Exclusionary Pricing When Scale Matters

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers, and both being able to price discriminate. The good has positive value to buyers only if the network size exceeds a certain threshold. The incumbent's installed base guarantees this critical size to the incumbent, while the entrant needs to attract enough ‘new’ buyers to meet this threshold. We show that price discrimination (in the various forms it may take) reduces the set of achievable socially efficient entry equilibria, and discuss the policy implications of this result.     

Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms.     

Acquisitions,entry, and innovation in oligopolistic network industries

In industries with network effects, incumbents' installed bases create barriers to entry that discourage entrepreneurs from developing new innovations. Yet, entry is not the only commercialization route for entrepreneurs. We show that the option of selling to an incumbent increases the innovation incentives for entrepreneurs when the network effects are strong and incumbents compete to preemptively acquire innovations. Thus, we establish that network effects and installed bases do not necessarily restrict the innovation incentives and that network effects promote acquisitions over entry.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

Competition network structure and product market entry

This study proposes and tests a theory of the effects of competition network structure on product market entry. Competition networks are defined as the patterns of interdependence between rivals that emerge from direct competition. Studying networks based on competitive interdependence allows us to extend social network theory to new territory and to enhance our understanding of product market entry. We propose that the size, interconnectedness and diversity of competition networks influence subsequent product market entry in a systemic way. We test our hypotheses in a unique dataset drawn from the aircraft modification industry. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous Network Formation in Patent Contests And Its Role as A Barrier to Entry

In a setting of R&D competition, we study how collaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest, and how the latter influences the collaboration network structures the firms can form. We use an all pay auction approach to endogenize both network formation and R&D intensities, and to take heterogeneous and private valuations for patents into account. We find that the complete network is not always the only pairwise stable one. The other stable networks have the realistic property that some firms drop out of the contest. Thus, ‘weak’ cooperation can serve as a barrier to entry on the market for innovation.     

关于网络行业竞争与接入定价的理论分析

网络行业在引入竞争后,很难再保证其普遍服务目标的实现。本文根据进入者进入情况的不同,从理论上分析了针对不同的情况,管制者应如何设立普遍服务基金及制定相庆的接入价格,使得网络行业在保证普遍服务目标实现的同时,又能有效竞争,提高这些行业的经营效率。     

Net Neutrality,Network Capacity,and Innovation at the Edges

We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high‐bandwidth content provider (CP)'s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services in content delivery to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP's entry is constrained by the Internet service provider's network capacity. If the capacity is relatively large, the prioritization reduces the investment as CP's investment and prioritization form substitutes. With limited capacity, however, they become complements and the prioritization can facilitate the entry of congestion‐sensitive content. Our analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations across mobile and fixed networks.     

Perfect timing? Dominant category,dominant design,and the window of opportunity for firm entry

The optimal time to enter emerging industries is a key concern in strategy, yet scholars struggle to create a theoretical foundation that can integrate conflicting empirical findings. We incorporate categorical dynamics to industry life cycle theory to enhance existing entry timing theories. We introduce the concept of a dominant category—the conceptual schema that most stakeholders adhere to when referring to products that address similar needs and compete for the same market space—linking it to the dominant technological design and entry‐timing advantages. In particular, we propose the existence of a window of opportunity for firm entry that starts with the emergence of the dominant category and ends with the emergence of the dominant design. © 2013 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Platform envelopment

Due to network effects and switching costs in platform markets, entrants generally must offer revolutionary functionality to win substantial market share. We explore a second entry path that does not rely upon Schumpeterian innovation: platform envelopment. Through envelopment, a provider in one platform market can enter another platform market, and combine its own functionality with that of the target in a multi‐platform bundle that leverages shared user relationships. Envelopers capture market share by foreclosing an incumbent's access to users; in doing so, they harness the network effects that previously had protected the incumbent. We present a typology of envelopment attacks based on whether platform pairs are complements, weak substitutes, or functionally unrelated and we analyze conditions under which these attack types are likely to succeed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Promoting competition in the presence of essential facilities

This paper addresses how to use simple access pricing to promote entry in the presence of spillovers and essential facilities. An inherent dilemma is that the greater the spillover, the greater is the benefit of attracting good entrants but the harder it is to exclude low-quality entrants because they can free ride on the quality of good entrants. We show that the inability to discriminate between entrants has the effect of discouraging access prices that enable the low-quality entrant to enter, generates a time consistency problem, and provides incentives for good-quality entrants to limit their competitiveness.     

Unbundling the incumbent and deployment of high-speed internet: Evidence from France

In this paper, we study the impact of competition on the legacy copper network on the deployment of high-speed broadband. We first develop a theoretical model, which shows that the relation between the number of competitors and investment in a quality-improving technology can be positive if the quality of the new technology is high enough, and is negative otherwise. We test these theoretical predictions using data on broadband deployments in France in more than 36,000 local municipalities. First, using panel data over the period 2011–2014, we estimate a model of entry into local markets by alternative operators using local loop unbundling (LLU). Second, using cross-sectional data for the year 2015, we estimate how the number of LLU entrants impacts the deployment of high-speed broadband with speed of 30 Mbps or more by means of VDSL, cable and fiber technologies, controlling for the endogeneity of LLU entry. We find that a higher number of LLU competitors in a municipality implies lower incentives to deploy and expand coverage of high-speed broadband with speed of 30 Mbps or more.     

When experience meets national institutional environmental change: foreign entry attempts of U.S. firms in the Central and Eastern European region

We develop an institutional change perspective to examine the tension that can exist between evolving external environmental influences and internal organizational influences on foreign entry attempts. Using data on the entries of 215 U.S. public firms made into 11 Central and Eastern European transition economies during the period of 1990–2003, we find that shifts in national institutional environments, from a socialist to a market economy, reduce the extent of challenges encountered to make a hierarchical entry, which leads to an increase in foreign hierarchical entry attempts but not necessarily to a decrease in relational entry attempts as institutional transformation. We find evidence of inertial influences as experienced entrants tend to follow their previous decisions when making subsequent entry attempts. Further, they are less responsive in their foreign entry strategies to the institutional transformation in a given host country than inexperienced firms. We also find that the experience gained from relational entries results in more hierarchical entry attempts, but hierarchical entry experience results in fewer relational entry attempts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MERGER, EASE OF ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN A DYNAMIC MODEL

We analyze whether ease and speed of entry can mitigate the anti-competititve effects of a merger, in a dynamic model of endogenous merger. In our model, if new firms can enter quickly, it is more likely that merger is motivated by efficiency as opposed to increased market power. Thus, there is less reason to challenge the merger. On the other hand, if entry of new firms becomes less costly, firms may have a stronger incentive to monopolize the industry through horizontal merger. We also show that when the incumbent can engage in entry deterrence activities, anti-merger policy can decrease welfare.     

ENTRY DETERRENCE BY NON‐HORIZONTAL MERGER*

We study when and how pure non‐horizontal mergers, whether cross‐product or vertical, can deter new entry. Organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition. Because heightened competition deters entry, mergers can occur in equilibrium even when, absent entry considerations, they do not. We show that, in order to prevent a flood of entrants, mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant.     

Second Mover Advantage and Entry Timing

We describe a model of entry timing assuming that a second mover can benefit from observing the experience of a first mover. We focus on how market attractiveness characteristics such as size and cost affect the time until first entry. The effects depend on whether the number of participants is exogenous or endogenous. In the former case, a more attractive market leads to earlier entry. In the latter case, it leads to later entry. Treating the number of firms as an integer, free entry leads to non‐monotone, but testable, effects of market attractiveness on entry timing.     

Sunk Costs,Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry

Although economists usually support the unrestricted entry of firms into an industry, entry may lower social welfare if there are setup costs or if entrants have a cost disadvantage. We consider the welfare effects of entry within a standard Cournot model where some of an incumbent firm’s costs are sunk. We find that the range of parameter values over which entry can harm welfare declines monotonically in the fraction of cost that are sunk. Furthermore, the presence of even a small fraction of sunk costs often reverses an assessment that entry harms welfare.     

OPTIMAL PRICING AND QUALITY CHOICE WHEN INVESTMENT IN QUALITY IS IRREVERSIBLE

This paper examines the price and quality choice of a single product, risk-neutral monopolist who can delay irreversible investments required for market entry. It is shown that the price and quality she chooses at entry increase with uncertainty about the size of future demand. In a Stackelberg leader-follower game, the leader and follower pre-commit immediately up to a certain level of uncertainty. In this case the leader produces the higher quality good. When uncertainty is higher than this threshold, the follower will wait and enter the market later with a higher quality good.     

The significance of network resources in the race to enter emerging product markets: the convergence of telephony communications and computer networking, 1989–2001

This paper focuses on the role of network resources and examines the associated mechanisms that affect the timing of entry into an emerging product market. Linking network theory to market entry research, I analyze the pattern in the structure, relation, and composition of 517 firms' strategic alliances as the firms face the decision of whether and when to enter the networking switches market over a 13‐year period from 1989 to 2001. The context for empirical testing is the voice/data convergence between telephony communications and computer networking technologies during which the industry boundary blurs. Firms that have access to information of high quality, large quantity, and compositional heterogeneity are likely to enter the newly developed market more quickly. However, network configuration lock‐in and network costs may counterbalance the benefits derived from network resources. I discuss the implications of these findings for research on social networks and the timing of market entry. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining the Credit Union Entry Decision,and Implications for Performance

Earlier research exploring rural bank entry decisions suggests that market size and its growth seem to be major explanatory factors. In addition, the role of leading bank holding companies is found to be important in stimulating entry of smaller rivals. This article finds that credit union entry responds in a similar way, and in addition that the state-level financial regulatory climate matters. An ordered-probit analysis of credit union numbers yields the intuitive result that credit unions possess little market power (even in rural markets where they might be expected to play a significant role), and what little there is can likely be eliminated by a third credit union in the market.