THE OPTIMAL DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS

This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects.     

我国不同形式转移支付财力 均等化效应研究

本文通过基尼系数分解的方法考察了我国转移支付的地区间财力均等化效应。计算结果显示,一般性转移支付和专项转移支付在资金分配上均向财力较弱的地区进行了倾斜,具有财力均等化效应,在强度上,一般较专项要强。在构成一般性转移支付的诸多子项目中,农村税费改革转移支付向财力较弱地区的倾斜程度最强,教育转移支付次之,紧随其后的分别是基本财力保障机制奖励补助以及调整工资转移支付。但是由于均衡性转移支付规模较大,财力均等化效应最强。     

Efficient delivery of subsidies to the poor: Improving the design of a cash transfer program in Ecuador

Many governments provide monetary transfers to low-income families. The mechanism through which these subsidies are distributed may contain several inefficiencies that diminish the net-value obtained by the recipients. In this paper, we build and estimate a behavioral dynamic model that allows us to evaluate the efficiency of current and alternative distribution mechanisms. The proposed model is simple and resembles the individual's decision to collect the transfer. To estimate it, we use data from a cash transfer program in Ecuador where recipients incur high transaction costs each time they collect their benefits. Despite its simplicity, our model is able to replicate the observed data remarkably well. We use it to simulate alternative payment mechanisms and show that an adequate design of the delivery of payments can substantially increase the value of cash transfer programs.     

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

转移支付与财政支出的灰色关联分析——基于新疆自治区

改革开放三十年来中央转移支付和新疆财政支出在数量上都有比较大的变化,总体而言都成上升趋势,而中央转移支付占新疆财政支出的比重一直维持在比较高的水平。从历年数据来看,生产性财政支出、非生产性财政支出和获得的中央转移支付的量交替上升,折射出新疆的发展历程以及人们意识的改变。中央转移支付由在地方财政中的绝对比重,慢慢转变成新疆财政支出最强有力的后盾;新疆财政支出也由最初重视基础设施建设等生产性财政支出,演变成强调教育、社会保障等非生产性财政支出的重要性,致力于经济社会的协调发展。通过运用灰色关联分析后发现,中央转移支付与生产性财政支出和非生产性财政支出的关系都非常密切,但是就新疆而言主要是满足非生产性财政支出的需要,而中央政府则可以通过加大专项转移支付力度的方式加强对新疆经济建设的直接干预。     

An American-Style Transfer Union in Europe,A First Glance at How Much It Might Cost

Since 1992, the European Union has been reallocating resources among its members through, among others, so-called cohesion funds. However, there is a growing perception among economists and politicians that the scope and magnitude of those transfers is inadequate. In this paper we compare the degree of fiscal transfers in the EU to those in the U.S. and estimate the changes needed to make the EU more like the U.S. Data on American inter-state fiscal transfers show that, on average, the most affluent states consistently make significantly larger payments to the federal government than they receive from it and that the opposite is true for the less affluent states. Our research shows that, unlike in the U.S., fiscal transfers in the EU are not closely related to a member state’s standard of living. We also find that, compared to the U.S., the least affluent nations in the EU receive disproportionally small net payments from the common budget. An American-style fiscal union would require more affluent EU members to make net contributions many times over their actual net payments.     

中央政府供给地区生态补偿的内生缺陷——对补偿原则和收益原则内在矛盾的分析

我国现在实施的生态补偿以财政补偿为主，其中，中央对地方的财政补偿所占的比例最高。鉴于这种情况，作者从地方公共品供给的角度，考察了由于补偿原则和收益原则的内在矛盾——在功利主义回报原则下，中央政府的转移支付难以达到完全补偿；在自然回报原则下，中央政府的转移支付显著的使分配非中性，违背自然回报原则所要求的中立性——不能同时达到补偿的完全性与中性。由于这种内生缺陷的存在，中央政府供给地区生态补偿时难以使所有地区都满意，其本身也陷入难以进退的矛盾境地。本文认为在我国纵向转移支付占据主导地位的今天，政府若要有效供给诸如环境保护类型的溢出性地方公共品，就应该转变单线条的由上至下的转移支付模式，强化地方供给，加强地区之间的横向交流，如让地区之间直接谈判如何划分合作的收益或如何进行横向的补偿，以使地方政府承担更多的地区生态补偿责任。     

The formation of networks with transfers among players

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network, when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We vary three aspects of the game: (i) whether players can only make transfers to (and receive transfers from) players to whom they are directly linked, or whether they can also subsidize links that they are not directly involved in, (ii) whether or not transfers relating to a given link can be made contingent on the full resulting network or only on the link itself, and (iii) whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects either accounts for a specific type of externality, or deals with the combinatorial nature of network payoffs.     

Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental Agreement

For international environmental problems involving many countries, such as, e.g., the climate problem, it is unlikely that all countries will participate in an international environmental agreement. If some countries commit themselves to cooperate, while the remaining countries act independently and in pure self-interest, it appears to be possible to achieve a Pareto improvement if the non-signatory countries reduce their emissions, in exchange for transfers from the countries which sign an agreement. However, the paper shows that the prospect of receiving a transfer for reducing one's emissions provided the country does not commit itself to cooperation, tends to reduce the incentive a country might have to commit itself to cooperation. Moreover, if the disincentive effect of such side payments is strong, total emissions will be higher in a situation with side payments than in a situation in which the signatory countries commit themselves to not give transfers to free riding countries.     

Demand Revelation,Hypothetical Bias,and Threshold Public Goods Provision

We examine the issues of hypothetical bias, demand revelation, and gender differences in a threshold public goods experiment with heterogeneous induced-values. First, we find no evidence of hypothetical bias in our threshold provision public goods experiments, despite the fact this is an open-ended type mechanism. Our results support recent experimental findings that use induced-values to investigate hypothetical bias. Second, we investigate the demand revealing performance of real and hypothetical payments and find no evidence that real payment performs better than hypothetical payment in our experiments. Third, we examine whether payments, real and hypothetical, are positively related to induced-values. Our results suggest there is statistical evidence that payments are positively related to true values. Finally, we examine the effect of gender on real and hypothetical payments in our experiment. The results show that gender matters for contributions through both real and hypothetical payments, after controlling for true values as well as socio-economic variables. Results also indicate that females are more likely to truthfully reveal their value than males through hypothetical payments, but gender is not significant for truthfully revealing their value through real payments.     

INTERFAMILY TRANSFERS AS ALTERNATIVES TO GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS TO PERSONS*

How have government transfers altered the distribution of income, the level of work effort, and the rate of personal saving? Most scholars approach this question by comparing the current level of government transfers with the unrealistic counterfactual of a zero-transfer situation. This method overlooks the fact that nongovernment transfers existed before government transfers and the possibility that private transfers might have grown more if government transfers had grown less. This paper explores the significance of one private alternative to government transfers-namely, direct interfamily giving of cash, food, and housing. Fragmentary evidence suggests that such interfamily transfer was quantitatively more important than governmental transfer for these purposes thirty years ago, but is now only half as great. If current government transfers are conversions of, or substitutes for, interfamily transfers, then it follows that some of the benefits of government transfer “slide” over to “secondary beneficiaries,” i.e. those who would have made the private transfers. Further, it follows that the effects of government transfers are not much different from those of the private transfers which they replace.     

Inverse stochastic dominance,inequality measurement and Gini indices

We investigate the relationship between the third degree inverse stochastic dominance criterion introduced in Muliere and Scarsini (1989) and inequality dominance when Lorenz curves intersect. We propose a new definition of transfer sensitivity aimed at strengthening the Pigou-Dalton Principle of Transfers. Our definition is dual to that suggested by Shorrocks and Foster (1987). It involves a regressive transfer and a progressive transfer both from the same donor, leaving the Gini index unchanged. We prove that finite sequences of these transfers and/or progressive transfers characterize the third degree inverse stochastic dominance criterion. This criterion allows us to make unanimous inequality judgements even when Lorenz curves intersect. The Gini coefficient becomes relevant in these cases in order to conclusively rank the distributions.     

RELATIVE INEQUALITY, ABSOLUTE INEQUALITY, AND WELFARE: LARGE SAMPLE TESTS FOR PARTIAL ORDERS

Two general welfare criteria, mean-relative Lorenz and mean-absolute Lorenz dominance, induce partial orders on income distributions. We propose asymptotically distribution-free inference procedures, based on the union-intersection principle, for these two welfare criteria. Unlike classical tests, our procedures allow one to distinguish among dominance, equality, and noncomparability. We show that union-intersection tests must be used to test for partial orders, and that the statistical ordering is acyclic. The tests are applied to compare the UK distribution of real family income to five other countries.     

Optimal Categorical Transfer Payments: The Welfare Economics of Limited Lump-Sum Redistribution

Despite their importance in tax-transfer systems, categorical transfer payments, based on (nearly) exogenous characteristics such as disability or date of birth, have been deemphasized in optimal-tax analysis. I use the well-developed theory of first-best redistribution to clarify the welfare economics of categorical transfers, which are a form of limited lump-sum redistribution. The comparison to first-best redistribution explains how categorical transfers affect groups' labor supplies and utility levels, why the use of categorical transfers is inversely related to the planner's inequality aversion, and why their use reduces the optimal income tax rate.     

Government Purchases, Government Transfers, and the Post-1970 Slowdown In U.S. Economic Growth

This article shows that the post-1970 slowdown in U.S. economic growth can be explained by a shift in fiscal policy away from government purchases and toward transfer payments. Two endogenous growth models that include government purchases and transfers imply a relationship between these variables and long-run growth. Empirically, the simultaneous decline in the fraction of output purchased by federal, state, and local governments and rise in transfer payments around 1970 dramatically overpredict the growth slowdown of the early 1970s. The growth rate is predicted to have risen in the absence of this change in fiscal policy.     

Revenue and Progressivity Neutral Changes in the Tax Mix

There has been much debate about the redistributive implications of a consumption tax and the treatment of low income households. This article presents a general model which allows for the interdependence between income and consumption taxes, while allowing for transfer payments to the low paid. The appropriate adjustment of transfer payments in response to a change in the tax mix, in order to maintain a fixed real value of transfers, is examined. The use of exemptions, of those goods for which the proportion of expenditure falls as total household expenditure rises, in order to increase the progressivity of consumption taxes is also considered. The model enables changes in the tax mix, which are both revenue and progressivity neutral, to be devised.     

Stabilization mechanisms in a monetary union

The stability of a monetary union entails the establishment of mechanisms that allow the member countries to smooth their paths of consumption after negative shocks in their income. A centralized fiscal institution could help countries through a mechanism of taxes and transfers. In this paper we study the stabilizing effects of different mechanisms of compensation in a two-country general equilibrium model subject to asymmetric technology shocks. In particular, we have focused on an optimal system of taxes and transfers as opposed to a discretionary transfer mechanism, finding that the optimal transfer consists in an intertemporal distribution to the economy that experiences the negative shock instead of a current high transfer as in the non-optimal mechanism. Lastly, we have assessed the degree of stabilization related to the mechanisms in question, showing that the optimal mechanism can match the degree of stabilization the empirical literature attributes to the case of the United States.     

Incomplete markets: transverse financial structures

Summary. In a multiperiod economy with incomplete markets and assets with payoff depending on the price history (e.g., asset and derivatives), we show that in order to get endowment generic existence of an equilibrium it is not needed to alter settlement features such as when payments are made and when the asset is traded. This is non-trivial as each such characteristic introduces a non-generic subclass of financial instruments. We show essentially that expiry date payments are the only payments that one needs perturbing (if at all). For previous periods - the P&L discovery map - is the one relevant for wealth transfers. This map transfers wealth between one period and the next by associating to each portfolio next period potential profit and losses as a function of the revealed information at the node. All present values involved can in general - because of backward induction pricing structure - be appropriately controlled via expiry payoffs only. This enables us to extend two-period work and introduce Transverse Financial Structures for multiperiod economies, where one cannot identify the payoffs of financial instruments to the P&L discovery map (in other words we introduce some financial ingeneering for Transverse Financial Structures). We capitalize on that difference using unexploited “maturity payout degrees of freedom” and rolling back the uncertainty tree. As an application of this approach we prove a conjecture by Magill and Quinzii that commodity forward contracts lead to endowment generic existence of an equilibrium in a multiperiod set-up. Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: April 4, 2001     

The identifiable victim effect in charitable giving: evidence from a natural field experiment

We design a natural field experiment to enhance our understanding of the role of the identifiable victim effect in charitable giving. Using direct mail solicitations to 25 797 prior donors of a nonprofit charity, we tested the responsiveness of donors to make a contribution to either an identifiable or a statistical victim. Unlike much previous research, which has used only laboratory experiments, we find that the campaign letter focusing on one identifiable victim did not result in significantly larger donations than the campaign letter focusing on the statistical victim. In addition to the role of the identifiable victim, we investigate the degree to which each of our campaign letters affected donors’ payments to other concurrent and future campaigns and whether there is decreasing marginal returns to campaigning in the sense that receiving a letter crowds out donors’ payments to other future and concurrent campaigns. We find some evidence of crowding out, indicating that charitable giving could be a zero-sum game; however, the treatment letters did not have different effects on other payments.     

转移支付与地方财政支出扩张——基于异质性与空间外溢视角的分析

本文通过构建空间计量模型实证检验地方政府在转移资金分配中的策略竞争行为,从新的视角对地方财政支出扩张进行解读。研究发现转移支付的“粘蝇纸效应”受到地区间竞争的制约,一般性转移支付对地区间竞争存在显著制约,但专项转移支付的影响不明显;地方政府的竞争,不仅“患寡”,也“患不均”。要完善转移资金的使用效率,须考虑转移支付实施的结构差别,尤其应注意转移资金分配的非均衡效应对地方政府扩张的差异化激励。