Governance factors enabling knowledge transfer in interorganisational development projects

In this study we examine governance factors affecting knowledge transfer in interorganisational development projects. There is a gap in the literature indicating a need for more insights into processes of knowledge sharing and governance of interorganisational development projects. By using cases from the Dutch construction industry, we discus how interorganisational development projects are governed and what impact this has on knowledge transfer between the firms involved. We find that knowledge transfer towards participating firms cooperating in an interorganisational development project is positively influenced when partners govern their cooperation by using mutual trust and contract complementary.     

社会资本影响社交网络知识共享效果的实证研究

结合社会资本理论及社交网络中知识共享行为相关研究,构建了社会资本3个维度影响社交网络知识共享效果的概念模型,选择“知乎”网用户作为研究对象,应用数据抓取技术获得354份有效问卷,应用网络分析技术和回归方法对模型进行验证。结果表明：社会资本结构维度与知识共享质量显著正相关,但与知识共享数量不存在显著影响关系;认知维度与知识共享质量和数量显著正相关;关系维度中信任、社区认可与知识共享质量显著正相关,但互惠与知识共享质量不存在显著影响关系;关系维度中互惠、社区认可与知识共享数量显著正相关,但信任与知识共享数量不存在显著影响关系。     

Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable

Societies provide institutions that are costly to set up, but able to enforce long-run relationships. We study the optimal decision problem of using self-governance for risk sharing or governance through enforcement provided by these institutions. Third-party enforcement is modelled as a costly technology that consumes resources, but permits the punishment of agents who deviate from ex ante specified allocations. We show that it is optimal to employ the technology whenever commitment problems prevent first-best risk sharing and fixed costs are sufficiently low, but never optimal to provide incentives exclusively via this technology. Commitment problems then persist and the optimal incentive structure changes dynamically over time with third-party enforcement monotonically increasing in the relative inequality between agents.     

社会资本与技术支持对学术虚拟社区知识共享的影响——基于科学网平台的知识共享要素分析

学术虚拟社区是广大学者和科研工作者进行知识交流与探讨的重要平台，也是学术碰撞和知识创新的新阵地。通过构建社会资本与技术支持对用户知识共享行为影响的理论模型，探讨社会资本（关系资本、结构资本、认知资本）和技术支持（感知有用性、感知易用性）对社区用户知识共享行为（知识共享质量和数量）的作用机理。结果表明，关系资本与结构资本分别对学术虚拟社区知识共享质量和数量具有显著正向影响，属于持续动力。伴随其它因素介入，认知资本对学术社区知识共享数量产生正向影响，技术支持对知识共享的影响具有显著差异，感知易用性对学术社区知识共享质量和数量均具有显著正向影响，而感知有用性对知识共享质量具有显著负向影响。基于此，提出社区管理者应采取措施拓展用户社会资本并加强平台技术支持，以实现学术虚拟社区可持续发展。     

Smart fund managers? Stupid money?

Abstract .  We develop a model of mutual fund manager investment decisions near the end of quarters. We show that when investors reward better performing funds with higher cash flows, near quarter-ends a mutual fund manager has an incentive to distort new investment toward stocks in which his fund holds a large existing position. The short-term price impact of these trades increase the fund's reported returns. Higher returns are rewarded by greater subsequent fund inflows which, in turn, allow for more investment distortion the next quarter. Because the price impact of trades is short term, each subsequent quarter begins with a larger return deficit. Eventually, the deficit cannot be overcome. Thus, our model leads to the empirically observed short-run persistence and long-run reversal in fund performance. In doing so, our model provides a consistent explanation of many other seemingly contradictory empirical features of mutual fund performance.     

Aid, Growth and Democracy

To the extent that aid is justified by the benefits to the recipient, rather than to the donor, it might be reasonably judged on two criteria: growth and poverty-alleviation. We study the first of these criteria. We find that the long-run growth impact of aid is conditional on the degree of political and civil liberties in the recipient country. Aid has a positive impact on growth in countries with an institutionalized check on governmental power; that is, in more democratic countries. The data suggest, however, that if this is not the case, aid will be used to satisfy the government's own non-productive goals. We also find that aid on average is not channeled to more democratic countries, even though there are large cross-country differences between major donors.     

The allocation of volatile aid and economic growth: Theory and evidence

We analyse, both theoretically and empirically, the growth effects associated with two components of volatile foreign financial assistance: ‘directly productive’ (or ‘tied’) aid and ‘pure’ aid. We find that scenarios in which aid can hurt the recipient's growth rate emerge only in cases where foreign aid is volatile. As a result, we conclude that it is only in conjunction with the presence of aid variability that aid allocation determines whether foreign aid hurts or promotes long-run growth.     

Information acquisition and mutual funds

We study the formation of mutual funds by generalizing the standard competitive noisy rational expectations framework. In our model, informed agents set up mutual funds as a means of selling their private information to uninformed agents. We study the case of imperfect competition among fund managers, where uninformed agents invest simultaneously in multiple mutual funds. The size of the assets under management in the mutual fund industry is determined by endogenizing the agents' information acquisition decisions. Our model yields novel predictions on the informativeness of price, the optimal fees of mutual funds, and the equilibrium risk premium. In particular, we show that a sufficiently competitive mutual fund sector yields more informative prices and a lower equity risk premium.     

社会资本视角下个体知识共享意向的影响因素研究——以企业孵化器中的新创企业家为例

在前人关于知识共享研究的基础上,以孵化器中的新创企业家为例,透过社会资本视角,构建个体知识共享意向影响因素理论模型。实证研究表明,孵化器中新创企业家知识共享意向的重要影响因素是知识感知价值、相互间信任、自我满足、共享规范、乐于助人,而互惠的相关性不显著。     

Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool

We study mutual‐aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution‐based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no‐insurance equilibrium while contribution‐based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a “dual interior equilibrium.” That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co‐existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.     

Working time, employment, and work sharing: Evidence from Sweden

We study three questions which are important for work sharing to increase employment. First, is there a negative long-run relation between working time and employment? Second, are hours per worker exogenous with respect to wages and employment? Third, can policy makers influence actual hours per worker? We formulate a theoretical model for employment, hours per worker, production, and real wages. A VAR model with cointegrating constraints is estimated by maximum likelihood using Swedish private sector data 1970:1–1990:4. We find (i) no long-run relation between hours per worker and employment, (ii) that hours per worker are endogenous with respect to the estimation of long-run parameters, and (iii) that legislated working time and hours per worker are related to each other in the long run. First version received: September 1997/final version accepted: June 1999     

Public versus private risk sharing

Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy where private risk sharing is incomplete? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is limited because insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley (1986) [8]) publicly provided risk sharing improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but their use is limited by limited enforcement (as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) [23]) then the provision of public insurance interacts with equilibrium private insurance, as, by providing risk sharing, the government affects the value of exclusion from private insurance markets and thus the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. We characterize consumption allocations in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing plausible income risk and tax systems with various degrees of progressivity (public risk sharing). We provide conditions under which more publicly provided insurance actually reduces total insurance for agents (excess crowding-out), or under which more public insurance increases total insurance (partial crowding-out).     

知识共享视角下联盟组合构型对企业创新绩效的影响

全球化竞争背景下,提高创新绩效、增强行业竞争力已经成为现代企业的迫切需求。在知识共享时代,联盟组合构型成为现代企业实现知识共享、有效获取外部资源的重要路径。为探明联盟组合构型对企业创新绩效的影响,引入知识共享变量,构建反映联盟组合、企业创新绩效以及知识共享三者关系模型,以揭示三者之间的相互作用机理。研究表明,联盟组合规模、多样性和网络密度对企业创新绩效发挥正向作用;知识共享在联盟组合构型与企业创新绩效间发挥正向调节作用。因此,企业应该根据自身需求寻找联盟伙伴,加强与不同行业、不同领域企业或组织的交流与合作,以促进知识共享。同时,还要不断提高联盟成员彼此信任度,建立稳定的知识共享平台和机制。     

Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations

When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by transferring their characteristics within the group. By allowing agents’ characteristics to be multi-dimensional and choosing the meaning of variables appropriately, our model can subsume a number of existing and new allocation problems, such as cost sharing, social choice with transferable utilities, income redistribution, bankruptcy with multiple types of assets, probability updating, and probability aggregation. A number of existing and new results in specific problems are obtained as corollaries.     

Status,Risk-Taking and Intertemporal Substitution in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper examines intertemporal risk-taking in a stochastically growing economy with externalities in human capital accumulation where agents have preferences for social status. In order to isolate the effects of status concerns on long-run expected growth, the analysis is embedded in a non-expected utility setting, which disentangles the effects from risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. We examine the interaction between status desire and risk, risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. The externalities generated by the status game are able to correct the allocative distortions from the knowledge spillovers.Acknowledgement The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for his valuable comments.     

休闲福利与知识共享的关系探讨——兼论社会资本的作用

在这个信息大爆炸的时代里,知识共享是企业提高知识利用效率的最佳途径。然而,组织的知识共享并不容易在组织内自动发生,而是需要组织提供特定的环境。文章通过对企业休闲福利、社会资本与知识共享关系的探讨,得出的结论是:第一,企业为员工提供的休闲福利能够有效地提高员工的社会资本,而社会资本是促成组织知识共享的关键因素;第二,员工的社会资本越高,进行知识共享的意愿就越大;第三,组织内的知识共享更容易在非正式的休闲时间和场合中发生。在得出上述结论的基础上,文章还对企业提出了相关的建议。     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

Risk taking under heterogenous revenue sharing

We examine the impact of informal risk sharing on risk taking incentives when transfers are organized through a social network. A bilateral partial sharing rule satisfies that neighbors share equally a part of their revenue. In such a society, correlated technologies generate interdependent risk levels. We obtain three findings. First, there is a unique and interior Nash-equilibrium risk profile, and it is in general differentiated and related to the Bonacich measure of the risk sharing network. Second, more revenue sharing enhances risk taking on average, although some agents may lower their risk level. Last, we find that under investment might often be observed.     

Imagery and Financial Judgment

Many studies have indicated that a buy-and-hold investment strategy is superior to a trading strategy. This is thought to be true because trading incurs transaction costs that lower net returns compared to a buy-and-hold strategy. We propose a behavioral finance argument to illustrate that merely switching between positive expected return assets can lead to a long-run negative expected return, even when transaction costs are ignored. This counterintuitive result may obtain because of Parrondo's Paradox. We provide a stylized theoretical example that demonstrates how a trader can lose money by trading between assets with positive long-run expected returns. We also present simulation results to support our example. Thus, long-run negative results from trading may not be due entirely to transaction costs. A trading strategy may prove inferior to buy-and-hold for agents simply because of their singular trading patterns, as we outline in the paper.     

Entrepreneurship and productivity: The slow growth of the planned economies

Trends in gross domestic product (GDP) and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the former socialist economies seem to indicate that these economies were converging to unusually low long-run growth rates in the late 1980s. In this paper we develop an endogenous growth model of entrepreneurship that is able to account for the difference in long-run performance between centrally planned economies and market-oriented ones. Long-run growth rates of output and productivity are determined by the growth of the stock of managerial knowledge, which in turn depends on the share of the population involved in entrepreneurial activities and on the time that spent on those activities. We analyze the effect of two characteristics of centrally planned economies on their growth performance. First, in centrally planned economies factors of production are distributed by the central planner to the firms' managers through a contest that uses up some of the managers' productive effort. Second, the leadership is “egalitarian,” in the sense that it treats individuals with different abilities equally. We show that these two features reduce the fraction of people becoming entrepreneurs/managers, as well as their managerial effort, which in turn reduces long-run output and TFP growth. Furthermore, we find that centrally planned economies have lower income inequality and slightly higher capital–output ratios, which is consistent with these countries' experiences.