Exit Deterrence

This paper is the first to provide a general context whereby potential entry can lead incumbent firms to permanently reduce the intensity of competition in a market. All previous results found that potential entry would lead to lower prices and greater competition. Examining markets where entry occurs by the acquisition of access rights from an existing incumbent, we demonstrate that, where competitive choices are strategic complements, a more efficient entrant may be unable to acquire those rights from a less efficient incumbent due to the unilateral accommodating behavior of the efficient incumbent. Similarly, such accommodating behavior may deter efficient investment by an incumbent. These results have implications as to how economists view potential entry and its benefits.     

Increasing Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Employee-centered Approach

As the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) literature has developed, it appears that a dominant paradigm has emerged. Both scholars who study CSR and those who write about its organizational application have largely converged on CSR as an organizational strategy issue. Viewing CSR as a matter of top-level strategy unwittingly links it to a particular conceptualization of organizational change—a top-down perspective. We suggest that the dominance of this traditional view of organizational change is limiting the study of CSR. Thus, we seek to increase awareness of an alternative model, one that complements the strategic view. Specifically, we describe a model of CSR organizational change that suggests two things. First we assert that significant change can be initiated at lower organizational levels as well as from the top. And second, we suggest that the change can be accomplished in small steps and involve only a portion of the organization, as opposed to an overarching organizational strategy. We present our employee-centered approach to CSR change as an addition to the traditional top-down view.     

Long-Term or Short-Term Managerial Incentive Contracts

This paper deals with the strategic role of the temporal dimension of contracts in a duopoly market. Is it better for a firm to sign long-term incentive contracts with managers or short-term contracts? For the linear case, with strategic substitutes (complements) in the product market, the incentive variables are also strategic substitutes (complements). It is shown that a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentives, while a short-term contract makes it a follower. We find that, under Bertrand competition, in equilibrium one firm signs a long-term contract and the other firm short-term incentive contracts; however, under Cournot competition, the dominant strategy is to sign long-term incentive contracts.     

Organizational Controls and Performance Outcomes: A Meta‐Analytic Assessment and Extension

Managing employees and external partners effectively has been a primary concern for organizations and their managers. Many studies have investigated the effectiveness of organizational controls in a wide variety of contexts. Using organizational controls literature that discriminates among outcome, behaviour, and clan control, this study synthesizes the research on the effectiveness of these controls. In particular, the study examines 23,839 organizational controls–performance relationships from 120 independent samples, and tests several new hypotheses using advanced meta‐analytic methods. The results indicate that outcome, behaviour, and clan controls generally enhance performance, with each control having a distinct performance effect. Our analysis also demonstrates that controls function as complements to one another. This finding indicates that one form of control increases the effectiveness of other forms of control. We also examine the organizational controls–performance relationships across various contexts, and our results show that they vary according to the type of task. The paper concludes with a discussion on the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings.     

Does asymmetric information always help entry deterrence? Can it increase welfare?

This paper compares the scenarios of complete and incomplete information in a general model where the incumbent can make a capital investment to deter entry. We show that the informational structure can make an unexpected difference in terms of entry deterrence and efficiency. Although asymmetric information encourages entry deterrence behavior, in some cases it decreases the probability of this behavior inducing no entry and thus promotes competition. In other cases, asymmetric information induces less entry but may lead to higher welfare.     

Determinants of Entry in an Emerging Economy: A Multilevel Approach

The dynamics of the world economy and global competition patterns are encouraging multinational enterprises (MNEs) to expand into emerging economies. This study validates the proposition that entry mode selection in an emerging economy is influenced by situational contingencies at four levels: nation, industry, firm, and project. Analysis of data collected from China suggests that the joint venture is preferred when perceived governmental intervention or environmental uncertainty is high or host country experience is low. The wholly-owned entry mode is preferred when intellectual property rights are not well protected, the number of firms in the industry is growing fast, the need for global integration is high, or the project is located in an open economic region. The importance of these multilevel determinants requires simultaneous and inseparable considerations of the risk, return, control, and resource effects of the entry mode decision. This necessitates a theoretical integration of multiple perspectives such as transaction cost, the eclectic paradigm, bargaining power, and organizational capability.     

Privatization, Competition, and Budget Constraints: Disciplining Enterprises in Russia

We investigate whether privatization, competitive forces, and the hardening of budget constraints played efficiency-enhancing roles in Russia in the immediate post-privatization period. We find evidence of a positive impact of privatization on labor productivity: a 10% point increase in private share ownership raises real sales per employee by 3–5%. The evidence on product market competition is weaker, depending on model specification. Soft budget constraints are usually found to reduce restructuring but the effect is small and insignificant. We find that in terms of their impacts on productivity, privatization and subsidy reduction are substitutes; privatization and competition (measured as the geographic scope of markets) are complements; and that competition and subsidy reduction are independent. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Incentives,Capital Budgeting,and Organizational Structure

Divisional managers compete for financial resources in what is often referred to as an internal capital market. They also have a common interest in maximizing corporate profits, as this determines the resources available to the firm as a whole. Both goals are powerful motivators but can at times conflict: while the amount of resources available to the firm depends on corporate performance, divisional funding depends upon the division's performance relative to the rest. We propose a model in which organizational form is endogenous, divisions compete for corporate resources, and managers have implicit incentives. We show that organizational design can help companies influence their divisional managers' potentially conflicting goals. Our analysis relates the firm's organizational structure to the source of incentives (external vs. internal), the nature of the incentives (competition vs. cooperation), the level of corporate diversification, the development of the capital market, and to industry and firm characteristics.     

How Does Cooperation and Competition Foster or Inhibit Creativity and Innovation?

The current article provides a brief insight into the relationship between cooperation and competition in organizational settings as they relate to the origination and proliferation of new ideas. Does cooperation stifle creativity? Does competition promote innovation? Or is it likely the answer resides in a more complex process somewhere in the middle? With a vested interest in organizational productivity, leadership should pay special attention to what social processes give rise to these phenomena.     

Technological Expansion: the Interaction Between Diversification Strategy and Organizational Capability

This study analyses technological expansion by examining the interaction between firms' diversification strategy and internal capabilities. We argue that when new technologies emerge, firms that were actively pursuing diversification do not have equal intention to adopt the technologies. For firms that possess internal capabilities similar or relevant to the new technologies, their diversification strategy facilitates technological expansion, otherwise diversification strategy negatively affects technological adoption. This study improves our understanding on technological expansion. Existing studies try to identify organizational characteristics that facilitate or impede firm entry into new technological fields. This research reveals that the same organizational characteristic (e.g. diversification strategy) can exhibit different effects on technological adoption. It facilitates technological expansion if firms' existing capabilities can be applied to new technologies, otherwise it impedes new technological adoption.     

Profit, productivity and distribution: Differences across organizational forms - The case of Spanish banks

We examine variations in financial and economic performance as a function of organizational form, and, over time. The forms we consider include Spanish commercial banks, savings banks, and financial cooperatives. We decompose multilateral variation in operating profit, our measure of financial performance, into price and quantity effects. We then decompose the latter into a margin effect and productivity change. Our measure of economic performance, productivity variation, is subsequently disaggregated into technical, cost efficiency, and scale. We find that deregulation and liberalization have acted to narrow performance gaps among organizational forms; this, despite less-than compelling evidence that increased competition has contributed to this convergence. For the Spanish banking system as a whole, the margin effect appears to deliver twice as much financial benefit as do improvements in productivity. Importantly, this finding does not vary across organizational form. Such regularity has an important implication: Incentives for growth are apparently provided by a positive margin rather than by the more elusive benefits of economies of scale and improved cost efficiency.     

Local business taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate

A theoretical model describes the local choice of the tax rate on capital income. It establishes preferences and various fiscal conditions — including the tax rates of competing jurisdictions — as determinants of the tax rate. The empirical implications are tested using a large panel of jurisdictions in Germany, which have discretion in setting the local rate of the business tax. Tax competition is identified by means of instrumental variables techniques. Despite significant competition effects between local neighbors, where tax rates are strategic complements, jurisdictions are found to have some leeway in using the tax rate as an instrument of their policy. In particular, large jurisdictions set higher tax rates in interjurisdictional competition.     

ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

This article is primarily concerned with exploring the relationships between organizational climate and characteristics of organizational environments. Environmental characteristics include dependencies, competition and uncertainty. In addition, the relationship of climate and environments with dimensions of organizational structure and size are examined. Using data from 15 industrial organizations in Britain, the results have shown that different environmental characteristics have different associations with organizational climate. Also, the relationships between organizational environments and climate are not similar to those found between environments and structure. It is suggested that the creation of appropriate climates and structural design as responses to environmental pressures may be considered as complementary strategies in an attempt to maintain administrative control. The results, therefore, provide support for the suggestion that, in order to improve our understanding of the dynamics of organizational climate, characteristics of organizational environments should be incorporated into future research designs.     

How does competition among lodging sharing platforms affect welfare and profits?

We investigate the likely effect on prices, consumer surplus, and profits of intensified competition among peer‐to‐peer lodging platforms. We find that intensified competition in the sharing economy may give rise to some surprising results. For instance, intensified competition may allow platforms to charge higher fees from peer suppliers and lead, therefore, to a decline in consumer surplus. Only if the market of professional hoteliers is highly competitive, intensified competition among platforms leads to the traditional outcome that the entry of more platforms leads to lower fees charged from consumers and to enhanced consumer surplus. We also find that platforms may actually earn higher profits when there is intensified competition among professional hoteliers. In addition, while intensified competition among professional hoteliers leads to a decline in the fees that platforms can charge customers, it may actually result in higher lodging prices. We explain these counterintuitive results by the dual role that the lodging price plays in affecting the welfare of individuals active in the sharing economy. While a higher price has an adverse effect on the welfare of demanders of lodging it benefits peer suppliers of lodging because a higher lodging price raises the compensation they receive when offering lodging capacity to a platform.     

产品市场竞争、竞争地位与企业金融资产配置

实体经济"脱实向虚"的微观表现就是企业金融化,而产品市场竞争程度和企业所处的竞争地位无疑是影响企业金融化的一个重要因素。本文选取2007~2018年我国A股非金融类上市公司的经验数据为样本,实证检验了产品市场竞争程度和企业竞争地位对企业金融资产配置的影响。结论表明:产品市场竞争程度和企业竞争地位与企业金融资产配置均呈正相关关系,产品市场竞争的加剧和企业竞争地位的提升都会增加企业金融资产配置规模。进一步的分析还发现:企业竞争地位在产品市场竞争程度与企业金融资产配置的关系中起到了反向的交互作用,而且竞争地位高的企业更倾向于配置金融资产,市场套利动机是企业进行金融资产配置的主要动因。因此,应降低行业进入壁垒和行业集中度,加强对企业融资后资金去向的监管,缓解企业融资难融资贵困境,提高实体经济活动的投资回报率。     

Surprise and sense making: what newcomers experience in entering unfamiliar organizational settings

Growing disillusionment among new members of organizations has been traced to inadequacies in approaches to organizational entry. Current directions of research on organizational entry and their limitations are described, and a new perspective is proposed. The new perspective identifies key features of newcomers' entry experiences, including surprise, contrast, and change, and describes the sense-making processes by which individuals cope with their entry experiences. Implications for research and practice on organizational entry are drawn.     

Ownership Structure of Cooperatives as an Environmental Buffer*

ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose that the ownership structure in the cooperative form acts as an environmental buffer. It is a mechanism to obtain stronger linkages with suppliers by internalizing them, and in this way, obtaining fundamental resources. Using this strategy, the cooperative form can isolate itself from adverse environments and from competition from other organizational forms. Although cooperatives have higher survival probability in any economic context, in rival ideological environments they have less support than other organizational forms. To test these ideas, we have chosen data from the Spanish olive oil milling industry for 1944–98. During this period, Spain changed from a dictatorial to a democratic regime and from a self‐subsistence economy in the post civil‐war period to a broad liberal international economy. The results show that, whereas other organizational forms are affected by economic and ideological influences, the cooperative form isolates itself by changing the competition level.     

企业内部市场创新:基于邯钢、海尔、江动的案例研究

企业内部市场创新是内部市场的构建过程,其实质是对各组织要素的调整和重新安排。本文通过提出和界定内部市场结构,分析了一体化、相关多元化等企业战略和决策权、内部价格信息、绩效考核标准、激励机制等组织要素对企业内部市场结构的影响,发现组织要素适应企业战略,进而实现内部市场结构的应然与实然相统一是内部市场创新应该遵循的原则,并运用这一发现分析和阐释了邯钢、海尔和江动三家企业内部市场创新的具体做法。     

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when firms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream firm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry profit. The upstream firm may encourage downstream competition (even excessively) in response to high downstream bargaining power. The option of vertical integration may be a barrier to entry downstream and may trigger strategic horizontal spinoffs or mergers. We extend the analysis to upstream competition.     

Competition under continuous technological change

This paper examines competition patterns and competitive strategies when technology changes continually. It first discusses optimal behavior for investment in technology. It is argued that although technological innovations supersede existing technologies, there are economically justifiable barriers to investing in the new technologies. These economic barriers, coupled with continuous technological change, have implications for certain aspects of strategy, such as entry by means of new technologies, timing of entry, leapfrog-type competition, vertical integration, the productivity dilemma, and escalating commitment. Finally, the industrial transformation of the steel industry is used as an example to illustrate these implications.