Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the empirical relation between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 403 CEO turnovers and 806 non‐turnover control firms during the period 2001–2010. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of the outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced and whether the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also control for the endogeneity of CEO turnover and a potential selection bias using 2SLS and Heckman's two‐stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following the peaceful departure of his predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO.     

Environmental uncertainty and managers’ use of discretionary accruals

Although an organization’s environmental uncertainty may induce greater variability in reported earnings, managers have incentives to reduce this variability. The flexibility accorded by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) provides managers the means to accomplish this via exercising discretion in recognizing accounting accruals. Thus, we examine the relation between managers’ use of discretionary accruals and environmental uncertainty. Overall, evidence suggests managers use discretionary accruals to reduce the variability in reported earnings more when firms operate in high uncertainty.     

THE EFFECT OF ANALYSTS' FORECASTS ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

I test a market consensus hypothesis about earnings management in the banking industry. This hypothesis states that when analysts have reached a consensus in their earnings forecasts, managers have an incentive to manage earnings through discretionary accruals to achieve market expectations. A sample of banks is partitioned based on the degree of forecaster consensus, and the behavior of one discretionary accrual, the loan loss provision, is predicted for each partition. The results suggest bank managers make greater use of the loan loss provision to manipulate earnings in a discretionary manner when analysts have reached a consensus in their earnings predictions.     

Accrual usage to manage earnings toward financial analysts' forecasts

This study examines whether management uses discretionary accounting accruals to move earnings upward toward analysts' earnings forecasts when it appears that earnings before discretionary accruals will fall short of the forecast. An earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts could lead management to fear lower compensation and an increase in the likelihood of job termination. The article finds that firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are below analysts' forecasts use income-increasing discretionary accruals and do so to a greater extent than do firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are above analysts' forecasts.     

Accruals and firm life cycle: Improving regulatory earnings management detection

Regulators have invested considerable energy into developing analytical tools to better detect earnings management. We propose that firms in similar life cycle stages (LCSs) face similar strategic concerns, managerial pressures, growth prospects, etc., and that the commonality in these factors contribute to the “normal” accruals generating process. Consistent with this prediction, we simulate various earnings management conditions and find that accruals models are misspecified in detecting manipulation within particular LCSs; in particular, introduction, shakeout, and decline firms are over-identified as manipulators, while growth and mature firms are under-identified as manipulators when LCS is not used to estimate accruals. Weighted average performance across life cycle stages reveals that LCS estimation of discretionary accruals substantially improves successful detection and reduces Type I errors relative to other grouping alternatives. The combined improvement across both Type I and Type II errors is over 70% for both the modified Jones and discretionary revenue models of accruals-based earnings management.     

Highly Valued Equity and Discretionary Accruals

Abstract:  Overvalued equity provides a strong incentive for managers to report earnings that do not disappoint the market (  Jensen, 2005 ). We find that this can be extended to highly valued equity more generally. In the year following the classification as highly valued and compared to firms with less extreme valuations, highly valued firms have significantly higher discretionary accruals and exhibit a more pronounced positive association between discretionary accruals and proxies for the likelihood of failing to meet earnings targets. These findings are consistent with the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings in support of extreme valuation. Because highly valued equity will likely result in CEOs with valuable stock and stock option portfolios, we test whether and show that the overvalued equity incentive is incremental to a CEO's equity portfolio incentive. One implication is that directors and audit committees should be especially on guard for possible earnings management when a firm has extremely high valuation multiples and when the CEO has a lot of equity at risk.     

Executive compensation and earnings management: Empirical evidence from Japan

This study investigates the relation between discretionary accounting choices and executive compensation in Japanese firms. The results show that the use of discretionary accruals increases executive compensation. The analyses also show that firm managers receiving no bonus adopt income-decreasing accruals and extraordinary items. In particular, evidence shows that negative extraordinary items are strongly associated with no bonus payment. Finally, the research indicates that the association between discretionary accruals and executive bonus varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. This study contributes to the literature on earnings management from an international comparative perspective since most previous studies on earnings management and executive compensation have focused on U.S. firms.     

The Use of Unsigned Earnings Quality Measures in Tests of Earnings Management

This paper examines the implications of using the absolute value of discretionary accruals when testing for earnings management. First, we analytically develop the mean and variance of the distribution of absolute discretionary accruals, and show that the expected value is an increasing function of the variance in the underlying error term from the first‐stage discretionary accrual estimation model. Second, we highlight several firm characteristics that are related to the error variance in discretionary accrual estimation models. Using simulations, we show that correlation between the earnings management partitioning variable and these firm characteristics leads to an overrejection of the null hypothesis of no earnings management. Third, we provide research design suggestions to help researchers mitigate the potential bias arising from the use of unsigned measures of earnings management. Using these suggestions, we replicate a recent study, and demonstrate that the inferences change after controlling for operating volatility.     

Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings Management

Prior research suggests that managers may use earnings management to meet voluntary earnings forecasts. We document the extent of earnings management undertaken within Canadian Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and study the extent to which companies with better corporate governance systems are less likely to use earnings management to achieve their earnings forecasts. In addition, we test other factors that differentiate forecasting from non‐forecasting firms, and assess the impact of forecasting and corporate governance on future cash flow prediction. We find that firms with better corporate governance are less likely to include a voluntary earnings forecast in their IPO prospectus. In addition, we find that while IPO firms use accruals management to meet forecasts; the informativeness of the discretionary accruals depends on whether or not the firm would have missed its forecast without the use of discretionary accruals.     

Does Investor Sentiment Affect Earnings Management?

I hypothesize and find that earnings management via accruals is driven partially by the prevailing market‐wide investor sentiment. Managers inflate earnings in periods of higher sentiment, but report more conservatively during periods of low sentiment. Moreover, the likelihood of income‐increasing earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises is also positively associated with investor sentiment. These results are robust to: (i) controls for time‐varying firm characteristics such as growth, investment opportunity sets, future profitability, leverage and size; (ii) macroeconomic variables such as future inflation, GDP growth, and growth in industrial production; (iii) multiple proxies for investor sentiment; and (iv) discretionary revenues as alternative measure of earnings management. Cross‐sectional analyses reveal that firms whose stock returns co‐move more with investor sentiment are more (less) likely to manage earnings upward via abnormal accruals in quarters of higher (lower) sentiment. The findings of managers’ strategic use of abnormal accruals show the need for increased attention from boards of directors, auditors and regulators to heightened managerial incentives to overstate earnings and to report optimistic earnings numbers during periods of high investor sentiment.     

Cash from operations and earnings management in Korea

Our study investigates the relationship between the operating performances of Korean industrial firms and the behavior of discretionary accruals during the period 1994-1997. We hypothesize that the degree of earnings management will depend on the firm operating performances. We construct 10 “cash from operations (CFO)” portfolios to test if there are systematic differences in discretionary accruals across portfolios.Four test methods (a mean accrual test, a correlation test, a regression analysis, and a sign-change test) are used to investigate if operating performances affect discretionary accruals differently. We compare three accrual estimation approaches (two discretionary accruals and total accruals) in testing the earnings management hypotheses.The results support the hypothesis that Korean industrial firms manage earnings. When operating performance is poor, the firms tend to choose income-increasing strategies. In addition, when operating performance is extremely poor, some firms tend to take a big bath, while some of the exceptionally well-performing firms tend to select income-decreasing strategies.     

The effect of firm-industry earnings correlation and announcement timing on firms' accrual decisions

Prior research shows that member firms in an industry adjust discretionary accruals (DAs) based on their relative earnings performance (REP), defined against industry. This study empirically examines whether firms' REP-based accrual decisions are related to earnings correlation with industry and relative announcement timing. We hypothesize that, when their REP is poor, firms with high earnings correlation and relative announcement delay (RAD) adjust DAs more actively than firms characterized otherwise. Our results support these hypotheses. The extent of accruals adjustment is, on average, significantly higher for the sample firms with high earnings correlation and RAD, respectively, than for those characterized differently. The negative relation between DAs and REP is particularly striking for the high correlation and poor REP firms and for the announcement delay and poor REP firms, than for the other firms. We conclude that firm-industry earnings correlation and relative announcement timing, in addition to REP, are important factors affecting individual member firms' discretionary accrual decisions.     

Hierarchy of earnings thresholds based on discretionary accruals

Prior studies identify hierarchies of earnings thresholds based on distributions of earnings (e.g., Degeorge et al., 1999) and survey opinions of CFOs (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). We complement extant literature by investigating a threshold hierarchy in the context of accounting discretion exercised by managers. We examine the relative extent of discretionary accruals used to achieve three earnings thresholds—avoiding losses, avoiding earnings declines, and avoiding negative earnings surprises. Our empirical findings suggest that managers are likely to use the largest amount of discretionary accruals to avoid earnings declines, and the least amount of discretionary accruals to avoid negative earnings surprises. Thus, this study identifies the hierarchy of the earnings thresholds based on accounting discretion used in financial reporting. We also find that the hierarchy remains stable over the last two decades during our sample period. Then, we provide several explanations for why managers are likely to exercise more accounting discretion to avoid earnings declines. These explanations include earnings smoothing, reduction of stock returns volatility, and signaling of future growth potential. Overall, this study provides new insights into accruals management behavior.     

Asset write-offs discretion and accruals management in Taiwan: the role of corporate governance

Using a sample of Taiwan’s public firms, this paper examines whether managers use discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals jointly to reach earnings targets and how corporate governance mechanisms react to such opportunistic behavior. We develop a set of simultaneous equations that capture executives’ incentives to manage earnings through write-offs and accrual management. These incentives include the existence and tightness of accounting-based covenants, “big bath,” income smoothing, and changes in senior management. The empirical results show that firms with larger discretionary write-offs also have lower discretionary accruals. In addition, we find that these earnings management tools are endogenous, suggesting that discretionary write-offs and discretionary accruals are partial complements for earnings manipulation and that their magnitudes are determined jointly. These findings contrast sharply with the tenor of discussion in the U.S. literature concerning the potential for using asset write-offs and discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings, which documents that managers use their discretion over accruals to signal economic realities rather than to obfuscate. Moreover, the results reveal that the empirical association between discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals is more pronounced in weakly governed firms, suggesting that a strong governance setting is likely to constrain management’s discretionary behavior. The above implications are robust to a number of alternative specifications and variables definitions.     

Management of Earnings and Analysts' Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises

Abstract:  This paper corroborates the finding of prior studies that managers avoid reporting earnings lower than analyst forecasts (i.e., negative earnings surprises) and provides new evidence of actions contributing to this phenomenon. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence of both (1) upward management of reported earnings and (2) downward 'management' of analysts' forecasts to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Further analysis of the components of earnings management suggests that both the operating cash flow and discretionary accruals components of earnings are managed.     

EARNINGS MANAGEMENT INDUCED BY COGNITIVE REFERENCE POINTS

Previous studies (Carslaw, 1988; Thomas, 1989; Niskanen & Keloharju, 2000) have shown that companies' managers tend to round-up the first digits of reported earnings (i.e. for companies reporting profits). According to Carslaw (1988), this type of behaviour is inspired by the existence of the so-called ‘$1·99’ phenomenon where a price of $1·99 is perceived as being abnormally lower than one of $2·00. In the current study, we try to determine whether managers of UK-listed companies also engage in this type of ‘earnings rounding-up behaviour’. Analogous to the earlier studies, our study compares observed and expected frequencies for the second-from-the-left digit in reported earnings. Our results suggest that managers of UK-listed companies tend to round-up reported pre-tax income, in a way that increases the first digit by one, when they are faced with a nine in the second-from-the-left position for this particular earnings measure. The major contribution of the current study is that it introduces discretionary accruals in this line of research. Discretionary accruals were estimated using both the Jones model (1991) and the modified Jones model as proposed by Dechow et al. (1995). Our results clearly suggest that discretionary accruals are used in order to round-up reported earnings figures. Moreover, discretionary accruals enabled us to increase the power of the tests used in previous studies.     

Economic Relations Among Earnings Quality Measures

Empirical studies on earnings quality use various measures that capture particular dimensions of earnings quality. This paper provides a theoretical foundation to evaluate and compare several common earnings quality measures: value relevance; persistence; predictability; smoothness; and discretionary accruals. We use a rational expectations framework in which a manager has market price, earnings, and smoothing incentives and can bias earnings reports. Taking the information content of reported earnings as a natural benchmark, we determine how variations of management incentives, operating risk, and accounting noise affect earnings quality and examine whether the different measures point in the same or in the opposite direction. We find that value relevance and persistence are measures that are closely aligned with each other and with our benchmark, followed by predictability and smoothness. Discretionary accruals measures are less aligned because they are based on the level of accruals, which confounds their information content. Our results also support the notion that smoother earnings and higher discretionary accruals are associated with greater earnings quality.     

Disclosure of GAAP line items in earnings announcements

We provide new evidence on the disclosure in earnings announcements of financial statement line items prepared under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). First, we investigate the circumstances that might provide disincentives generally for GAAP line item disclosures. We find that managers who regularly intervene in the earnings reporting process limit disclosures at the aggregate level and in each of the financial statements so as to more effectively guide investor attention to summary financial information. Specifically, this disclosure behavior obtains when managers habitually cater to market expectations, engage in income smoothing, or use discretionary accruals to improve earnings informativeness. Second, we predict and find that the specific GAAP line items that firms choose to disclose are determined by the differential informational demands of their economic environment, consistent with incentives to facilitate investor valuation. However, these valuation-related disclosure incentives are muted when managers habitually intervene in the earnings reporting process.     

Earnings Management and the Post‐earnings Announcement Drift

We posit that the post‐earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is related to earnings management. Accordingly, we find that firms with large negative (positive) changes in operating cash flows manage accruals upward (downward). Most importantly, we find that PEAD is concentrated largely among those firms that are most likely to have smoothed their reported earnings and is generally associated with discretionary accruals as opposed to nondiscretionary accruals. There is no evidence of a positive (negative) PEAD for those firms with large positive (negative) earnings changes that are least likely to have managed earnings downward (upward).     

Managing Earnings with Intercorporate Investments

Abstract:  We explore to what extent firms deliberately manage their financial reports by exploiting the flexibility of generally accepted accounting principles. Using a sample of Oslo Stock Exchange-listed firms with 20–50% equity holdings in other firms, we find that firms with high financial leverage tend to maximize reported earnings from these investments through their choice between the cost method and the equity method, possibly in an attempt to reduce debt renegotiation costs or to avoid regulatory attention. In contrast, managers do not systematically bias reported earnings to extract private benefits or to signal revised expectations about future cash flows. Firms use different earnings management tools in a consistent way, as the earnings effect of the cost/equity choice is not offset by discretionary accruals.