The Competitive Impact of Commercial Bank Underwriting on the Market for Municipal Revenue Bonds

This paper examines the impact of commercial bank entry in the market for municipal revenue bonds. We show that issues underwritten by commercial banks have lower underwriter spreads but not lower yields relative to issues underwritten by nonbank investment firms. In particular, this is more significant for non-investment-grade bonds underwritten by commercial banks. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that bank entry has resulted in increased competition in the municipal revenue bond market and that the lower yields observed for bank-underwritten commercial bonds may be due to banks having private information. Overall, our results suggest that policy changes leading to the relaxation of restrictive provisions concerning bank underwriting of municipal revenue bonds have had beneficial effects.     

CAPITAL FORMATION AND THE INTERNET

The Internet is expected to play a significant role in the capital-raising process. Internet investment banks like Wit Capital and WR Hambrecht are supposed to make the IPO process more equitable by giving retail investors access to deals and pricing deals more accurately, thereby leaving less "money on the table" and lowering the cost of going public.
This article argues that the Internet will not replace, but will likely "supplement," the current system. The certification function provided by traditional investment banks and their relationships with institutional investors will continue to be important determinants of a successful offering. Thus, although Internet banks will get pieces of IPO transactions, the lead managers of such deals will continue to be older firms with well-established reputations and ties with institutions.
Nevertheless, the Internet is expected to play a larger role in the case of public bond offerings. Because the issuance of bonds is a repetitive business and the pricing is much simpler, the authors predict that the Internet will significantly reduce the costs of issuing bonds and perhaps limit the role of traditional investment banks in this process.     

债券投资如何影响商业银行系统性风险?--基于系统性风险分解的视角

作为我国商业银行最重要的非信贷资产业务,债券投资如何影响银行系统性风险?理论分析表明,债券投资对系统性风险的综合影响取决于其个体风险分散效应和系统关联性提升效应孰强孰弱。在此基础上,本文应用2008-2018年25家上市银行季度数据,实证检验债券投资对系统性风险的影响。结果发现,债券投资同时具有降低银行个体风险和增加银行个体与系统关联性的效果。进一步分析表明,一方面,对于规模较小的商业银行而言,债券投资的个体风险分散效应较弱、系统关联性提升效应较强;另一方面,商业银行持有较多以公允价值计量的债券时,债券投资的系统关联性提升效应较强。本文研究对于监管部门协调微观审慎和宏观审慎监管、防范债券投资业务引致系统性风险具有重要的启示意义。     

Banks and sovereign risk: A granular view

We investigate the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of German banks and the implications of such holdings for bank risk. We use granular information on all German banks and all sovereign debt exposures in the years 2005–2013. As regards the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of banks, we find that these are larger for weakly capitalized banks, banks that are active on capital markets, and for large banks. Yet, only around two thirds of all German banks hold sovereign bonds. Macroeconomic fundamentals were significant drivers of sovereign bond holdings only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. With the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, German banks reallocated their portfolios toward sovereigns with lower debt ratios and bonds with lower yields. With regard to the implications for bank risk, we find that low-risk government bonds decreased the risk of German banks, especially for savings and cooperative banks. Holdings of high-risk government bonds, in turn, increased the risk of commercial banks during the sovereign debt crisis.     

Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets

We examine the spillover wealth effects of the Orange County, California bankruptcy announcement in December 1994 on municipal bonds, municipal bond funds, and bank stocks. This bankruptcy is prominent because of unprecedented losses and because it was caused by a highly leveraged derivatives strategy rather than a shortage of tax revenues and excess spending. We find contagion in the bond market with significantly negative abnormal returns for municipal bond funds without direct exposure to Orange County and for non‐Orange County municipal bonds. In addition, our findings suggest the contagion spills over to the common stocks of investment and commercial banks that deal in or use derivatives; however, the equities of banks unexposed to derivatives are not affected.     

Global Public‐Private Investment Partnerships: A Financing Innovation with Positive Social Impact

Global bond markets, along with banks and governments, are the main source of funding for investment in environmentally friendly infrastructure and the transition to clean energy. Although such bonds are a relatively recent innovation, the green bond market has grown rapidly from its start in 2008 to around $800 billion in outstanding issues. The problem, however, is that green bonds, which represent less than 1% of global bond markets, have been issued disproportionately by government‐sponsored entities, corporations, and municipalities in developed markets. In the emerging market countries where the infrastructure investments are most needed, they barely exist. The authors describe a new investment vehicle, called the AP EGO fund, whose mission and MO are to channel the vast global pools of institutional savings that are now invested in low or (even negative) yield fixed‐income assets—as much as $17 trillion in 2019—to higher‐return emerging markets green investments, in particular sustainable infrastructure, by creating a new asset class: emerging‐market green bonds issued by banks. The AP EGO fund is premised on and involves a reworking of the public‐private partnership (PPP) into a form they call the global public‐private investment partnership (or GPPIP). Unlike the PPP, which combines a public agency with a private operator, the GPPIP has four instead of just two partners. In addition to the standard public agency and the private concession operator, there is a development bank—in this case the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is the financial markets affiliate of the World Bank—and private investors that include emerging‐market banks as well as global institutional investors. Along with the mediating role played by a public agency like the IFC, the AP EGO Fund is fundamentally different from other PPPs in that it takes the form of a special purpose securitization vehicle whose shares are backed by a pool of green bonds issued by emerging market banks in multiple emerging market countries. And besides its application to a new asset class, the fund also breaks new ground by applying a securitization technique with a fund structure designed with an embedded “first‐loss” protection to a global pool of green bonds originated in emerging market economies. By means of this structuring, the green‐bond‐backed fund shares issued by the AP EGO are now providing developed market institutional investors with somewhat higher‐yielding fixed income securities that nevertheless carry an investment‐grade rating.     

Effects of securitization and covered bonds on bank stability

This paper empirically investigates the relationship of securitization and covered bonds with bank stability and highlights that this relationship varies with the level of a bank's involvement in a specific instrument. The study uses the data from 46 securitizing and covered bond issuing listed banks in Europe for 2000–2014. The initial results show that some banks have been heavily involved in securitization activity, while covered bond issuance does not go beyond a certain limit. The results obtained using a quadratic model and a generalized additive model show a U-shaped relationship between securitization and systemic risk of banks. However, some interesting results are obtained for covered bonds. Initial results do not show a significant impact of covered bonds on systemic risk, but further analysis shows the presence of a size effect. The systemic risk of smaller banks increases after the issuance of covered bonds, while larger banks remain unaffected. The study does not support imposing uniform limits on covered bond issuance; rather such limits should be linked to the bank size. However, some regulatory framework is needed to limit banks’ involvement in securitization.     

The effect of unfunded pension liabilities on corporate bond ratings,default risk,and recovery rate

Unfunded pension liabilities lower ratings of non-senior secured bonds but do not affect ratings of senior secured bonds due to their higher seniority. Pension funding improvement (deterioration) is associated with bond rating upgrade (downgrade). Moreover, large unfunded liabilities increase bond default risk and reduce the recovery rate of bondholders after controlling for credit ratings, suggesting that bond ratings do not fully capture pension underfunding risk. Overall, our results highlight the important effects of unfunded pension obligations on bond ratings, default risk, and creditors’ payoff, and suggest that investors should look beyond bond ratings in making investment decisions.     

The real effects of bank taxation: Evidence for corporate financing and investment

This paper examines how bank taxation affects the financing decisions and investment activities of corporates. Exploiting exogenous tax variation at the bank level, we show that taxing banks' gross profits leads to higher bank leverage, and results in lower risk and credit supply. The contraction in credit supply has implications for corporate debt financing and investment activity. Corporates more exposed to banks subject to gross profit tax exhibit lower leverage and rely less on bank debt. Corporates partly offset lower bank financing by switching to bond financing. The cost of bond financing increases with corporate exposure to the tax. A greater exposure also impacts negatively on corporate investment activity. Overall, our results highlight the importance of bank taxation for corporate financing and investment decisions.     

The decision to first enter the public bond market: The role of firm reputation,funding choices,and bank relationships

This paper uses survival analysis to investigate the timing of a firm’s decision to issue for the first time in the public bond market. We find that firms that are more creditworthy and have higher demand for external funds issue their first public bond earlier. We also find that issuing private bonds or taking out syndicated loans is associated with a faster entry to the public bond market. According to our results, the relationships that firms develop with investment banks in connection with their private bond issues and syndicated loans further speed up their entry to the public bond market. Finally, we find that a firm’s reputation has a “U-shaped” effect on the timing of a firm’s bond IPO. Consistent with Diamond’s reputational theory, firms that establish a track record of high creditworthiness as well as those that establish a track record of low creditworthiness enter the public bond market earlier than firms with intermediate reputation.     

The effect of bank relationships on bond spreads: Additional evidence from Japan

This study investigates the impact of bank relationships on bond spreads using data on Japanese bond-issuing firms. In doing so, it extends the existing literature, which found that bank relationships decrease bond spreads, consistent with the view that bond investors benefit from bank monitoring, but this is not the case for investment-grade bonds in the US. This study provides evidence that the influence on the yields of investment-grade bonds varies with the type of bank relationship. In this research, a main bank is defined as a bank that is not merely the top lender to a firm but also one of the ten largest shareholders, while firms that borrow money from banks but have no ties with main banks are considered to have support bank relationships. The regression results show that although main bank relationships are not systematically associated with the yields of investment-grade bonds, support bank relationships are positively associated with them. It is suggested that, even for a sample of investment-grade bonds, a specific type of bank relationship affects bond spreads and the association between them is consistent with the view that bond investors are concerned about the hold-up problem posed by banks.     

Does proximity matter in international bond underwriting?

In this study, we analyze a sample of 3982 international bond issues from 31 countries to examine the impact of geographic proximity on the selection of lead underwriter in the international bond market. We find that proximate banks are more likely to lead underwrite risky bonds and non-rated bonds. On average, the total issue cost is lower if the lead underwriter is a proximate bank. The overall results suggest that geographically proximate banks have better access to private information about issuing companies. We also find that the cost reduction effect of proximate underwriting only appears in developed markets. In addition, this cost reduction effect is relatively weak in countries with a legal system that provides good investor protection.     

欧元区国债强制引入集体行动条款的可能影响及启示

自2013年1月1日起,欧元区各国新发行且期限超过一年的国债,必须引入集体行动条款（CACs）。文章介绍分析了欧元区国债引入CACs条款的历程、CACs条款主要内容,多角度分析了其相关影响。文章指出,此次欧元区国债强制引入CACs条款,开启了发达国家大规模引入该条款先例,对债券市场特别是欧元区国债投融资可能产生重要影响,如未来出现重组,欧央行及成员国央行均可能出现损失。     

Heterogeneity in asset allocation decisions: Empirical evidence from Switzerland

We analyze the heterogeneity in asset allocation decisions of different investor groups in response to changes in the macroeconomic environment. Using a new data set that includes the monthly portfolio holdings of private, commercial, and institutional investors deposited with Swiss banks, we estimate the relationship between equity and bond holdings and common business cycle indicators. Regression analysis indicates that private investors do not systematically move from stocks into bonds by selling stocks to institutional investors and purchasing bonds from them in adverse macroeconomic states. A VAR-error correction framework including cointegration and error correction restrictions suggests that the investment behavior of commercial investors leads and private investors follow in their investment decisions only slowly over time. The asset allocation decisions of institutional investors are not affected by the actions of private and commercial investors. Our results refute a principle of “institutional irrelevance”.     

The IMF in a world of private capital markets

In analyzing the IMF attempts to stabilize private capital flows, we contrast cases where banks and bondholders do the lending. Consistent with banks’ natural advantage in monitoring, they reduce spreads as they obtain more information through repeat transactions with borrowers. By comparison, repeat borrowing has little influence in bond markets, where publicly-available information dominates. But spreads on bonds are lower when they are issued in conjunction with an IMF-supported program, as if the existence of a program conveys positive information to bondholders. The influence of IMF monitoring in bond markets is especially pronounced for countries vulnerable to liquidity crises.     

Requiem for a Market Maker: The Case of Drexel Burnham Lambert and Junk Bonds

This article adds to both the financial intermediation and market microstructure literature by examining the market reactions surrounding the withdrawal of a major financial intermediary and market maker from a specific securities market. We examine the exit of Drexel Burnham Lambert (Drexel) from the junk bond market in 1990. At the time Drexel exited the market by declaring bankruptcy, it was the dominant market maker and underwriter of junk bonds. We examine the impact of Drexel's failure on direct and indirect holders of junk bonds by investigating the effect of Drexel's collapse on junk bond returns, and on the stock returns of a group of firms that, on average, held significant amounts of junk bonds. We find that the collapse of Drexel had a significant impact on junk bond prices in general, and a greater impact on the prices of lower-quality junk bonds in particular. We interpret this result to imply that the value of the liquidity services supplied by Drexel was higher for lower-quality junk bonds. Additionally, we find that junk bonds underwritten by Drexel, as opposed to other investment banks, experienced a significant decline in price over the months leading up to Drexel's failure announcement. This suggests that the monitoring services provided by Drexel for the bonds it underwrote would not be replaced easily by other financial intermediaries operating in the junk bond market. Our results also indicate that the stock returns of life insurance companies with relatively high junk bond exposure tended to be affected more negatively by Drexel's financial distress than the stock returns of life insurance companies with relatively low junk bond exposure.     

Organizational structure,risk-based capital requirements,and the sales of downgraded bonds

Using bond downgrades as external shocks to life insurers’ asset risk, we document several findings of the impact of organizational structure and risk factors on investment risk taking. First, we find that mutual insurers and widely-held stock insurers are more likely to sell downgraded bonds than are closely-held stock insurers. Second, we find evidence that insurers are less likely to sell downgraded bonds that remain in the same rating class than bonds downgraded to a lower rating class. The result implies that insurers sell downgraded bonds mainly because of additional capital charge is imposed, not because of downgrade itself. In other words, risk factors in risk-based capital regulation do matter on life insurers’ investment risk taking. Finally, we find that life insurers might be reluctant to sell downgraded bonds at fire-sale prices during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

Banks' home bias in government bond holdings: Will banks in low‐rated countries invest in European safe bonds (ESBies)?

This paper offers two new explanations for banks' home bias in government bond holdings: a sovereign‐based rating cap on corporates and the existence of a ‘bank tax.’ These are complementary to the four explanations offered in the literature: risk‐shifting, gambling for resurrection, moral suasion, and a means to store liquidity for financing future investment. Collectively, they cast doubt on the European Union's demand‐led approach to investment in European safe bonds (ESBies) by banks in low‐rated countries. Bank regulations such as constraints on large exposure or risk‐based capital on credit risk concentration will be needed if the objective is to break the so‐called ‘deadly embrace.’     

Historic Changes in the High Yield Bond Market

In a history that now stretches about four decades, the high yield (HY) market has experienced growth in issuance and out‐standings that is remarkable both for its level (about 13% per annum, with HY bonds now accounting for about 25% of the total corporate bond market) and its cyclicality and sensitivity to the broad economy. The HY market has also experienced a notable shift away from B‐rated bonds and toward both lower‐risk Ba‐rated bonds and, to a lesser extent, more risky Caa‐rated bonds. Consistent with this development, studies of the performance of HY bonds show Ba‐rated bonds experiencing not only lower risk, but also higher returns than Caa‐rated bonds, which have produced surprisingly low average returns along with exceptionally high volatility. At the same time, studies of the correlation of HY bond returns with returns on other major asset classes report that all classes of HY bonds (but particularly the riskier B‐ and Caa‐rated bonds) have consistently stronger relationships with common stocks (especially small‐cap stocks) than with Treasuries and investment‐grade bonds. Analysis of the volatility of HY bond returns over time shows that during periods of stability in the economy and financial markets, the volatility of HY bond returns has been very similar to that of investment‐grade bonds. But during periods of political or economic uncertainty, the volatility of HY bonds has become two or three times that of investment‐grade bonds, approaching the volatility of common stocks. The main driver of the significant increase in the risk of the aggregate HY bond market during periods of uncertainty has been Caa‐rated bonds, whose risk pattern has been remarkably similar to that of small‐cap common stocks. Analysis of the credit risk spread (or CRS) series for both the composite HY bond market and each of its rating categories shows markedly non‐normal distributions with significant positive “skewness”—that is, periods of exceptionally high spreads (that are not counterbalanced by periods of exceptionally low spreads). The authors also report a consistently strong relationship of the CRS series with default rates and the general state of the economy, with major peaks occurring during or shortly after economic recessions. Near the end of 2008, however, there was a clear break in this relationship when the CRS reached an historic peak of 2,000 basis points, or more than five standard deviations above its long‐term mean, while the default rate (at 4%) was below its long‐term average. The authors offer two explanations for this break in CRS‐default rate relationship: the jump in the CRS caused by the extreme flight to quality and drop in liquidity for all risky securities during the second half of 2008; and the use of covenant‐lite securities and other sources of financial flexibility that appear to have enabled many HY issuers to defer defaults (if not avoid them entirely).     

Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting Services

The relation between investment bank reputation and the price and quality of bond underwriting services is studied here. After controlling for endogeneity in issuer–underwriter matching, I find that reputable banks obtain lower yields and charge higher fees, but issuers' net proceeds are higher. These relations are pronounced in the junk‐bond category, in which reputable banks' underwriting criteria are most stringent. These findings suggest that banks' underwriting decisions reflect reputation concerns, and are thus informative of issue quality. They also suggest that economic rents are earned on reputation, and thereby provide continued incentives for underwriters to maintain reputation.