Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage

New legislation and traditional FDIC insolvency-resolution procedures transform and intensify the principal-agent problems most responsible for the FSLIC mess. These problems explain counterproductive constraints on the governance and operating policies of the agency responsible for rescuing and salvaging assets in insolvent thrifts: the RTC. The constraints slow insolvency resolution, increase interim financing costs, and undermine RTC recovery of asset value. Operationalizing its task as preserving evanescent and economically misconceived “franchise values,” the RTC allows insolvents to seek financing on an unconsolidated basis, initiates bidding for one institution at a time, holds back seriously troubled assets, and recruits an overly narrow range of bidders.     

When time is not on our side: The costs of regulatory forbearance in the closure of insolvent banks

In this paper, we empirically estimate the costs of delay in the FDIC's closures of 433 commercial banks between 2007 and 2014 based upon a counterfactual closure regime. We find that the costs of delay could have been as high as $18.5 billion, or 37% of the FDIC's estimated costs of closure of $49.8 billion. We think that these findings call for a more aggressive stance by bank regulators with respect to the provisions for loan losses and write-downs of banks’ non-performing assets. More aggressive (and earlier) provisions and write-downs, or adoption of a capital ratio that penalizes nonperforming loans, would allow the concept of “prompt corrective action” (PCA) to play the role that it was meant to play in reducing FDIC losses from insolvent banks.     

Selling Failed Banks

The average FDIC loss from selling a failed bank is 28% of assets. We document that failed banks are predominantly sold to bidders within the same county, with similar assets business lines, when these bidders are well capitalized. Otherwise, they are acquired by less similar banks located further away. We interpret these facts within a model of auctions with budget constraints, in which poor capitalization of some potential acquirers drives a wedge between their willingness and ability to pay for failed banks. We document that this wedge drives misallocation, and partially explains the FDIC losses from failed bank sales.     

The Losses Realized in Bank Failures

This paper examines the losses realized in bank failures. Losses are measured as the difference between the book value of assets and the recovery value net of the direct expenses associated with the failure. I find the loss on assets is substantial, averaging 30 percent of the failed bank's assets. Direct expenses associated with bank closures average 10 percent of assets. An empirical analysis of the determinants of these losses reveals a significant difference in the value of assets retained by the FDIC and similar assets assumed by acquiring banks.     

Non‐performing loans and the harmonisation of extrajudicial collateral enforcement across Europe

The European Union plans on partially harmonising the extrajudicial enforcement of collateral in order to reduce the stocks of nonperforming loans. This article discusses the proposed regime and its background. After examining its impact on the national secured transactions law of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and The Netherlands, the authors comment on the appropriateness of the proposed harmonisation.     

Ability of accounting and audit quality variables to predict bank failure during the financial crisis

We examine the ability of selected accounting and audit quality variables measured in a period prior to the financial crisis (i.e., the four quarters of 2006), to predict banks that subsequently failed during the financial crisis. We employ two sets of samples from the US: a troubled banks sample that includes banks that failed in or after 2007 as well as banks classified as being troubled based on profitability, loan quality, and balance sheet position in 2007, and a full sample that includes all banks with available required data. Using the troubled banks sample, we identify six reliable predictors of bank failure: auditor type, auditor industry specialization, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, growth in loans, and loan mix. For the larger full sample of banks, we identify the following ten predictors of bank failure: auditor type, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, nonperforming loans, loan loss provisions, growth in commercial loans, growth in real estate loans, growth in overall loans, loan mix, and whether the bank is a public bank.     

Dispelling fiscal illusions: how much progress have governments made in getting assets and liabilities on balance sheet?

When rights and obligations are not recognized as assets and liabilities on a government's balance sheet, the government's deficit can be reduced by selling unrecognized assets or incurring unrecognized liabilities. This paper examines how much has been done in 28 advanced economies since 2003 to recognize assets and liabilities and thus dispel the fiscal illusions that such transactions create. Good progress has been made in the recognition of some assets and liabilities, such as shares owned and accounts payable, but much less in others, such as pensions for civil servants.     

Open-book accounting: Reason for failure of inter-firm cooperation?

Inter-firm accounting techniques such as open-book accounting (OBA) have been described as an important means for effectively managing costs in buyer–supplier relationships and for improving relationship quality. However, disclosing cost data also implies for the supplier the risk that the buyer uses the data during price negotiations to pressure the supplier's profit margin. To date, there is sparse empirical evidence addressing the extent to which cost-data disclosure does affect the supplier's perception of the exchange relationship. This study addresses this gap by investigating the impact of OBA on supplier relationship satisfaction. The findings indicate that OBA may negatively affect supplier relationship satisfaction and thus represents a potential risk to cooperation. The results further suggest that effective safeguards against opportunistic behavior, such as relational social norms, significantly attenuate the negative effect of OBA on supplier relationship satisfaction.     

Aggregate liquidity shortages, idiosyncratic liquidity smoothing and banking regulation

This paper develops a model of banking fragility driven by aggregate liquidity shortages. Inefficiencies arise from a failure of the interbank market to smooth the available liquidity in such a shortage. We find that a standard lender of last resort policy is ineffective in restoring efficiency as it leads to offsetting changes in the banks’ supply of liquidity. In contrast, subsidizing the purchase of assets from troubled banks increases welfare by improving the banks’ liquidity holdings. The first best, however, is achieved by redistributing existing liquidity from healthy to troubled banks in a crisis.     

Testing the fire-sale FDI hypothesis for the European financial crisis

Using a panel of corporate transactions in 27 EU countries from 1999 to 2012, we investigate the impact of the financial crisis on the market for corporate assets. In particular, we test the ‘fire-sale FDI’ hypothesis by analyzing the number of cross-border transactions, the price of corporate assets and the impact of credit and macroeconomic conditions. According to the fire-sale FDI hypothesis, countries affected by a crisis attract foreign buyers selling assets at a discount. We find a dampening effect of the crisis on cross-border transactions in all EU countries. Although countries with higher sovereign default risk and lower economic demand attracted more foreign buyers in the crisis, lower domestic credit is associated with less cross-border transactions. Corporate assets in crisis countries are cheaper, particularly if domestic credit is low; however, these findings are not limited to the crisis period. This pattern is strikingly different from the East Asian and Latin American financial crises. Overall, we find little evidence for ‘fire-sale FDI’ suggesting an integrated European market without significant frictions.     

Pricing Risk-Adjusted Deposit Insurance: An Option-Based Model

This paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships between equity and a call option, and insurance and a put option. The data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility. Market perceptions of FDIC bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility. Sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification, thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks.     

Repeated acquirers in FDIC assisted acquisitions

We studied repeated acquirers in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) assisted acquisitions. Using a sample of 128 FDIC assisted acquisitions and 387 non-assisted acquisitions, we found that FDIC assisted acquirers, on average, produced positive abnormal returns. This result was driven by repeated acquirers. First-time acquirers did not profit in these assisted acquisitions. In a logit analysis, we found that the FDIC repeated acquirer improved its profiting chances by reducing the winning bid and the number of bids. This evidence is consistent with the suggested experience/information effect based on theory and FDIC practices.     

民间非营利组织会计若干处理规定及其意义

本文系统介绍了我国《民间非营利组织会计制度》中规范的 ,关于捐赠、政府补助、受托代理业务、文物文化资产、资产减值会计、净资产的分类与列报、收入的确认、费用的确认与列报等民间非营利组织特有或者特殊的交易或者事项的会计处理 ,阐述了这些处理出台的背景和意义。     

Increased Concentration in Banking: Megabanks and Their Implications for Deposit Insurance

During the past two decades, the U.S. banking industry has experienced an unprecedented wave of consolidation, marked by a substantial decline in the number of insured depository institutions and the emergence of banking behemoths with assets totaling in the hundreds of billions of dollars. This unparalleled concentration of assets and deposits among a handful of "megabanks" has important implications for deposit insurance. Most importantly, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) now faces a situation in which the failure of even a single megabank could overwhelm the resources immediately available to the deposit insurance system and expose both the banking industry and the government (i.e., taxpayers) to huge potential liabilities. This article highlights the current structure of the banking industry, examines the threat that this structure poses to the deposit insurance funds, and suggests possible approaches for dealing with megabanks and the increasing concentration of insured deposits.     

The Effects of Variations in Laxity (or Strictness) of Closure Rules on the Valuation of Deposit Insurance

The passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), which removed some of the freedom or latitude the FDIC had in resolving and closing insolvent institutions, makes it clear that regulatory closure rules are not invariant with regard to time and events. Therefore, this paper analyzes the effects of variations in the laxity or strictness of bank closure rules on the valuation of deposit insurance. Hardly predictable state variables, such as political, economic and bureaucratic constraints, represent potential sources of uncertainty that drive changes in the stringency of closure policy. A variation of Ronn and Verma's [14] model is extended to consider situations where the insurance agency's closure rule is uncertain.     

Value relevance of disclosed related party transactions

Several recent North American corporate scandals have brought attention to the potential for accounting manipulations associated with related party transactions (RPTs), which have lead to a decline in perceived earnings quality. We examine the value relevance of disclosed RPTs in Chinese corporations. We focus on two types of RPTs: sales of goods and sales of assets. From 1997 to 2000, we find that the reported earnings of firms selling goods or assets to related parties exhibit a lower valuation coefficient than those of firms in China without such transactions. This result is not observed during 2001-2003 after a new fair value measurement rule for RPTs came into effect. Our evidence suggests that the new RPT regulation in China is perceived to be effective at reducing the potential misuse of RPTs for earnings management purposes. Since RPTs have been the subject of numerous scandals in North America, our evidence from the Chinese stock markets suggests that new RPT accounting standards could prove an efficient solution to this issue.     

The Winner's Curse and Bidder Competition in Acquisitions: Evidence from Failed Bank Auctions

This study examines the effect of bidder competition in acquisitions. We use predictions from auction theory to test whether acquirers of failed banks overpay (the “winner's curse”) when bidding in FDIC sealed-bid purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions (auctions). The empirical results indicate that winning bids tend to increase as the number of competitors increases, as predicted by theory. We also find that bid levels of all bidders increase with increased competition, which is consistent with bidders' failing to adjust for the winner's curse in a common value auction setting. However, additional tests using winning bids only are consistent with both a common value and a private values model, so this result should be interpreted with caution.     

Price uncertainty and vertical integration: an examination of petrochemical firms

The petrochemical industry employs assets subject to temporal and site specificity. The OPEC oil price shocks of the 1970s made it difficult to write contracts covering business dealings in the industry. I use this production and economic setting as a natural experiment to test transaction cost theory. In support of the theory, I find that input price uncertainty in the 1970s positively affected the extent of vertical integration by firms into input stages. Moreover, the positive reaction of vertical integration to price uncertainty mainly occurs in transactions subject to asset specificity. I also examine price controls and market power as alternative explanations for vertical integration in the industry, but fail to find support for these hypotheses.     

Forbearance: An empirical analysis

Several recent articles have analyzed conditions under which allowing capital-deficient banks to continue to operate may be optimal policy. This article examines the performance of banks admitted into the FDIC's Capital Forbearance Program between 1986 and 1989 and finds that, for the majority of these banks, there was no substantial improvement in their capital ratios. We use a logit regression analysis to attempt to identify those banks whose financial condition improved with forbearance and find that banks which did improve are not clearly identifiable from pre-forbearance financial data. Instead, the banks which improved did so due to infusions of new capital, extraordinary income, and improvements in the local economies, factors which are not easily identifiable ex ante by regulators. The conclusion is that, while some grants of forbearance may result in large saving to the FDIC, in the majority of cases granting forbearance to troubled banks is unlikely to reduce the expected loss to the deposit insurer.University of HoustonUniversity of HoustonCooperative Bank of Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan     

Capital and resolution policies: The US interbank market

We develop an empirically based simulation study to test two types of policies designed to control systemic risk: preventive policies targeting capital requirements and mitigation policies targeting default resolution. We find that capital buffers reduce both the number of defaults and the resulting losses. The loss reduction benefit increases as the magnitude of adverse shocks becomes higher. We find that a simple branch-breakup resolution strategy reduces the loss borne by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The mitigation effect becomes higher as the fraction of assets resolved through auctions and auction competitiveness increase.