On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers

This paper provides a tightly written overview and modest extension of the constitutional exchange and evolution model developed in Perfecting Parliament and uses that approach to analyze the division of authority that one would expect to see in contemporary constitutional governments. The analysis suggests that constitutions tend to be written, based on the king and council template, and buttressed by a more or less independent court system. Moreover, it suggests that constitutions change at the margin through time as constitutional bargaining takes place. This suggests that a complete separation of power is unlikely to be observed in the long run. Empirical evidence developed from the IAEP data base is consistent with these predictions.     

Anti-competitive agreements in Russian courts (2008–2012): antitrust law implementation and interpretation

This article analyses antitrust enforcement practice in Russian courts in the area of competition-restricting agreements. The analysis is based on the court decision database of litigations with the Russian competition authority (the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS)). In the database litigations that officially started in the period 2008–2012 were included. Final court decisions were evaluated, taking into account litigation duration (sometimes up to 3 years). The database contains 400 cases, including 236 horizontal agreements and 164 other agreements (mostly vertical agreements). Based on the evidence of this database, important features and problems of the interpretation and implementation of competition law in Russia and priority areas of enforcement were identified. Antitrust policy was analysed taking into account the risks of type 1 and type 2 errors, including the problem of flexibility of prohibitions (per se vs Rule of reason (ROR) approaches), standards of proof and the problem of consistency of enforcement.     

Asymmetric information, optimal money growth targets, and fed secrecy in a monetary policy game

This paper analyzes the impact on inflation of requiring the monetary authority to announce money supply targets and punishing it for deviations from same. Two regimes are considered. In one, called the ex ante regime, the target is announced prior to the authority's obtaining information concerning relevant economic shocks. In the other, called the ex post regime, the announcement is made after the authority obtains relevant information and thus provides the public with data concerning the authority's private information. It is shown that the ex ante regime may dominate the ex post regime. This follows because an ex post regime may yield a higher mean inflation rate as the monetary authority attempts to exploit the relationship between its announcement and expected inflation.     

Networks, Knowledge and Power: Decision Making, Politics and the Process of Innovation

This paper examines the highly political nature of innovation appropriation processes. The central focus is on the role of networks, networking, and knowledge in these processes. The data presented is drawn from two case study companies, both of which were implementing Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems. While formal, hierarchical authority was found to be an important contextual factor, shaping the appropriation processes examined, it was found that such authority was not automatically translatable into actual power. In terms of knowledge and networks, the paper concludes that they were inextricably inter-related, largely because the typically tacit nature of much relevant knowledge required the development of networks to access and utilize it. The paper further concluded that the use of both networks, and knowledge in the innovation appropriation processes examined had a dual character. They could not only provide access to relevant knowledge and artefacts, but could also be used as political tools in support of particular interests.     

论中国律师法庭辩论豁免权——以新《律师法》为视角

律师法庭辩论豁免权是指律师代理刑事、行政和民事案件过程中,在法庭上发表的代理、辩护意见不受法律追究的权利。2008年6月1日起正式实施的《律师法》首次对律师法庭辩论豁免权作出了明确规定。从中国律师法庭豁免权的概念、立法及其内涵入手,继而从法理、法经济学以及比较法的视角论证其理论基础,进而对该权利的适用作出具体分析,并提出相应的完善建议。     

Networks,Knowledge and Power: Decision Making,Politics and the Process of Innovation

This paper examines the highly political nature of innovation appropriation processes. The central focus is on the role of networks, networking, and knowledge in these processes. The data presented is drawn from two case study companies, both of which were implementing Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems. While formal, hierarchical authority was found to be an important contextual factor, shaping the appropriation processes examined, it was found that such authority was not automatically translatable into actual power. In terms of knowledge and networks, the paper concludes that they were inextricably inter-related, largely because the typically tacit nature of much relevant knowledge required the development of networks to access and utilize it. The paper further concluded that the use of both networks, and knowledge in the innovation appropriation processes examined had a dual character. They could not only provide access to relevant knowledge and artefacts, but could also be used as political tools in support of particular interests.     

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes Under Court Errors

This article presents a strategic model of liability and litigationunder court errors. Our framework allows for endogenous choiceof level of care and endogenous likelihood of filing and disputes.We derive sufficient conditions for a unique universally divinemixed-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium under low courterrors. In this equilibrium, some defendants choose to be grosslynegligent; some cases are filed; and some lawsuits are dropped,some are resolved out of court, and some go to trial. We findthat court errors in the size of the award, as well as damagecaps and split awards, reduce the likelihood of trial but increasefiling and reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages.We derive conditions under which the adoption of the Englishrule for allocating legal costs reduces filing.     

THE CHANGING GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE IN AVIONICS

Abstract

Taking in hand the two sides (i.e. cognitive and risk-bearing) of authority in design and production in complex tasks, this paper aims to give a first look at shifts in the locus of authority in the aviation electronics—or avionics—industry. Relying on patent and joint ventures data, we attempt to trace the evolution of problem-solving ‘authority’ over the evolution of the industry, using an empirical approach which can then be used to explore similar trends in other industries. We find that while it is still too early to say whether we are observing a wholesale shift of ‘authority’ from aircraft makers to avionics producers, it is clear that the leading avionics producers are challenging their clients in taking the role of systems integrators. We can speculate that we may be observing the beginning of a ‘market for technology’. At the very least, we are observing an increasing distribution of both problem-solving authority and risk in this industry.     

Horizontal Mergers,Entry and International Trade

We use a two‐country trade model to analyze an authority's decision to approve or reject a merger followed by entry, when the entrant can choose where to locate. We show that approval of a merger in the small country followed by timely, likely and sufficient entry may lead to lower consumer welfare than its rejection: when the alternative to such entry is entry into another country that also benefits consumers through trade, then the gains of attracting entry are small. In this context, we discuss differences between optimal decisions by the small country's authority, large country's authority and supranational authority.     

Human Fallibility, Complementarity, and Fiscal Decentralization

This paper examines economic growth properties under alternative fiscal organizations when a bureau's decisions are fallible. A country consists of J jurisdictions, which need a public service. In a centralized government, one authority decides on services in every jurisdiction. In a decentralized government, J authorities are in charge of each public service. An authority can have high ability or low ability, and an authority with high ability draws a good project with higher probability. We first show that the decentralized government provides the same average quality of public services, with lower variance, than does the centralized government. We then apply this result to an economic growth model where the value of the Solow residual is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of public services. We show that there is a critical value of the degree of complementarity below which fiscal decentralization is more desirable than fiscal centralization for an expected economic growth, and the decentralized government has a lower variance of GDP growth.     

Unconventional monetary policy,liquidity trap,and asset prices

This article offers a fundamental critique of monetary policy implemented in the United States following the 2007–8 global financial crisis. It aims to show that the misunderstanding of the mainstream theoretical thinking underlying monetary policy actions led to the ineffectiveness of the policy response to the 2007–8 global financial crisis. The conventional view that monetary policy is the stabilization tool has serious flaws and is ineffective for bringing about economic recovery. The Federal Reserve’s experiment with the so-called unconventional monetary policy exposed the weakness of the conventional belief in understanding how banks operate, how the monetary authority can influence the yield curve, and how the monetary transmission mechanism works, resulting in prescribing an ineffective treatment to boost economic activity. In this regard, it is argued that the Federal Reserve’s decision to let long-term interest rates be market determined represents a significant self-imposed constraint, which limits policy options regarding monetary policy actions and the effective control of long-term interest rates. By limiting the setting of policy rates only to the overnight interest rate, the ability of the monetary authority to influence long-term interest rates is both weak and indirect.     

权威分配和信息传递

在成员间有利益冲突的情况下,授权是激励组织中成员释放其私人信息的一个重要方式.该文考察了在对多人授权时,权威分配的方式对于信息释放的影响.该文考虑了两种分配方案的影响.其一是所有的成员在形式上有同等的权威(委员会);其二是,某一个成员有全部的决策权威(科层制).委员会的决策规则虽然在形式上是平等的,但在实质上却可能偏向于某个成员.科层制则在形式上就完全偏向于它的领导.该文表明,权威的集中分配放大了利益冲突的影响.并且,权威分配的形式上的偏向有支配性的作用:它压倒了利益冲突以及实质偏向的影响.     

From Sovereignty to Imperium: Borders,Frontiers and the Specter of Neo-Imperialism

Borders are changing in myriad and multifaceted ways. After 9/11, states redoubled efforts at shoring up their perimeters and building walls. But borders are not merely increasingly securitized, they are also becoming thicker and bi-national. This new ‘zonal’ border emerging worldwide radically shifts the debate about borders and sovereignty. If sovereignty is indivisible, unitary and final, how can it be shared between states at their mutual perimeters? Is this really evidence of sovereignty waning? In this article, I suggest we are stuck at this conceptual impasse because of two conflations. The first one involves two aspects of sovereignty: authority and control. Looking at borders as thin jurisdictional lines, we observe only their legal authority (de jure); instead, by examining changing modes of control, we can see how new securitized borders actually reinforce state strength. The second conflation revolves around the conceptual linking of borders, states and sovereignty. This article argues that as borders thicken, they start to resemble frontiers, and sovereignty starts to resemble imperium – a Roman designation for political authority that is territorially unbounded. This disrupts the border/state dyad and situates borders (lines) and frontiers (zones) on a continuum. In doing so, it reveals how sovereignty is not waning, but changing shape – a worrisome geopolitical conclusion given the possibilities of neo-Imperialism due to power asymmetries between neighbouring states.     

Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence—the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

It is argued that government credibility is an important resource and that it can be improved by delegating decision-making competence beyond the nation-state. It is hypothesized that such delegation should result in higher income and growth. Some former British colonies retained the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as their final court of appeals even after independence. This court is thus taken as a natural experiment to test our hypothesis. It turns out that retaining the jurisdiction is indeed significant for explaining economic growth.     

二代继任方式、家族权威与家族企业创新投入

代际传承背景下家族企业创新投入是家族企业治理研究领域的重要问题。分析和检验了差异化二代继任方式如何影响家族企业创新投资水平,以及二者关系是否会依赖于家族权威差异而发生变化。研究结果发现：与渐进型二代继任相比,激进型二代继任会削减家族企业创新投入;二代继任方式与家族企业创新投入关系受到家族权威的影响。在家族成员权威和非家族创业元老权威较重的企业,激进型继任者对家族企业创新投入的削弱效应更显著。进一步研究发现,二代继任3年后,激进型继任者对家族企业创新投入的负面影响显著下降,且其削弱效应在规模较大企业以及创立时间较长的企业中更显著。     

National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause

We develop a game in which a court monitors states as they regulatetrade among themselves. Contrary to commentators who see SupremeCourt oversight of state burdens on interstate commerce as theproduct of a powerfully ascendant court, we argue that the "dormantCommerce Clause" (DCC) originates as the strategic product ofan institutionally weak court. We provide three lines of argument.First, we refute the notion that merely observing the courtruling against state governments and those governments complyingwith its ruling is evidence of judicial power. Second, we showthat the equilibria of our "weak court" model directly impliesthe doctrinal contours of the DCC while the ascendancy hypothesisdoes not. Finally, we provide evidence that the court announceda weaker version of the DCC doctrine than sincerely preferredby pivotal justices on the court. Our arguments invite a revisedunderstanding of the role of the court in the development ofthe American political system.     

Producer and Consumer Interests, the State-Owned Pipeline, and Public Authority Pricing of Natural Gas*

This paper considers producer and consumer interests when state ownership of a pipeline provides a public authority with monopoly and monopsony power. In contrast with the producer/consumer conflict in the regulatory setting where self-interested authorities choose the price at which producers and consumers directly transact with one another, in the pipeline case producers and consumers have a commonality of interest which is sustained even if the authorities take the view that it is politically inexpedient to take advantage of monopoly power with respect to consumers.     

The limits to designed orders: Authority under “distributed knowledge” conditions

We examine the argument, put forward by modern management writers and, in a somewhat different guise by Austrian economists, that authority is not a viable mechanism of coordination in the presence of “distributed knowledge” We define authority and distributed knowledge and argue that authority is compatible with distributed knowledge. Moreover, it is not clear on theoretical grounds how distributed knowledge impacts on economic organization. An implication is that the Austrian argument that designed orders are strongly constrained by the Hayekian dispersed knowledge (Hayek, Kirzner, Sautet) is less decisive than it has usually been taken to be. The positive flipside of this argument is that Austrians confront an exciting research agenda in theorizing how distributed knowledge impacts economic organization. JEL Codes B53, L20     

依法执政条件下关于领导权威的思考

在依法执政的前提下,各级党的领导仍然要树立领导权威,将客观的＂法＂与主观的＂权威＂有机结合。在运用领导权威时,要以法律和制度为基础,坚持依法治国和以德治国相结合,坚持职务权威和信任权威的统一。     

基于信息交流技术的组织权威演化机制

沿袭巴纳德组织理论关于信息交流技术对组织权威影响的思路，对组织权威的本质进行了讨论，在此基础上，进一步讨论了信息交流技术对组织权威演化进程的影响。