Collusion,entry, and market shares

This paper analyzes market entry and collusion in a model of duopoly with product-specific-set-up costs. The analysis demonstrates that collusion can alter the incentives for entry deterrence. We find conditions under which an established firm will permit entry and collude with a potential entrant even though entry deterrence is a viable option under noncooperative oligopoly rules. Conditions are also specified in which entry will be effectively impeded and collusion will not be undertaken.     

Sunk Costs,Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry

Although economists usually support the unrestricted entry of firms into an industry, entry may lower social welfare if there are setup costs or if entrants have a cost disadvantage. We consider the welfare effects of entry within a standard Cournot model where some of an incumbent firm’s costs are sunk. We find that the range of parameter values over which entry can harm welfare declines monotonically in the fraction of cost that are sunk. Furthermore, the presence of even a small fraction of sunk costs often reverses an assessment that entry harms welfare.     

Entry and exit in retailing: Incentives, barriers, displacement and replacement

In this study the determinants of entry and exit and the interrelationship between these market phenomena are investigated. We examine incentives, barriers, displacement and replacement for a panel data-set of 23 Dutch shoptypes for the 1981–1988 period. Results indicate that profit as a ratio of modal income, growth of consumer spending and growing unemployment are important incentives to enter and disincentives to exit. Requirements of floorspace and professional skills appear to reduce entry rates. We find evidence for entry and exit to interact but not to be simultaneously determined. The implication being that entry (exit) has a separate influence on exit (entry) next to market incentives and entry and exit barriers.     

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities

We analyze the potential entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” The model assumes quality-dependent marginal production costs and considers sequential quality choices by an incumbent and an entrant. Entry-quality decisions and the entry-deterrence strategies are related to the fixed cost necessary for entry and to the degree of consumers’ taste for quality. We detail the conditions under which the incumbent increases its quality level to deter entry. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well. Welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.     

Advertising,industry innovation,and entry deterrence

With the advent of the Internet and social media platforms, advertising has become cheaper and more effective in reaching consumers. This paper studies the effect of better informative advertising on innovation and industry growth. This paper finds that improvements in informative advertising can lead to costly entry deterrence. Because advertising and innovation are complementary, better advertising raises the threats of entry. When innovation spillover is present in an industry, an incumbent firm has incentives to strategically lower its own innovation to deter entry. As a result, better advertising in innovation-intensive industries can have negative consequences on industry growth and consumer welfare. This paper also investigate the role of innovation spillover on entry deterrence.     

Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences

In standard models of Cournot competition, it is well-known that if large-scale entry is impossible, then any merger failing to create technological synergies must harm consumers through a higher price level. This paper shows that this is true irrespective of entry conditions: any profitable Cournot merger failing to generate synergies must raise price, even if large-scale entry is possible or if the merger allows the avoidance of fixed cost duplication.     

Monopoly, competition and information acquisition

An incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand, but can acquire public information at a cost. We determine how an entry threat affects the firm's information acquisition. If returns to scale are constant and the state-contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases, then entry reduces information acquisition. If, however, either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns; or if the state-contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion, then entry can increase information. Finally, entry can hurt consumers. Although entry always increases output, it can decrease information. Consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly.     

Acquisitions,entry, and innovation in oligopolistic network industries

In industries with network effects, incumbents' installed bases create barriers to entry that discourage entrepreneurs from developing new innovations. Yet, entry is not the only commercialization route for entrepreneurs. We show that the option of selling to an incumbent increases the innovation incentives for entrepreneurs when the network effects are strong and incumbents compete to preemptively acquire innovations. Thus, we establish that network effects and installed bases do not necessarily restrict the innovation incentives and that network effects promote acquisitions over entry.     

Regulatory risk,investment, and welfare

This paper assesses the allocative and distributional effects of uncertain regulatory constraints on rate of return, on price, and on competitive entry. A profit-maximizing firm responds to rate-of-return risk by substituting variable factors for sunk investment, but expands capacity when faced with either price risk or entry risk. Investors gain from the elimination of regulatory risk, a result that parallels Peltzman's contention that regulators could raise investor wealth by reducing risk. Consumers benefit from price and entry risk, but only under severe restrictions on tastes and technology. An inherent feature of government intervention, regulatory risk should be taken into account when comparing alternative policies for regulating (or deregulating) an industry.     

Exploring Mediating and Moderating Influences on the Links among Cycle Time,Proficiency in Entry Timing,and New Product Profitability*

Development cycle time is the elapsed time from the beginning of idea generation to the moment that the new product is ready for market introduction. Market‐entry timing is contingent upon the new product's cycle time. Only when the product is completed can a firm decide whether and when to enter the market to exploit the new product's window of opportunity. To determine the right moment of entry a firm needs to correctly balance the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry. Proficient market‐entry timing is therefore defined as the firm's ability to get the market‐entry timing right (i.e., neither too early nor too late). The literature has produced divergent evidence with regard to the effects of development cycle time and proficiency in market‐entry timing on new product profitability. To explain these disparities this study (1) explores the mediating roles of development costs and sales volume in the relationships among development cycle time, proficiency in market‐entry timing, and new product profitability, respectively; and it (2) explores the moderating influence of product newness on the relationship between development cycle time and development costs and that of new product advantage on the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results from a survey‐based study of 72 manufacturers of industrial products in the Netherlands suggest that development costs mediate the relationship between development cycle time and new product profitability and that sales volume mediates the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and new product profitability. In addition, the findings indicate that new product advantage strengthens the positive relationship between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results provide no evidence for a moderating effect of product newness. These results have important implications because to maximize new product profitability managers need to distinguish between costs and demand side effects of development cycle time and market‐entry timing on new product profitability. Keeping this distinction in mind should help them to better determine the relative profit impact of investments in cycle time reduction or improved entry timing. Moreover, the findings suggest that highly advantaged products that enter the market at the right time may have a highly attenuated sales volume. It also implies that new products with lower advantage may have very little leeway in hitting the “sweet spot” in market. The message is that “doing the right thing” (i.e., to develop a highly advantaged new product) may be at least as important as correctly balancing the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

Entry,imperfect competition,and futures market for the input

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in the literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on the number of firms and production is ambiguous.     

Regulation,enforcement, and entry: Evidence from the Spanish local TV industry

Although we have many tools to understand the effect of regulation on firm entry, we know little about the importance of actual regulation enforcement. For this purpose, this paper uses data from Spain's local television industry from 1995 through 2001, which provide a unique opportunity for examining how firms' profitability changes with the introduction of regulation and a posterior liberalization. During this period, the local television industry transitioned from a state of alegality (no regulation in place) to being highly regulated and finally to being informally deregulated. Using a firm entry model from Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991a,b), we estimate local TV station entry thresholds by number of entrants across years. We find the entry threshold in 1998 increased relative to the thresholds in 1995 and 2001, suggesting that entry was less attractive during the period when the local TV industry was highly regulated. We decompose the entry thresholds into the fixed costs and variable profits, and find the fixed-cost ratios increase in 1998 and stay constant in 2001. Meanwhile, we find an increase in the variable-profit ratios in 2001. These findings suggest that the informal deregulation did not invalidate the regulation introduced in 1995 on the cost side. However, the deregulation seemed to have an impact on variable profits through how local TV stations competed.     

Sunk costs, windows of profit opportunities, and the dynamics of entry

This article adds two elements to a standard model of monopolistic competition: First, the number of potential entrants is limited in each period and increases only over time. Second, the potential entrants differ with respect to the consumers’ valuation of the variant they could offer. The resulting simple model exhibits a rich dynamic structure covering the product life cycle, a path dependent equilibrium and the traditional textbook case of entry. The welfare analysis confirms the view that there cannot be too much entry. Even entry of ‘inefficient’ firms improves welfare.     

The learning curve,technology barriers to entry,and competitive survival in the chemical processing industries

This paper evaluates entry and survival rates in a sample of 39 chemical product industries. The analysis focuses on learning-based cost advantages potentially held by incumbent firms. A logit model of entry gives no evidence that entry decisions were sensitive to the cumulative production lead held by incumbents. Entry was facilitated by the fact that for most products, technology was available from a range of sources. A hazard function model reveals that entrant survival rates were unrelated to order of entry or source of process technology. However, survival was adversely affected when the leading incumbent held a large cumulative output advantage or when entrants built plants of sub-optimal scale. Thus, a large incumbent lead in production experience did not deter new entry but did reduce the entrant'S probability of survival.     

Entry, exit, and shakeouts in the United States in new manufactured products

During their early evolution, new manufacturing industries commonly experience a ‘shakeout’ period during which the number of producers declines by 50% or more. In order to gain additional insight into shakeouts, we develop new information on the patterns of entry and exit for 16 major new manufactured products from their commercial inception through 1980. We use a model in which entry and exit coordination problems can generate shakeouts to structure the analysis of the data. We find that shakeouts are distinguished by entry falling off sharply but rates of exit remaining steady or rising over time.     

Spectrum Licensing,Policy Instruments and Market Entry

Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants, and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than there are incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.     

Order, positioning, scope and outcomes of market entry

This research aims to analyze the relationships between three dimensions of the market entry strategy for new products - order, positioning and scope - and four dimensions of performance - customer satisfaction, competitive position, costs and profitability. The consideration of internal links between the entry dimensions, together with their effect on the different performance variables, will enable us to determine the existence of mediating effects, which up until now have barely been examined in the literature. We test our model on a cross-sectional sample of 136 manufacturing firms, applying structural equation modeling based on the Partial Least Squares (PLS) methodology. Our findings reveal that all the three strategic decisions included in our model of market entry do affect performance, although their influence changes according to the performance dimension being measured.