Stakeholder Management, Reciprocity and Stakeholder Responsibility

Stakeholder theory advocates that firms bear responsibility for the implications of their actions. However, while a firm affects or can affect stakeholders, stakeholders can also affect the corporation. Previous stakeholder theorising has neglected the reciprocal nature of responsibility. The question can be asked whether??in a spirit of reciprocity, loyalty and fairness??stakeholders should treat the corporation in a fair and responsible way. This study based on different definitions of stakeholders argues that various stakeholder attributes differ for different categories of stakeholders. This analysis presumes that the attribute of stakeholder reciprocity can probably be restricted to real stakeholders, labelled stakeowners: genuine stakeholders with a legitimate stake, the loyal partners who strive for mutual benefits. Stakeowners own and deserve a stake in the firm. Stakeholder reciprocity could be an innovative criterion in the corporate governance debate as to who should be accorded representation on the board. Corporate social responsibility should imply corporate stakeholder responsibility.     

Evaluating Stakeholder Theory

This paper is the third in a series of four that is directed at understanding and assessing stakeholder theory for the purposes of business ethics. It addresses the suitability and viability of the theory, rejecting objections of a moral and efficiency sort based (respectively) on claims about property rights and the economic superiority of the alternative stockholder approach, but accepting that implementation problems require limiting both the number of groupings admitted to stakeholder status and the degree of responsibility towards them. The conclusion looks forward to the construction of a suitably limited version of the stakeholder approach in a fourth paper drawing upon this one and the previous two.John Kaler teachers at the University of Plymonth Business School. He is the co-author of An Introduction to Business Ethics (Chapman and Hall, 1993; ITP, 1996) and Essentials of Business Ethics (McGraw-Hill, 1996), and co-editor of the ‘Teaching Business Ethics’ website hosted by the Institute of Business Ethics.     

From Stakeholder Management to Stakeholder Accountability

Confronted with mounting pressure to ensure accountability vis-à-vis customers, citizens and beneficiaries, organizational leaders need to decide how to choose and implement so-called accountability standards. Yet while looking for an appropriate standard, they often base their decisions on cost-benefit calculations, thus neglecting other important spheres of influence pertaining to more broadly defined stakeholder interests. We argue in this paper that, as a part of the strategic decision for a certain standard, management needs to identify and act according to the needs of all stakeholders. We contend that the creation of a dialogical understanding among affected stakeholders cannot be a mere outcome of applying certain accountability standards, but rather must be a necessary precondition for their use. This requires a stakeholder dialogue prior to making a choice. We outline such a discursive decision framework for accountability standards based on the Habermasian concept of communicative action and, in the final section, apply our conceptual framework to one of the most prominent accountability tools (AA 1000). Andreas Rasche is currently working at the chair for Business Administration at the Helmut-Schmidt-University, Hamburg, Germany and is finishing his PhD in strategic management at EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL, Germany where he is also teaching business ethics. His research interests include the institutionalization of ethics initiatives in multinational corporations (see also www.ethics-in-pratice.org) and reflections about the theory of strategic management. Daniel Esser until recently was a Tutorial Fellow in Development Management at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is now working for the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific where he is involved in the design and management of urban governance programmes and service schemes supporting the poverty reduction agenda for the region.     

The Future of Stakeholder Management Theory: A Temporal Perspective

We propose adding a temporal dimension to stakeholder management theory, and assess the implications thereof for firm-level competitive advantage. We argue that a firm’s competitive advantage fundamentally depends on its capacity for stakeholder management related, transformational adaptation over time. Our new temporal stakeholder management approach builds upon insights from both the resource-based view (RBV) in strategic management and institutional theory. Stakeholder agendas and their relative salience to the firm evolve over time, a phenomenon well understood in the literature, and requiring what we call level 1 adaptation. However, the dominant direction of stakeholder pressures can also change, namely, from supporting resource heterogeneity at the firm level to fostering industry homogeneity, and vice versa. When dominant stakeholder pressures shift from supporting heterogeneity towards stimulating homogeneity in industry, the firm must engage in level 2 or transformational adaptation. Stakeholders typically provide valuable resources to the firm in an early stage. Without these resources, which foster heterogeneity (in line with RBV thinking), the firm would not exist. At a later stage, stakeholders also contribute to inter-firm homogeneity via isomorphism pressures (in line with institutional theory thinking). Adding a temporal dimension to stakeholder management theory has far reaching implications for this theory’s practical relevance to senior level management in business.     

Morality and Strategy in Stakeholder identification

Definitions of what it is to be a stakeholder are divided into "claimant" definitions requiring some sort of claim on the services of a business, "influencer" definitions requiring only a capacity to influence the workings of the business, and "combinatory" definitions allowing for either or both of these requirements. It is argued that for the purposes of business ethics, stakeholding has to be about improving the moral conduct of businesses by directing them at serving more than just the interests of owners. On that basis, influencer definitions are eliminated on the grounds that they only concern morally neutral strategic considerations and combinatory definitions on the grounds that the combining of ethical and strategic considerations they promise can be less confusingly achieved through an exclusively claimant definition. It is concluded that for the purposes of business ethics, stakeholders are claimants towards whom businesses owe perfect or imperfect moral duties beyond those generally owed to people at large.     

Problems of Stakeholder Theory

Stakeholder theory diverts attention from creating business success to concentrating on who share its fruits. But what right have stakeholders to make the claims they do? Perhaps a new model is needed. T.F.J. Ambler is Grand Metropolitan Senior Research Fellow at London Business School, Sussex Place, Regent's Park, London NW1 4SA, where Andrea Wilson completed her MBA in 1993. She is now a consultant in New York.     

对利益相关者理论的再认识

利益相关者理论是现代企业理论、契约理论研究的核心问题之一.通过对利益相关者理论的界定、起源,发展、内涵、理论基础及其应用进行综述,期望对利益相关者理论形成一个清晰的框架.     

Market Orientation,Competitive Strategy and Firm Performance

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the mediating effects of a firm's competitive strategy in the market orientation-performance relationship. Based on a sample of 371 manufacturing firms in China, evidence was found that the three dimensions of market orientation exert different effects on competitive strategy and performance. Among them, customer orientation has the strongest association with competitive strategy and market performance. This lends credence to a componentwise approach on the study of the relationship between market orientation and performance. The results of structural equation analyses indicate that the mediating effect of competitive strategy is mainly revealed in innovation strategy, the most vital factor in creating superior value for the company in the emerging market. Limitations of this study and implications for future studies are discussed.     

Living in Agreement with a Contract: The Management of Moral and Viable Firm–Stakeholder Relationships

In a contractual firm–stakeholder relationship the participants are expected to act according to the agreement and for mutual benefit. By acting against the agreement at the expense of the other participant, however, may result in higher individual profits within a short period of time. Building on the unlocked iterated prisoner’s dilemma (PD) setting, Scanlon’s [Scanlon, T.␣M.: 1998, What We Owe to Each Other (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass)] version of contractualism, and the social dilemma literature, this article considers what types of behaviors should be followed by both parties in an established firm–stakeholder relationship in order to reach an outcome that is defensible both in terms of morality and viability. It is argued that a normative foundation, which advises firms and stakeholders to ground their behavior on principles that could not reasonably be rejected by others, forms a basis for moral and viable behavior that can be expressed in the form of a strategic rule that excludes defection and utilizes the option to exit in response to the other participant’s defection. Then, a set of testable propositions is developed that describe how a firm and its stakeholders can further promote moral and viable relationships.Kalle Pajunen received his Ph.D. in strategic management. His current research interests include research methodologies, turnaround processes, stakeholder theory, strategic leadership, and business ethics. His recent articles appear (or are forthcoming) for instance in Advances in Strategic Management, Human Relations, Journal of Management Studies, and Leadership.     

Behavioral Economics,Federalism, and the Triumph of Stakeholder Theory

Stakeholder theorists distinguish between normative stakeholders, those who gain moral standing by making contributions to the firm, and derivative stakeholders, those who can constrain the corporate association even though they make no contribution. The board of directors has the legal authority to distinguish among these stakeholder groups and to distribute rights and obligations among these stakeholder groups. To be sure, this stakeholder formulation appropriately seizes on the firm’s voluntary, associative character. Yet, the firm’s constituents contribute assets and incur risks to participate in market, economic activities. And, as such, the firm’s “stakeholders” must share an imperfect language to assist in making two key economic decisions: (1) who are the legitimate and who are the derivative stakeholders; and (2) who should sit on the board? Still, stakeholder theorists have good reason to be skeptical of neoclassical economics. Its assumptions that all act opportunistically and that all can calculate rationally and fully hardly correspond to studies on the managerial experience of corporate coordination. However, advances in behavioral law and economics now provide a cogent economic logic that readily fits into a stakeholder mode. In brief, we argue that (1) the firm’s economic purpose designates legitimacy to core stakeholders, to those who add value, assume unique risk, and can incur harm; (2) the board serves as the principal who coordinates these core stakeholders to sustain competitive advantage and new wealth creation; and (3) state incorporation law, Delaware in particular, reinforces the board’s function. These, in turn, supply selection criteria for board membership. We aim to synchronize concepts from behavioral law and economics with stakeholder theory.     

Reframing the Debate Between Agency and Stakeholder Theories of the Firm

The conflict between agency and stakeholder theories of the firm has long been entrenched in organizational and management literature. At the core of this debate are two competing views of the firm in which assumptions and process contrast each other so sharply that agency and stakeholder views of the firm are often described as polar opposites. The purpose of this paper is to show how agency theory can be subsumed within a general stakeholder model of the firm. By analytically deconstructing the assumptions of agency theory, it is argued that agency theory: (1) must include a recognition of stakeholders; (2) requires a moral minimum to be upheld, which places four moral principles above the interests of any stakeholders, including shareholders; (3) consists of contradictory assumptions about human nature and which give rise to the equally valid assumptions of trust, honesty and loyalty to be infused into the agency relationship. In this way, stakeholder theory is argued to be the logical conclusion of agency theory. Empirical hypotheses are presented as a means to substantiate this claim.     

Dynamic and Responsive Firm Strategy

Abstract

Since the opening of China in 1980, Hong Kong manufacturing industries collaborated with China manufacturing industries to maintain a low-cost labor intensive strategy. The strategy seems to be sufficient in maintaining the global competitive advantage of Hong Kong for the past two decades. However, with the rapid organizational learning of the Chinese partner and the reluctance of the Hong Kong partner to upgrade technology, Hong Kong manufacturing industries are facing the risk of potential loss of competitive advantages. This article attempts to review this dynamic evolution of HK/China collaborations and suggest some future actions for Hong Kong manufacturing industries to maintain their competitiveness. At the same time, the article also provides some ideas for global investors to rethink their future firm strategies in China.     

利益相关者理论研究现状综述

利益相关者理论现有研究主要集中在利益相关者参与治理的基础、利益相关者的界定和分类三个方面。现有研究重理论分析,实证支持不够;现有研究在对利益相关者界定及分类时未考虑企业所处的行业和生命周期;现有研究在对利益相关者利益的量化方面处于空白。     

基于利益相关者理论的废旧家电回收管理体系

电子产品带给人们方便的同时也带来了大量的废旧电器,如何回收并有效处理是各国面临的新问题之一。所以只有将利益相关者理论与废旧家电回收管理结合起来,从利益相关者的角度对发达国家废旧家电回收管理体系进行剖析,才能为我国建立可持续的废旧家电回收管理体系提供参考。     

The Application of Stakeholder Theory to Relationship Marketing Strategy Development in a Non-profit Organization

Non-profit (NP) organizations present complex challenges in managing stakeholder relationships, particularly during times of environmental change. This places a premium on knowing which stakeholders really matter if an effective relationship marketing strategy is to be developed. This article presents the successful application of a model, which combines Mitchell’s theory of stakeholder saliency and Coviello’s framework of contemporary marketing practices in a leading NP organization in the U.K. A cooperative enquiry approach is used to explore stakeholder relationships, dominant marketing practices, and to surface differing perceptions about the organization’s marketing strategy. Resolving these differences sets the scene for developing choices in marketing strategy for the future. Simon Knox is Professor of Brand Marketing at the Cranfield School of Management in the UK and is a consultant to a number of multinational companies including Levi Strauss, DiverseyLever, BT and Exel. Upon graduating, he followed a career in the marketing of international brands with Unilever plc in a number of senior marketing roles in both detergents and foods. Since joining Cranfield, Simon has published over 100 papers and books on strategic marketing and branding and is a regular speaker at international conferences. He is a Director of the Cranfield Centre for Brand Management Development in the School and is currently looking at the impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Brand Management. He is the co-author of two recent books, "Competing on Value", published by FT Pitman Publishing in the UK, Germany, the USA and China, and "Creating a Company for Customers", FT Prentice-Hall, in the UK, Brazil and India. Colin Gruar is currently studying for his Doctorate of Business Administration at the School. His thesis is concerned with developing marketing strategy across stakeholder groups in the Not-for-Profit sector.Formerly Head of Marketing at a major UK medical research charity, Colin has also had senior roles in sales, marketing and operations management in a range of sectors including manufacturing, financial services and energy supply.     

Stakeholder Theory and Managerial Decision-Making: Constraints and Implications of Balancing Stakeholder Interests

Stakeholder theory is widely recognized as a management theory, yet very little research has considered its implications for individual managerial decision-making. In the two studies reported here, we used stakeholder theory to examine managerial decisions about balancing stakeholder interests. Results of Study 1 suggest that indivisible resources and unequal levels of stakeholder saliency constrain managers’ efforts to balance stakeholder interests. Resource divisibility also influenced whether managers used a within-decision or an across-decision approach to balance stakeholder interests. In Study 2 we examined instrumental and normative implications of these two approaches. We conclude by considering the contributions of this research.     

The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm and Firm Survival

This paper examines the determinants of firm survival. We use hazard models to test a number of hypotheses mainly drawn from the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm. According to the Resource-Based View the ability of a firm to develop distinct capabilities enhances its ability to adapt to the changing competitive environment and improves its survival prospects. The results confirm that firms that develop firm-specific assets through advertising and making R&D (independently of the technological intensity of the industry) enjoy better survival prospects. Furthermore, failure risk increases up to about 20 years of trading, and then decreases to later rise in line with liability of “adolescence” and “senescence.”      

The Stakeholder Theory and the Common Good

The theory of the social responsibility of the firm oscillates between two extremes: one that reduces the firm's responsibility to the obtainment of (the greatest possible) profit for its shareholders, and another that extends the firm's responsibility to include a wide range of actors with an interest or "stake" in the firm. The stakeholder theory of the social responsibility of business is more appealing from an ethical point of view, and yet it lacks a solid foundation that would be acceptable to a variety of schools of thought. In this paper I argue that the stakeholder theory could be founded on the concept of the common good. First, I explain the foundations of the theory of the common good, the concept itself, how it relates to the individual good, and its role in the firm. Following that, I explain how the theory of the common good could be applied to the stakeholder theory. Finally, I draw some conclusions.