Using bounds to investigate household debt repayment behaviour

Understanding the factors that influence arrears is crucial if policy makers wish to alleviate the problems caused by debt. But conventional estimates of repayment behaviour impose implausible assumptions about lender behaviour. However, an upper and lower bound for the effect of the determinants of repayment behaviour can be estimated. Reasonable assumptions about the behaviour of economics agents narrow these bands. We use administrative data from a leading Italian lender to the household sector to demonstrate the methodology, and we show that conventional estimates under-estimate the true default probability.     

Hurdle models of repayment behaviour in personal loan contracts

This paper proposes a hurdle model of repayment behaviour in loans with fixed instalments. Using information on previous and current contracts, the approach yields a model of customer behaviour, useful, for example, in assessing the impact of determinants of default, a natural concern for credit and behavioural scoring. Under plausible assumptions, a debtor in each period faces a number of missed payments, which depends on his previous repayment decisions; meanwhile, as most debtors are expected to meet financial obligations, the number of missed payments is bound to display excess zeros, with reference to a single-part law. Each sequence of missed payments is modelled by using the binomial thinning, a conceptual tool that allows for dependence between integers by defining the support of consecutive counts. Under suitable assumptions on heterogeneity, the model can be produced under a random effects approach, leading to a two-part panel data model, estimable by quasi-maximum likelihood. The proposed approach is illustrated using a panel data set on personal loans granted by a Portuguese bank.     

Repayment performance in group lending: Evidence from Jordan

Using data from a survey of 160 urban borrowing groups of the Microfund for Women in Jordan, we investigate the effect of screening, peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties on borrowing groups' repayment behavior as an indirect test of different theoretical models. The dependent variable used captures the intensity of default measured by the total number of days of late repayment after each due date, allowing us to use count data models with cluster standard errors. As theory predicts, our empirical analysis suggests that peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties reduce delinquency. The paper uncovers interesting evidence about the role of social ties and religion. Most notably, in an area where religion contributes to attitudes and beliefs of individuals, we find that religiosity improves repayment performance.     

Progressive Lending in Microfinance—What about the Farmers?

Dynamic incentives have become a common measure in microfinance institutions (MFI) to counteract the risk of default and to strengthen the borrower's identification with his micro‐lender. This article focuses on progressive lending over the course of the bank–borrower relationship. As the agricultural sector is increasingly important for Azerbaijan's economy, this study differentiates between the lending policies faced by farmers and non‐farmers, and matches the findings with the repayment performances of both client groups. By means of a rich data set spanning from 2007 through 2012 provided by an MFI in Azerbaijan, it can be demonstrated that farmers face a higher degree of loan volume rationing that cannot be justified by our findings on repayment performances. Moreover, we find that repeated borrowing increases the default probabilities of both client groups. In conclusion, we deduce that the MFI and borrowers could benefit from reconsidering the current lending policies.     

Borrower runs

Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default.     

Sovereign Default Risk and Recovery Rates: What Government Bond Markets Expect for Greece

Bond market data on sovereign bond yields is used to estimate sovereign default risk and the amount of the expected “hair‐cut” for Greece between 2008 and 2011. Using a structural pricing model that relies on compound option theory short‐term and long‐term default probabilities and their dependencies can be inferred. Thereby bond yield spreads for different maturities are integrated. In addition, a reduced form model is applied to infer the recovery rate expected by bond market participants. The paper shows that sovereign default risk and recovery rate dynamics reflect events that are important for Greece's repayment capacity.     

Determinants of microcredit repayment in Portugal: analysis of borrowers,loans and business projects

Microcredit programs in Portugal represent a unique case for studying the microcredit repayment determinants in a developed country, as it experienced a financial hardship in 2008–2009, with economic and social consequences that led to unemployment crisis. This research examined the determinants of microcredit loan repayment based on a sample of 752 microcredit loans granted in Portugal by the National Association for the Right to Credit, adopting individual lending mechanisms and granting loans through partnerships with several credit institutions. This is the first study to ascertain the influence that a set of factors – grouped into three categories: borrowers’ individual characteristics; loan characteristics; and characteristics of business projects implemented by borrowers – has on the repayment ability of microcredit programs, in a developed country of the Eurozone. Moreover, this is the first study using an ordered logistic regression (OLR) in estimating the determinants of microcredit loan repayment. Similar to previous studies, married borrowers tend to repay loans faster as they tend to be more responsible than single borrowers. Nationality seems to be an issue as foreigners tends to default the repayment loans. Finally, those involved in manufacturing activities perform better than those involved in service activities in repaying their loans. This clearly indicates that in developed countries special attention needs to be provided to minority groups as well as market/supply conditions, which are not normally considered in less favored economic countries.     

A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt

We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-risk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance terms. We explore two different mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Our theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer credit and auto insurance markets.     

Repayment performance of joint-liability microcredits: Metropolitan evidence on social capital and group names

This study empirically tests the predictions of four primary theories applicable to joint-liability microcredit programs’ repayment performance using an administrative data in a metropolitan setting. We introduce a new variable, group names, as a proxy for social capital to capture cooperation, solidarity, and drive for success, which shows a significant positive impact of 9.9% on repayment performance. Precise calculations of residential distance between group members show a deterioration of repayment performance by 1.1% with a 15-min increase in minimum walking distance. The results also show that joint liability, sectoral diversification, type of sector that the borrowers facilitate, the ratio of new members in a group, characteristics of loan officers, loan amount, interest rate, income-loan amount coverage ratio, the existence of senior members, average education, and diversity in income streams significantly affect repayment performance.     

The suspension of borrowing: an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information

A credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default. Such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check. Our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information. We show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates, but loosened otherwise, to improve the repayment performance of borrowers. We also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information, the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity.     

中国商业银行体系信用风险评估——基于宏观压力测试的研究

宏观压力测试,作为压力测试方法在宏观经济分析中的具体运用,可以提供极端事件对金融体系影响的前瞻性信息.随着各国金融监管当局对系统性风险的日趋重视,宏观压力测试方法逐渐成为检验一国银行体系的脆弱性、维护金融稳定的首选工具.本文主要研究宏观压力测试在银行信用风险评估中的应用,并在已有的模型成果的对比分析基础上,建立适用于我国的宏观压力测试模型并以此进行实证分析.本文以贷款违约率作为评估银行系统信用风险的指标,选取对银行信贷违约风险构成冲击的宏观经济变量,通过多元线性回归模型将其整合成为一个综合性指标.研究结果发现:名义国内生产总值(NGDP)和通货膨胀率指标(CPI)对银行体系的贷款表现冲击力较强.在此基础上构建了两种宏观经济极端情境,在关于NGDP大幅下降和CPI骤升的压力情境设定下,银行体系的贷款违约率都出现了不同程度的大幅度提高.尤其在关于通货膨胀率的情境设定下,贷款违约率的增幅高于其在NGDP下降情境下的增幅.     

Industry equilibrium with random exit or default

An industry consisting of a large number of small price taking firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks is considered. At the moment of entry, a firm takes on debt. We show that in a competitive equilibrium, some firms exit and pay out their debt while others choose to default. The outcome depends on the realization of firm‐specific shocks. The paper demonstrates that if the firms self‐select between exit with debt repayment and default, then the default region is disconnected from the exit region. The methodological contribution of the paper is the analytical characterization of the long‐run equilibrium for two scenarios of the initial distribution of productivity shocks. We consider two public policy mechanisms—contract enforcement and creditor protection. Our policy recommendation is that regulators need to reduce the contract enforcement if they want to decrease the long‐run default rate.     

LES DÉTERMINANTS DE LA PERFORMANCE DE REMBOURSEMENT DES MICROCRÉDITS EN TUNISIE

Our work is part of the quest for sustainability of MFIs. To ensure sustainability, an MFI must be effective. It must, among others, face many risks and in particular the default risk. A question arises: what are the determinants of portfolio quality of MFIs? In other words, what are the determinants that influence delays in payment of MFIs? The interest of this research is twofold. The first is practical: knowing the importance of performance measures of microcredit as a precondition for the efficiency and financial performance of MFIs, this study identified determinants of the reimbursement rate in an MFI of Tunisia. It may even give an evidence for banks to intervene on the market of micro credit. The second is methodological: to find the determinants of reimbursement behaviour in MFIs, a binary logistic regression is used, while differing in explanatory variables between key variables and moderators’ ones, which was not met previously in the literature. The results showed that among the variables related to the characteristics of the loan, the loan amount and the borrower's experience with the MFI affect the rate of reimbursement. The credit increases the likelihood of default. Unlike, when borrower's experience with the MFI increases, the risk of default decreases. A relationship between the industry and the repayment rate has not been verified. For variables related to the characteristics of the borrower, age, educational level and marital status of the borrower appear to affect the relationship between the risk of default and the amount of credit. The effect of the credit amount on the default risk decreases as age and level of education increases. In addition, this effect is more important for married compared to the unmarried. For gender, we found that the effect of maturity on the risk of default is not the same for men or women borrowers. It seems that when the maturity increases, men provide reimbursement rates lower than women.     

小企业信用评估的模型构建与实证分析

文章采用我国东部某银行小企业信贷数据,使用Logistic模型与因子分析相结合的方法提出了构建小企业信用评估体系的思路。研究结果表明,财务因素中资产负债率与违约概率正相关,非财务指标中对违约概率影响最大的是基本存款账户是否在本银行和银行客户类型。与以往研究相比,文章综合考虑了财务与非财务指标,研究结果对构建小企业信用评估指标体系具有重要的参考价值。     

Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts

I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending resources. The principal uses enforcement to reduce the resources available to the agent after a default, thus providing incentives for the agent to stay in the relationship. She also ensures contract compliance by backloading the payments to the agent: expected utility rises over time, preventing a default. I consider an application of the framework developed in the paper to the area of firm dynamics. I show that enforcement and backloading are always used jointly. Firm size (measured by capital) grows with time and each firm converges to the efficient size. A second application is to the field of economic development. Costlier enforcement leads to the choice of sub-optimal technology; secondly, it leads to inefficient dispersion of capital across establishments.     

Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

We consider a financing game where monitoring is costly, non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. The optimal contract, which is debt, induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults on the equilibrium path, consistent with empirical evidence on repayment and monitoring behavior in credit markets. Our paper is the first where the optimal contract is debt and default is not synonymous with bankruptcy.     

宏观统计数据质量规范研究

根据国内外宏观统计数据质量规范演变的历程,在界定宏观统计数据质量新内涵的基础上,依据国际货币基金组织评价数据质量的规范,本文对我国宏观数据质量的规范进行了实证研究。我国宏观数据质量在金融统计数据、社会人口统计数据上与国际货币基金组织制定的数据公布通用系统(GDDS)一致,而财政统计数据与对外经济数据与GDDS尚存在差距;我国数据公布系统在金融统计和人口统计上与GDDS一致,在对外统计与财政统计上与GDDS存在一定差异。     

个人住房抵押贷款违约风险影响因素实证研究-以杭州市为例

随着银行个人住房抵押贷款余额的快速上升,个人住房抵押贷款违约风险日益成为人们关注和研究的焦点.该文应用杭州市某国有商业银行信贷数据,采用LOGISTIC模型实证研究发现影响当前个人住房抵押贷款的违约因素按重要性排序依次为:是否为当地人、贷款价值比、期房还是现房、月还款额占家庭月收入的比例、还款方式、家庭收入和建筑面积.该文进一步应用不完全合同理论解释了结论背后的制度含义,并提出了相应的治理措施.     

Risk premium,macroeconomic shocks,and information technology: an empirical analysis

This study empirically identifies the impact of various macroeconomic factors on the default risk premium. Using monthly data for the period 1970–2010 for the US, our estimations indicate that the monetary policy aggregates, risk-free interest rate, term structure of interest rates, inflation, and the state of the business cycle influence the risk premium. The results also provide some evidence in support of the hypothesis that the development of information technology has had a decreasing impact on the risk premium. As expected, various financial crises have had substantial and long-lasting effects on the premium. The results suggest that the direct impact of the subprime crisis and Lehman’s collapse on the risk premium was as large as two and a half percentage-points for a sustainable period. Foreign financial crises, in turn, have lowered the risk premium in the US market, suggesting a flight-to-safety phenomenon.     

基于贷款偏好、企业规模和还贷行为的银企关系分析

中小企业融资难的一大原因是商业银行在选择授信对象时具有“授信给中小规模企业风险大”的贷款偏好．从而在信贷业务操作中表现出对中小企业的歧视。那么实际中小企业还贷履约行为如何？以商业银行和融资企业为对象,本文建立信贷交易博弈模型并实证检验融资企业的规模大小与其还贷履约行为的关系。结果表明：考虑到违约成本,相比较大规模企业的还贷履约情况,中小企业选择按时还贷履约的概率更大,还贷履约情况更好。