财会“主体”类型及其关系

基于会计主体假设中对“会计主体”的质疑、财务主体研究中对“财务主体”的争议，理财主体假设中“理财主体”的悄然出现，分析了财会“主体”的三个类型及其三者之间的交叉关系和主客体关系。     

政府绩效评估多元主体利益运行机制创新研究

利益是政府绩效评估多元主体追求的目标,也是主体评估行为的动力。在政府绩效评估多元主体体系中,主体之间会产生利益差别、矛盾和竞争,于是就需要建立利益运行机制,来创新政府绩效评估多元主体体系。政府绩效评估多元主体的利益运行机制要在利益表达机制、利益激励机制和利益平衡机制上取得新的突破,来促进科学发展。     

关联企业间的保证及对银行的影响

企业之间的关联关系在现代经济社会中是普遍存在的。所谓“关联”，表明的是多个具有独立法人人格的企业之间的特定关系。新修订的《公司法》对“关联关系”进行了明确的界定，第二百一十七条第四款规定，关联关系是指公司控股股东、实际控制人、董事、监事、高级管理人员与其直接或间接控制的企业之间的关系，以及可能导致公司利益转移的其他关系。这种关联关系的形成一般是基于股权参与、合同机制或其他手段。其中因股权参与形成的关联关系（如母子公司）最为常见。     

会计信息生产与需求的行为对象分析

企业会计信息的生产者和需要者不统一,导致了需要者对生产者所提供的信息持理性的怀疑态度.依据委托代理理论,企业控制者与会计人员之间构成一对委托代理关系.在这对关系中,企业控制者有权操纵会计人员生产其所需的会计信息;作为会计信息需要者,如果企业控制者有强烈动机去粉饰会计信息时,会计诚信危机就将产生.会计信息需要者也会基于各自利益的考虑,区分为真实信息需要者和虚假信息需要者两类.     

会计信息生产与需求的行为对象分析

企业会计信息的生产者和需要者不统一,导致了需要者对生产者所提供的信息持理性的怀疑态度.依据委托代理理论,企业控制者与会计人员之间构成一对委托代理关系.在这对关系中,企业控制者有权操纵会计人员生产其所需的会计信息;作为会计信息需要者,如果企业控制者有强烈动机去粉饰会计信息时,会计诚信危机就将产生.会计信息需要者也会基于各自利益的考虑,区分为真实信息需要者和虚假信息需要者两类.     

地下保险市场利益主体的博弈分析

"地下保单"已经成为我国地下金融市场的一种主要的非法金融活动。从宏观方面看,地下保险严重地冲击着我国的保险行业,扰乱了我国保险市场正常的秩序。从微观看,购买地下保险个人存在着各种风险,这些风险构成了对投保人的潜在危害。地下保险市场中的利益主体有四个:内地投保人、境外保险公司代理人、境外保险公司和监管者。通过对这四个利益主体之间的博弈关系分析可以看出,"地下保单"的存在就是博弈各方的利益均衡结果。解决"地下保单"问题就要打破这种博弈格局,改变每个利益主体的支付收益,从而达到一种新的博弈关系,实现新的均衡。     

论企业会计主体间资金内部控制

正如古典企业理论将企业看作是生产函数一样 ,现代企业理论将企业看作是一系列不完全契约的组合 ,但是 ,在我国企业理论的研究中 ,更多地关注股东与经营者之间的不完全契约所导致的代理问题。我们认为 ,多会计主体企业高层经营者与中层经营者之间同样存在不完全契约所导致的代理问题。本文准备在此框架下讨论多会计主体企业资金内部控制 ,主要是企业对其分支机构的资金内部控制问题 ,包括资金内部控制组织、银行账户控制、资金收入与支出控制、资金筹集与使用控制等。重点研究了多会计主体企业资金内部控制中存在的问题 ,并提出相应的改进建议。     

简析税收征管过程中各类经济主体的行为特征

各类经济主体具有各自的经济利益，具有特定的行为特征，在税收征管过程中他们通常会自动结成一定的利益集团，各利益集团一般会为集团利益而在相互间展开博弈活动，为了尽量放大经济主体相互博弈的正面效益并降低其负面影响，需要整合经济主体间的利益，实现相互间的“相容性激励”。     

试论破产会计主体

随着我国企业破产制度的逐步规范,企业因经营不善导致破产将不可避免,适应破产企业的需要,构建区别于传统财务会计的破产会计理论体系,成为会计理论界亟需解决的问题之一。鉴于此,本文拟对破产会计主体这一问题作粗浅探讨,以期能够对破产会计理论的研究有所助益。关于破产会计主体,在会计界存在着多种不同的看法,较有代表性的观点有“一元化会计主体说”和“二元化会计主体说”两种。“一元化会计主体说”认为破产会计主体是向人民法院负责的清算组;“二元化会计主体说”则认为“破产企业会计主体和清算组会计主体”两者兼有。笔者认为,之所…     

主体监管探析

当前,外汇监管模式与主体监管要求之间存在着以下几方面的矛盾：一是监管对象单一性与主体形式多层次性的矛盾;二是监管行为区域性与主体行为跨空间性的矛盾;三是监管职能分割性与主体业务全面性的矛盾;四是监管信息分散性与主体内在完整性的矛盾。     

Corporate capital structure and the characteristics of suppliers and customers

We investigate the link between a firm's leverage and the characteristics of its suppliers and customers. Specifically, we examine whether firms use decreased leverage as a commitment mechanism to induce suppliers/customers to undertake relationship-specific investments. We find that the firm's leverage is negatively related to the R&D intensities of its suppliers and customers. We also find lower debt levels for firms operating in industries in which strategic alliances and joint ventures with firms in supplier and customer industries are more prevalent. Consistent with a bargaining role for debt, we find a positive relation between firm debt level and the degree of concentration in supplier/customer industries.     

Internal capital markets and the partial adjustment of leverage

Prior literature provides support both for the existence of target capital structures and internal capital markets (ICM). The issue of whether firms use internal capital markets to reduce deviations from target capital structures, however, has yet to be examined. We provide the first empirical evidence of a link between deviations from target leverage and ICM activity. Based on data that allow us to trace intra-group capital market transactions for property–casualty insurers, our findings provide the first joint evidence that affiliated insurance companies have target leverage ratios and that ICM activity is used to manage deviations from target leverage.     

Downstream Value of Upstream Finance

We examine market value implications of managing liquidity via supplier financing. Results suggest a direct link between shareholder wealth and use of trade credit, and the relation exhibits significant cross‐sectional variation. In particular, the market value of trade credit varies with the liquidity of goods sold and competition in product markets. Evidence also indicates the value‐supplier financing association strengthens with financial constraint, which supports the financing motive for trade credit. Further findings are consistent with the transaction cost motive. Overall, we conclude that shareholders value the strategic benefits associated with supplier financing and that downstream firms’ characteristics influence this value.     

The impact of customer firm data breaches on the audit fees of their suppliers

This study investigates whether audit risks that accompany data breaches of major customer firms can spillover into the supply chain and affect audit fees of their suppliers. Based on the economic bond that exists between supplier firms and their major customers, we predict that data breach incidents of customer firms will lead to higher audit fees for their respective suppliers. Consistent with customer breaches increasing the audit risk to the supplier, we observe a positive association between breach disclosures made by major customers and audit fees of the supplier firm. This association exists for both internal and external data breaches. We further find that audit fees are increasing with the number of major customers disclosing a breach in a given year. Our results are robust to both a matched sample design and a difference-in-difference approach. Interestingly, we find that while supplier auditors appear to price the risks associated with customer breaches, the breaches do not appear to affect audit quality. The findings of this study are timely and relevant to academics, practitioners, and regulators as supply chains continue to become larger and more complex.     

The Role of Auditing in Buyer-Supplier Relations

Supply chain management has emerged as one of the more important topics in managerial accounting. The importance of information exchange between parties involved in supply chains has also been well documented. By addressing the value of audits in this setting, this theoretical paper serves to link two strains of accounting research: the managerial topic of supply chain effectiveness and the value of the audit function, in particular audits of the suppliers conducted by the buyers. We analyze the role of supplier audits with long-term, profit sharing contracts between the buyers and suppliers. Through a stylized model, we demonstrate that when random supplier audits are conducted, the buyer can effectively leave zero informational rents to the supplier, regardless of the supplier's cost type.     

Credit allocation when borrowers are economically linked: An empirical analysis of bank loans to corporate customers

Using detailed loan level data, we examine bank lending to corporate customers relying on principal suppliers. Customers experience larger loan spreads, higher intensity of covenants and greater likelihood of requiring collateral when they depend more on the principal supplier for inputs. The positive association between the customer’s loan spread and its dependence on the principal supplier is less pronounced when the bank has a prior loan outstanding with the principal supplier, and when the bank has higher market share in the industry. Longer relationships between the customer and its principal supplier, and between the bank and the principal supplier, mitigate lending constraints. The evidence is consistent with corporate suppliers serving as an informational bridge between the lender and the customer.     

IPO注册制下发行人与中介机构虚假陈述民事责任研究

以信息披露为核心的股票发行注册制改革背景下,发行人与中介机构虚假陈述民事责任面临新挑战。统计发现,上市公司信息披露违规行为大多与控股股东、实际控制人的故意欺诈有关,建议在制度设计与监管执法方面强化对“首恶”的追责,并探索中介机构过错大小与责任承担相匹配的法律路径。中介机构之间的虚假陈述民事责任划分,应综合多维度指标,按照过错程度与导致损失的原因力大小确定责任份额,并厘清第三方主体间接导致虚假陈述的民事责任。在此基础上,从中介机构、行政监管与司法审判三方面提出对注册制下虚假陈述民事责任的风险防范与政策调整建议。     

Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high‐level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three‐month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.     

From Micro to Macro: Public Polices and Aggregate Economic Performance

This paper provides an overview of the link between policy and economic growth. It stresses that while growth, as measured and discussed, is a macroeconomic phenomenon, the best available evidence of policy effectiveness is typically from studies using micro data. It also reiterates the message that divergence between private and social returns is a key part of the evidence needed to discuss what kinds of policy intervention are desirable.     

The relationship between supplier control and competition in public sector outsourcing

The aim of this article is to develop theory and contribute to empirical studies about how the effectiveness of bureaucratic controls in public sector outsourcing is contingent upon supplier competition, and why and how this interaction plays out differently for hard and soft types of outsourced services. In previous inter‐organizational management control (IOMC) research there is a contradiction between theory and empirical results concerning how bureaucratic control and supplier competition interacts in aligning suppliers. While IOMC theory suggests competition reduces the need for bureaucratic control, empirical studies clearly indicate the opposite. We extend previous research and theorizing by differing between the outsourcing of hard and soft types of services and by testing the joint effect of bureaucratic control and competition on supplier alignment. The empirical case for testing theory is outsourcing by competitive tendering in the public sector. We use transaction level data from 166 local government suppliers in Sweden. In accordance with our prediction, the effect of bureaucratic control in aligning suppliers decreases with supplier competition when hard types of services are outsourced. For soft types of services, our results indicate that bureaucratic control is not contingent upon supplier competition. Furthermore, we show that when supplier competition is low the effect of bureaucratic control on supplier alignment is stronger for hard than for soft types of services. These results constitute an important contribution to the central notion of the interplay between bureaucratic control and competition in the IOMC literature.