Bidding for money

We analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches. We consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money, and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining. Two different pricing mechanisms are used: ex ante price posting, and ex post bidding (auctions). Also, we consider settings both with and without lotteries. We find that the model generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those with random matching and bargaining, but with different comparative static and welfare properties.     

ON THE GAME‐THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETITIVE SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We provide a unified directed search framework with general production and matching specifications that encompass most of the existing literature. We prove the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies in a finite version of the model. We use this result to derive a more complete characterization of the equilibrium set for the finite economy and to extend convergence results as the economy becomes large to general production and matching specifications. The latter extends the microfoundations for the standard market utility assumption used in competitive search models with a continuum of agents to new environments.     

生育指标和婚姻匹配*

本文通过研究中国计划生育政策改革来检验贝克尔（Becker）关于婚姻的经济学理论。中国从20世纪80年代起实行“一胎化”政策,但随后逐渐允许夫妻均为独生子女的家庭生育第二胎,即“双独二胎”政策。由于“双独二胎”实施前不同省份“一胎化”政策的执行力度不同,所以放开“双独二胎”在不同省份间的政策效果也不同。笔者利用政策实施时间前后和省份间政策力度的差异,采用二重差分的实证设计进行分析,发现“双独二胎”政策增加了独生子女之间的匹配,减少了独生子女和非独生子女的“混合匹配”。笔者建立搜寻—匹配模型对“双独二胎”政策如何影响婚姻市场均衡进行分析。二重差分的实证分析得到的证据与模型的推论相一致,实证结果在一系列检验中保持稳健。     

The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

We study two-sided markets with a finite number of agents on each side, and with two-sided incomplete information. Agents are matched assortatively on the basis of costly signals. Asymmetries in signalling activity between the two sides of the market can be explained by asymmetries either in size or in heterogeneity. Our main results identify general conditions under which the potential increase in expected output due to assortative matching (relative to random matching) is offset by the costs of signalling. Finally, we examine the limit model with a continuum of agents and point out differences and similarities to the finite version. Technically, the paper is based on the elegant theory about stochastic order relations among differences of order statistics, pioneered by Barlow and Proschan in 1966 in the framework of reliability theory.     

Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job

We develop a general stochastic model of directed search on the job. Directed search allows us to focus on a Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) where agents' value functions, policy functions and market tightness do not depend on the distribution of workers over wages and unemployment. We formally prove existence of a BRE under various specifications of workers' preferences and contractual environments, including dynamic contracts and fixed-wage contracts. Solving a BRE is as easy as solving a representative agent model, in contrast to the analytical and computational difficulties in models of random search on the job.     

A theory of commerce

The theory of commerce advanced here captures prominent features of retail trade: large employment, congestion effects, anonymous posted prices, and quantity discounts. This theory is built around a directed search model where buyers’ preferences are private information. The analytical solution is easily inserted in a Neoclassical growth framework. In this framework, the parameters of retail trade are calibrated using commercial margins and employment. Welfare properties depend on the sellers’ ability to charge two-tier prices. With two-tier prices, the directed search equilibrium is efficient. Otherwise, it is not. This contrasts with the full information benchmark, where directed search is always efficient.     

WHAT AFFECTS EFFICIENCY IN LABOUR MARKET MATCHING AT DIFFERENT TERRITORIAL AGGREGATION LEVELS IN POLAND?

We analyse efficiency of a labour market matching process at different levels of territorial aggregation and in different time horizons. We apply a stochastic matching frontier to random, job queuing and stock‐flow models. We use data for Poland, a country with highly regionally diversified unemployment. We find that search and matching mechanisms significantly differ with territorial aggregation. Higher efficiency in small regions results from lower frictions. Larger regions enjoy better structural matching if only labour market participants have time to search. Different policy measures should be designed to improve labour market matching efficiency at different regional levels.     

LABOR‐MARKET FRICTIONS,HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION,AND LONG‐RUN GROWTH: POSITIVE ANALYSIS AND POLICY EVALUATION*

We construct a search model with endogenous human capital and labor participation to study the growth effects of short‐run frictions and the effectiveness of human capital policies. Employment, learning effort, and output growth increase with more effective learning, better labor‐market matching, lower job separation, or less costly vacancy creation. Although output growth, employment, vacancy creation, and learning and search effort are most responsive to changes in a human capital policy that directly affects learning effort, such a policy need not be more beneficial for welfare. The effects of human capital policies become larger as the severity of labor‐market frictions rises.     

Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets

Summary. We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Strategies for Recruitment and Retention

A common assumption in equilibrium search and matching models of the labour market is that each firm posts a wage, to be paid to any worker hired. This paper considers the implications of firms posting contracts , in a random matching model with on-the-job search. More complex contracts enable firms to address both recruitment and retention problems by, for example, increasing the wage with tenure. The effect on the labour market is to reduce turnover, below the level required for efficient matching of workers to firms.     

NEW MICROFOUNDATIONS FOR THE AGGREGATE MATCHING FUNCTION*

Empirical studies of the aggregate labor market matching function have favored a Cobb–Douglas functional form, for which there are no microfoundations in the existing literature. I present a new model for the matching process, based on a “telephone‐line” Poisson queuing process, which, unlike other microeconomic approaches, can be integrated directly into standard theoretical search models. This implies a CES matching function, approximately Cobb–Douglas when search costs are approximately linear. The model allows empirical estimates of matching function parameters to be interpreted in terms of the costs and benefits of search.     

A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model

We provide a full dynamic analysis of a continuous-time variant of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) matching and bargaining model with unbalanced flows of buyers and sellers. The focus is on the price limit as the frictions of search are removed. It is found that a necessary and sufficient condition for the limit price to be Walrasian at all times is the alignment of the initial buyer and seller stocks with the flows.     

Class, gender and marriage

This paper estimates the contributions of differential fecundity, social heterogeneity, assortative matching and search frictions to aggregate marriage behavior in 18th century Quebec. The reduced form estimates show that a simple random matching model of the marriage market, in which there are gains to assortative matching and women may leave the marriage market at a higher rate than men, can explain these data. The estimates also show that the marriage market was segmented by social status.     

Labour‐market institutions and their impact on trade partners: A quantitative analysis

Recent theoretical literature studies how labour market reforms in one country can affect labour market outcomes in other countries, thereby rationalizing widely held policy beliefs and empirical evidence. But what is the quantitative relevance of such spillover effects? This paper combines two recent workhorse models: the canonical search‐and‐matching framework and the heterogeneous firms international trade model. Qualitatively, the framework confirms that labour market reforms in one country benefit its trading partners, replicating the stylized facts. However, when wages are bargained flexibly, the model quantitatively underestimates the correlation of structural unemployment rates across countries. Introducing some degree of real wage rigidity remedies this problem.     

Marriage, commitment and divorce in a matching model with differential aging

This paper analyses a matching model of the marriage market with directed, on-the-job search. Everyone is born attractive but “matures” according to a Poisson process into unattractiveness. Marriages between equally attractive people are stable but mixed marriages are not. The implied patterns of marriage and divorce are consistent with those identified in the empirical literature. When the utility from being single is low, in order to commit to their relationship, attractive people in mixed marriages may voluntarily divest of their attractiveness.     

Demand and supply effects of bargaining power shocks

In times of crisis, social partners may consider a temporary decline in wages as a necessity to maintain employment. This paper studies the opposing demand and supply effects following declining bargaining power of workers in a New-Keynesian model with search and matching in the labour market. Lower labour income reduces aggregate demand in the presence of credit-constrained consumers. The main result is that falling bargaining power contracts output notably when monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound or when agents' expectations about the persistence of the shock adjust slowly.     

SEARCH,LIMITED PARTICIPATION,AND MONETARY POLICY*

A model is developed that employs recent developments in the literature on search models of money to capture the distributional effects of monetary policy in a tractable way. Deterministic and stochastic versions of the model are studied. Money is not neutral, and these nonneutralities persist, whether or not the change in the money supply is anticipated or unanticipated. At the optimum, monetary policy is geared to correcting distortions in the search sector of the economy, while correcting for the persistent effects of past monetary policy actions.     

Directed search with multi-vacancy firms

I construct a directed search model in which firms decide whether to enter a market and how many positions to create. Within this framework, the number of firms and the size of each firm are determined endogenously, wages play an allocative role in the matching process, and the frictions inherent in this process derive from the equilibrium behavior of workers and firms. I characterize the (unique) equilibrium. Comparative statics generate testable implications for cross-sectional variation in matching efficiency, as well as the dynamic behavior of vacancies and unemployment. Moreover, allowing for ex-ante heterogeneity across firms, the model can easily and naturally generate the observed relationship between firm size, wages, profitability, and hiring.     

Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity

Just like perfect (frictionless) matching models, a search model is proposed that is characterized by bilateral search and vertical heterogeneity. It allows for a generally specified utility function. The equilibrium allocation is unique and exists in iterated strict dominance. The model is robust with the perfect matching model as frictions disappear. Nonetheless, the equilibrium allocations are surprisingly odd. For multiplicatively separable preferences, the distributions are partitioned endogenously. And for a wide range of preferences, matching sets are naturally disconnected.     

HETEROGENEITY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE POLICY

A model with search and matching frictions and heterogeneous workers was established to evaluate a reform of the public sector wage policy in steady state. The model was calibrated to the U.K. economy based on Labour Force Survey data. A review of the pay received by all public sector workers to align the distribution of wages with the private sector reduces steady‐state unemployment by 1.4 percentage points.