Is Innovativeness a Link between Pay and Performance?

The relationship between innovativeness and pay-performance sensitivity is theoretically ambiguous because innovative activities simultaneously enhance the productivity of executives in creating shareholder value (productivity effect) and increase the volatility of the firm's performance (volatility effect). The empirical findings from the pooled sample suggest that innovativeness and executive pay-performance sensitivity are inversely related. The extent to which the volatility effect outweighed the productivity effect was especially pronounced during the 2000-2003 market crash period. While the productivity effect is stronger than the volatility effect in both the CEO and low-free-cash-flow subsamples, the volatility effect is stronger than the productivity effect in both the non-CEO and high-free-cash-flow subsamples.     

Is There a Replication Crisis in Finance?

Several papers argue that financial economics faces a replication crisis because the majority of studies cannot be replicated or are the result of multiple testing of too many factors. We develop and estimate a Bayesian model of factor replication that leads to different conclusions. The majority of asset pricing factors (i) can be replicated; (ii) can be clustered into 13 themes, the majority of which are significant parts of the tangency portfolio; (iii) work out-of-sample in a new large data set covering 93 countries; and (iv) have evidence that is strengthened (not weakened) by the large number of observed factors.     

Is there Value-Added Information in Liquidity and Risk Premiums?

Size has become a significant factor in explaining returns. According to the size effect, smaller capitalization stocks on average outperform larger capitalization stocks over long periods of time. This paper first documents the traditional size effect on the French market for the 1986–1998 period. It introduces a new proxy for size, free float, which is argued to be the appropriate measure of size and liquidity for most non‐US markets. Evidence is presented of a negative link between historical returns and free float. The link is significant even outside of the month of January, a notable divergence from results obtained on the NYSE. The rest of the paper is an attempt to take advantage of this 'ex‐post' phenomenon on an 'ex‐ante' basis, with an empirical study of the link between expected return, risk, and liquidity in a sample consisting of the main 150 stocks quoted on the Paris Bourse between January 1986 and January 1998. Liquidity premiums are estimated for portfolios from both a univariate and a multivariate perspective. The paper shows how risk and liquidity premiums can be used separately or in tandem for market timing and asset allocation. In all cases, the use of both premiums together leads to superior performance. Results confirm our measurements of liquidity and liquidity premiums and supply evidence that liquidity premiums together with risk premiums are useful in active asset management.     

Municipal Debt and Marginal Tax Rates: Is There a Tax Premium in Asset Prices?

We study the marginal tax rate incorporated into short‐term municipal rates using municipal swap market data. Using an affine model, we identify the marginal tax rate and the credit/liquidity spread in 1‐week tax‐exempt rates, as well as their associated risk premia. The marginal tax rate averages 38.0% and is related to stock, bond, and commodity returns. The tax risk premium is negative, consistent with the strong countercyclical nature of after‐tax fixed‐income cash flows. These results demonstrate that tax risk is a systematic asset pricing factor and help resolve the muni‐bond puzzle.     

Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power at the regional level. Firstly, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an “income effect” which disincentivises the efforts of the regional tax administration. Secondly, these efforts tend to be lower in those electoral districts where vote turnout is high, the margin to lose a parliamentary seat is narrow and their parliamentary representation is high, although the importance of these disincentives decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent. Finally, leftist governments, through the tax administration, tend to exert a greater effort in ensuring tax compliance.     

Liquidity Crunch in the Interbank Market: Is it Credit or Liquidity Risk, or Both?

The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit by idiosyncratic random liquidity shocks. The market may also be hit by bad news at a future date, implying the insolvency of some participants and creating a lemons problem; this may end up with a gridlock of the interbank market at that date. Anticipating such possible contingency, banks currently long of liquidity ask a liquidity premium for lending beyond a short maturity, as a compensation for the risk of being short of liquidity later and being forced to liquidate some illiquid assets. When such premium gets too high, banks currently short of liquidity prefer to borrow short term. The model is able to explain some stylized facts of the 2007–2009 liquidity crunch affecting the money market at the international level: (i) high spreads between interest rates at different maturities; (ii) “flight to overnight” in traded volumes; (iii) ineffectiveness of open market operations, leading the central banks to introduce some relevant innovations into their operational framework.     

Lease Maturity and Initial Rent: Is There a Term Structure for UK Commercial Property Leases?

Seminal work by Grenadier (J. Financ. Econ. 38:297–331, 1995) derived a set of hypotheses about the pricing of different lease lengths in different market conditions. Whilst there is a compelling theoretical case for and a strong intuitive expectation of differential pricing of different lease maturities, to date the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Drawing upon a substantial database of commercial lettings in central London (West End and City of London) over the last decade, we investigate the relationship between rent and lease maturity. In particular, we test whether building quality, credit risk and micro-location variables omitted in previous studies provide empirical results that are more consistent with the theoretical and intuitive a priori expectations. It is found that initial leases rates are upward sloping with the lease term and that this relationship is constant over time.

Is There a Favoritism Strategy in Taiwan Mutual-Fund Companies?

This paper investigates whether Taiwan mutual-fund companies actively pursue a corporate-level strategy of enhancing the performance of "high-value" funds (i.e., high fee-ratio funds or high past performers) at the expense of other "low-value" funds belonging to the same companies. The results show a significant difference between high- and low-value funds within the same fund families and that this difference favors the high past-perorming funds. The future incremental cash inflows from these high-value funds indicate that fund companies indeed benefit from the subsidized strategy. Our findings highlight the potential for agency problems and the importance of corporate and fund governance in the Taiwan asset-management industry.     

Is There a Better Way to Examine Income Inequality?

Dividing U.S. tax returns into half‐millionaires (those reporting adjusted gross income (AGI) of $500,000 or more in a given year) and their complement allows greater use of IRS data on income sources than is possible with an analysis that examines a fixed percentage of returns, such as the top one percent. Contrary to popular perception and media rhetoric, the inflation‐adjusted difference between the reported AGI of half‐millionaires and the rest actually declined by 25 percent from 1993 to 2011. The income gap between half‐millionaires and other filers reflects differences in kinds of income, with half‐millionaires deriving a much larger fraction of their income from capital investments whose varying returns make that component of income—and thus the income of half‐millionaires—more volatile. The percentage of total tax returns filed by half‐millionaires in a given year and the percentage of their income derived from taxable gains reported on Schedule D account for virtually all of the variation in the half‐millionaire percentage of aggregate AGI. As this finding suggests, the expanding income share for half‐millionaires does not signify that some collection of privileged rich have become richer. The significant net growth in the percentage of filers who are half‐millionaires has been uneven because a significant proportion of their income derives from volatile Schedule D gains, which are higher during economic expansions and lower during recessions. The incomes of half‐millionaires—and especially millionaires—are anything but recession proof. But even with that volatile component of income included, when their percentage of returns doubles, their percentage of income less than doubles, consistent with declining income inequality.     

Promotion Incentives and Corporate Performance: Is There a Bright Side to “Overpaying” the CEO?

Earlier studies have shown that stronger equity-based incentives for CEOs are generally associated with better corporate performance and higher values. In this article, the authors report the findings of their recent study of the effects of promotion-based "tournament" incentives for non-CEO executives (or "VPs") on corporate performance for a large sample of companies during the 12-year period from 1993-2004.
The study's main finding is that such tournament incentives, as measured by the pay differential between the CEO and VPs, were associated with better corporate operating performance and higher corporate stock returns. Moreover, tournament incentives, as one would expect, appeared to be more effective when CEOs were nearing retirement—but less effective when the firm had a new CEO (and even weaker when the new CEO was an outsider).     

Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?

This study investigates the interrelationship between bank regulatory capital and bank diversification. We argue that regulatory capital might act as a substitutive mechanism of diversification to alleviate a bank's default risk. As a result, regulatory capital is likely to discourage firms from excessive diversification, which might in turn indirectly improve bank value. Using a sample of listed banks in developed countries from 2011 to 2017, we find that total regulatory capital is inversely associated with bank diversification. Narrower regulatory capital ratios only have a significant association with income-based but not with asset-based diversification. Our results also reveal an indirect effect of regulatory capital on bank value mediated by bank diversification (i.e. indirect-only mediation). Overall, our study provides novel insights into the complementarity of the institutional and strategic domains so as to understand the far-reaching implications of regulation reforms for the strategic behaviour of banking companies.     

Is there a symmetric nonlinear causal relationship between large and small firms?

This paper uses both linear and nonlinear causality tests to reexamine the causal relationship between the returns on large and small firms. Consistent with previous results, we find that large firms linearly lead small firms. We also find a significant linear causality in the direction from small firms to large firms, particularly in the more recent time period where the impact from small firms to large firms is greater than from large to small. More important, in contrast to the received literature, we find significant nonlinear causality that is bi-directional and of the same duration in either direction. Using the BEKK asymmetric GARCH model we are able to capture most of the detected nonlinear relationship. This indicates that volatility spillovers are largely responsible for the observed nonlinear Granger causality.     

Is there a link between politics and stock returns? A literature survey

This survey starts by reviewing the literature investigating whether political connectedness of companies creates wealth for their shareholders. It then moves on to examine whether there is an association between the orientation of the political executive or the phase of the electoral cycle with movements of the stock market index. The price impact of politically-relevant events, such as wars, terrorist attacks, revolutions, coups or issuance of communications by those in positions of power is also discussed. The review closes with an examination of the impact of political uncertainty on stock markets and with a reflection on the direction of causality.     

Clearing and Collateral Mandates: A New Liquidity Trap?

All too often, legislative solutions to some financial crisis have serious consequences that are both unwanted and unintended. The author of this article foresees several possible negative consequences arising from Title VII of the Dodd‐Frank Act, which mandates that eligible derivatives be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs) that require initial and variation margin. The new legislation also requires that the remaining non‐cleared derivatives that are traded by some market participants be more heavily collateralized. The Act's authors have argued that derivatives pose uniquely dangerous systemic risks because of the leverage and counterparty risk associated with them. Increased collateralization, their thinking goes, would reduce derivatives‐related leverage and the systemic risk to the financial system associated with such leverage. The author argues that these hopes are unduly optimistic because they fail to recognize how market participants can substitute other forms of leverage, such as bank lines of credit or collateral transformation trades, for the leverage derivatives provided previously. The author also believes that the larger collateral mandates and frequent marking‐to‐market will make the financial system more vulnerable since margin requirements tend to be “pro‐cyclical.” And more rigid collateralization mechanisms can restrict the supply of funding liquidity, and lead to spikes in funding liquidity demand that can reduce the liquidity of traded instruments and generate destabilizing feedback loops. The fragmentation of CCPs across jurisdictions and products will lead to greater demand for CCP‐eligible collateral to maintain the same level of hedging transactions. This demand will likely be met by using riskier assets as collateral and encourage the shadow banking system to create new assets that can be posted as collateral (for example, via collateral transformation services). In sum, although the Dodd‐Frank rules are intended to reduce systemic risk, their expected impact on liquidity makes it a very open question as to whether they will achieve this goal. Although they may reduce some risks, they will simply shift others while possibly creating new ones.     

Is There a Difference Between Solicited and Unsolicited Bank Ratings and, If So, Why?

This paper analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the actual outcome of bank ratings. Using two sample banks (one rated by Fitch and one rated by S&P), I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observable bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information and are therefore dependent on the quantity of public information disclosed by the banks. As a result, unsolicited ratings tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information. While the latter result is also consistent with the fact that credit rating agencies may blackmail low-disclosure firms, the findings suggest that blackmailing—if it is actually used—is ineffective in making these firms start to pay for a rating.     

Is There a Case for Industrial Policy? A Critical Survey

What are the underlying rationales for industrial policy? Doesempirical evidence support the use of industrial policy forcorrecting market failures that plague the process of industrialization?This article addresses these questions through a critical surveyof the analytical literature on industrial policy. It also reviewssome recent industry successes and argues that public interventionshave played only a limited role. Moreover, the recent ascendanceand dominance of international production networks in the sectorsin which developing countries once had considerable successimplies a further limitation on the potential role of industrialpolicies as traditionally understood. Overall, there appearsto be little empirical support for an activist government policyeven though market failures exist that can, in principle, justifythe use of industrial policy.      

Valuation Ratios and Stock Return Predictability in South Africa: Is It There?

Using monthly South African data for January 1990 through October 2009, this paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to examine the predictability of real stock return based on valuation ratios, namely, price-dividend and price-earnings ratios. We cannot detect either short-horizon or long-horizon predictability; that is, the hypothesis that the current value of a valuation ratio is uncorrelated with future stock price changes cannot be rejected at both short and long horizons based on bootstrapped critical values constructed from linear representations of the data. We find, via Monte Carlo simulations, that the power to detect predictability in finite samples tends to decrease at long horizons in a linear framework. Although Monte Carlo simulations applied to exponential smooth-transition autoregressive models of the price-dividend and price-earnings ratios show increased power, the ability of the nonlinear framework in explaining the pattern of stock return predictability in the data does not show any promise at either short or long horizons, just as in the linear predictive regressions.     

Religiosity and risk taking: Is there a demand-side effect?

Religiosity may impact firm risk taking via its risk averse employees or through risk-sensitive demand. Using detailed financial statements of property-liability insurance companies, we find that both religiosity at firms' headquarters and the religiosity of firms' largest geographic market are negatively related to firm risk taking. For firms with one salient market, the impact of market religiosity is approximately the same order of magnitude as headquarter religiosity. Our evidence suggests that firm risk taking is influenced by customer demand.     

Is the relationship between prices and exchange rates homogeneous?

Empirical tests of purchasing power parity (PPP) are implicitly based on the conditions of symmetry and proportionality of the price coefficients. We investigate a separate condition, which we term homogeneity. Specifically, while there may be factors that drive a wedge between prices and exchange rates, when these factors are held constant we would expect a change in exchange rates to be associated with a proportional, or homogeneous, change in prices. To test for the existence of homogeneity in prices, we conduct two experiments. First, we apply a time-varying-coefficient procedure to nine euro-area countries as well as the euro area as a whole during the (monthly) sample period, 1999:M1 to 2011:M3. Second we apply the same procedure to the same group of countries, plus Canada, Japan and Mexico, over the longer period, 1957:M4 to 2011:M3. We find that averages of the price coefficients, corrected for specification biases, are uniformly homogeneous in the long run, providing strong support for PPP.     

Is There One Best Way to Sell a Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales1

For managements and boards that have decided that the value‐maximizing choice is to sell their companies, the board must then address another important question: what is the best way to sell the company? Should they use a wide‐ranging auction that seeks to attract the largest number of bidders, exclusive negotiation with a single bidder, or a “controlled sale” with a limited group of potential buyers? In a much cited 1996 article in the American Economic Review called “Auctions Versus Negotiations,” economists Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer argued that there is “no merit in arguments that negotiation should be restricted to one or a few bidders to allow the seller to maintain control of the negotiating process.” But in their series of studies of the corporate M&A sales process over the past five years, the authors of this article have come to a very different conclusion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, wide‐ranging auctions that seek the greatest number of bidders are far from the dominant approach. Roughly half of the large M&A deals investigated by the authors were accomplished through negotiations with single bidders. At the same time, full‐fledged auctions accounted for only about half of the deals involving multiple bidders, while the other half were classified as controlled sales aimed at a small number of carefully selected potential buyers. In their attempt to explain this preference for negotiations and controlled sales over auctions in M&A sales, the authors draw extensive parallels with the market for initial public offerings. As in the “bookbuilding” approach that now dominates the IPO process in virtually all global capital markets, the decision to limit the number of bidders through either negotiations or controlled sales appears to have the advantage of eliciting more aggressive bids from the “most qualified” buyers. Or, to put this another way, auctions appear to have the effect of discouraging such buyers from participating in the process.