Empire-builders and shirkers: Investment,firm performance,and managerial incentives

We consider the equilibrium relationships between incentives from compensation, investment, and firm performance. In an optimal contracting model, we show that the relationship between firm performance and managerial incentives, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits of investment, as in theories of managerial entrenchment. We estimate the joint relationships between incentives and firm performance and between incentives and investment. We provide new results showing that investment is increasing in incentives. Further, in contrast to previous studies, we find that firm performance is increasing in incentives at all levels of incentives. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with theories of overinvestment based on managers having private benefits of investment. These results are consistent with managers having private costs of investment and, more generally, models of underinvestment.     

Excessive managerial entrenchment,corporate governance,and firm performance

This paper investigates the differential impact of positive and negative excessive managerial entrenchment on the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, CEO compensation, and firm performance. We measure the degree of managerial entrenchment using the E-index introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Our findings suggest that an increase in excess CEO entrenchment reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor performance. We also show a positive association between excessive entrenchment and CEO compensation as managers gain more power and authority when they are entrenched. On the other hand, excess CEO entrenchment has an inverse correlation with firm performance and firm value. Overall, we propose that excessive managerial entrenchment has a converse impact on board monitoring and shareholders’ welfare.     

The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in high R&D firms

Several studies have examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance/value (e.g., [Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 293; Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1990) 595; Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (1999) 79]). Using different samples, these studies provide general support for the argument that increases in managerial ownership create countervailing interest alignment and entrenchment effects, leading to a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, the actual form of this nonlinear relationship differs across the studies.The present paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and performance for high R&D firms that are listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. We find that Tobin's Q initially declines with managerial ownership, then increases, then declines again and, finally, increases again—a W-shaped relationship. The findings from our study point to the importance of industry effects in the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.     

IT internal control weaknesses and firm performance: An organizational liability lens

The information systems literature and the public press have called for organizations to more closely scrutinize their information technology (IT) controls; however, little more than anecdotal evidence exists on the business value of quality IT internal control, beyond regulatory compliance. In this paper, we (a) advance an organizational liability perspective to the question of IT internal control value; and (b) use the unique setting provided by the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) to investigate the relationship between IT internal control weaknesses (ICWs) and both accounting earnings (a contemporaneous measure of firm performance) and market value (a forward looking, risk-adjusted measure of firm performance). Using a data set that provides audited annual assessments of the effectiveness of both IT and non-IT internal controls for a cross-section of companies as mandated by SOX, we find that firms that report an IT ICW have lower accounting earnings compared to firms with strong IT internal controls. We also find that IT ICW moderates the association between accounting earnings and market valuation, with firms reporting weak IT internal controls having a lower earnings multiple. These results are sustained even after controlling for non-IT ICWs and firm-specific factors that are known determinants of ICWs, and are reinforced using an inter-temporal changes analysis in which we use each firm as its own control at a different point in time. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence which suggests that IT internal controls are a strategic necessity and that information systems risk is priced by the capital markets. The implications of these findings for theory and practice are discussed.     

The effect of board composition and managerial pay on Saudi firm performance

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Using five empirical methodologies to account for endogeneity issues, this study investigates the effects of board independence and managerial pay on...     

The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex,lies, and firm value

Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm's business activities but provide information about the manager's integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firm's value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.     

Perceptions of the relationship between scenario planning and firm performance: A qualitative study

This paper presents research findings from the application of scenario planning in multinational firms that operate in competitive industries. We use exclusive and not publicly available data to investigate the link between scenario planning and firm performance from a qualitative perspective. The focus was primarily on firms that had real-life experiences with this strategic tool. Our research suggests that scenario planning is interwoven in how strategy is formulated and that it has a major influence on decisions taken by management. We also found that none of the firms reported formal efforts of assessing the success rate of scenario planning. Participants report that this is due to difficulties in measuring qualitative and quantitative outcomes and because standardized assessment tools are not readily available for this kind of strategic intervention. Overall, participants generally regarded scenario planning as an effective intervention with a positive contribution to the firms’ performance. When pressed for more detail, participants revealed that scenario planning techniques were useful in exploring the business environment and future risks, isolating trends, understanding interdependent forces, and considering the implications of strategic decision-making.     

Budget emphasis, budgetary participation and managerial performance: A note

Ongoing research into the impact of budget emphasis on the relationship between participation and managerial performance has failed to provide consistent results. The purpose of this study was to conduct a replication of this two-way interaction model, drawing on data from a range of organizations in order to promote result generalizability and to test whether the model fits the data. It is proposed that a potential reason for why the results of this study conflict with those of prior research is that their findings were based on non-random sampling.     

Procedural justice in managerial performance evaluation: Effects of subjectivity,relationship quality,and voice opportunity

This study investigates the effect of subjectivity in performance evaluation on managerial perceptions of procedural justice. Using survey data from a sample of 317 managers, we examine two forms of subjectivity: use and weight of subjective performance measures and ex post flexibility in the weighting of multiple performance measures. We also examine the interaction effects of two contextual factors, superior–manager relationship quality and voice opportunity, on the association between subjectivity and perceived procedural justice. The results suggest that only the superior's use of ex post flexibility in weighting multiple performance measures adversely affects managers' perceptions of procedural justice. Moreover, superior–manager relationship quality reduces the negative effects of ex post flexibility in weighting multiple performance measures on procedural justice, whereas voice opportunity amplifies this negative effect. These findings have practical and theoretical implications, as they shed new light on the trade-off between the informative benefits and perceived unfairness of incorporating subjectivity into performance evaluation.     

Nonprofit boards: Size,performance and managerial incentives

We examine relations between board size, managerial incentives and enterprise performance in nonprofit organizations. We posit that a nonprofit's demand for directors increases in the number of programs it pursues, resulting in a positive association between program diversity and board size. Consequently, we predict that board size is inversely related to managerial pay-performance incentives and positively with overall organization performance. We find empirical evidence consistent with our hypotheses. The number of programs is positively related to board size. Board size is associated negatively with managerial incentives, positively with program spending and fundraising performance, and negatively with commercial revenue, in levels and changes.     

Slack heterogeneity and firm performance: Investigating the relationship in Indian context

The present study aims to investigate the impact of diverse forms of slack on firm performance in the Indian context: By investigating a panel data set of 426 non-financial Indian firms over a period of 5 years, the empirical results of both fixed effects model and generalized method of moments (GMM) reveal that different forms of slack have a negative impact on firm performance in Indian firms. The results of the study provide support for the agency view of the negative impact of slack resources on firm performance Moreover, the results remain robustly negative across alternative specifications and sub-samples.     

Trust and firm performance: A bi-directional study

This paper investigates the relationship between firm performance and trust in the firm. We use a trust measure based on the count of trust words in the Management Discussion and Analysis section of 10-K filings. Our regression results indicate that the current level of trust is associated with improved future performance, while current level of performance is positively related to future improvement in trust. We discuss these results and their managerial, investment and research implications.     

Management accounting systems, task uncertainty and managerial performance: A research note

This study examines the interactive effects of management accounting systems (MAS) design and task uncertainty on managerial performance. MAS design was defined in terms of the extent to which managers use broad scope MAS information. The responses of 42 managers, drawn from a cross-section of Australian manufacturing companies, to a questionnaire survey were analysed by using a multiple regression technique. The results showed that under a high task uncertainty situation, the extent of use of broad scope MAS information led to effective managerial decisions and hence to improved managerial performance. On the other hand, under low task uncertainty situations, the extent of use of broad scope MAS information led to information overload which was dysfunctional to managerial performance.     

Corporate risk-taking,firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts

We examine the impact of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts, an important form of voluntary disclosure, on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a policy of high disclosure may reduce managers' willingness to invest in higher-risk, higher-return projects. We first verify, as in prior research, that corporate risk-taking is associated with higher future firm value. We then document a negative relation between firms with high levels of forecasting and corporate risk-taking. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that high levels of managerial earnings forecasts reduce the positive association between corporate risk-taking and future firm value. Our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and future firm value, and alternative definitions of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts. Our results may be of importance to varying interests as they highlight the potential for high levels of earnings forecasts to inhibit corporate risk-taking and lower firm value.     

Associations between strategic resource importance and performance measure use: The impact on firm performance

This study investigates the relation between managers’ perception of the importance of several types of performance measures and managers’ assessment about the importance of the firm's strategic resources that sustains its competitive advantage. Furthermore, it investigates whether there is a significant association between the importance of performance measures and firm performance, and thus, whether performance measures are mediating variables in the relation between the importance of strategic resources and performance. Using survey data from 107 companies, the results indicate that managers place importance on multiple measures and show some evidence that the importance of performance measures mediates the association between the importance of strategic resources and performance. Implications and insights are discussed, along with ideas for future research.     

Culture, management accounting and managerial performance: Focus Iran

Modern management and control systems may not be equally effective in every country. Budget participation is one of the effective tools in western nations. However, management control tools, in general, and budget participation, in particular, could be ineffective or even dysfunctional in other environments. Hofstede (1980) had suggested that cultural differences among countries are influencing factors. In this study, we investigate the impact of culture, budgetary participation, and management accounting systems on managerial performance in Iran. Three-way analyses of variance are used separately for each of the four cultural Hofstede dimensions. We find convincing evidence that the application of management tools and techniques developed in western countries for effective management performance is not as useful in the Iranian context.     

Strategy,performance measurement techniques and information technology of the firm and their links to organizational performance

This study investigates the relationships between organizational performance and customer-focused strategies, performance measures and information technology. The results indicate that when a firm does not follow a customer-focused strategy, contemporary management accounting systems in combination with advanced information technology are related to high customer performance. The results also indicate that contemporary performance measures do not help firms with a highly customer-focused strategy to achieve high customer performance. Finally, the results show that a fit between the customer-focused strategy and financial performance measures improves customer performance.     

CEO excess compensation: The impact of firm size and managerial power

Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has received a great deal of attention over the past several decades. Critics assert that CEO compensation is “excessive” because it is only weakly linked to firm performance (i.e., managerial rent-extraction). On the other hand, defenders suggest that CEO compensation is “justified” given the incremental shareholder wealth created by CEOs, or that large CEO compensation packages merely reflect labor market forces. Prior research documents that CEO power and firm size are associated with larger compensation, but providing evidence that the larger compensation is excessive (i.e., not economically justified) has proven difficult. For each test firm we identify a potential replacement CEO (i.e., an executive-specific, within-country (US) compensation benchmark) and create an empirical test of excess compensation. We also examine the possibility that excess compensation is conditional upon firm size or CEO power. In spite of an inherent bias against finding excess compensation, the results suggest that the most powerful CEOs receive compensation that is not economically justified. We find no evidence of CEO excess compensation in the largest firms.     

Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled Chinese firms

We compare the sensitivity of managerial cash compensation to firm performance, the level of long term managerial incentives, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance for three types of state-controlled Chinese firms: A shares (firms incorporated and listed in mainland China), H shares (firms incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong), and Red Chip shares (firms incorporated outside mainland China and listed in Hong Kong). We find no difference in the three pay-for-performance sensitivity measures between H shares and A shares. The cash pay-for-performance sensitivity and the level of long-term managerial incentives are higher for Red Chip shares than for the other two firm types. However, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is insignificant for all three firm types. Our study illustrates the complexity in the influence of mainland China’s versus Hong Kong’s institutional forces on state-controlled Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong.     

On institutional ownership and firm performance: A disaggregated view

We study the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in Finland. A systems approach is employed to investigate the potential two-way causality between firm performance and ownership structure. Three-stage least squares estimation technique is used to solve for the systems. The evidence suggests an endogeneity problem between firm performance and institutional ownership. However, the magnitude of the problem differs with respect to the concentration of ownership measure used. Our results show that a more equal distribution of the voting power among the largest institutional stakeholder may exert positive effects on firm performance. We also find a significant difference relating to firm performances and equity ownerships between the two classes of institutional investor. Consistent with the ownership structure in Finland, we find that a simple ownership concentration index does not influence firm performance.