Putting a price tag on others’ perceptions of us

Standard economic theories assume that people are self-interested and their wellbeing solely dependent on their own material gains or losses. Unless they have an impact on monetary payoffs, the perceptions of anonymous individuals are irrelevant to people’s decision making. However, a large body of research in sociology and social psychology demonstrates that self-identity is developed through one’s understanding of how one is perceived by others. Using (Cooley’s, Human nature and the social order, 1964) concept of the “looking-glass self” as a framework, we evaluate experimentally whether or not people care about the imputed judgment of anonymous others arising from their imagination of their perceptions. We implemented variants of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism to elicit the monetary value attached to the perceptions by participants. In one variant, only nonnegative bids were allowed, while in another, negative bids were allowed. We show that in an environment in which the perceptions of others are only conveyed to participants anonymously and privately, self-interested individuals exhibited strong negative perception avoidance even though the perceptions have no impact on their monetary payoff. The participants were willing to spend a significant amount in order to avoid confirming the supposedly negative perception. Thus, for them, ignorance was truly bliss. We also show that, in the absence of the audience effect, the fair-minded participants adopted a neutral attitude towards the perception of them as fair.     

On the optimal social contract: Agency costs of self-government

In a typical study of political economy, citizens are regarded as the principals, and government as the agent. In contrast, classical theorists of democracy such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and James Madison were deeply interested in the dual nature of people; they are the principals (citizens sharing the sovereign power) and, at the same time, the agents (subjects under the laws). Government, in their framework, is an intermediate body which helps people solve their self-control problem. Equipped with tools of modern economics, this paper explores the classical problem to see how economic development and political institutionalization relate to the structure of government and the quality of public sector. In particular, I consider repeated games with a large population and incomplete information, in which players decide whether to sacrifice private consumption to provide public goods. Because both people and the executive of the public projects are subject to moral hazard, the people spend resources to monitor the executive and the people themselves. The optimal self-enforcing contract, which can be interpreted as an efficiency upper bound of political systems, is characterized. An analysis of the contract shows that as a country gets more economically developed and politically institutionalized, the agency problem on the people’s side becomes negligible and that poor economic performance of a country might prevent the citizens from establishing a more efficient public sector.     

Peer effects on risk behaviour: the importance of group identity

This paper investigates whether and to what extent group identity plays a role in peer effects on risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which different levels of group identity are induced through different matching protocols (random or based on individual painting preferences) and the possibility to interact with group members via an online chat in a group task. Risk behaviour is measured by using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task and peer influence is introduced by giving subjects feedback regarding group members’ previous decisions. We find that subjects are affected by their peers when taking decisions and that group identity influences the magnitude of peer effects: painting preferences matching significantly reduces the heterogeneity in risk behaviour compared with random matching. On the other hand, introducing a group task has no significant effect on behaviour, possibly because interaction does not always contribute to enhancing group identity. Finally, relative riskiness within the group matters and individuals whose peers are riskier than they are take on average riskier decisions, even when controlling for regression to the mean.     

Relative standing and temporary migration: Empirical evidence from the South Caucasus

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between households’ relative deprivation and the intentions of their members to temporarily migrate abroad in three transition economies of the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. To capture respondents’ relative deprivation, we use self‐reported information on respondents’ perception of the relative standing of their household in comparison to those of their neighbors. Controlling for households’ absolute income and other relevant subjective dimensions, we illustrate that households’ relative position vis‐à‐vis their reference groups plays an important role in determining the intentions of their members to migrate abroad. In particular, individuals are more willing to engage in temporary emigration if they perceive themselves to be poorer than the reference group. Our results may have important policy implications. A conjectural suggestion of our empirical exercise is that if migration has to be curbed, reducing absolute poverty alone may not be sufficient. In addition, policy‐makers may need to decrease relative income differentials within the country.     

Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived target of threat

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the perceived target of threat—groups or individuals—and the symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one׳s own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The perceived target of threat dramatically alters decisions to participate in conflict. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive—reciprocity—is ruled out by the data.     

Perceived trade-off between education and sports career: evidence from professional football

To explore the attitudes towards risky career choices of young people in highly competitive environments, we surveyed almost 1000 football players in the youth academies of German professional clubs (Bundesliga), who must generally decide early in their careers whether or not to risk quitting school to focus solely on a professional football career. Based on the survey responses, we empirically analysed which factors influence these youths’ tendencies to choose a high-risk career option over a lower risk one. Our results seem to indicate that such risk taking in competitive environments can be explained by potential benefits expected from this decision, as well as judgments about the likelihood of achieving the desired career. Risk attitudes towards career choices vary by differences in individuals’ estimates of the potential benefits and in particular, in their own assessments of the likelihood of success, which is an important driver of risk acceptance. We also found that opportunity cost considerations influence risk acceptance: the better the low-risk option, the less willing the individual to give it up for a high-risk alternative. In addition, both national origin and level of cultural integration play a role in attitudes towards risky career choices, with reductions in the latter increasing the risk premium of quitting school.     

Choices of organizational structures in religious organizations: a game theoretic approach

This study has extended the work done by Allen [Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27 (1995) 97] and others who attempted to show a relationship between a denomination’s doctrine and its organizational structure. While Allen’s work resulted in a one-to-one mapping between doctrinal beliefs and organizational structure, this study has argued that there exists a continuum of structures that are consistent with a particular church’s doctrine. The church’s ultimate organizational structure is a game theoretic outcome resulting when churches attempt to maximize membership subject to the constraints imposed by their doctrines. We examine how churches’ organizational structures depend on the extent to which members are willing to sacrifice their structural preferences to hold on to their doctrines. Consistent with Allen’s outcome, our result indicates the further apart are the doctrines held by two churches, the greater the variation in their structural organization. This paper also examines the relationship between churches’ organizational structures and the degree of the majority church’s majority.     

Do China's people favour redistribution? Evidence from an incentivized experiment

From 1949, China's leaders brought their country through three decades of income and wealth compression, which was followed by more than three decades of sharply rising inequality. What preferences do China's people hold regarding what price (if any) is worth paying for greater equality? We conduct a laboratory decision‐making experiment mimicking aspects of a macro‐political–economic environment, using Chinese undergraduate student subjects. We find that our subjects have qualitatively similar tastes for equality as their counterparts in parallel US and European experiments; for example, most are willing to sacrifice some payment for more equality of earnings among other participants, and their willingness to do this is stronger when inequalities originate randomly versus based on performance. Considering the cases permitting direct comparison between Chinese and US subjects’ choices, redistributive choices tend to be a bit higher in China if the participant pays no direct cost and a bit lower if he or she pays such a cost, but the two distributions of decisions differ significantly in under 14% of conditions. Survey data too suggests preferences for a more equal income distribution in China than in other East Asian countries, suggesting a possible impact of the Chinese Communist Party dominance in education and media.     

殉教市场

虽然在所有的宗教传统中都存在着极端的自我牺牲现象，但要对它加以解释却并非易事。我们想当然地认为大多数自寻痛苦和自寻死路的人是精神不正常的。但某些研究驳斥了下面这种貌似明白无误的结论，即宗教中的自我牺牲也是由沮丧、痴迷或其他非理性所致。旨在伤害的牺牲可视为一种市场现象，是自愿牺牲的数目较少的人力供给和那些从牺牲行为中获益的数量较大的“需求者”之间的交换行为。与流行的看法相反，“殉教”市场不繁荣不是因为需求受限，而是因为供给受限。在招募、训练并指导潜在的殉教者方面训练有素的那些人，几乎从未从自杀式袭击中获益。但殉教市场一旦建立，就很难关闭。对供给的遏制很难奏效，抑制需求的效果会更长久。     

农户有机生产行为意向影响因素与调控措施研究述评

农户是否愿意从事有机生产是有机农业发展的规模与速度的关键。鉴于人们对有机农业的日益关注,基于计划行为理论,对农户有机生产行为意向的影响因素和调控措施研究的相关文献进行了述评。研究表明,知觉行为控制和行为态度是农户有机生产行为意向的主要直接影响因素,其次是主观规范。重要的间接因素有有机产品价格、生产成本、产量、转换期的损失、农户风险厌恶程度、邻居和政府的行为、农户对风险的感知以及家庭资源。公共部门调控措施可以增强农户的有机生产行为意向,其中最重要的调控措施是财政支付。最后,讨论了今后研究的趋势。     

Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?

This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum game played by individuals with the same game played by three-person groups. In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group conducted a brief, face-to-face discussion in order to decide, as a group, on a proposed division, whereas the members of recipient group held a discussion on whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal was accepted, each group member received an equal share of his group's payoff (the pie in the group condition was three times that in the individual condition). In both experiments, groups offered less than individuals. But as indicated by the low rejection rate in both treatments, groups were also willing to accept less.     

保障性住房、社会身份与公平感——来自社区实地实验的证据

2020年中央经济工作会议指出要重视保障性租赁住房建设,同时明确提出要逐步使租购住房在享受公共服务上具有同等权利。长期租购权利的不平等容易使得人们在心理认知上给予租房与购房不同的价值权重,这种认知上的差异进一步造成了租、购两类住户社会身份上的差异。因此,探究租购身份差异是否会影响人们日常交往时的公平感,对于改善人民居住条件,避免租购不同群体之间的社会分割,促进全体人民共同富裕有重要意义。为控制其他因素的干扰,我们运用实地实验方法,以同一社区的经济适用房住户和公租房住户为实验对象,以是否公开租购身份信息为干预手段,将租购身份外生地引入最后通牒博弈中,从自我认知和对他人的认知两个角度考察租购身份是否会影响租、购住户之间的公平分配行为。结果显示,公开租购身份会唤醒租房者的自我认知,长期的租购权利不平等使得租房者渴望更公平的资源分配。同时,公开租购身份也会改变人们对他人的认知,相比于面对购房者,人们在面对租房者时会提出更加公平的分配方案。     

Trust and reciprocity in inter-individual versus inter-group interactions: The effects of social influence, group dynamics, and perspective biases

Using an experimental trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group representatives and consensus groups differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, this research concerns whether norms and dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1) autonomous group representatives, i.e., individuals who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making a decision on behalf of a three-person group engaging with a group representative of another such group; and 2) consensus groups, i.e., group members making a consensus trust or reciprocity decision for their groups via a collective process with another such group. Results of these studies show that 1) people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision as autonomous group representatives; 2) consensus groups do not differ from individuals in their level of trust but show dramatically less reciprocity. The group consensus mechanism in fact produced by far the lowest reciprocity level, significantly lower than that exhibited by either individuals or autonomous group representatives. Thus, inter-group trust and reciprocity dynamics are not readily inferable from their inter-individual counterparts. Moreover, an important implication is emerging here: the extent and direction of the discrepancy between individual and group choices in regard to trust and reciprocity levels and possibly other social preferences in general may depend importantly on the precise details of the group decision-making mechanism, for example whether decisions are made consensually, by majority vote, or by a group leader or representative. In addition to examining the level of trust and reciprocity that occur in these various situations, I also studied, using both behavioral and questionnaire data, the roles of self-interest, social influence, and group dynamics in trust and reciprocity perceptions and behavior. The results showed that there exist discrepancies between behavioral forecasts and the actual behavior, and that trusting behavior is driven strongly by expectation of level of reciprocation, while reciprocating behavior is driven strongly by the difference between trust expectation and actual trust received.     

Public perceptions of nursing careers: the influence of the media and nursing shortages

The high public regard for nurses has not necessarily translated into an adequate supply of individuals who are willing to be nurses. The expected future demand for nurse labor challenges us to look more closely at the public's perceptions of nursing and nursing careers, and consider how they are shaped by personal experience, media messages, and socio-demographic factors. As part of ongoing efforts to examine factors shaping the future of the nursing workforce, a national survey of Americans was conducted to probe attitudes toward the nursing profession and their experiences with nurses. The data in this national survey of the public about nursing demonstrate that the nursing profession is highly respected and that the vast majority of the general public would recommend nursing careers to qualified students. If the profession is so well thought of and so highly recommended, why are there persistent concerns that not enough people are becoming RNs to avoid or at least slow down the development of future shortages? A prolonged and persistent effort is needed to educate people about nursing careers, to stimulate the expanded production of nursing faculty, and to bring creative approaches to financing nursing education and workforce improvements to convert the large number of seriously interested candidates into the nursing profession.     

Fiscal implications of AIDS in South Africa

The number of people living with HIV is alarmingly large. In addition to the incomprehensible human suffering of those directly affected, AIDS also has large, negative economic effects. In this paper, I study the fiscal implications of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa in a standard neo-classical growth model. I find that an antiretroviral program is to a large extent self financing. Improvement in dependency ratios and health care cost savings would pay for Rand 144 billion of a full epidemiological intervention. The indirect effect through the changing demographic structure will be more important than the direct health care cost saving effect. I also explore different taxation policies. The households would be willing to sacrifice an amount equal to 12% of GDP in the first period to be subject to an optimal (Ramsey) fiscal policy rather than an alternative fixed debt to GDP policy. The optimal policy implies an increase in government debt during the peak of the epidemic.     

Managerial perceptions of employees’ affective commitment and product innovation

In this paper we examine how managers perceive employees’ affective commitment and how this perception determines their trust as a managerial attitude toward organizational learning capability (OLC). Likewise, we study how managerial trust affects product innovation and OLC. In other words, we carry out a double mediation: firstly, we examine whether managerial trust is a mechanism through which managerial perceptions of employees’ affective commitment influences on OLC, and secondly, we study if OLC mediates between managerial trust and product innovation. By using structural equation modeling (partial least squares) on a sample of 192 Spanish firms we conclude that: (1) if managers perceive employees to be affectively committed, they will be willing to enhance OLC and to trust them; (2) managerial trust favors OLC and product innovation and (3) OLC appears to exert a full mediation between managerial trust and product innovation.     

Choosing the Joneses: Endogenous Goals and Reference Standards

A growing economic literature stresses the importance of relative comparisons, e.g., for savings and consumption or happiness. In this literature it is usually assumed that reference standards against which people compare themselves are exogenously given. In contrast, findings from social psychology suggest that people play an active role in determining their reference standards. We introduce a social comparison model where people choose their reference standards to serve motives of self‐improvement and self‐enhancement. The model predicts that reference standards increase in individuals’ abilities and that people thus tend to compare themselves to similar others. The results of a questionnaire study confirm the prediction of the model.     

An economic theory of altruism based on rankings in a stable social hierarchy

In order to fully understand the interaction between selfish and non-selfish actors, social scientists need rigorous formal models of other-regarding preferences. While the current models clearly present progress relative to the self-interest approach, the evidence also makes it clear that further theoretical progress is warranted. There is ample opportunity for improving our understanding of other-regarding behavior. This paper develops a theory of economic altruism entirely compatible with self-interest utility maximization by rational individuals. Sympathy arises when someone is interested in improving somebody else’s condition, and this will also enhance the utility of the one who acts. Construed in that way, sympathetic behavior is essentially self-interested behavior. A question addressed in this paper is whether a sympathetic population of individuals will exert their income-producing labor differently than a population of egoistic individuals. Two parameters suffice to characterize the altruistic conduct of an individual: a parameter governing the individual’s ranking in a social hierarchy and a parameter determining the sensitivity of an individual’s sympathy for others at different social ranks. The main testable implication of the theory is that in a large population, where each individual has a concave utility function embodying sympathy, the altruistic behavior of any specific individual is determined by his rank in the social hierarchy. A second implication is that in a horizontal social hierarchy, the most altruistic people in the population are those in the middle of it.     

Religiosity and social trust: evidence from Canada

Using the latest wave of the Canadian Ethnic Diversity Survey, I investigate whether religious identity and religious intensity associate with the degree to which people trust others, controlling for a wide range of characteristics. The analysis shows that Canadian Roman Catholics are appreciably less trusting than mainline Protestants, and religious nones are situated in between these two groups. With regard to religious intensity, I find that higher commitment negatively correlates with trust in unknown others for Roman Catholics. The reverse is true for Protestants. Results also show stark cross-denominational variations within Protestantism, as two highly committed denominations of Mennonite and Pentecostal are found to be the most and the least trusting religious groups in Canada. No non-Christian religious minority is found statistically significantly less trusting than Canadian Roman Catholics. Considering particularized trust in one’s neighbours and co-workers yields comparable conclusions.     

Religion,discrimination and trust across three cultures

We propose that religion impacts trust and trustworthiness in ways that depend on how individuals are socially identified and connected. Religiosity and religious affiliation may serve as markers for statistical discrimination. Further, affiliation to the same religion may enhance group identity, or affiliation irrespective of creed may lend social identity, and in turn induce taste-based discrimination. Religiosity may also relate to general prejudice. We test these hypotheses across three culturally diverse countries. Participants׳ willingness to discriminate, beliefs of how trustworthy or trusting others are, as well as actual trust and trustworthiness are measured incentive compatibly. We find that interpersonal similarity in religiosity and affiliation promote trust through beliefs of reciprocity. Religious participants also believe that those belonging to some faith are trustworthier, but invest more trust only in those of the same religion—religiosity amplifies this effect. Across non-religious categories, whereas more religious participants are more willing to discriminate, less religious participants are as likely to display group biases.