Mortgage Prepayment and Default Behavior with Embedded Forward Contract Risks in China’s Housing Market

Most condominiums in China are sold forward on a pre-sale market, where purchasers and developers transact on an underlying property that is not yet completed. During the pre-sale period home buyers face a significant forward contract risk. However, home buyers can borrow mortgages from banks so that they can effectively share the forward contract risk with banks. This explains the phenomenon of irregularly high early-stage default and prepayment rates observed in residential mortgage lending in China, where there are few, if any, financial incentives for mortgage borrowers to exercise either put or call options. Mortgages collateralized by forward housing assets are riskier than are those with underlying assets traded on the spot market. However, currently Chinese mortgage banks charge the same rate to all mortgage borrowers. This inefficiency in risk sharing between mortgage borrowers’ groups in the forward and spot housing markets leads to mispricing in secondary mortgage sales and mortgage-backed security trading.     

Presale Contract and its Embedded Default and Abandonment Options

The presale contract is a popular property selling method that allows a buyer to default on the remaining payment and/or a developer to abandon a project. Using a simple two-period game theoretical model, we derive a closed-form pricing equation for a presale contract that explicitly accounts for a developer??s abandonment option and a buyer??s default option. Although a developer has an abandonment option under either a spot sale or a presale method, the option is more valuable under a presale contract because of an additional cash inflow from the presale downpayment. A presale also provides a buyer a default option, which is valuable in a real estate market with uncertain demand and price risk. We analyze the implications of the abandonment option on a developer??s construction decision and choice of selling method, as well as the implications of the default option on a buyer??s purchase decision. Furthermore, our model framework has implications to the pricing of futures contracts that involve both stochastic revenues and costs.     

Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets

This paper studies a duopolistic credit market in which borrowers differ in risk. In our competition game, one lender is in an advantaged position with respect to the other due to past relations with the borrowers. We investigate the features of the equilibrium contract and show that the best borrower is indifferent between the dominant and the opponent lenders’ contract while the other borrowers prefer that of the dominant lender. Also, repayment and collateral do not depend upon the borrowers’ respective project risk. The author is grateful to Jean-Charles Rochet for his comments and encouragement. The author acknowledges the reviewer’s very careful reading of the paper. The final version has benefited considerably from his comments and suggestions.     

Information reduction via level crossings in a credit risk model

This paper provides an alternative credit risk model based on information reduction where the market only observes the firm’s asset value when it crosses certain levels, interpreted as changes significant enough for the firm’s management to make a public announcement. For a class of diffusion processes we are able to provide explicit expressions for the firm’s default intensity process and its zero-coupon bond prices.      

The Market for Real Estate Presales: A Theoretical Approach

Presale agreements have become a pervasive worldwide practice for residential sales, especially in many Asian markets. Although there is a burgeoning empirical literature on presales agreements, only a few papers actually address their theoretical foundations. We create a set of interrelated theoretical models for explaining how and why developers and buyers engage in presale contracts for non-completed residential dwellings. Given heterogeneous consumer beliefs about future market prices, developers and buyers enter into presale agreements to mitigate, two intertwined, fundamental risks: those of real estate market valuation and default. Our analyses are consistent with prior empirical findings and provide additional theoretical insights for understanding the market for presales.     

Bonuses and Non-Public Information in Publicly Traded Firms

Recent research in accounting explores how firms use “individual” or “non-financial” measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. We model a firm that conditions bonus payments to executives on information that is not available to those outside the firm. This raises two issues. First, market participants may use the magnitude of such payments to infer the non-public information. Second, because information that is non-public is, by extension, non-verifiable, the firm cannot write explicit contracts based on it. Combining the relational incentive contracts and financial signaling literatures, we examine equilibria of a signaling game in which bonus payments from a firm to a manager convey non-public information regarding the firm’s future cash flows. Our main result is that increases in corporate myopia can, under some conditions, lead to increased profits. This finding is contrary to that typically found in financial signaling models.     

Asymptotic behaviour of mean-quantile efficient portfolios

In this paper we investigate portfolio optimization in the Black–Scholes continuous-time setting under quantile based risk measures: value at risk, capital at risk and relative value at risk. We show that the optimization results are consistent with Merton’s two-fund separation theorem, i.e., that every optimal strategy is a weighted average of the bond and Merton’s portfolio. We present optimization results for constrained portfolios with respect to these risk measures, showing for instance that under value at risk, in better markets and during longer time horizons, it is optimal to invest less into the risky assets.This research was partially supported by the National Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and the Mathematics of Information Technology and Complex Systems (MITACS) Network of Centres of Excellence.     

Land Development: Risk, Return and Risk Management

We model and examine the financial aspects of the land development process incorporating the industry practice of preselling lots to builders through the use of option contracts as a risk management technique. Using contingent claims valuation, we are able to determine endogenously the land value, presale option value, credits spreads and the effects of presales on debt pricing and equity expected returns. We show that using presales options effectively shift market risk from the land developer to the builder. Results from the model are consistent with the high rates of return on equity observed in empirical surveys; they also suggest that developers may be justified in pursuing projects with substantially lower expected returns to equity when a large number of lots can be presold. Additionally, we show that presales reduce default risk dramatically for leveraged projects and can support a considerable reduction in the cost of construction financing. Large debt risk premiums are justified for highly levered projects, which helps explain the use of mezzanine financing in the land development industry to reduce expected default costs.

Optimal insurance contracts without the non-negativity constraint on indemnities: revisited

In the literature on optimal indemnity schedules, indemnities are usually restricted to be non-negative. Keeler [1974] and Gollier [1987] show that this constraint might well bind: insured could get higher expected utility if insurance contracts would allow payments from the insured to the insurer at some losses. This paper extends Collier’s findings by allowing for negative indemnity payments for a broader class of insurers’ cost functions and argues that the indemnity schedule derived here is more appropriate for practical applications (e.g. in health insurance). JEL Classification D80 · D81 · D89     

Are Minorities or Minority Neighborhoods More Likely to Get Low Appraisals?

We empirically examine the role of appraisal in the residential mortgage lending process—in particular, the incidence, consequences, and determinants of appraisal below contract purchase price. Using the Boston Federal Reserve Study data set, we find that, as expected, low appraised value significantly increases the probability of mortgage loan application rejection. We find no evidence that low appraised value is related to census tract racial composition, an important finding given the history of the appraisal industry; however, low appraised value is related to proxies for neighborhood quality. Moreover, properties securing adjustable rate mortgages, condominiums, and properties purchased by African American buyers show an increased probability of low appraisal, though the race effect result is highly sensitive to model specification.     

Do lack of transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing?

This paper studies the extent to which poor institutions compromise risk-sharing. We model a multilateral organization as a social contract that provides insurance to members. Countries privately observe the realization of a performance variable with a verification cost that differs across countries, reflecting the “transparency” of institutions. When the level of transparency is exogenous, the optimal contract provides complete expected risk sharing across countries and states. Poor transparency and enforcement reduce consumption and result in insurance rationing. When a country can increase transparency endogenously, this generates an externality and moral hazard. We first characterize the outcome when the multilateral agency can influence members’ institutions by choosing the countries’ level of effort. Next we derive a tax/subsidy scheme that can induce countries to choose the socially optimal level. JEL Classification Numbers D8, F3 We are grateful to Biung-Ghi Ju, Ted Juhl, Donald Lien, Joseph Sicilian and Jianbo Zhang for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee for comments that improved the paper substantially.     

The valuation of a firm’s investment opportunities: a reduced form credit risk perspective

This paper develops a valuation model for a firm’s investment opportunities. Given standard market imperfections, we show that maximizing the firm’s equity value is consistent with the need to include a capital charge for an investment specific to a firm’s capital structure and in excess of the investment’s market determined risk. A reduced form credit risk perspective is taken to enable a continuous time implementation. This continuous time implementation is illustrated within the paper.      

Political Risk and Purchases of Privatized State‐Owned Enterprises

We assess the valuation effects and risk for acquirers of privatized state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). The valuation effects of purchasers are positive and significant; they increase for purchasers that have recent high performance, better access to capital, and have engaged in larger acquisitions. The acquirer valuation effects are lower when the selling government is more corrupt, more bureaucratic, and a weaker financial performer. Acquirer's total and unsystematic risk increases, indicating that purchasers of SOEs realize diversification benefits. Systematic risk increases for purchasers when the government is characterized by high political risk.     

Devaluation with contract redenomination in Argentina

This study offers the first empirical microeconomic analysis of the effectiveness of dollar debt and contract redenomination policies to mitigate adverse financial and relative price consequences from a large devaluation. An analysis of Argentina’s policy of devaluation with redenomination in 2002, in contrast to Mexico’s policy of devaluation without debt redenomination in 1994–1995, shows that devaluation benefited tradables firms, and that dollar debt redenomination in Argentina benefited high-dollar debtors, as shown in these firms’ investment behavior, especially non-tradables firms whose revenues in dollar terms were adversely affected by devaluation. That investment behavior contrasts with the experience of Mexican firms in the aftermath of Mexico’s large devaluation, in which non-tradables producers with high dollar debt displayed significant relative reductions in investment. Stock return reactions to Argentine debt redenomination indicate large, positive, unanticipated effects on high-dollar debtors from debt redenomination. Energy concession contract redenomination likewise increased investment by high energy users in Argentina, and that benefit was apparent also in positive stock returns of those firms.      

Does knowing the volatility states affect the market risk premium?

Mayfield (J Financ Econ 73:465–496, 2004) has devised a method for estimating the market risk premium, based on a variant of Merton’s ICAPM wherein volatility is specified as a two-state Markov process. In this study, we assess Mayfield’s key assumption that investors know the current volatility state with certainty, via empirical testing of the assumption of exogenous Markov-switching in Mayfield’s model. We detect strong evidence of endogenous switching. This indicates that investors infer the current volatility state, as opposed to simply observing it. We also find that the risk premium estimates are affected by the switching type.     

Reform of the regulations on marginal employment lacks cohesion

Conclusion If the federal government is concerned to avoid restricting labour market dynamics in the low-income segment, it should seek a solution that tears down the ‘wall’ represented by the ceiling on marginal employment. This is not achieved by the envisaged reform concept. In fact the way forward was set out in the new government’s coalition agreement. There the government’s intention is expressed to incorporate all forms of paid employment, i.e. including self-employed activities, into the social insurance system. This would tear down the wall consisting of a high marginal tax and contribution burden that still blocks the transition from marginal work to regular part-time employment. Yet this would also require the courage to abolish flat-rate taxation in favour of an extension of individual income taxation. It seems that such a reform—as is the case with a comprehensive concept for a re-regulation of the labour market and a reform of social security—cannot be implemented in the short run. Consequently, the reform of marginal employment should be placed on the agenda of the ‘Alliance for Jobs’: these tripartite talks between employers, unions and the government, that are to be chaired by the Chancellor personally, should serve not only to bring about a reduction in German unemployment in the short-term, but also to find new, sustainable regulations for the labour market and social security. One advantage, at least, of the proposed reform of marginal employment is that it is in fact so marginal that it will not constitute an obstacle to a more comprehensive reform.     

Loan Portfolio Swaps and Optimal Lending

Theories on loan portfolio swap hedging are based on a portfolio-choice approach. This paper presents an alternative: a firm-theoretic model for bank behavior with loan portfolio swaps. Our paper derives the optimal loan rate and rate-taking loan amount of the banks portfolio, and relates them to the market loan rate, counterparty loan rate, swap default risk, capital-to-deposits ratio, and deposit insurance. We find that in the bilateral default risk approach, the comparative static results are generated by four factors: the banks risk magnitude about the equity market value, loan composition in the swap contract, the substitution effect in the loan portfolio, and the income effect from the swap transaction. The results imply that changes in the payoff asymmetry in the event of swap default and the banks regulatory parameters have a direct effect on the banks loan portfolio for lending and swap transactions.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and advice.     

Equity financing activities and European value-growth returns

This paper extends the U.S. evidence in Bali et al. (2010) to European stock markets. Like in the United States, European value-growth returns are strongly dependent on the valuation signals contained in the firm’s equity financing activities. The high returns of value firms are due to value purchasers, while the low returns of growth firms are due to growth issuers. Among value issuers and growth purchasers, there exists no value premium at all. The large return difference between value purchasers and growth issuers cannot be explained by common risk factors. However, employing Piotroski and So’s (2012) recently proposed market expectation errors approach shows that the observed value-growth returns can be attributed to mispricing.     

An analysis of pricing and basis risk for industry loss warranties

In recent years, industry loss warranties (ILWs) have become increasingly popular in the reinsurance market. The defining feature of ILW contracts is their dependence on an industry loss index. The use of an index reduces moral hazard and generally results in lower prices compared to traditional, purely indemnity-based reinsurance contracts. However, use of the index also introduces basis risk since the industry loss and the reinsured company’s loss are usually not fully correlated. The aim of this paper is to simultaneously examine basis risk and pricing of an indemnity-based industry loss warranty contract, which is done by comparing actuarial and financial pricing approaches for different measures of basis risk. Our numerical results show that modification of the contract parameters to reduce basis risk can either raise or lower prices, depending on the specific parameter choice. For instance, basis risk can be reduced by decreasing the industry loss trigger, which implies higher prices, or by increasing the reinsured company attachment, thus inducing lower prices.     

Investment guarantees in unit-linked life insurance from the customer perspective

Interest rate guarantees are a typical contract feature in unit-linked-life insurance products. As the financial crisis of 2007/2008 has shown, these guarantees can be of substantial value for policyholders since they ensure that at least a minimum amount will be paid back even if the mutual fund value falls below a specific guaranteed level. However, from the insurance company’s view, these guarantees can be costly—especially in highly volatile markets—due to the required risk management measures which must be undertaken to secure the guarantees promised to the customers. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate whether customers really value these guarantees and if their willingness to pay (WTP) is sufficient to cover the guarantee costs. To elicit customer WTP, we use an online questionnaire and compare these results to the actual guarantee costs calculated with the Black and Scholes option pricing formula. One main finding is that even though most of the participants in the online questionnaire work in the financial industry, subjective prices are difficult to derive and are lower, on average, than the prices obtained using a financial pricing model. However, many participants are still willing to pay a substantially higher price.