Peer group effects on the academic performance of Italian students

We analyse peer effects among students of a middle-sized Italian public university. We explain students’ average grade in exams passed during their Second Level Degree course on the basis of their pre-determined measures of abilities, personal characteristics and peer group abilities. Thanks to a rich administrative data set, we are able to build a variety of definitions of peer groups, describing different kinds of students’ interaction, based on classes attended together or exams taken in the same session. Self-selection problems are handled through Two-Stage Least Squares estimations using as an instrument, the exogenous assignment of students to different teaching classes in the compulsory courses attended during their First Level Degree course. We find statistically significant positive peer group effects, which are robust to the different definitions of peer group and to different measures of abilities.     

Peer group effects in applied general equilibrium

Summary. In this paper, I develop an applied general equilibrium environment with peer group effects. The application I consider is schooling. The framework used here is general equilibrium with clubs. I establish the existence of equilibrium for the economy with a finite number of school types. This result is then extended to the case where the set of school types is a continuum. The two welfare theorems are shown to hold for both economies. To compute the equilibrium, I construct a Negishi mapping from the set of weights on individual type's utility to the set of transfers that support the corresponding Pareto allocations as competitive equilibria with transfers. Because this mapping is a correspondence, a version of Scarf's algorithm is used to find a competitive equilibrium. Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: March 13, 2000     

On the effects of group identity in strategic environments

We examine differences in behavior between subjects interacting with a member of either the same or different identity group in both a centipede game and a series of stag hunt games. We find evidence that subjects interacting with outgroup members are more likely to behave as though best-responding to uniform randomization of the partner. We conclude that group identity not only affects player׳s social preferences, as identified in earlier research, but also affects the decision making process, independent of changes in the utility function.     

Peer effects and selection effects on smoking among Canadian youth

Abstract.  A number of studies have indicated that peer smoking is a highly influential factor in a young person's decision to smoke. However, this finding is suspect, because the studies often fail to account for selection and simultaneity bias. This paper develops an econometric model of youth smoking that incorporates both peer effects and selection effects. Identification is achieved by using the degree of selection on observables as a proxy for the degree of selection on unobservables. The results indicate that peers have some influence on a young person's decision to smoke, but that influence is much weaker than is suggested by reduced form models. JEL classification: C35, I12     

The tragedy of the commons revisited: The importance of group decision-making

We use a laboratory experiment to compare the way groups and individuals behave in an inter-temporal common pool dilemma. The experimental design distinguishes between a non-strategic problem where players (individuals or groups of three) make decisions without interaction and a strategic part where players harvest from a common pool. This allows us to correct for differences between individuals and groups in the quality of decisions when testing for differences in competitiveness. Group decisions are either made by majority rule or unanimity. The results show that groups are less myopic than individuals (i.e., they make qualitatively better decisions) but that they are more competitive than individuals when placed in a strategic setting. The net result for groups deciding by majority rule is that they make less efficient decisions in the strategic game than individuals do. We are able to show that this is caused by the median voter departing from her original preference in early periods with a shrinking pool. When groups have to make unanimous decisions they start playing the strategic game more efficiently then individuals do, but they rapidly become more competitive with repetition of the game.     

Social aspirations in European banks: peer-influenced risk behaviour

We test a sample of 3,586 banks from 33 European countries to determine whether performances above or below a social aspiration level (median performance of peer banks) influence banks’ aggregate risk levels. Our results are consistent with the behavioural theory of the firm and prospect theory in that we find that bank performance below a bank’s social aspiration level is followed by increased aggregate risk, i.e. risk-taking behaviour in the subsequent year. Although under-performing banks tend to be risk-takers, large banks and banks with high aggregate risk levels tend to limit the increase in their aggregate risk levels.     

Peer effects in computer assisted learning: evidence from a randomized experiment

We conduct a large scale experiment to investigate peer effects in computer assisted learning (CAL). Identification relies on three levels of randomization. We find an average 0.17 standard deviation improvement in math scores among primary school students. This average effect is the same for students treated individually or in pairs, implying that peer effects double the learning benefit from a given equipment. Among paired students, poor performers benefit more from CAL when paired with good performers and vice versa. Average performers benefit equally irrespective of who they are paired with. This suggests that the treatment is dominated by knowledge exchange between peers. We also find that CAL treatment reduces the dispersion in math scores and that the beneficial effects of CAL can be strengthened if weak students are systematically paired with strong students.     

The effects of exchange rate risk on economic performance: the Turkish experience

This study examines the effects of real exchange rate risk on the economic performance for an emerging, small open economy: Turkey. When the ratios of the total foreign exchange liabilities of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) to: (1) total reserves; (2) the CBRT's reserves; and (3) the CBRT's total Turkish lira liabilities are taken proxy of exchange rate risk, the empirical evidence suggests that the increase in exchange rate risk causes a depreciation in the real exchange rate, an increase in prices and a decrease in output.     

The effects of regulation on stochastic systematic risk

There is recent evidence that systematic risk measures for most firms are stochastic, and that non-stationarity in systematic risk characteristics for regulated firms is related to the presence of regulation. Prior empirical evidence, which suggests that regulation reduces risk, did not incorporate the stochastic nature of the risk/return relationship. There are also problems with the modeling of regulation in this earlier work, and there is evidence that regulated firms may have recently grown riskier. These issues are addressed here by examining a stochastic model that structurally incorporates regulation. Differences in the risk structure of regulated and unregulated firms are identified. Analytic results, simulation results, and actual empirical estimates provide evidence that regulation reduces, but does not eliminate, stochastic systematic risk. The actual empirical results suggest that regulators do reduce stochastic systematic risk, which should lead to lower required rates of return for utilities.     

The effects of parent company business on occupational credit union behaviour

The allocation of British bilateral foreign aid among developing countries is simultaneously modelled, focusing on allocations during the period 1980–87. Two aid allocation decisions are analysed using a variant of the Lee-Maddala econometric model. The first decision concerns the determination of developing country eligibility for aid, while the second concerns the amount of aid eligible countries are allocated. Given the implied two-part decision-making process, sample selection techniques are employed. It is hypothesized that British bilateral aid eligibility and amount decisions are based on Bristain's humanitarian, commercial and political interests in developing countries. Results obtained indicate that these decisions are generally consistent with each of these interests, especially those relating to the political importance of Commonwealth members.     

Growth and risk at the industry level: The real effects of financial liberalization

This paper analyzes the effects of financial liberalization on growth and volatility at the industry level in a large sample of countries. We estimate the impact of liberalization on production, employment, firm entry, capital accumulation, and productivity. In order to overcome omitted variables concerns, we employ a number of alternative difference-in-differences estimation strategies. We implement a propensity score matching algorithm to find a control group for each liberalizing country. In addition, we exploit variation in industry characteristics to obtain an alternative set of difference-in-differences estimates. Financial liberalization is found to have a positive effect on both growth and volatility of production across industries. The positive growth effect comes from increased entry of firms, higher capital accumulation, and an expansion in total employment. By contrast, we do not detect any effect of financial liberalization on measured productivity. Finally, the growth effects of liberalization appear temporary rather than permanent.     

The importance of worker, firm and match effects in the formation of wages

This paper estimates a Mincerian wage equation with worker, firm, and match specific effects and thereby complements the growing empirical literature started by the seminal paper of Abowd (Econometrica 67:251–333, 1999b). The analysis takes advantage of the extensive Danish IDA data which provides wage information on the entire working population in a 27-year period. We find that the major part of wage dispersion in the Danish labor market can be explained by differences in worker characteristics. However, the relative contributions of the three components vary across subgroups of workers. The match effect constitutes a non-negligible part of the overall wage dispersion. An analysis of inter-industry wage differentials shows that firm characteristics are more important at the industry level than at the worker level. Similarly, we find evidence that high-wage workers tend to sort into high-wage industries to a larger extent than they sort into high-wage firms within industries. The mobility pattern of workers is related to the quality of the firm and the match. Finally, we find that firms’ wage policies differ across subgroups.     

The effects of heterogeneous interaction and risk attitude adaptation on the evolution of cooperation

This paper addresses the evolution of cooperation in a multi-agent system with agents interacting heterogeneously with each other based on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game. The heterogeneity of interaction is defined in two models. First, agents in a network are restricted to interacting with only their neighbors (local interaction). Second, agents are allowed to adopt different IPD strategies against different opponents (discriminative interaction). These two heterogeneous interaction scenarios are different to the classical evolutionary game, in which each agent interacts with every other agent in the population by adopting the same strategy against all opponents. Moreover, agents adapt their risk attitudes while engaging in interactions. Agents with payoffs above (or below) their aspirations will become more risk averse (or risk seeking) in subsequent interactions, wherein risk is defined as the standard deviation of one-move payoffs in the IPD game. In simulation experiments with agents using only own historical payoffs as aspirations (historical comparison), we find that the whole population can achieve a high level of cooperation via the risk attitude adaptation mechanism, in the cases of either local or discriminative interaction models. Meanwhile, when agents use the population’s average payoff as aspirations (social comparison) for adapting risk attitudes, the high level of cooperation can only be sustained in a portion of the population (i.e., partial cooperation). This finding also holds true in both of the heterogeneous scenarios. Considering that payoffs cannot be precisely estimated in a realistic IPD game, simulation experiments are also conducted with a Gaussian disturbance added to the game payoffs. The results reveal that partial cooperation in the population under social comparison is more robust to the variation in payoffs than the global cooperation under historical comparison.     

董事网络下企业同群捐赠行为研究

同群行为是影响企业慈善捐赠的重要因素.基于社会嵌入理论,文章从董事网络嵌入角度研究了企业慈善捐赠的同群效应.研究发现:(1)当企业嵌入董事网络时,联结企业之间的慈善捐赠行为存在显著的同群效应.(2)受同群效应影响的慈善捐赠为管理层攫取私利提供了便利,具体表现为:国有企业管理层享受到更高的非货币性收益,而民营企业管理层获取了更高的货币性收益.(3)受同群效应影响的慈善捐赠并未带来政府补助的增加,但企业绩效却得到显著提升.因此,企业应理性对待董事网络,选择性地学习和模仿联结企业的慈善捐赠经验,以免得不偿失.     

On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.JEL Classification: C91, C92     

Government interventions in banking crises: effects of alternative schemes on bank lending and risk taking

We analyse the effects of policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allow banks to influence the scale of assistance and externalise risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance without reference to new activities, like granting lump sum transfers or establishing bad banks, does not generate adverse incentives, but may have higher fiscal costs.     

企业金融化的同群效应:基于连锁董事网络的研究

近年来,越来越多的实体企业将大量资金投资于金融市场,使得中国实体经济出现了“脱实向虚”的现象.本文以同群效应为研究视角,选取2008-2017年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,从连锁董事网络的角度分析了企业金融化同群效应的存在性、产生机制和经济后果.研究发现,同一董事网络中的企业金融化行为具有显著的同群效应,这种现象主要源于信息传递和资源获取两种途径,且企业董事网络中心度越高、企业董事会成员具备金融背景、上市年限越长、企业的融资约束越弱,同群效应越明显.嵌入董事网络的企业金融化同群效应会导致企业偿债能力下降、主业投资不足的经济后果.本文以连锁董事网络同群效应为新视角,拓展了企业金融化研究范围,同时也为政府、企业和管理者在降低金融化同群效应带来的负面影响方面提供了对策建议.