Shareholder Rights,Insider Ownership and Earnings Management

This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.     

市场环境、民事诉讼与盈余管理

以中国上市公司2001--2004年的经验数据为样本,本文对市场环境、民事诉讼和盈余管理之间的关系进行了实证检验。研究发现,公司所在地的市场化程度越高,公司遭受诉讼的概率越大。在诉讼发生当年,上市公司普遍采取了降低盈余的盈余管理行为,这一现象在地方政府控制的上市公司中表现更为明显。此外,我们没有发现,各地区市场环境的差异对上市公司因诉讼诱发的盈余管理行为存在遏制作用。     

事务所地域与其对盈余管理的抑制能力

与西方发达市场相比,我国会计师事务所产生于政府挂靠体制,政府干预过多;上市公司多由国有企业改制而来,国家持股比例较多,上市公司受到当地政府保护等,使得我国的独立审计具有强烈的地域特色,本地事务所多在当地招揽客户,其审计过程明显受到当地政府的干预。鉴于此,我国政府于1999年开始要求会计师事务所与其挂靠单位脱钩,经过这几年的发展,有必要考察目前本地/异地事务所的审计质量差异是否巳消除。本文使用2002—2004年在沪深两市上市的A股公司数据,考察了会计事务所的地域特征对其盈余这理抑制能力的影响。本文使用可操控性应计的绝对值和非经常性损益的绝对值衡量上市公司的盈余管理程度,使用两步回归控制事务所的自选择偏误,结果发现,异地事务所对盈余管理的抑制能力显著强于本地事务所。     

Managerial discretion in distressed firms

This study examines the earnings management behaviour of 455 distressed US firms that filed for bankruptcy during the period 1986–2001. We examine (a) possible earnings management during the years prior to bankruptcy-filing, (b) whether qualified audit opinions cause conservative earnings management behaviour, (c) whether earnings management differs between firms that discontinued operations and firms that survived thereafter, and (d) the effect of earnings management on subsequent stock returns. Our results are consistent with downwards earnings management 1 year prior to the bankruptcy-filing. Results also show that (a) firms receiving unqualified audit opinions 4 or 5 years prior to the bankruptcy-filing event manage earnings upwards in subsequent years, consistent with Rosner [2003. Earnings manipulation in failing firms. Contemporary Accounting Research 20, 361–408], (b) more conservative earnings management seems to be related to the qualified audit opinions rendered in the preceding year, (c) firms with long-term negative accruals the year of bankruptcy-filing have a greater chance to survive thereafter, and (d) more pronounced (negative) earnings management is associated with more negative (next year's) subsequent returns.     

审计师变更与盈余管理关系的实证研究--来自中国A股市场的经验证据

通过对2001～2003年A股上市公司的实证研究发现:审计师变更与公司可操纵应计利润的增长具有显著正相关关系,且两者关系在不同年度、不同前期审计意见的情况下有所不同.这表明,一方面审计师变更影响到后任审计师的独立性,即公司能够通过更换审计师实现盈余管理的目标;另一方面,对前期非标审计意见的公司,审计师采取了较为谨慎的做法,且伴随着监管政策的逐渐强化,后任审计师的独立性逐年提高.     

Institutional Ownership Type and Earnings Quality: Evidence from Iran

Institutional ownership is an important factor in corporate governance. Institutional investors play important roles in firms because of their substantial shareholdings and their capability to monitor managers. However, the question is whether they are capable of monitoring the managers. The literature has provided different evidence for the monitoring role of institutional investors. This study attempts to provide insights into the monitoring roles of institutional investors by examining the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Institutional investors are classified into two groups, namely active institutional investors and passive institutional investors, based on their monitoring power in Iran. A multidimensional method is used to measure the various aspects of earnings quality, such as earnings response coefficient, predictive value of earnings, discretionary accruals, conservatism, and real earnings management. The results show that institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings quality. Similar to total institutional ownership, active institutional ownership has positive effects on proxies of earnings quality. Nonetheless, passive institutional ownership does not have any power to affect earnings quality. Moreover, lead-lag tests of the direction of causality suggest that institutional ownership leads to more earnings quality and not the reverse.     

The Corporate Acquisition Policy of Financially Distressed Firms

The paper examines a unique motive for corporate acquisitions among distressed firms: the desire to enhance creditworthiness by both the acquirer and the acquired firms. I develop a theoretical model of the creditworthiness conditions necessary for corporate acquisitions and identify the optimal policy in searching for an acquirer. I distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic acquisitions and find the necessary conditions and most favorable policy for a strategic acquisition to evolve. I demonstrate the importance of the cost of finding an acquirer, the impact of sharing bargaining leverage, and the economic significance of credit quality for the success of the accord.     

Ownership Structure, Firm Performance and Top Executive Change: An Analysis of UK Firms

The results of this paper reveal a significantly negative relationship between the equity stake owned by a senior executive and the likelihood that this executive will be removed from office. We also establish the existence of a strong positive relationship between poor company performance and the likelihood that the top managers responsible will be forced out of their firms; this forced departure only tends to occur when the managers' stake in the firm is less than 1%; as the level of ownership rises, managers become increasingly entrenched in their posts. The stock market reaction to management change is greatest (a) when the departure is unexpected and (b) when the dismissed executive owns more than 5% of the equity of his company. This study also examines the influence of other aspects of ownership structure and board composition upon the likelihood of a top executive dismissal.     

Earnings Management of Firms Subjected to Product Price Controls

This study documents Australian firms' earnings management activities in response to product price controls established by the Australian government in the early 1970s. We predict that firms subject to price controls will adjust their discretionary accounting accruals downward to reduce reported net income and to increase the likelihood of approval of the requested price increase. To control for the confounding effect of performance, we analyse the performance of two groups of firms subject to price scrutiny prior to the event window and estimate the earnings management of these firms and a control group of firms during the period of scrutiny. Our results based on both longitudinal and a cross sectional experimental designs confirm that firms that were subject to the greatest scrutiny engaged in significant negative earnings management during the period of scrutiny, but not outside that period. Further, firms that were not subject to price controls did not engage in any significant earnings management during the same periods.
JEL classification: M41; M43     

终极产权性质、第一大股东对盈余质量的影响分析

以我国2006年底已经实施了股改的深沪两地A股上市公司2007～2008年的经验数据为样本,采用收益-盈余模型检验了终极产权性质、第一大股东与盈余质量之间的关系,研究发现:对于已经实施了股改的上市公司,股权仍然相对集中;当上市公司属于国家终极控制时,盈余质量会较高;第一大股东持股比例与盈余质量正相关;第一大股东对上市公司董事会的控制能力与盈余质量正相关;其他大股东对控股股东的制衡能力对盈余质量的影响不显著.     

我国上市公司盈余管理时间选择的实证研究

本文研究了我国上市公司在不同季度进行盈余管理的时间选择行为。我们首先采用可操控性应计利润来识别上市公司中期报告中的盈余管理行为,然后进一步通过考察季度间盈余反转来识别。研究结果表明,我国上市公司虽在各个季度都存在盈余管理行为,但第四季度利润中包含了比其他季度更多的盈余管理行为。特别的,巨额冲销的公司在第四季度进行盈余管理调低利润,前三季度表现欠佳而年末好转的公司在第四季度通过盈余管理调高利润。     

Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.     

Earnings management,audit adjustments,and the financing of corporate acquisitions: Evidence from China

Acquirers are motivated to overstate earnings prior to stock-financed acquisitions. We hypothesize that audits help to detect and correct such overstatements. We test this using a difference-in-differences design, which compares audit adjustments to earnings for stock-financed and cash-financed acquirers before versus after the acquisitions. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find larger downward adjustments in the audits immediately before stock-financed acquisitions. Further analysis of regulatory sanctions suggests the downward adjustments are in fact warranted, rather than auditors being overly conservative. Moreover, modifications in audit reports suggest that downward adjustments do not correct all of the reporting irregularities in audited financial statements.     

董事会监管下的高管变更对盈余管理的影响研究

以我国上市公司为样本,对董事会监管下高管变更带来的盈余管理行为进行研究。实证结果表明:高管变更当年存在调减盈余行为;董事会监管程度与高管变更的概率有相关关系;董事会监管能抑制高管变更时的盈余管理行为。因此,我国上市公司应注重董事会制度建设,强化董事会监管作用,以规范盈余管理行为,促进我国上市公司健康、有效的发展。     

Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the empirical relation between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 403 CEO turnovers and 806 non‐turnover control firms during the period 2001–2010. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of the outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced and whether the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also control for the endogeneity of CEO turnover and a potential selection bias using 2SLS and Heckman's two‐stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following the peaceful departure of his predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO.     

首发上市盈利预测制度变迁与公司盈余管理研究

本文研究盈利预测制度由强制性向自愿性披露的变化对首发上市公司盈余管理的影响。研究发现,在控制其他首发上市制度影响条件下,自愿性盈利预测制度使首发公司披露盈利预测的偏好明显下降,盈利预测高估程度明显降低,且激进会计政策选择偏好明显下降,公司盈余管理水平显著降低。研究表明,市场化信息披露制度改革有助于缓解公司盈余管理行为。     

股权结构与上市公司应计和真实盈余管理行为

过高的股权集中度会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控行为,而对真实盈余管理行为的影响总体上不显著;无论对于应计盈余操控还是真实盈余操控,机构持股均具有较好的抑制作用;国有控股会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控,但在真实盈余操控方面,更多地体现在异常酌量费用方面;国有控股上市公司管理层持股越高,其应计盈余管理行为越显著,而在真实盈余管...     

区域竞争与商业银行的盈余质量——基于我国商业银行的经验证据

本文运用2002-2014年间我国商业银行的数据,实证检验了银行业区域竞争程度对商业银行盈余质量的影响。研究结果显示,商业银行的区域竞争程度越高,银行的盈余质量水平越低。进一步,从银行规模和上市情况来看,随着竞争的加剧,规模较小的商业银行以及非上市的商业银行更倾向于进行盈余管理。同时,区域竞争对商业银行盈余质量的负向影响在由小所进行审计的银行中更加显著。本文的研究不仅丰富了商业银行盈余质量的影响因素及银行竞争的经济后果等方面的文献,还能在一定程度上深化利益相关者对我国商业银行盈余质量的认识。     

The Impact of Institutional Characteristics on Return–Earnings Associations in Japan

In this paper, we report the result of investigation into the impact of institutional characteristics on return–earnings associations in Japan. It is found that the strength of return–earnings associations in Japan is inversely affected by the extent to which a firm's shares are cross-held, the degree of a firm's holding of real estate assets relative to other assets, the amount of a firm's investment in equities of other firms, and the degree of a firm's reliance on debt financing, while it is positively affected by the extent to which a firm's shares are owned by foreign investors. We also provide evidence suggesting that reported earnings are less value-relevant in Japan than in the US, and that the pervasive use of conservative accounting practices in Japan is well manifested in the return–earnings association. Collectively, our results indicate that future research on cross-national differences in the value relevance of accounting disclosures must pay more attention to institutional environments unique to countries concerned.     

Strategic Conservative Earnings Management of Technology Firms: Evidence from the IPO Market

In this paper, we investigate the conservative earnings management strategies of technology firms in the IPO market. We hypothesize that technology IPOs, due to their fewer tangible assets, more information asymmetry, and higher uncertainties of future cash flows, tend to have higher litigation risk. At equilibrium, technology firms are more motivated to strategically employ conservative earnings management during the IPO process, to mitigate their higher litigation risk. Using a sample of U.S. IPOs, we find that technology IPOs, on average, involve significantly more conservative earnings management, especially during the bubble periods. Our results also show that the conservative earnings management strategies of technology firms tends to have a greater impact on their underpricing than for non‐tech firms, and thus effectively reduce their risk of being a target in the securities class action lawsuits.