M&A needn't be a loser's game

Three out of four acquisitions fail; they destroy wealth for the buyer's shareholders, who end up worse off than they would have been had the deal not been done. But it doesn't have to be that way, argue the authors. In evaluating acquisitions, companies must look beyond the lure of profits the income statement promises and examine the balance sheet, where the company keeps track of capital. It's ignoring the balance sheet that causes so many acquisitions to destroy shareholders' wealth. Unfortunately, most executives focus only on sales and profits going up, never realizing that they've put in motion a plan to destroy their company's true profitability--its return on invested capital. M&A, like other aspects of running a company, works best when seen as a way to create shareholder value through customers. Some deals are sought to help create better value propositions for the business or to better execute current strategies--or to block competitors from doing these things. But most deals are about customers and should start with an analysis of customer profitability. Some customers are deliciously profitable; others are dismal money losers. The better an acquirer understands the profitability of its own customers, the better positioned it will be to perform such analyses on other companies. In this article, the authors show that customer profitability varies far more dramatically than most managers suspect. They also describe how to measure the profitability of customers. By understanding the economics of customer profitability, companies can avoid making deals that hurt their shareholders, they can identify surprising deals that do create wealth, and they can salvage deals that would otherwise be losers.     

Customer value exchange

This paper discusses the state of the US banking industry — its challenges and some of the common shortcomings of their current strategies — and presents compelling reasons why banks must re-formulate new strategies for growth and profitability focused on the customer. It proposes a framework, called the customer value exchange (CVE), as a potential solution that would enable banks to develop effective strategies tailored to their customers’ specific needs and perceptions of value, which are the drivers for profitability. This framework is organised into capabilities, which are explained in this paper. A sample process for how these capabilities are applied is provided with an emphasis on an iterative, dynamic refinement process. The iterative approach includes strategy, people, process, analyses and information that companies can integrate to yield higher value and exchange with the banks’ customers. The paper also presents a real company case study. This framework can be utilised by academics and industry practitioners of customer relationship programmes alike.     

Maintaining a Flexible Payout Policy in a Mature Industry: The Case of Crown Cork and Seal in the Connelly Era

This case study suggests that the payment of cash dividends may not be essential to the long-run success of even mature companies. A mature company in a mature industry, the Crown Cork and Seal Company did not pay any common dividends during John Connelly's 33-year tenure as chairman and CEO. During that period (from 1957 to 1990), the company used stock repurchases along with a compensation policy featuring low executive salaries and generous executive stock options to motivate and execute a focused business strategy. Under the leadership of Connelly, Crown was rescued from what appeared to be certain bankruptcy to become one of the most profitable firms in its industry. Debt was immediately paid down, preferred stock was retired, and the firm's operations were revamped and streamlined. Instead of following the diversification strategies of larger industry peers, Crown's strategy was focused and driven by profit margin and customer service. This strategy eventually led Crown to invest internationally and acquire one of its major rivals. In addition to significant equity ownership by Crown's management and board members, the company's board had a remarkable number of “outsiders” and representatives from international operations, creating a culture that was outward-looking as well as cohesive. And without paying a dollar of dividends—a practice that many finance scholars believe imposes a necessary discipline on mature companies—Crown both preserved its financing flexibility and produced a remarkable record of increases in both profits and market value.     

The service-driven service company

For more than 40 years, service companies like McDonald's prospered with organizations designed according to the principles of traditional mass-production manufacturing. Today that model is obsolete. It inevitably degrades the quality of service a company can provide by setting in motion a cycle of failure that produces dissatisfied customers, unhappy employees, high turnover among both--and so lower profits and lower productivity overall. The cycle starts with human resource policies that minimize the contributions frontline workers can make: jobs are designed to be idiot-proof. Technology is used largely for monitoring and control. Pay is poor. Training is minimal. Performance expectations are abysmally low. Today companies like Taco Bell, Dayton Hudson, and ServiceMaster are reversing the cycle of failure by putting workers with customer contact first and designing the business system around them. As a result, they are developing a model that replaces the logic of industrialization with a new service-driven logic. This logic: Values investments in people as much as investments in technology--and sometimes more. Uses technology to support the efforts of workers on the front lines, not just to monitor or replace them. Makes recruitment and training crucial for everyone. Links compensation to performance for employees at every level. To justify these investments, the new logic draws on innovative data such as the incremental profits of loyal customers and the total costs of lost employees. Its benefits are becoming clear in higher profits and higher pay--results that competitors bound to the old industrial model will not be able to match.     

Best face forward

Most companies serve customers through a broad array of interfaces, from retail sales clerks to Web sites to voice-response telephone systems. But while the typical company has an impressive interface collection, it doesn't have an interface system. That is, the whole set does not add up to the sum of its parts in its ability to provide service and build customer relationships. Too many people and too many machines operating with insufficient coordination (and often at cross-purposes) mean rising complexity, costs, and customer dissatisfaction. In a world where companies compete not on what they sell but on how they sell it, turning that liability into an asset is what separates winners from losers. In this adaptation of their forthcoming book by the same title, Jeffrey Rayport and Bernard Jaworski explain how companies must reengineer their customer interface systems for optimal efficiency and effectiveness. Part of that transformation, they observe, will involve a steady encroachment by machine interfaces into areas that have long been the sacred province of humans. Managers now have opportunities unprecedented in the history of business to use machines, not just people, to credibly manage their interactions with customers. Because people and machines each have their strengths and weaknesses, company executives must identify what people do best, what machines do best, and how to deploy them separately and together. Front-office reengineering subjects every current and potential service interface to an analysis of opportunities for substitution (using machines instead of people), complementarity (using a mix of machines and people), and displacement (using networks to shift physical locations of people and machines), with the twin objectives of compressing costs and driving top-line growth through increased customer value.     

The competitive advantage of corporate philanthropy

When it comes to philanthropy, executives increasingly see themselves as caught between critics demanding ever higher levels of "corporate social responsibility" and investors applying pressure to maximize short-term profits. In response, many companies have sought to make their giving more strategic, but what passes for strategic philanthropy is almost never truly strategic, and often isn't particularly effective as philanthropy. Increasingly, philanthropy is used as a form of public relations or advertising, promoting a company's image through high-profile sponsorships. But there is a more truly strategic way to think about philanthropy. Corporations can use their charitable efforts to improve their competitive context--the quality of the business environment in the locations where they operate. Using philanthropy to enhance competitive context aligns social and economic goals and improves a company's long-term business prospects. Addressing context enables a company to not only give money but also leverage its capabilities and relationships in support of charitable causes. The produces social benefits far exceeding those provided by individual donors, foundations, or even governments. Taking this new direction requires fundamental changes in the way companies approach their contribution programs. For example, philanthropic investments can improve education and local quality of life in ways that will benefit the company. Such investments can also improve the company's competitiveness by contributing to expanding the local market and helping to reduce corruption in the local business environment. Adopting a context-focused approach goes against the grain of current philanthropic practice, and it requires a far more disciplined approach than is prevalent today. But it can make a company's philanthropic activities far more effective.     

The customer experience ecosystem in two cultural contexts

This study focuses on the development of a customer experience ecosystem during a journey which is embedded in meso- and macro-layers. Using the critical incident technique, the author collected in-depth interview data from bank customers in Switzerland and Iran to empirically study this ecosystem, including customer–company interaction in the micro-layer and social context of the meso-layer. Moreover, in a macro-layer analysis, the Hofstede cultural dimension was employed to show the role of cultural context in this ecosystem. The findings indicate that customer experience in the pre-encounter stage is mostly shaped by customer past experience and social context rather than company touchpoint. The importance of these factors is different in the two cultural contexts. Although customer experience in the encounter stage is mainly the result of customer and company interactions, other people have a role in this stage and cultural differences between the two countries largely explain these differences. Moreover, in the post-encounter stage, customers in different cultural contexts use various factors to evaluate their experiences and the effects on their emotional and behavioral responses. The findings provide key managerial implications for national and international companies with respect to the role of multiple layers in customer experience management.     

Why business models matter

"Business model" was one of the great buzz-words of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a Web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, WalMart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.     

Get inside the lives of your customers

Many companies have become adept at the art of customer relationship management. They've collected mountains of data on preferences and behavior, divided buyers into ever-finer segments, and refined their products, services, and marketing pitches. But all too often those efforts are too narrow--they concentrate only on the points where the customer comes into contact with the company. Few businesses have bothered to look at what the author calls the customer scenario--the broad context in which customers select, buy, and use products and services. As a result, consultant Patricia Seybold maintains, they've routinely missed chances to deepen loyalty and expand sales. In this article, the author shows how effective three very different companies have been at using customer scenarios as the centerpiece of their marketing plans. Chip maker National Semiconductor looked beyond the purchasing agents that buy in bulk to find ways to make it easier for engineers to design National's components into their specifications for mobile telephones. Each time they do so, it translates into millions of dollars in orders. By developing a customer scenario that describes how people actually shop for groceries, Tesco learned the importance of decentralizing its Web shopping site and how the extra costs of decentralization could be outweighed by the higher profit margins on-line customers generate. And Buzzsaw.com used customer scenarios as the basis for its entire business. It has used the Web to create a better way for the dozens of participants in a construction project to share their drawings and manage their projects. Seybold lays out the steps managers can take to develop their own customer scenarios. By thinking broadly about the challenges your customers face, she suggests, you can almost always find ways to make their lives easier--and thus earn their loyalty.     

Profit pools: a fresh look at strategy

In charting strategy, many managers focus on revenue growth, assuming that profits will follow. But that approach is dangerous: today's deep revenue pool may become tomorrow's dry hole. To create strategies that result in profitable growth, managers need to look beyond revenues to see the shape of their industry's profit pool. The authors define an industry's profit pool as the total profits earned at all points along the industry's value chain. Although the concept is simple, the structure of a profit pool is usually quite complex. The pool will be deeper in some segments of the value chain than in others, and depths will vary within an individual segment as well. Segment profitability may, for example, vary widely by customer group, product category, geographic market, and distribution channel. Moreover, the pattern of profit concentration in an industry will often be very different from the pattern of revenue concentration. The authors describe how successful companies have gained competitive advantage by developing sophisticated profit-pool strategies. They explain how U-Haul identified new sources of profit in the consumer-truck-rental industry; how Merck reached beyond its traditional value-chain role to protect its profits in the pharmaceuticals industry; how Dell rebounded from a misguided channel decision by refocusing on its traditional source of profit; and how Anheuser-Busch made a series of astute product, pricing, and operating decisions to dominate the beer industry's profit pool. The companies with the best understanding of their industry's profit pool, the authors argue, will be in the best position to thrive over the long term.     

Loyalty-based management

Despite a flurry of activities aimed at serving customers better, few companies have systematically revamped their operations with customer loyalty in mind. Instead, most have adopted improvement programs ad hoc, and paybacks haven't materialized. Building a highly loyal customer base must be integral to a company's basic business strategy. Loyalty leaders like MBNA credit cards are successful because they have designed their entire business systems around customer loyalty--a self-reinforcing system in which the company delivers superior value consistently and reinvents cash flows to find and keep high-quality customers and employees. The economic benefits of high customer loyalty are measurable. When a company consistently delivers superior value and wins customer loyalty, market share and revenues go up, and the cost of acquiring new customers goes down. The better economics mean the company can pay workers better, which sets off a whole chain of events. Increased pay boosts employee moral and commitment; as employees stay longer, their productivity goes up and training costs fall; employees' overall job satisfaction, combined with their experience, helps them serve customers better; and customers are then more inclined to stay loyal to the company. Finally, as the best customers and employees become part of the loyalty-based system, competitors are left to survive with less desirable customers and less talented employees. To compete on loyalty, a company must understand the relationships between customer retention and the other parts of the business--and be able to quantify the linkages between loyalty and profits. It involves rethinking and aligning four important aspects of the business: customers, product/service offering, employees, and measurement systems.     

Charting your company's future

Few companies have a clear strategic vision. The problem, say the authors, stems from the strategic-planning process itself, which usually involves preparing a large document, culled from a mishmash of data provided by people with conflicting agendas. That kind of process almost guarantees an unfocused strategy. Instead, companies should design the strategic-planning process by drawing a picture: a strategy canvas. A strategy canvas shows the strategic profile of your industry by depicting the various factors that affect competition. And it shows the strategic profiles of your current and potential competitors as well as your own company's strategic profile--how it invests in the factors of competition and how it might in the future. The basic component of a strategy canvas--the value curve--is a tool the authors created in their consulting work and have written about in previous HBR articles. This article introduces a four-step process for actually drawing and discussing a strategy canvas. Readers will learn how one European financial services company used this process to create a distinct and easily communicable strategy. The process begins with a visual awakening. Managers compare their business's value curve with competitors' to discover where their strategy needs to change. In the next step--visual exploration--managers do field research on customers and alternative products. At the visual strategy fair, the third step, managers draw new strategic profiles based on field observations and get feedback from customers and peers about these new proposals. Once the best strategy is created from that feedback, it's time for the last step--visual communication. Executives distribute "before" and "after" strategic profiles to the whole company, and only projects that will help move the company closer to the "after" profile are supported.     

How to invest in social capital.

Business runs better when people within a company have close ties and trust one another. But the relationships that make organizations work effectively are under assault for several reasons. Building such "social capital" is difficult in volatile times. Disruptive technologies spawn new markets daily, and organizations respond with constantly changing structures. The problem is worsened by the virtuality of many of today's workplaces, with employees working off-site or on their own. What's more, few managers know how to invest in such social capital. The authors describe how managers can help their organizations thrive by making effective investments in social capital. For instance, companies that value social capital demonstrate a commitment to retention as a way of limiting workplace volatility. The authors cite SAS's extensive efforts to signal to employees that it sees them as human beings, not just workers. Managers can build trust by showing trust themselves, as well as by rewarding trust and sending clear signals to employees. They can foster cooperation by giving employees a common sense of purpose through good strategic communication and inspirational leadership. Johnson & Johnson's well-known credo, which says the company's first responsibility is to the people who use its products, has helped the company in time of adversity, as in 1982 when cyanide in Tylenol capsules killed seven people. Other methods of fostering cooperation include rewarding the behavior with cash and establishing rules that get people into the habit of cooperating. Social capital, once a given in organizations, is now rare and endangered. By investing in it, companies will be better positioned to seize the opportunities in today's volatile, virtual business environment.     

Corporate tax reforms and tax-motivated profit shifting: evidence from the EU

This paper examines whether the profit-shifting trend in Europe during 2003–2013 can be explained by tax policy changes. Consistent with prior literature, we find that affiliates’ profits are sensitive to tax rate changes. However, we document that tax base–broadening reforms have mitigated the incentives for both inward and outward profit shifting. In particular, we find that anti-avoidance rules prevent multinational companies from shifting profits out of their foreign affiliates, whereas other tax base–broadening rules, such as restrictions on the deductibility of tax losses or on group tax relief, reduce the incentives for multinational companies to shift profits into foreign affiliates. Furthermore, we find evidence of a downward trend in profit shifting across European countries, especially when the tax enforcement is stricter. Overall, these results suggest that broader tax bases and stricter tax enforcement have successfully curbed this particular tax strategy.     

Don't homogenize, synchronize.

To be more responsive to customers, companies often break down organizational walls between their units--setting up all manner of cross-business and cross-functional task forces and working groups and promoting a "one-company" culture. But such attempts can backfire terribly by distracting business and functional units and by contaminating their strategies and processes. Fortunately, there's a better way, says the author. Rather than tear down organizational walls, a company can make them permeable to information. It can synchronize all its data on products, filtering the information through linked databases and applications and delivering it in a coordinated, meaningful form to customers. As a result, the organization can present a single, unified face to the customer--one that can change as market conditions warrant--without imposing homogeneity on its people. Such synchronization can lead not just to stronger customer relationships and more sales but also to greater operational efficiency. It allows a company, for example, to avoid the high costs of maintaining many different information systems with redundant data. The decoupling of product control from customer control in a synchronized company reflects a fundamental fact about business: While companies have to focus on creating great products, customers think in terms of the activities they perform and the benefits they seek. For companies, products are ends, but for customers, products are means. The disconnect between how customers think and how companies organize themselves is what leads to inefficiencies and missed opportunities, and that's exactly the problem that synchronization solves. Synchronized companies can get closer to customers, sustain product innovation, and improve operational efficiency--goals that have traditionally been very difficult to achieve simultaneously.     

Strategy as simple rules

The success of Yahoo!, eBay, Enron, and other companies that have become adept at morphing to meet the demands of changing markets can't be explained using traditional thinking about competitive strategy. These companies have succeeded by pursuing constantly evolving strategies in market spaces that were considered unattractive according to traditional measures. In this article--the third in an HBR series by Kathleen Eisenhardt and Donald Sull on strategy in the new economy--the authors ask, what are the sources of competitive advantage in high-velocity markets? The secret, they say, is strategy as simple rules. The companies know that the greatest opportunities for competitive advantage lie in market confusion, but they recognize the need for a few crucial strategic processes and a few simple rules. In traditional strategy, advantage comes from exploiting resources or stable market positions. In strategy as simple rules, advantage comes from successfully seizing fleeting opportunities. Key strategic processes, such as product innovation, partnering, or spinout creation, place the company where the flow of opportunities is greatest. Simple rules then provide the guidelines within which managers can pursue such opportunities. Simple rules, which grow out of experience, fall into five broad categories: how- to rules, boundary conditions, priority rules, timing rules, and exit rules. Companies with simple-rules strategies must follow the rules religiously and avoid the temptation to change them too frequently. A consistent strategy helps managers sort through opportunities and gain short-term advantage by exploiting the attractive ones. In stable markets, managers rely on complicated strategies built on detailed predictions of the future. But when business is complicated, strategy should be simple.     

Attracting Long‐Term Investors Through Integrated Thinking and Reporting: A Clinical Study of a Biopharmaceutical Company

Faced with a large percentage of investors that chase short‐term returns, companies could benefit by attracting investors with longer‐term horizons and incentives that are more consistent with the long‐term strategy of the company. The managers of most companies take their investor base as a “given” that cannot be changed through their actions or words. Using the case of Shire, a biopharmaceutical company with a strong commitment to the goals of improving the safety of its products and the reliability of its supply chain, the authors of this article suggest that companies have the ability and the means to change their investor base in ways that are consistent with their strategy. One of the most promising ways of attracting such investors is integrated reporting, which provides companies with a means of credibly communicating the commitment of its top leadership to diffusing integrated thinking across the organization and to building strong relationships with important external stakeholders. In the case of Shire, both a commitment to integrated thinking and the adoption of integrated reporting appear to have helped the company attract longer‐term investors, which in turn has strengthened management's confidence to carry out its strategy of stakeholder engagement and investment.     

Bottom-feeding for blockbuster businesses

Marketing experts tell companies to analyze their customer portfolios and weed out buyer segments that don't generate attractive returns. Loyalty experts stress the need to aim retention programs at "good" customers--profitable ones- and encourage the "bad" ones to buy from competitors. And customer-relationship-management software provides ever more sophisticated ways to identify and eliminate poorly performing customers. On the surface, the movement to banish unprofitable customers seems reasonable. But writing off a customer relationship simply because it is currently unprofitable is at best rash and at worst counterproductive. Executives shouldn't be asking themselves, How can we shun unprofitable customers? They need to ask, How can we make money off the customers that everyone else is shunning? When you look at apparently unattractive segments through this lens, you often see opportunities to serve those segments in ways that fundamentally change customer economics. Consider Paychex, a payroll-processing company that built a nearly billion-dollar business by serving small companies. Established players had ignored these customers on the assumption that small companies couldn't afford the service. When founder Tom Golisano couldn't convince his bosses at Electronic Accounting Systems that they were missing a major opportunity, he started a company that now serves 390,000 U.S. customers, each employing around 14 people. In this article, the authors look closely at bottom-feeders--companies that assessed the needs of supposedly unattractive customers and redesigned their business models to turn a profit by fulfilling those needs. And they offer lessons other executives can use to do the same.     

Zero defections: quality comes to services

Companies that want to improve their service quality should take a cue from manufacturing and focus on their own kind of scrap heap: customers who won't come back. Because that scrap heap can be every bit as costly as broken parts and misfit components, service company managers should strive to reduce it. They should aim for "zero defections"--keeping every customer they can profitably serve. As companies reduce customer defection rates, amazing things happen to their financials. Although the magnitude of the change varies by company and industry, the pattern holds: profits rise sharply. Reducing the defection rate just 5% generates 85% more profits in one bank's branch system, 50% more in an insurance brokerage, and 30% more in an auto-service chain. And when MBNA America, a Delaware-based credit card company, cut its 10% defection rate in half, profits rose a whopping 125%. But defection rates are not just a measure of service quality; they are also a guide for achieving it. By listening to the reasons why customers defect, managers learn exactly where the company is falling short and where to direct their resources. Staples, the stationery supplies retailer, uses feedback from customers to pinpoint products that are priced too high. That way, the company avoids expensive broad-brush promotions that pitch everything to everyone. Like any important change, managing for zero defections requires training and reinforcement. Great-West Life Assurance Company pays a 50% premium to group health-insurance brokers that hit customer-retention targets, and MBNA America gives bonuses to departments that hit theirs.     

Kill a brand, keep a customer

Most brands don't make much money. Year after year, businesses generate 80% to 90% of their profits from less than 20% of their brands. Yet most companies tend to ignore loss-making brands, unaware of the hidden costs they incur. That's because executives believe it's easy to erase a brand; they have only to stop investing in it, they assume, and it will die a natural death. But they're wrong. When companies drop brands clumsily, they antagonize loyal customers: Research shows that seven times out of eight, when firms merge two brands, the market share of the new brand never reaches the combined share of the two original ones. It doesn't have to be that way. Smart companies use a four-step process to kill brands methodically. First, CEOs make the case for rationalization by getting groups of senior executives to conduct joint audits of the brand portfolio. These audits make the need to prune brands apparent throughout the organization. In the next stage, executives need to decide how many brands will be retained, which they do either by setting broad parameters that all brands must meet or by identifying the brands they need in order to cater to all the customer segments in their markets. Third, executives must dispose of the brands they've decided to drop, deciding in each case whether it is appropriate to merge, sell, milk, or just eliminate the brand outright. Finally, it's critical that executives invest the resources they've freed to grow the brands they've retained. Done right, dropping brands will result in a company poised for new growth from the source where it's likely to be found--its profitable brands.