The Zilcha criterion for dynamic inefficiency

Summary. This paper reexamines the condition (1 + n), which Zilcha (1991) presents as a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic inefficiency of stationary allocations in overlapping generation models with stochastic production. We show that this condition is necessary but not sufficient for a stationary allocation to be dynamically inefficient by Zilchas definition. We also show that there is a narrow but widely studied class of specifications in which the Zilcha test is both necessary and sufficient for dynamic inefficiency of stationary competitive equilibrium allocations. Outside this class, however, counterexamples can be constructed relatively easily.Received: 30 September 2002, Revised: 13 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D90, E13, E22. Correspondence to: Steven RussellWe thank Jon Burke, Subir Chakrabarti, Itzhak Zilcha and an anonymous referee for helpful conversations and/or comments.     

Firm exit and technical inefficiency

The purpose of the paper is to examine formally the fundamental implication that technical inefficiency (TI) is related to firm exit. Traditional stochastic frontier models allow for the measurement of TI but do not allow for a direct effect of TI on exit. We propose a model which allows for such effects and consists of a stochastic frontier model, and an additional equation that describes the probability of exit as a function of covariates and TI. Since TI is unobserved, econometric complications arise, and obtaining consistent estimates is non-trivial due to the presence of integrals in the likelihood function. We propose and implement maximum likelihood estimation one step, employing data for 3,404 manufacturing firms in Greece. We find significant positive effects from TI on the probability of exit. We also propose and provide measures of TI that respect the fact that unobserved TI affects the probability of exit and compare them to TI measures from the traditional stochastic frontier model.

The measurement of environmental economic inefficiency with pollution-generating technologies

This study introduces the measurement of environmental inefficiency from an economic perspective. We develop our proposal using the latest by-production models that consider two separate and parallel technologies: a standard technology generating good outputs, and a polluting technology for the by-production of bad outputs. While research into environmental inefficiency incorporating undesirable or bad outputs from a technological perspective is well established, no significant attempts have been made to extend it to the economic sphere. Based on the definition of net profits, we develop an economic inefficiency measure that accounts for suboptimal behavior in the form of foregone private revenue and environmental cost excess. We show that economic inefficiency can be consistently decomposed according to technical and allocative criteria, considering the two separate technologies and market prices, respectively. We illustrate the empirical implementation of our approach using a dataset on agriculture at the level of US states.     

Beliefs and Pareto Efficient Sets: A Remark

We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed, then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify equivalence classes of beliefs, giving rise to the same set of Pareto optimal allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D61.     

Human capital effects on technical inefficiency: a stochastic frontier analysis across industries of the Greek economy

In this paper we examine the impact of human capital on technical inefficiency. A stochastic production frontier is simultaneously estimated with a technical inefficiency model using data from one-digit industries of the Greek economy, for the period 2000–2005. The results indicate a significantly negative impact of human capital on technical inefficiency, which is comparatively lower in magnitude for the sector of public services. The most efficient industries of the Greek economy are those of Education, Financial intermediation and Real estate, renting & business activities. The highest contribution of human capital on technical efficiency is observed in the industries of Health, Education and Real estate, renting & business activities.     

On the difficulty of combining actual and potential criteria for an increase in social welfare

Summary. This paper examines two problems associated with the use of potential Pareto criteria in welfare economics. The first problem is the well-known intransitivity of the compensation criteria à la Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky. The second problem is the possible incompatibility between the Chipman-Moore-Samuelson criterion and the Pareto principle. The main result of this paper is that, in order to avoid either of these problems, it is necessary and sufficient that the domain to which these criteria are used is such that the Chipman-Moore-Samuelson criterion encompasses completely the Pareto criterion. When interpreted in a standard economic environment, this result is shown to be equivalent to Gorman's requirement of non-crossing between utility possibility frontiers. Received: June 18, 1998; revised version: March 2, 2000     

Pareto optimality in coalition formation

A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a close structural connection between Pareto optimality and perfection that has various algorithmic consequences for coalition formation. Based on this insight, we formulate the Preference Refinement Algorithm (PRA) which computes an individually rational and Pareto optimal outcome in hedonic coalition formation games. Our approach also leads to various results for specific classes of hedonic games. In particular, we show that computing and verifying Pareto optimal partitions in general hedonic games, anonymous games, three-cyclic games, room-roommate games and B-hedonic games is intractable while both problems are tractable for roommate games, W-hedonic games, and house allocation with existing tenants.     

Two-sided altruism, Lindahl equilibrium, and Pareto optimality in overlapping generations models

Summary. This paper extends the Samuelsonian overlapping generations general equilibrium framework to encompass a variety of altruistic preferences by recasting it into a Lindahl equilibrium framework. The First and the Second Welfare theorems hold for Lindahl equilibrium with respect to the Malinvaud optimality criterion but not with respect to the Pareto optimality criterion. A complete characterization of Pareto optimal allocations is provided using the Lindahl equilibrium prices.Received: 2 October 2003, Revised: 13 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D62, D64, C62.An earlier draft of the paper was prepared for presentation at the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, 1990, Barcelona, Spain. Much of this work was done when I was at Yale University and University of California-San Diego. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal and to Don Brown, Vince Crawford and Joel Sobel for many insightful comments and encouragements on an earlier draft of the paper.     

International organizations and arrangements: Pivotal countries and manipulations

A problem of making an investment in a large developing or transition economy by an international organization is considered in this paper. We design a dominant strategy (the truth-telling) mechanism in a decision making problem where both Pareto optimality and optimization of an international organization's welfare are achieved. We determine that if there are pivotal countries within an international organization, necessary assumptions made for such a mechanism to work cannot be all satisfied. The mere presence of pivotal countries within an international organization is an empirical question, but casual empiricism suggests their existence.     

A reformulation of the foundations of welfare economics

Neoclassical welfare economics takes an outcome-oriented approach that uses Pareto optimality as its benchmark for welfare maximization. When one looks at the remarkable improvements in economic welfare that have characterized market economies, most of those improvements in welfare have been due to economic progress that has introduced new and improved goods and services into the economy, and innovations in production methods that have brought costs down, leading to higher real incomes. Pareto optimality is only peripherally related to actual economic welfare, and no economist would argue that people are materially better off today than a century ago because the economy is closer to Pareto optimality. After analyzing the actual factors that lead to improvements in welfare, this paper suggests a reformulation of the foundations of welfare economics to replace the almost irrelevant outcome-oriented concept of Pareto optimality as the benchmark for evaluating welfare with a process-oriented benchmark based on factors that generate economic progress. The paper then explores some implications of this reformulation.

从帕累托标准看我国土地制度改革方式取向

土地制度改革是改革土地现有的权利义务关系，通过土地权利的让渡实现资源配置，促进农村生产力的发展。所以，应在土地所有制上再造集体所有制并在此基础上实现土地使用权的自然流转，实现资源的优化配置。     

Economists,social reformers,and prophets: a feminist critique of economic efficiency

This article examines the concept of Pareto optimality, bringing to light some of its implicit assumptions about the nature of human agency, work, and gender. It explores the androcentric character of the economic agent and the gendered nature of neoclassical models in relation to the historical development of the concept of economic efficiency during the late 1930s. The thrust toward the development of Pareto optimality as a scientific criterion of economic welfare was a response to the methodological tensions between the clearly political nature of economics and the scientific aspirations of economists. An examination of the debates from this period illuminates some of the values that became embedded in neoclassical economics, and which are now hidden by the masks of mathematics and abstraction.     

Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality

In a deterministic allocation problem in which each agent is entitled to receive exactly one object, an allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is the outcome of a serial dictatorship. We extend the definition of serial dictatorship to settings in which some agents may be entitled to receive more than one object, and study the efficiency and uniqueness properties of the equilibrium allocations. We prove that subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of serial dictatorship games are not necessarily Pareto optimal; and generally not all Pareto optima can be implemented as subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of serial dictatorship games, except in the 2-agent separable preference case. Moreover, serial dictatorship games do not necessarily have unique subgame perfect equilibrium allocations, except in the 2-agent case, hence their outcomes are indeterminate and manipulable.     

The case for international tax co-ordination reconsidered

In a world of high capital mobility, governments may be tempted to undercut each other's capital income taxes to attract capital from abroad. Since such tax competition may have detrimental effects for all countries, European policy makers have debated the introduction of a minimum capital income tax rate within the EU. This paper develops an applied general equilibrium model to estimate the effects of such tax co-ordination on resource allocation, income distribution and social welfare. The model allows for the concern of policy makers that a rise in capital taxes within the EU may cause a capital flight out of Europe. Capital flight will indeed reduce the welfare gain from tax co-ordination within Western Europe, but a positive net gain will remain, although it is likely to be well below 1% of GDP. The gain from co-ordination will be unevenly distributed across European countries, due to differences in economic structures and in the social preference for redistribution. Moreover, even if the median voter's gain from tax co-ordination may be small, the gains for the poorer sections of society may be quite large.     

The Italian contribution to early economic dynamics

Abstract

Contrary to the prevailing literature, the study of economic dynamics began at the end of the nineteenth century, at least four decades before Hayek's and Samuelson's essays on dynamic equilibrium, as Pareto's dynamic insights prove. Throughout this early phase of the discipline, economists interested in dynamic studies put forward a wide spectrum of suggestions. This paper investigates the lines of research that sprang from the Italian debate either according to or in opposition to the Paretian mechanistic legacy, aiming to show that a growing awareness of subjective variables’ role weakened the mechanistic faith of the strictly Paretian followers, pushing them toward probabilistic analysis, anchoring dynamics to uncertainty and disequilibrium.     

A dynamic profit function with adjustment costs for outputs

It is well known that there are adjustment costs associated with many input factors, which delays firms response to changes in relative prices. Although adjustment costs are implicitly acknowledged when a cost rather than profit function is used, little attention has been given to adjustment costs for outputs. However, in many cases there will also be adjustment costs associated with changes in the product mix for multioutput firms. In this paper we formulate a firm’s optimization problem in a profit maximizing set up that allows adjustment costs for all netputs from which it follows that adjustment cost for some factors affect the adjustment of both inputs and outputs. We also show that one can test whether a factor is quasi-fixed or fully fixed.      

论双重合约

本文提出了关于外部性的新定义:没有参加特定相关合约,但却对该合约中的某特定行为人产生的影响,就是外部性。前述特定相关合约就是内部合约;没有参加特定相关合约的其他人,但同该合约中的特定行为人所达成的产生外部性影响的其他合约,就是外部合约。上述内外合约组合为双重合约。鉴于任何交易都有外部性,则每一个内部合约同时伴随着若干个外部合约,故双重合约是人类相互关系中普遍存在的事实。运用合作博弈与讨价还价理论,可以建立双重合约存在与稳定的模型。     

就业选择机制的博弈分析

就业问题是经济领域的中心问题。在现实社会中，我国的就业选择机制存在着很大的缺陷。本文通过就业选择机制的博弈模型的建立，证明在完全信息时，显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果，并且其均衡结果是帕累托有效和公平的。最后针对当前全球性金融危机为背景的经济形势和中国所面临的就业问题压力，对中国的现状进行了分析，并根据模型对就业选择机制的应用，以及如何有效解决中国的就业问题提出了一些建议。     

A dynamic game for fiscal federalism with non-local externalities

We address the questions of the patterns and the efficiency of public intervention in a dynamic game model between public agencies in charge of a non-local externality. We give two examples: pollution spreading between water basins (negative externality), and non-uniform contributions from the elite and from the mass to a cultural background (positive externality). We define two extreme cases, depending on whether or not the receiving end of the externality balances the transmitting end. When both balance, the reactivity of the agency structure is strong and the need for redistribution between them is weak. When they do not balance, the externality is more markedly non-local and redistribution is required to balance the fiscal burden (or product) from pigouvian instruments among all beneficiaries. We show that, with a static rule of redistribution that allows them to compute transfers between them as a function of their own strategies, the decentralized agencies' reactivity is somewhat slowed, but they still react faster and more efficiently than a static central agency.     

The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining

In bargaining between a buyer and several sellers on prices and quantities, strategic inefficiencies arise. By reallocating quantities between agreements, the buyer can increase its share of the surplus. With two symmetric sellers producing substitutes, the quantity in the first agreement will be higher than the efficient quantity, and the quantity in the last lower, thus implying that sellers are strategically discriminated. When asymmetries are not too large and sellers produce substitutes, the buyer first agrees with the seller with the lowest marginal cost and only the most efficient order of agreement is an equilibrium outcome. When goods are complements, both equilibrium quantities are lower than the efficient levels.