Firm efficiency and stock returns: Australian evidence

We employ a stochastic frontier approach to estimate firm efficiency - the efficiency with which a firm converts its inputs into output. We find a negative relation between firm efficiency and the cross-section of stock returns (‘firm efficiency effect’) in the Australian stock market. The firm efficiency effect is robust after controlling for other firm characteristics and is more pronounced in stocks with high limits-to-arbitrage. However, we find no evidence that firm efficiency is a priced factor in the cross-section. Our findings suggest that investors misprice firm efficiency and arbitrage costs perpetuate its return predictability.     

Understanding the Endogeneity Between Firm Value and Shareholder Rights

I explore the relation between firm value and the shareholder rights-based Governance Index "G," which has become a popular measure of governance quality among researchers and investors. I show that the relation is not spuriously driven by unobservable firm heterogeneity or an assortment of observable firm characteristics, such as firm growth potential and profitability. The causality seems to run from G to firm value, rather than from firm value to G. My results suggest that granting more rights to shareholders could be an effective way to reduce agency costs and enhance firm value.     

Managerial ability and firm risk-taking behavior

In this study, we show that managerial heterogeneity plays an important role in firm decisions. Our view is that in addition to the effects of previously examined determinants, firm decisions are affected not just by the managers’ explicit mandate to maximize firm value, but also by the ability of the manager in managing the firm. We find that high-ability managers and low-ability managers have opposite effects on firm behavior and firm value. High-ability managers are receptive to risk-taking whereas low-ability managers refrain from risk-taking. High-ability managers cut capital expenditures but spend significantly more on research and development projects; low-ability managers reduce both capital expenditures and research and development expenses significantly. High-ability managers are associated with higher levels of firm focus than low-ability managers. Managerial ability is negatively associated with firm leverage. In addition, our results show that high-ability managers are associated with increases in firm value whereas low-ability managers are associated with decreases in firm value.     

Do foreign investments increase firm value and firm performance? Evidence from Japan

As empirical evidence on the impact of internationalization on firm performance remains unclear, we revisit the question of whether foreign investments enhance firm value and firm performance. Using a panel sample of publicly listed firms in Japan during the 1990–2016 period, we find that foreign investments are negatively associated with firm value. In addition, foreign investments are negatively related to firm performance at short- and long-horizons. Furthermore, foreign investments appear to reduce revenue growth but have no effect on firm efficiency, suggesting that simply increasing foreign investments does not necessarily enhance revenue growth or firm efficiency.     

The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Productivity and Exports: A Firm-Level Evidence from China

Abstract

This paper investigates the influence of environmental regulation on firm performance, as captured by firm productivity and firm exports. We first construct a Melitz-style model investigating the causal effects of environmental regulation on firm productivity and firm exports, and then test the theoretical predictions using firm-level data over the period 2005–2009. The theoretical and empirical investigation suggests that environmental regulation promotes firm productivity slightly with a lagged effect, has a harmful impact on firm exports, and has a U-shaped relationship with firm exports. China is to the far left of the inflection point, but this U-shaped relationship is not present at firms in clean industries and clean regions.     

Auditor selection within a business group: evidence from Taiwan

Although auditor selection is well documented in the literature, it is unclear whether group characteristics affect firms’ auditor selection decisions. Generally, a business group is the result of diversification by the core firm. Major decisions of the business group, such as auditor selection, are made by the core firm and influenced by the business group’s characteristics. Using operational and ownership linkages perspectives, this study investigates the determinants of a business group’s member firm engaging the same auditor as its core firm. We employ the input–output relationship of products along a supply chain to construct product vertical relatedness measures between member firms and the core firm, and establish logistic regression models to test our hypotheses. Using a sample of publicly listed business groups in Taiwan from 2000 to 2010, our results suggest that a member firm is more likely to engage the same auditor as its core firm when (1) the core firm engages a Big N auditor, (2) the core firm’s auditor is an industry specialist for both the core firm and its member firm, (3) the degree of vertical relatedness increases, or (4) the controlling shareholders’ deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights increases (hereafter deviation). On the other hand, the likelihood of a member firm engaging the same auditor as its core firm when induced by higher deviation could be offset by the influence of stronger business vertical linkages.     

The U.S. Property and Liability Insurance Industry: Firm Growth,Size, and Age

The relationship between firm size, age, and growth is tested for the U.S. property and liability (P‐L) insurance industry, and the determinants of firm characteristics on firm growth are analyzed. Using Heckman's two‐stage methodology, this article examines the relationship between corporate growth and firm size. The relationship between firm growth and firm age is also investigated. Furthermore, to determine time‐varying effects, the analysis is conducted for the different subperiods. The results of this article strongly support Gibrat's Law in the U.S. P‐L insurance market for the testing periods. The results are consistent for longer time periods and for shorter subperiods. It also finds that young firms grow faster than old firms during the sample periods. Related to the determinants of firm characteristics on firm growth, insurers using less input cost tend to grow fast. Economies of scope are positively related to firm growth as well.     

Firm ratings, momentum strategies, and crises: evidence from the US and Taiwanese stock markets

This paper investigates whether there is a link between momentum profitability and firm ratings. We follow traditional and practical (non-) investment-grade classifications to divide into three rating groups, high, median, and non investment-grade group (HIG, MIG, and NIG) since firm ratings express risk in relative rank order to contain valuable information. This study considers the US and Taiwanese stock markets. We find that firm ratings momentum strategies can even earn positive profits, larger than na?ve momentum, supporting that firm ratings can be used to strengthen naive momentum effects. By comparisons, the US firm ratings momentum with NIG produces larger profits than HIG but opposite in direction and V-shaped pattern in Taiwan. With an examination of crises on firm ratings momentum, we find that firm ratings momentum indeed helps increase the payoff during (non-)crises although firm ratings momentum profits should be strong following non-crises states and weak following crises states. However, firm ratings momentum profits partially result from the predictability of business cycle, calendar months, and information asymmetries. Our results highlight the critical importance of using firm ratings screens in empirical momentum studies.     

The effect of corporate culture on firm performance: Evidence from China

This study examines whether corporate culture promotion affects firm performance in China in terms of firm market value, firm financial performance and innovation output. We find consistent evidence that corporate culture promotion is negatively related to firm market value, positively related to innovation output and not significantly related to firm financial performance. In addition, the negative effect of corporate culture promotion on firm market value is driven by small firms and firms located in less developed provinces. Furthermore, we find that some specific corporate culture promotions, such as innovation culture promotion and integrity culture promotion, are not related to firm value or financial performance. However, innovation culture promotion is positively associated with innovation output.     

Corporate governance,capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand

We examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for a panel sample of 493 firms of non-financial firms in Thailand during the period 2001–2014. We find that for the full sample, corporate governance is not associated with financial leverage and firm performance. Leverage has a positive effect on firm performance. When we split firms into small and large firm subsamples, we observe some influence of corporate governance. The negative effect of audit committee size on firm performance is evident for large firms while the effect of audit reputation on firm performance is evident for small firms only. Furthermore, financial leverage mediates the effect of audit committee size on firm performance for the large firms.     

Market reactions to the closest peer firm’s analyst revisions

Prior analyst literature focuses on the impact of financial analysts on the firms they cover, and prior information-transfer literature concentrates on the externalities of information provided by management. This paper fills gaps in both streams of literature by examining the focal firm’s market reactions to the closest peer firm’s (identified by product similarity) analyst revisions. We find that the focal firm’s stock price reacts to the closest peer’s analyst revisions made by analysts who are not covering the focal firm. The focal firm’s cumulative abnormal return for a five-day window centered on the revision date is 0.54% higher if the peer firm’s analyst revision magnitude is in the top decile than if it is in the bottom decile. Cross-sectional tests show that the sensitivity of the focal firm’s market reactions to the peer firm’s revisions increases with the revision informativeness and the similarity between the focal firm and the peer firm. In addition, we find that focal firms do not react to peer firms’ revisions in industries with strong competition where the competitive effects cancel out the spillover effects. Finally, we find that the focal firm’s market reactions can predict its own future analyst revisions, suggesting that the reactions are at least partially rational.     

The Effects of Four Dimensions of Strategic Orientation on Firm Innovativeness and Performance in Emerging Market Small- and Medium-Size Enterprises

We investigate the effects of technology, entrepreneurial, market, and learning orientations on firm innovativeness, and the mediating effect of firm innovativeness on these relationships, using a survey of 374 small- and medium-size enterprises in Korea. The results reveal that, while technology, entrepreneurial, and learning orientations significantly influence firm innovativeness, firm innovativeness has a significant effect on firm performance. We also find that firm innovativeness has a statistically significant mediating role in the relationships of technology, entrepreneurial, and learning orientations to firm performance. Our study contributes to strategic management and emerging market literature by identifying the pivotal role of innovativeness for firms that seek to benefit from various types of strategic orientations.     

公司治理影响公司财务风险吗?

绩效和公司价值往往为学术界和实务界所重视,而风险这一反映企业行为的经济后果以及企业质量的重要指标往往被忽视。这样的一个结果是,一些看似业绩很好的公司一夜之间轰然倒塌。从已有的文献看,公司治理具有改善公司业绩及公司价值的作用,同样,我们认为,公司治理应该具有风险效应,即它可能影响到公司的风险。本文以我国证券市场2002-2005年的上市公司为研究对象,研究了公司治理对企业财务风险的影响。实证结果表明,我国上市公司的公司治理结构对企业财务风险具有一定的影响。本文的研究为人们深入认识公司治理的作用以及通过合理构建公司治理结构来有效降低企业财务风险具有一定的启示意义。     

Human capital investment,new firm creation and venture capital

This paper studies the relation between firm investment in general human capital, new firm creation and financial development for new firm financing, such as the existence of a venture capital industry. On one hand, firm investment in general human capital leads employees to generate new innovative ideas for starting their own firm. Since employees need a venture capitalist to start their new firm, firm investment in general human capital encourages the creation of venture capitalists by increasing the need for their services, such as providing advice and monitoring. On the other hand, as new firm financing becomes available, firms’ willingness to invest in general human capital increases, and as a by-product, the creation of employee-founded and venture capital-backed new firms increases in the economy. Hence, our model provides a rational explanation for the emergence of new firms created by employees of established firms, which represents one of the most common type of new firms in many industries.     

Employee treatment and firm innovation

We identify firm innovation as a channel through which the treatment of employees affects firm value. Long‐term incentive theory supports positive effects of ‘good’ employee treatment on innovation. Alternatively, entrenchment theory suggests such treatment will lead to complacency and shirking, hence deterring innovation. These opposing views merit investigation since human capital is increasingly essential to the growth and success of a firm. Using the KLD database and patent/citation data, we find a significant positive relationship between favorable employee treatment and the innovation quantity and quality of a firm. Furthermore, we find that the positive treatment of employees improves innovation focus – more innovation related to firms’ core business, leading to greater firm value via the increased economic value of patents. These findings, robust to endogeneity concerns, provide support for the long‐term incentive hypothesis, suggesting that well‐treated employees increase firm innovation. Thus, firm innovation represents a channel through which positive employee treatment enhances firm value.     

Firm level return-volatility analysis using dynamic panels

This paper examines “leverage” and volatility feedback effects at the firm level by considering both market and firm level effects, using 242 individual firm stock data in the US market. We adopt a panel vector autoregressive framework which allows us to control simultaneously for common business cycle effects, unobserved cross correlation effects in return and volatility via industry effects, and heterogeneity across firms. Our results suggest that volatility feedback effects at the firm level are present due to both market and firm effects, though the market volatility feedback effect is stronger than the corresponding firm level effect. We also find that the leverage effect at the firm level is persistent, significant and negative, while the effect of market return on firm volatility is persistent, significant and positive. The presence of these effects is further explored through the responses of the model's variables to market-wide return and volatility shocks.     

Earnings vs. stock-price based incentives in managerial compensation contracts

We develop a theory of stock-price-based incentives even when the stock price does not contain information unknown to the firm. In our model, a manager must search for and decide on new investment projects when the market may have a difference of opinion about the quality of the firm’s investment opportunities. The firm optimally provides incentives based solely on realized earnings, leading to an efficient investment policy, when the market has congruent or pessimistic beliefs; however, the firm optimally introduces stock-price-based incentives, leading to an inefficient investment policy, when the market has optimistic beliefs. If the firm can raise equity capital on favorable terms, negative NPV projects from the perspective of the firm may be positive NPV projects from the perspective of current shareholders. The firm motivates the manager to take such projects by basing some compensation on the current stock price.     

Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm

A government's choice of regulatory stringency can depend on investments that a firm made in earlier periods. The regulated firm may therefore invest strategically, to effect the government's choice of regulation. To reduce its payment of emissions taxes, the firm may therefore reduce emissions below their socially optimal level. In contrast, a firm subject to regulation by quantity wants to reduce the stringency of regulations. A firm which invests little thereby reduces the marginal social cost of reducing emissions, and so can induce government to weaken its regulations.     

审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系与审计调整

本文运用我国独到的审计调整数据,研究审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系对审计质量的影响问题.研究发现,审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系能够提高审计调整的概率,这一结果在控制内生性和排除潜在替代性解释之后仍然成立,表明审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系能够促进审计委员会与会计师事务所之间的信息共享,从而提高审计质量.研究还发现,审计委员会-会计师事务所连锁关系对审计调整概率的提升效应,在机构投资者持股和管理层持股的公司以及国内会计师事务所中更为明显.进一步的研究发现,连锁的审计委员会成员为审计委员会主任时,上述效应更为明显;而连锁的审计委员会成员是否为独立董事对结果没有明显的影响.     

Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts

We present a possible explanation for the lack ofpermanence of the very high levels ofconcentration of ownership that accompany leveraged buyouts. Wefirst argue that some diffusion of ownership can be beneficial to theshareholders of a firm by encouraging the employees of the firm toenter into implicit contracts with the firm. The level of concentrationof ownership that maximizes firm value is therefore that whichtrades off the well-known gains from monitoring with the gains fromimplicit contracting. We then argue that, in the process ofconcentrating the ownership of a firm that has excessively diffuseownership to a level that maximizes firm value, investors inleveraged buyouts will choose an initial level of concentration ofownership that is very high. They will do so in order to put pressureon managers to breach existing implicit contracts. Following thebreach of these contracts, investors will decrease the level ofconcentration of ownership to the level that maximizes firm value.There will be no further breach of implicit contracts, for such breachis incidental to the transformation of the firm from one that hasexcessively diffuse ownership to one that has the optimal level ofdiffusion of ownership. No change in the concentration of ownershiptherefore occurs once the level of diffusion of ownership thatmaximizes firm value has been attained.