企业真实活动盈余管理文献综述

本文从真实活动盈余管理的定义、应计项目操控与真实盈余管理的比较分析、进行真实活动盈余管理的动机、真实活动盈余管理的操控方式、研究模型及经济后果等六个方面进行了归纳梳理,最后提出了这一领域的研究展望,以期能对国内真实盈余管理的研究提供一定的借鉴。     

我国微利上市公司盈余管理偏好研究

盈余管理是一种机会主义行为,它的存在与会计准则、市场效率、公司治理结构以及企业的外部监督密切相关。文章以2009—2013年度沪深两市A股制造业微利上市公司为研究对象,在建立盈余管理方式偏好模型的基础上利用多元线性回归探讨制造业微利上市公司盈余管理的存在性及方式选择。研究显示：真实盈余管理是制造业微利上市公司实施盈余管理的主要方式,但应计利润盈余管理也未退出“历史舞台”,仍辅助真实盈余管理共同实现企业的“管理目标”;在真实盈余管理方式下,费用操控对盈余的影响最大,而销售操控对盈余的影响最小。最后,对规范微利上市公司盈余管理提出适当的对策建议。     

真实盈余管理研究综述与展望

目前绝大多数关于盈余管理的研究都着眼于应计项目操控,而少有针对真实盈余管理的研究,与实务界倾向操控真实活动实现盈余管理之间存在一定的脱节。鉴于此,文章就真实盈余管理这一领域的国内外文献研究内容进行分类梳理,以期能对国内真实盈余管理的研究提供一定的借鉴意义。     

IFRS的强制趋同、盈余动机与应计及真实盈余操纵

本文运用我国2005年至2008年A股市场的数据,实证研究了新会计准则的实施、盈余动机与应计及真实盈余管理的关系。结果发现:与国际财务报告准则趋同的新准则强制实施以后,公司的应计盈余管理空间扩大了,公司的真实盈余管理也明显地增加了,其中应计盈余管理空间的扩大可能是由于会计稳健的结果;公司为满足盈余管理的各种动机需要,会灵活地同时使用应计与真实盈余管理来协调互补地达到恰当调节利润的目的;除了股票增发(Zengfa)动机以外,其余各种动机在一定程度上都利用了新会计准则的强制实施来进行应计或各种真实盈余管理,以达到操纵利润的目的。     

IFRS的强制趋同、盈余动机与应计及真实盈余操纵

本文运用我国2005年至2008年A股市场的数据,实证研究了新会计准则的实施、盈余动机与应计及真实盈余管理的关系。结果发现:与国际财务报告准则趋同的新准则强制实施以后,公司的应计盈余管理空间扩大了,公司的真实盈余管理也明显地增加了,其中应计盈余管理空间的扩大可能是由于会计稳健的结果;公司为满足盈余管理的各种动机需要,会灵活地同时使用应计与真实盈余管理来协调互补地达到恰当调节利润的目的;除了股票增发(Zengfa)动机以外,其余各种动机在一定程度上都利用了新会计准则的强制实施来进行应计或各种真实盈余管理,以达到操纵利润的目的。     

产品市场竞争、竞争地位与盈余管理

使用我国上市公司2007—2012年数据,就产品市场竞争和竞争地位对经理人盈余管理行为（具体包括应计盈余管理行为和真实活动盈余管理行为）的影响进行研究,发现产品市场竞争和竞争地位对上市公司经理人的应计盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理都具有重要影响。具体而言,在其他条件相同的情况下,上市公司所处行业的集中度越低,产品市场竞争越激烈,其应计盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理程度都越高;上市公司在行业内所处的竞争地位（定价力量和市场份额）对其盈余管理的影响则较为复杂,在行业内拥有较强定价力量的上市公司,更倾向于通过应计盈余管理调高利润,而在行业内所占市场份额较高的上市公司,更倾向于通过真实活动盈余管理来操纵利润。     

真实盈余管理活动实证研究综述

随着盈余管理研究的深入开展,真实盈余管理活动逐渐成为该领域研究的重点。本文主要从真实盈余管理活动存在性、经济后果及与应计盈余管理活动的比较研究这三方面对国内外相关的实证研究进行梳理和述评,并探究未来可能的研究方向。     

盈余管理度量方法的争议与思考

（--）盈余管理度量方法的争议1．总体应计利润法总体应计利润法是盈余管理实证研究中最常用的方法。其核心思想是：企业报告的收益由经营现金流量和应计利润两部分组成,其中,经营现金流量与会计方法的选择关系不大,盈余管理的成本较高,因此企业一般不予考虑。而应计利润则容易通过变化会计方法或微调业务时间来进行操控。但应计利润中只有部分利润是可操控的。     

资产减值视角下高新企业盈余管理问题研究——以A公司为例

利用资产减值操控利润是企业实现盈余管理目的的常用手段，高新企业由于其高产品附加值、企业超常规发展、无形资产数额大等特点，使其更容易通过资产减值进行灵活的盈余管理。文章将结合高新企业行业特点，通过全部应计利润模型与均值回复应计利润模型对A公司盈余管理问题进行研究。最后，结合行业发展现状与案例分析结论，从会计及企业运营的角度对资产减值和盈余管理提出一些自己的建议。     

微利公司应计与真实盈余管理权衡的实证研究

随着证券市场监管的加强,上市公司应计盈余管理的空间受到了更多限制。本文侧重真实盈余管理方式,以2004~2011年我国A股主板上市公司为研究样本,考察了微利上市公司的盈余管理活动。研究发现,微利公司为实现保盈目的,同时实施了应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理。与非微利公司相比,微利公司具有更低的异常经营现金流量和异常操纵性费用以及更高的异常生产成本,其真实盈余管理更为突出。     

Real and Accrual‐Based Earnings Management in the Pre‐ and Post‐IFRS Periods: Evidence from China

The purpose of this study is to investigate the prevalence of both accrual‐ and activities‐based earnings management for Chinese A‐share firms surrounding the adoption of substantially IFRS‐convergent accounting standards. Since 2007, all listed A‐share firms in China have been required to comply with a new set of accounting standards that have substantially conformed to IFRS. The new reform also produced a set of new auditing standards and internal control reporting requirements. Based on a sample of 4,050 firm‐year observations from 2002 to 2011, we find that Chinese firms in the post‐IFRS period (2007–2011) are less likely to engage in accrual‐based earnings management. The magnitude of discretionary accruals also declines after IFRS adoption. In response, we see firms turning to real activities manipulation as a substitute for upward earnings management. The reduction in accrual‐based earnings management could stem from higher quality accounting standards associated with IFRS adoption and/or concurrent changes in the governance regimes introduced with the IFRS mandate. A further analysis, however, indicates that the benefits of IFRS adoption in curbing upward accrual‐based earnings manipulation are not evenly distributed across firms. Specifically, the benefit diminishes for firms that are controlled by Chinese central or local governments, are located in less developed regions, and that have weak financial performance and therefore subject to delisting status. We also find that the benefit is less pronounced for manufacturing firms than for their non‐manufacturing counterparts.     

The Effects of IFRS Adoption on Observed Earnings Smoothness Properties: The Confounding Effects of Changes in Timely Gain and Loss Recognition

Ball and Shivakumar [(2006), The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition. Journal of Accounting Research, 44, 207–242] show that the observed smoothness of earnings (i.e. negative contemporaneous correlation between accruals and cash flows) is the joint product of the role of accruals in smoothing out transitory fluctuations in operating cash flows (noise reduction role) and the role of accruals in providing timely recognition of economic gains and losses (contracting role). These two roles of accruals have opposite effects on earnings smoothness properties. Using a regression framework that allows us to simultaneously consider both roles, we show that failing to control for changes in timely gain and loss recognition as firms shift to IFRS can lead to erroneous inferences regarding the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings smoothness, and consequently on researcher’ conclusions about how IFRS adoption has affected accounting quality. Our results are consistent with mandatory (2005) IFRS adoption resulting in a change in the contracting role rather than the noise reduction role (or smoothness role) of accruals. A decrease in timely loss recognition, an increase in timely gain recognition, and a net decrease in asymmetric timely loss recognition are what drives the change in observed smoothness properties of earnings around mandatory IFRS adoption.     

可操纵应计的市场反应——来自中国证券市场的实证证据

基于应计制核算的净利润和经营活动现金流量之间的差异,可以分为不可操纵应计和可操纵应计,后者为企业管理层提供了一种重要的盈余管理手段。本文利用中国证券市场的数据,证明中国上市公司平均而言通过操纵应计项目进行了正的盈余管理,而且证券市场对可操纵应计作出了价格反应。     

上市公司应计质量实证研究

现行财务会计系统主要是基于权责发生制亦即应计制下的历史成本会计,对收入和费用确认时间的基础是实际影响期间而非现金收付发生时间。因此,对应计项目的确认就不可避免地要依赖于管理者和会计人员的主观估计和判断,从而导致应计项目金额与实际现金流金额往往存在不同程度的差异,而历年差异变动的程度可用于度量应计项目的质量。本文以1992-2004年财务数据为样本,对中国A股上市公司应计质量问题进行了研究。     

Camouflaged Indicators of Earnings Management†

Abstract

We argue that, in response to increased scrutiny and greater attention to accruals versus sales, firms become more likely to engage in accrual conversion (AC) cash management aimed at aligning cash and accruals with earnings and sales (e.g. by factoring of receivables). In doing so, they reduce the statistical power of standard indicators of accrual-based earnings management – in effect, camouflaging their earnings management activity. This proposition is of interest because many influential papers on earnings management have utilized accrual-based indicators to reach their conclusions. Our results indicate that firms indeed became more likely to engage in AC cash management after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and that this tendency was particularly pronounced among firms with strong incentives (or enhanced ability) to perform and hide earnings management. In particular, our findings suggest that the post-SOX decrease in standard measurements of accrual-based earnings management, identified in prior research, is partially attributable to firms’ increased engagement in AC cash management activity.     

Earnings Management Vehicles for Korean Firms

We investigated the vehicles that Korean firms use when the firms manage earnings. We partitioned our sample into low, mid and high accrual sub‐samples based on discretionary accruals. Low accrual firms are defined as income‐decreasing firms whereas the high accrual firms are considered income increasing firms in this study. We decomposed accounting earnings into cash from operations and various components of accruals in a systematic way. Next we examined the types of accruals individual firms use when the respective firms increase reported earnings. The empirical results of the study indicate that there are clear discrepancies in the earnings management vehicles firm use when the firms manage earnings depending on the directions of earnings management. More specifically, income‐increasing firms frequently employ non‐cash revenues including asset‐disposal gains. Income‐decreasing firms employ non‐cash expenses including bad‐debt expenses and asset‐disposal losses. Firms also tend to use current accruals but to a limited extent as current accruals entail cash flow implications in the following years.     

Earnings quality and corporate payout policy linkages: An Indian context

We investigate the role of accounting quality as an antecedent of dividend payout decision of firms, for both dividend levels and dividend event, in an emerging market context. Using the data for Indian firms through the years 2006–2016, we evaluate the impact of discretionary accruals on payout decision employing Tobit and Logit regression models amid set of idiosyncratic controls. We report that better earnings quality, on average, is associated with large dividend payments for Indian firms. Moreover, the likelihood of dividend payment reduces with poor earnings quality and more so when earnings manipulation is done to increase earnings. Nonetheless, we show that higher earnings quality reduces dividends during the crisis period and also for group-affiliated firms. However, the same doesn’t hold true for dividend likelihood. The relationship is robust to the idiosyncratic controls and the causality test confirms that results are not susceptible to endogeneity issue. Overall, we conclude that better earnings quality takes care of free cash flow problems and alleviates the agency and information asymmetry related costs, thereby stimulating payout policy.     

How CEO narcissism affects earnings management behaviors

This study examined whether chief executive officers’ (CEOs) with narcissistic tendencies are more likely to execute earnings management behavior because of pressure to fulfill earnings thresholds. The results revealed that a CEO who exhibits high narcissism is more likely to be involved in earnings management to compensate for her/his performance. Our findings suggest that CEO narcissism directly influences financial decisions. Considering the earnings thresholds, firms with a more narcissistic CEO experience a regulatory effect on real earnings management behavior. Studies have indicated that CEOs manipulate earnings to satisfy three primary earnings thresholds: prior year’s reported earnings, zero earnings, and analysts’ forecasts. Our empirical results provide further evidence that CEOs engage in earnings management to fulfill positive earnings thresholds and analysts’ forecasts. We infer that CEOs use the abnormal production cost method as an underlying mechanism to increase reported earnings. Our findings help clarify the relationship between CEO personality traits and earnings manipulation to assist investors with decision-making.