Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts

We establish that non‐linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a three‐part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.     

Buying power and strategic interactions

Abstract.  This paper shows that buying power at the retail level can lead to a rise in wholesale price. As a result, retailers without buying power may increase their retail price. Nevertheless, total surplus is non‐decreasing in the degree of buying power possessed by the 'dominant' retailer. JEL classification: L13     

The NOME law: implications for the French electricity market

In December 2010, France approved the law “Nouvelle Organisation du Marché de l’Electricité” (or NOME law) to promote competition in the retail electricity market. In practice, the law allows retailers to buy nuclear production from the incumbent, at a regulated access price. This mechanism works up to a ceiling of 100 terawatt hours, which represents one quarter of the incumbent’s production from nuclear plants. Each retailer is assigned a share of that amount proportionally to its portfolio of clients. We contribute to the debate raised by the NOME law regarding the evolution of retail market prices. We show that a price decrease results if the ceiling is sufficiently high compared to the market share of the retailers competing with the incumbent. This pro-competitive effect is stronger when the incumbent’s rivals take into account the impact of their market strategy on the redistribution rule. Finally, we find that, if the regulated price of the NOME electricity is set above the nuclear cost, the incumbent realizes a gain that may result in strategic withholding, weakening the pro-competitive effects of the law.     

Retailer power: recent developments and policy implications

It is common, but incorrect, to view retailing as a highly competitive activity. Unlike manufacturing, retailing has displayed a trend towards much higher concentration, reinforced by actions of retailers themselves, such as emphasis on own-label brands. This may introduce distortions arising from exercise of market power or may create countervailing power to that already enjoyed by manufacturers. Acknowledging increased market power within retailing raises new issues for competition authorities. We develop a consistent framework of analysis and use it to examine two issues: attitudes to retail mergers and exclusivity arrangements between retailers and their suppliers.     

The CMA’s assessment of customer detriment in the UK retail energy market

Journal of Regulatory Economics - In 2016, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) found that “weak customer response” enabled incumbent UK energy retailers to set higher and...     

Regulation under Financial Constraints

Abstract This article studies a simple procurement problem (Laffont and Tirole,1993) where the regulator faces a cash‐in‐advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the instruments available to the regulator. The wealth constraint could change the optimal regulatory contract from a two‐part tariff, where the quantities produced depend on the firm's cost, to a less efficient fixed fee where the firm produces the same quantity whatever its cost .     

Multidivisional firms, internal competition, and the merger paradox

Abstract.  Traditional modelling of mergers has the merged firms (insiders) cooperate and maximize joint profits. This approach has several unappealing results in quantity‐setting games, for example, mergers typically are not profitable for insiders, but are profitable for non‐merging firms (outsiders). We take a different approach and allow for a parent company that can play each insider off one another. In quantity‐setting games, with our approach mergers are profitable for insiders, unprofitable for outsiders, socially beneficial, and involve (in a non‐monopolizing merger) a small number of firms. Finally, we find that the optimal strategy depends on whether firms compete in quantity or prices. JEL classification: L000     

Trade, market size, and industrial structure: revisiting the home‐market effect

Abstract.  This paper shows that the issues in the recent discussion over the 'home‐market effects' are more complicated than previously thought. It is shown that, in general, market size matters for industrial structure even when both the homogeneous and the differentiated goods face transport costs. The home‐market effect for production structure can arise, disappear, or even reverse in sign. The analysis shall change a common perception about de‐industrialization of (small) economies and may also have important implications for the empirical research strategies in this area. JEL classification: F12, L1     

When does tiered wholesale pricing create an incentive to reduce retail prices?

Wholesale ‘ladder pricing’ involves setting the wholesale price retailers face as a nonlinear (generally increasing) function of price chosen by retailers. This form of wholesale pricing occurred recently in UK Telecoms, and the issue became extensively debated in the law courts. A major concern in deciding the merits of the case lay with the question of whether or not the introduction of tiered wholesale pricing created incentives for retailers to actually reduce their prices. This paper examines the incentive for the case where the wholesale tariff is a non-linear continuous differentiable function. It is shown that so long as the tariff is strictly increasing, convex, and positive only for retail prices greater than the maximum retailer marginal cost, then there is indeed an incentive to reduce price, whatever the actual gradient of the tariff schedule.     

Product differentiation, cost‐reducing mergers, and consumer welfare

Abstract.  Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two‐firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost‐reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post‐merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre‐merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two‐firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings. JEL classification: L10, L41     

Interconnected communications networks and home market effects

Abstract.  This study develops a model of trade that highlights the effects of the interconnection of country‐specific communications networks as a driving force behind trade in high‐tech products with positive transport costs. By constructing a two‐country model of monopolistic competition with two production factors, it is shown that the locational decisions of firms may magnify the influence of interconnected networks. In a reversal of the standard home market effects, the abundance of unskilled labour in the developing countries can attract high‐tech firms from the developed countries. JEL classification: D43, F12, L13     

Patents and R&D as Real Options

This article develops and implements a simulation approach to value patents and patent‐protected R&D projects based on the Real Options approach. It takes into account uncertainty in the cost‐to‐completion of the project, uncertainty in the cash flows to be generated from the project, and the possibility of catastrophic events that could put an end to the effort before it is completed. It also allows for the possibility of abandoning the project when costs turn out to be larger than expected or when estimated cash flows turn out to be smaller than anticipated. This abandonment option represents a very substantial part of the project's value when the project is marginal or/and when uncertainty is large. The model presented can be used to evaluate the effects of regulation on the cost of innovation and the amount on innovative output. The main focus of the article is the pharmaceutical industry. The framework, however, applies just as well to other research‐intensive industries such as software or hardware development.
(J.E.L.:G31, O22, O32).     

Indirect Employment Effects of Foreign Direct Investment into the UK

This paper examines some of the employment consequences, broadly defined, associated with foreign inward investment. A foreign firm entering an industry in the UK will have a degree of firm‐specific advantage over the incumbent firms. This advantage is assumed to manifest itself in terms of a productivity differential over the domestic sector. As such, foreign entry will create factor market disequilibrium in the domestic sector. It is shown that such investment generates 'employment substitution' away from UK firms, equivalent to approximately one–fifth of all the jobs created by inward investment.     

Can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the ‘protection for sale’ model?

Abstract.  In the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of endogenous trade protection, sectoral lobbies try to influence an incumbent government that maximizes a weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate welfare. We empirically investigate this model using U.S. and Turkish data. Our specification is more tightly tied to theory than those in existing studies. Additionally, we assume all specific‐factor owners to be organized into different lobbies. These changes, validated by hypothesis tests, yield more realistic parameter estimates of the government's concern for aggregate welfare and of the fraction of population organized into lobbies.     

Privatizing Monopolies in Developing Countries: The Real Effects of Exclusivity Periods in Telecommunications

Many developing countries have given newly privatized incumbent network utilities, especially telecommunications, exclusive rights to serve particular markets. Research to date has explored privatization, competition, and to a lesser extent, regulation. We know little, however, about the effects of the privatization transactions themselves and, in particular, how these exclusivity periods matter. I use original data to investigate this approach to privatization. I find that exclusivity periods are associated with significant increases in the firms sale price. Exclusivity periods are also, however, correlated with a significant decrease in the incumbents investment in the telecommunications network, payphones, mobile telephone penetration, and international calling.JEL Classification: L1, L5, L96, O12I am grateful for the thoughtful comments and suggestions of Luke Haggarty, Tom Hazlett, Phil Keefer, Roger Noll, Russ Pittman, Greg Rosston, David Sappington, Mary Shirley, Lixin Colin Xu, and two anonymous referees. I thank Troy Kravitz for research assistance. I am solely responsible for all mistakes.     

Imperfect price discrimination, market structure, and efficiency

Abstract.  We introduce a flexible third‐degree price discrimination framework by modeling the information firms possess about consumers' locations (preferences) on the Salop circle as a partition. Higher information quality is translated into a partition refinement. In the limit, we obtain the perfect price discrimination paradigm. We show that the free‐entry equilibrium number of firms exhibits a U‐shape as a function of the quality of information. This implies that imperfect price discrimination generates the most efficient free‐entry outcome. JEL classification: D43, L11, L43     

Tariff‐jumping FDI and domestic firms' profits

Abstract.  Studies of trade policy welfare effects often ignore the potential for tariff‐jumping foreign direct investment (FDI) to mitigate positive gains to domestic producers. Using event study methodology we find that affirmative U.S. antidumping decisions are associated with average abnormal gains of over 3% to a firm in the petitioning industry in the absence of tariff‐jumping FDI, but much smaller and statistically insignificant abnormal gains if there is tariff‐jumping FDI. We also find evidence that tariff jumping in the form of new plants or plant expansion has significantly larger negative effects on U.S. domestic firms' profits than other types of tariff‐jumping FDI. JEL Classification: F13, F23, L11     

Entry Deterrence in a Unionized Oligopoly

We investigate wage determination between an incumbent firm and its labour union under threat from another firm entering its product market. In equilibrium, it may be optimal for a labour union of the incumbent firm to lower its wage demand. This may make it possible for the incumbent firm to maintain a higher employment level, in that the lower wages can help the firm deter the entry of a rival firm. This will yield a higher profit for the incumbent firm and a lower utility level for the labour union compared with those in an equilibrium with no threat of entry.
JEL Classification Numbers: J51, L10     

Incomplete Information, Trading Costs and Cross‐autocorrelations in Stock Returns

This paper provides an economic rationale for the cross‐autocorrelation patterns in stock returns in the context of a microstructure model in which investors have incomplete information. The paper shows that in a market in which investors are informed about only a sub‐set of stocks, the emergence of lead‐lag, cross‐autocorrelations is a function of the cost of trading in other stocks based on information about the sub‐set of stocks. If cross‐trading costs are high, informed investors will trade only in the sub‐set of stocks they are informed about; if cross‐trading costs are moderate, informed investors will randomize between trading and not trading in other stocks; and if cross‐trading costs are low, they will trade in all stocks. When informed investors trade only in a sub‐set of stocks, prices of stocks with more informed trading will adjust to common factor information faster than the prices of stocks with less informed trading giving rise to asymmetric lead‐lag cross‐autocorrelations. When informed investors trade in all stocks, asymmetric lead‐lag cross‐autocorrelations will disappear as a result of their cross‐market arbitrage trading. These results provide a number of testable implications for lead‐lag cross‐autocorrelation patterns. The data is consistent with the empirical predictions .
(J.E.L.G12, G14).