental contextual variables affect the evolution and performance of institutional rules, several sets of experiments have been performed in laboratory settings at Arizona State University and in field settings in rural villages in Thailand and Colombia. In these experiments, participants make both a decision about how much to invest in public infrastructure and how much to extract from the resources generated by that public infrastructure. With both studies we find that head-enders act as stationary bandits. They do take unequal shares of the common-pool resource but if their share is very large relative to downstream participants' shares, the latter will revolt. Therefore for groups to be successful, head-enders must restrain themselves in their use of their privileged access to the common-pool resource. The comparative approach shows that this result is robust across different social and ecological contexts.     

Dissertation abstract: Three essays on the determinants of behavior in the commons-experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia

This dissertation presents the results of a series of common pool experiments conducted in three regions of rural Colombia with individuals who face a social dilemma in their everyday lives that is similar to what was presented in the experiment. The research objectives are to develop an empirical characterization of how individual behavior deviates from purely self-interested Nash behavior and to further our understanding of the effects of alternative institutions to promote more conservative choices in common pool experiments.Groups of five subjects participated in a 20-period common pool resource game framed as a harvest decision from a fishery. Every group first played 10 rounds of a baseline limited access common pool resource game and then 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions: face-to-face communication, one of two external regulations, and communication combined with one of the two regulations. The two external regulations consisted of an individual harvest quota that was set at the efficient outcome, but differ with respect to the level of enforcement. A total of 420 individuals participated in the experiments, with individual earnings averaging slightly more than a day’s wages. The results are presented in three essays.The first essay, What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users?, develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by combinations of self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion or conformity. The results suggest that a model which balances self-interest with a strong preference for conformity best describes average strategies. The data are inconsistent with a model of pure self-interest, as well as models that combine self-interest with individual preferences for altruism, reciprocity and inequity aversion.The second essay, Communication and Regulation to Conserve Common Pool Resources, tests for interaction effects between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and non-binding verbal agreements to do the same. The results indicate that formal regulations and informal communication are mutually reinforcing in some instances, but this result is not robust across regions or regulations. Therefore, the hypothesis of a complementary relationship of formal and informal control of local natural resources cannot be supported in general; instead the effects are likely to be community-specific. There is some evidence to suggest that these effects are correlated with the relative importance of formal regulations versus informal community efforts in the community.The third essay, Within and Between Group Variation in Individual Strategies in Common Pools, analyzes the relative effects of groups and individuals within groups in explaining variation in individual harvest decisions for particular institutions, and uses a hierarchical linear model to examine how these sources of variation may vary across institutions. Communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies within groups, but these coordinated strategies vary considerably among groups. In contrast, externally-imposed regulatory schemes (as well as unregulated limited access) produce significant variation in the individual strategies within groups, but these strategies are roughly replicated across groups so that there is little between-group variation.     

The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of common pool resource governance

Common pool resource experiments in the laboratory and the field have provided insights that have contrasted to those derived from conventional non-cooperative game theory. Contrary to predictions from non-cooperative game theory, participants are sometimes willing to restrain voluntarily from over extracting resources and use costly punishment to sanction other participants. Something as simple as face-to-face communication has been shown to increase average earnings significantly. In the next generation of experiments, both in the laboratory and in the field, we need to extract more information that provides insight concerning why people make the decisions they make. More information is needed concerning attributes of individuals as well as the social and social-ecological context in which they interact that may give rise to such deviations from theoretical predictions. In the process of extracting more information from participants and the contexts in which they interact, we face several methodological and ethical challenges which we address in this paper.     

Strategic entry and externalities in groundwater resources: Evidence from the lab

This study uses economics experiments to extend the literature on common-pool resources by focusing on entry investment behavior in a stylized, spatially explicit aquifer. The model consists of a two-stage game, where participants make an entry decision in the first stage and, if they choose to enter, decide how much resource to extract in the second stage. Results show that entry behavior and groundwater pumping decisions are significantly affected by the underlying spatial externalities of the resource. In instances where the impacts of groundwater use are spread across all resource users, we observe both a greater number of users choosing to use the resource and a higher intensity of use. The results support expectations from the model that groundwater management policies should focus on entry in addition to decisions related to the volume of pumping. The results also discern the interplay of entry with both hydrogeologic characteristics of the resource and the option to exit and reveal that the option to exit increases the intensity of extraction as well as initial entry rates.     

桂西山区原生态旅游资源及其可持续利用研究

桂西山区旅游资源优势和特点主要体现在其资源的原生态。但桂西属于喀斯特生态环境脆弱区和少数民族区，使得其旅游资源开发具有特殊性。本文分析了桂西山区原生态旅游资源的特色和优势以及桂西山区原生态旅游资源的脆弱性．提出建立多级资源遗产保护、建立少数民族文化基因库、元素库等原生态旅游资源安全保护及可持续利用思路。     

管制经济学理论与实践20年的发展演变

从美国管制产业研究中心1982年举行的东部会议开始,20年来,管制经济学和管制都发生了很大的变化.本文从自身研究的角度对这些年来的主要变动进行了评述.文章分析了管制经济学理论的重大发展以及激励管制的理论与实践的关键问题,并对某些理论和放松管制的有效性进行了分析.     

Sharing Common Resources in Patriarchal and Status-Based Societies: Evidence from Tanzania

ABSTRACT

In rural African societies, socioeconomic differentiation linked to gender and social status exerts an important influence on the distribution of common-pool resources. Through a behavioral experiment conducted in 2008 in rural Tanzania, this contribution examines the influence of gender and social status on distribution behavior of users of self-governed common watersheds. It finds that men and women with low social status distribute water equally when water is abundant but keep larger shares when water is scarce, although low-status women try to be as fair as possible at the expense of their returns from irrigated agriculture. Men of high social status keep more than half of the available water for themselves, both in abundance and scarcity, and deprive others from sizeable returns from irrigated agriculture. Women of high social status share altruistically when water is abundant and equally when water is scarce, giving up on returns from irrigated agriculture.     

中国企业环境保护合规风险防范机制与对策

国内外环境保护形势的变化要求我国企业必须实现环保合规经营。由于历史原因,我国企业走的是广义“违规”的路子,这种“违规”惯性导致我国企业正面临很大的“环境保护合规风险”。加强我国企业环境保护合规风险防范机制建设是我国企业进行环境保护合规风险识别、防范和补救的关键。本文应用制度经济学的基本研究框架,在分析我国企业环境保护外部环境、内部风险控制制度以及我国企业环境保护合规现状的基础上,提出了加强我国企业环境保护合规风险防范机制的结论及相关对策。     

西部地区土地资源可持续利用评估系统研究

土地资源利用系统是一个复杂而巨大的社会、经济和生态系统,传统的定性与定量方法难以有效地解决土地资源利用系统的问题.本文从区域可持续发展理论出发,以系统动力学的理论与方法为系统分析和建模的主要方法,建立了土地资源利用系统主要因果关系模型、土地资源利用动态流模型和动态仿真模型,通过计算机实现了土地资源利用系统的政策分析和动态模拟,得出优化方案.为成功解决西部土地资源利用的矛盾问题提供一种思路,从而为促进西部经济、社会、环境协调发展做出相应的贡献.     

低碳经济视角下浙江临港产业发展提升路径和策略

低碳经济发展模式是浙江产业结构优化和发展方式转变的战略取向,也是当前浙江临港产业提升的主流方向。浙江临港产业升级的关键在于充分利用其资源禀赋条件和比较优势,促使以高投入、高能耗、高排放和低技术为特征的传统制造业、贸易加工业和低端港航物流业,向高技术加工业和中高端港航现代服务业转变和延伸。     

Regulation of State-Owned and Privatized Utilities: Ukraine Electricity Distribution Company Performance*

Both ownership and regulation affect the behavior of utility managers. Private ownership rewards managerial decisions that enhance shareholder value. Regulatory incentives reward behavior that affects profits and costs. An empirical analysis of 24 Ukraine electricity distribution companies from 1998 to 2002 indicates that privately owned firms do respond to incentives that add to net cash flows (associated with reducing commercial and non-commercial network losses). However, they also respond more aggressively than do state-owned distribution utilities to mark-up (cost-plus) regulatory incentives that increase shareholder value but decrease cost efficiency. This study was initiated while Val Tsaplin was a PURC Visiting Scholar with funding from the FSA Contemporary Issues Fellowship Program. Michael Pollitt, David Sappington, Fernando Damonte, and an unknown reviewer provided very helpful comments on earlier drafts. We thank Patricia Mason for copy-editing the paper. The conclusions do not necessarily represent the views of organizations with which the researchers are affiliated.     

制假产业存在的原因与规制——基于收入差距的市场演化分析

本文首先论证了收入差距的固化是生产者的逐利动机加强和消费者对低端产品消费需求增加的原因。然后通过演化博弈分析得到结论,在存在收入差距的条件下,若监管缺位,市场将出现正常产业与制假产业并存的均衡状态;消费者的收入约束差距越大,生产者进入制假产业的概率越高。因此缩小收入差距,并对通过对制假产业分类实施市场监管,提高监管效率,才能真正减少直至消除制假产业。     

Classroom Games: The Allocation of Renewable Resources Under Different Property Rights and Regulation Schemes

The authors describe a renewable resource allocation game designed to stimulate students' interest in and understanding of market failure associated with open-access types of resource use. They also use the game to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various property rights and regulation schemes. Because this exercise demonstrates the power of unregulated and regulated economic incentives, many types of students may benefit from this game, including undergraduates enrolled in the standard introductory and in more advanced microeconomics classes, as well as courses in environmental economics and natural resource economics. This game was specifically designed so that noneconomics majors in natural resource management and environmental courses could also benefit.     

关联购销、价格管制及价值相关性研究--来自我国上市公司的经验证据

关于关联交易对企业的影响有两种对立的观点:正面观和负面观。文章通过分析关联交易会计管制政策出台前后(1998~2003年)上市公司关联销售比率和利润率指标的变化发现,会计管制通过规定关联交易价格上限能限制企业管理当局利用关联交易进行盈余管理的活动,但这种限制作用是有限的。实证研究表明关联购销业务的增加导致市场负面反应,从而支持了关联交易的负面观。文章还发现股票市场对关联购销业务的反应经历了一个过程。在2001年会计管制政策出台前,股市对于关联购销总量变动没有反应;管制政策出台后,利润率操纵受到抑制,关联购销业务对股价的负面影响得到明显体现。     

环境规制、双元创新与企业绩效:环境动态性的调节作用

基于"波特假说"和双元理论,以双元创新为中介变量,以环境动态性为调节变量,探讨环境规制对企业绩效的内在影响机理,通过利用中国A股上市公司2013—2017年的数据进行实证分析,结果发现:(1)环境规制对企业绩效具有显著的促进效应,支持了"波特假说";(2)探索式创新在环境规制与企业绩效之间发挥了部分中介作用,而开发式创新在两者关系间的中介作用未得到显著性体现;(3)环境动态性不仅增强了环境规制与企业绩效之间的关系,同时也强化了探索式创新和开发式创新分别与企业绩效间的关系。