Entry in Local Telecommunication Markets

In this paper, we explore the determinants of recent entry into local exchange service, and the role that regulatory policies have had in aiding this policy objective. Our results suggest that the 1996 Telecommunications Act did lead to some entry, but that strategic non-price behavior by incumbents may have offset this impact to some extent. We also find that regulatory policies and market fundamentals play an important role in determining entry. Clearly, market size (measured in various ways) is an important determinant of entry, while there is empirical support for the role of more flexible regulatory mechanisms in promoting new entry.     

Competition in Local Markets: Some Evidence from the Spanish Retail Banking Market

Using the entry threshold concept developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (Brookings Pap Econ Act 3:833–882, 1987), this paper examines how competitive conditions vary in independent local banking markets when the number of depository branches grows. With data on the Spanish retail banking sector in 2003, I estimate a discrete choice model to calculate the entry thresholds. The empirical evidence suggests that the entry of a new branch implies competition on a local level. Local branches seem to have some scope for changing prices fixed on national and regional levels. Moreover, the entry of new branches increases the competition among branches with instruments other than price (e.g., advertising, location, and promotion).      

强制性管制放松与边缘性进入的发生--"小灵通"现象的深层思考

本文的分析表明“小灵通”现象的发生是市场需求结构、管制放松的路径和管制权力安排共同作用的结果。以拆分原有在位者为主要手段的电信业管制放松,所造成的需求与价格的矛盾为“小灵通”的发生提供了市场机会,而高盈利业务的被剥离,迫使原有在位者利用尚存的垄断势力或优势,以及和管制者的“拆分—补偿”关系,向新运营商的市场进行了局部的渗透。这种行为表面上加剧了中国电信业管制的无序和混乱,但却提高了市场的可竞争性和消费者剩余。     

Multihospital Chain Acquisitions and Competition in Local Health Care Markets

This paper examines the determinants of multi-hospital acquisitions in California during a period of increased competition, 1984–1993. Evidence is examined for differences by chain type in acquisition preferences in the face of increased competitive pressure. Significant differences are found among chain types (for-profit, non-profit, and church). All three types appear to position themselves through acquisitions to obtain multiple-hospital holdings within local markets, with the non-profit type exhibiting the greatest tendency. Such positioning may enhance efficiency in payor contracting and increase market power, lowering competition in the long run.     

Structure and Profitability in Banking Markets

We use the structure-performance model and regression analysis to investigate a number of analytical issues that often arise in evaluating competition in connection with bank mergers and that are generally relevant to mergers in other industries. Perhaps our most consistent and strongest finding is that the local market HHI is positively and significantly related to profitability. We also find that the number of organizations and the level of recent deposit growth may provide some additional information on the level of competition. Finally, several variables including market size, the number of large banking firms, deposits per office, and resident migration rates exhibit similar relationships to profitability in the bivariate analysis, suggesting that there may be some characteristic associated with market size, density, or attractiveness that is important for competition.     

Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets

This paper examines incentives for brand-name pharmaceutical producers to market pseudo-generic versions of their own branded products upon the expiry of patent protection.Using a two-stage game model, we determine that under plausible demand and cost conditions, brand-name incumbents can find it profitable to produce pseudo-generics as a means of blocking rivals' entry even when independent firms producing true generics face low entry costs.The model shows that social welfare can be higher when firms use pseudo-generics instead of capacity for entry deterrence as long as substitutability between brand-name and generic products is sufficiently high.     

Competition Policy in Banking in the European Union

Review of Industrial Organization - We examine the evolution of competition in banking in the EU in its interaction with regulatory developments and the parallel evolution of the application of...     

Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets

We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.     

Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Common Network Externalities

We study competition in two-sided markets with a common network externality rather those than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups benefit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satisfies a homogeneity condition then platforms’ profits and price structures have some specific properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to the other, according to the homogeneity degree. Prices are affected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers. In the specific but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platforms’ profits do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This result differs from those of the two-sided models, which deal with standard positive inter-group network externality.     

Economics, Competition, and Costs in the Resructuring of U.S. Electricity Markets

Many of the problems facing U.S. electricity markets stem from blatant disregard for the advice and warnings of economists who specialize in these markets. The short list of disregarded economic advice includes existing market power of some generators; transmission discrimination, lack of efficient pricing of transmission congestion; inefficient retail prices; anemic incentives to minimize costs; and lack of consumer choice and experience, occasionally coupled with high switching costs. As uncomfortable as the current state of electric power restructuring may be, going back to full regulation likely would be worse. There is reason to hope that less direct paths to increased competition will resolve some of the worst policy patches and half-reforms. These less direct paths to increased competition include expansion of the size of geographic markets, geographic expansion of transmission unbundling, reductions in obstacles to long-term supply contracting, growth of demand response programs, improvements in generator efficiency and availability, and expansion of real-time pricing and customized energy services for commercial and industrial customers. In aggregate, these constitute a promising “quiet phase” of electric power reform.     

The Profit-Structure Relationship in Legally Protected Banking Markets Using Efficiency Measures

Our various tests suggest that our sample banks that are shielded from competition by severe intrastate branching restrictions have market power. This analysis has allowed us to test rigorously the adverse effects of legal and possibly market barriers to entry. We reject the notion that profits are a result of superior $x$-efficiency. We conclude if these results are corroborated by further research (e.g., using other measures of profit, efficiency, capital, etc), and if these and/or other barriers remain, the Federal Reserve should be concerned with the competitive impacts of rural, in-market bank mergers.     

Entry,Standards and Competition: Firm Strategies and the Diffusion of Mobile Telephony

This paper studies the effects of a countrys regulatory setting and competitive environment the performance of second-generation (2G) mobile on telecommunication. We consider three dimensions of sector performance: entry time, service prices and diffusion. We address the question of non-random selection arising from cross-country differences in the timing of the commercialization of new technologies. Our empirical exploration shows that this type of sample selection may indeed be a substantial problem in cross-country studies on technology diffusion and yield biased estimates of the policy variables of interest. Our estimation results suggest that standardization accelerates 2G entry and diffusion, although within-standards competition triggers less aggressive price competition than between-standards competition. We also find that an early monopolist will price more aggressively to build up an installed base. Furthermore, we find that liberalizing markets for incumbent technologies (i.e., fixed line telephony) has accelerated the commercialization of 2G.     

Markets Linked by Rising Marginal Costs: Implications for Multimarket Contact,Recoupment, and Retaliatory Entry

This paper studies the effects on prices and welfare of multimarket contact when firms serve multiple markets from a single facility with rising marginal costs. Here a link is created between markets, even with independent demands: greater output in one market leads to a higher marginal cost and lower output in other markets; and multimarket contact can indeed lower welfare. Variations of the model can explain two other puzzling phenomena: “recoupment” – lower prices in one market “paid for” by higher prices in other markets; and “retaliatory entry” – the credible threat to enter a rival’s market if it enters yours.     

Estimating Differential Dynamic Merger Effects on Market Structure and Entry in Related Markets

The U.S. and EU merger guidelines emphasize “ease of entry” arguments but little is known about the dynamic impact of realized mergers on market structure. This study provides insights on this topic with the use of detailed firm-level data on the memory chip market. Our estimation results provide evidence for differential merger effects on market structure. These effects depend on whether the mergers are dominated by market-power or efficiency gains. While efficiency-dominated mergers cause exit, market-power-dominated mergers attract entrants, and these effects are increasing over time. We also find that market-power mergers have a larger effect on entry than efficiency mergers have on exit. Our results show that mergers can reduce the number of potential entrants into related product markets and serve as an instrument to “reduce the likelihood of entry”.

     

入世后的标准化与企业竞争

加入世界贸易组织后,我国将在更大范围内和更深程度上参与经济全球化的进程,表明我国经济发展将进一步融入世界经济一体化和激烈的国际竞争中去,国内石油工业市场将扩大开放,国外的企业和产品将进入国内市场,同时,国内的工程技术服务企业和产品也将更加积极地进入国际市场,在这     

Local Ownership Restrictions, Entry Mode Choice, and FDI Performance: Japanese Overseas Subsidiaries in Asia

This study examines the moderating effects of a host government's local ownership restrictions on the linkage between the choice of foreign entry mode and its performance, using a sample of 917 Japanese foreign subsidiaries in Asia. The study focuses on two foreign entry modes, joint ventures (JVs) and wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS), and two performance measures, financial performance and termination rate. The results suggest that the extent of local ownership restrictions is negatively and significantly associated with the financial performance of WOS, whereas it does not directly influence that of JVs. There is no clear association between the extent of local ownership restrictions and the termination rate for the JV and WOS samples.     

Creating Growth in New Markets: A Simultaneous Model of Firm Entry and Price*

Sales in a new market generally follow a hockey‐stick pattern: After commercialization, sales are very low for some time before there is a dramatic takeoff in growth. Reported sales takeoffs across products vary widely from a few years to several decades. Prior research identifies new firm entry or price declines as key factors that relate to the timing of a sales takeoff in new markets. However, this literature considers these variables to be exogenous and only finds unilateral effects. In the present article, new firm entry and price declines are modeled as being endogenous. Thus, the simultaneous relationship between price declines and firm entry in the introductory period of new markets when industry sales are negligible is studied. Using a sample of new markets formed in the United States during the last 135 years, strong support for a simultaneous model of price and firm entry is found: Price decreases relate to the competitive pressures associated with firm entry, and, in turn, firm entry is lower in new markets with rapidly falling prices. Furthermore, a key driver of firm entry during the early years of a new market involves the level of patent activity, and a key driver of price decreases is the presence of large firms. In contrast to the recommendations from other research, these results indicate that rapid price declines may further delay sales takeoff in industries by dampening new firm entry. Instead, rapid sales takeoffs in new markets come from encouraging greater innovative activity and the entry of large firms.