THE INTERWAR DEBT CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH

This article analyzes the sovereign defaults of the 1930s andreports nine major findings. (1) There is little evidence thatfinancial markets of the 1930s were unsophisticated or thatbanks have a comparative advantage over the bond market in processinginformation. (2) Debt default in the 1930s depended on a combinationof factors, including the magnitude of the external shock, thelevel of debt, and the economic policy response, as well ason a range of non-economic considerations. (3) Countries thatinterrupted service recovered more quickly from the Great Depressionthan did countries that resisted default. (4) There is littleevidence that countries that defaulted in the 1930s later sufferedinferior access to the capital market. (5) The readjustmentof defaulted debts was protracted: the analogy with corporatebankruptcy proceedings is not applicable. (6) Although defaultled in some cases to a substantial reduction of transfers fromdebtors to creditors, on balance returns on sovereign loanscompared favorably with returns on domestic investments. (7)Creditor governments in the 1930s did act to accelerate thesettlement process. (8) Global schemes analogous to the Bakerplan were widely proposed but never implemented. (9) In contrast,debt buybacks played a useful role in the resolution of thecrisis.      

Frailty Correlated Default

The probability of extreme default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt is much greater than would be estimated under the standard assumption that default correlation arises only from exposure to observable risk factors. At the high confidence levels at which bank loan portfolio and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) default losses are typically measured for economic capital and rating purposes, conventionally based loss estimates are downward biased by a full order of magnitude on test portfolios. Our estimates are based on U.S. public nonfinancial firms between 1979 and 2004. We find strong evidence for the presence of common latent factors, even when controlling for observable factors that provide the most accurate available model of firm-by-firm default probabilities.     

A Macrofinance View of U.S. Sovereign CDS Premiums

Premiums on U.S. sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) have risen to persistently elevated levels since the financial crisis. We examine whether these premiums reflect the probability of a fiscal default—a state in which a balanced budget can no longer be restored by raising taxes or eroding the real value of debt by increasing inflation. We develop an equilibrium macrofinance model in which the fiscal and monetary policy stances jointly endogenously determine nominal debt, taxes, inflation, and growth. We show that the CDS premiums reflect the endogenous risk-adjusted probabilities of fiscal default. The calibrated model is consistent with elevated levels of CDS premiums but leaves dynamic implications quantitatively unresolved.     

The differential impact of leverage on the default risk of small and large firms

We analyse a sample of 6 million firm-year observations of large corporations and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) spanning 6 European countries from 2005 to 2015, to determine the impact of leverage and different sources of funding on default risk. We find that financial leverage has a greater impact on the probability of default of SMEs than of large corporations. The difference in default probability between the top and bottom leverage quartiles is 1.24% for large firms and 2.87% for SMEs. This difference may be explained by the greater exposure of SMEs to short-term debt and their consequently higher refinancing risk. Indeed, we find that SMEs that recover from the state of insolvency may have similar leverage to defaulted SMEs; however their liability structure is significantly altered towards long-term debt and away from short-term debt. Our findings have important implications not only for bank regulators and policy-makers but also for credit risk modelling.     

Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face adverse consequences when they grant debt forgiveness to borrowers. I provide evidence consistent with borrowers communicating their debt forgiveness to other borrowers, who then more frequently strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, the default rate increases by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, my findings suggest that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication the lender tightens its debt forgiveness policy to mitigate default contagion.     

Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

We show that the prospect of a debt renegotiation favorable to shareholders reduces the firm's equity risk. Equity beta and return volatility are lower in countries where the bankruptcy code favors debt renegotiations and for firms with more shareholder bargaining power relative to debt holders. These relations weaken as the country's insolvency procedure favors liquidations over renegotiations. In the limit, when debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, equity risk is independent of shareholders' incentives to default strategically. We argue that these findings support the hypothesis that the threat of strategic default can reduce the firm's equity risk.     

Distressed debt prices and recovery rate estimation

This paper has two purposes. First, it uses distressed debt prices to estimate recovery rates at default. In this regard, estimates are obtained for three recovery rate models: recovery of face value, recovery of Treasury, and recovery of market value. We show that identifying the “economic” default date, as distinct from the recorded default date, is crucial to obtaining unbiased estimates. The economic default date is defined to be the first date when the market prices the firm’s debt as if it has defaulted. An implication is that the standard industry practice of using 30-day post default prices to compute recovery rate yields biased estimates. Second, we construct and estimate a distressed debt pricing model. We use this model to implicitly estimate the parameters of the embedded recovery rate process and to price distressed debt. Our distressed debt pricing model fits market prices well, with an average pricing error of less than one basis point.      

Effect of rollover risk on default risk: Evidence from bank financing

We study the effect of rollover risk on the risk of default using a comprehensive database of U.S. industrial firms during 1986–2013. Dependence on bank financing is the key driver of the impact of rollover risk on default risk. Default risk and rollover risk present a significant positive relation in firms dependent on bank financing. In contrast, rollover risk is uncorrelated with default probability in the case of firms that do not rely on bank financing. Our measure of rollover risk is the amount of long-term debt maturing in one year, weighted by total assets. In the case of a firm that depends on bank financing, an increase of one standard deviation in this measure leads to a significant increase of 3.2% in its default probability within one year. Other drivers affecting the interaction between rollover risk and default risk are whether a firm suffers from declining profitability and has poor credit. Additionally, rollover risk's impact on default probability is stronger during periods when credit market conditions are tighter.     

Belief updating, debt pricing and financial decisions under asymmetric information

This paper studies debt holders’ belief updating, valuation of corporate debt, and equity owners’ financing decisions during financial distress under asymmetric information. This is done within a continuous-time framework, where the relevant state variable is assumed to follow an Arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM). ABM can take negative values and has very realistic feature compared with Geometric Brownian motion (GBM). Using Chapter 11 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code as a costly screening device, we can characterize which firm will choose private workouts (in the form of strategic debt service) and which will choose to file for the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy procedure (in the form of debt-equity swap) when the firm is in financial distress. Using arguments similar to equilibrium refinements, we give a clear picture of how debt holders’ beliefs about the firm’s types are updated according to the state variable and the firm’s default behavior, and describe optimal strategies of both parties under those beliefs. We also provide an approximate solution to the debt pricing problem under asymmetric information.     

Credit default swaps and the market for sovereign debt

In this paper, we analyze the determinants and effects of credit default swap (CDS) trading initiation in the sovereign bond market. CDS trading initiation is associated with a 30–150 basis point reduction in sovereign bond yields, with greater yield reductions accruing to higher default risk economies. For countries with high default risk, rated B or lower by Standard and Poor’s, CDS initiation is also associated with significant price efficiency benefits in the underlying market. CDS trading initiation is more likely following increases in local equity index volatility, index spreads for regional and global CDS markets, or depreciation of the local currency relative to the US dollar, and decreases in a country’s ability to service foreign debt. Our results are robust to selection bias controls based on these factors.     

Growth options,macroeconomic conditions,and the cross section of credit risk

This paper develops a structural equilibrium model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, incorporating the fact that firms are heterogeneous in their asset composition. Compared with firms that are mainly composed of invested assets, firms with growth options have higher costs of debt because they are more volatile and have a greater tendency to default during recession when marginal utility is high and recovery rates are low. Our model matches empirical facts regarding credit spreads, default probabilities, leverage ratios, equity premiums, and investment clustering. Importantly, it also makes predictions about the cross section of all these features.     

Financial statement comparability and credit risk

Prior research shows that firms’ financial statement comparability improves the accuracy of market participants’ valuation judgments and thus may reduce firms’ costs of capital. Distinct from prior research focusing on the equity market, we develop measures of comparability relevant to debt market participants based on the within-industry variability of Moody’s adjustments to reported accounting numbers for the purposes of credit rating. We examine two sets of adjustments: (1) to the interest coverage ratio and (2) to non-recurring income items. We validate these comparability measures by providing evidence that greater comparability is associated with lower frequency and magnitude of split ratings by credit rating agencies. We predict and find that greater comparability is associated with (1) lower estimated bid-ask spreads for traded bonds, (2) lower credit spreads for both bonds and five-year credit default swaps, and (3) a steeper one- to five-year credit default swap term structure. Our results are consistent with financial statement comparability reducing debt market participants’ uncertainty about and pricing of firms’ credit risk.     

The impact of junior debt issuance on senior unsecured debt’s risk premiums

Numerous studies have examined the impact of security issuance upon the value of pre-existing debt and equity but the focus has largely been on changes in equity value. We examine changes in senior unsecured debt risk premiums that accompany new junior debt issues. Additionally, we test several hypotheses regarding the potential impacts of junior debt issues. Extant theory suggests senior debt value may be threatened under certain conditions by the issuance of junior debt. Our results indicate that when junior debt replaces bank debt, senior default risk premiums experience abnormal declines. The result is broadly consistent with the elevation of the senior unsecured debt by way of the elimination of a separate and more senior class of debt claimants. In contrast, we also find that larger junior bond issues are associated with abnormal increases in senior risk premiums, broadly consistent with issue size being correlated with negative information about firm cash flows. We find strong evidence of interaction effects. For example, replacement of bank debt results in greater changes in default risk premiums the larger the issue size. We also find lower credit ratings magnify other effects. For example, if the junior debt issued matures before the outstanding senior unsecured bond, senior risk premiums experience abnormal increases for lower rated debt.     

Interest Tax Shields: A Barrier Options Approach

There is a link between barrier options and tax shields of interest expense. We combine this link with a traditional valuation approach, to present practical valuation formulas for interest tax shields in three debt scenarios with risk of default: (1) constant debt, (2) delayed debt, and (3) debt refinancing. In all cases, default and refinancing are contingent on the random evolution of the income of the firm. For each scenario, we work out sensitivity analysis of the value of tax shields with respect to income, growth, systematic and business risk, risk-free interest rate, interest coverage ratio covenant, and the firm??s refinancing strategy.     

From equity to default correlation with taxes

For fixed income investment, the preponderant risk is the clustering of defaults in the portfolio. Accurate prediction of such clustering depends on the knowledge of default correlation. We develop models with exogenous debt and endogenous debt to predict default correlations from equity correlations based on a self-consistent structural framework. We also examine how taxes affect the prediction of default correlations based on the two models. The empirical analysis shows that the corporate taxes tend to decrease default correlations, while personal taxes could increase or decrease default correlations. Our default correlation model with exogenous debt does a better job of predicting default correlations for high quality bonds, while the one with endogenous debt predicts more accurately for lower rated bonds. Our studies not only theoretically improve the modeling of default correlation in the structural setting but also shed new light on various aspects of default correlations and thereby help financial practitioners price credit derivatives more accurately and formulate more effective strategies to manage default risk of credit portfolios.     

Capital Structure and Debt Priority

We study a defaultable firm's debt priority structure in a simple structural model where the firm issues senior and junior bonds and is subject to both liquidity and solvency risks. Assuming that the absolute priority rule prevails and that liquidation is immediate upon default, we determine the firm's interior optimal priority structure along with its optimal capital structure. We also obtain closed‐form solutions for the market values of the firm's debt and equity. We find that the magnitude of the spread differential between junior and senior bond yields is positively, but not linearly related to the total debt level and the riskiness of assets. Finally, we provide an in‐depth analysis of probabilities of default and the term structure of credit spreads.     

民营企业债务违约是内因驱动吗？——基于短贷长投和多元化经营视角的分析

不同于以往从外部因素的角度关注民营企业债务问题,本文从企业自身行为出发分析了民企债务违约是否由内因驱动。具体地,本文考察了短贷长投和多元化经营对民营企业债务违约的影响。结果发现,总体上短贷长投以及多元化程度提高了民企债务违约的可能性。从传导机制上看,短贷长投和多元化降低了企业的盈利水平、提高了过度负债、增加了代理成本,并通过以上三个渠道提高了企业债务违约的可能性。从异质性结果来看,信贷紧缩会加大短贷长投对债务违约的促进作用。对于政府支持的行业而言,短贷长投和多元化引发的债务违约问题更严重。最后,更多的短贷长投和多元化在决策得当情况下不会引发债务违约风险。本文的结果表明,民营企业债务违约主要是由内因驱动,即由企业在“求大”“上层次”的心理下实施的粗放式发展模式驱动。本文对于追溯民企违约的根源、精准施策进而更好地支持民企发展具有一定的启示。     

Yield spreads,agency costs and the corporate bond call feature

This paper theoretically compares yields and optimal default policies for callable and non-callable corporate debt. It shows that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is possible for the yield spread (callable minus non-callable) to be negative. It also identifies the key determinants of the yield spread. Next, it shows that the optimal default trigger for non-callable debt is higher than the trigger for callable debt, resulting in additional default-related costs. Thus, the use of non-callable debt gives rise to an indirect agency cost of early default, which is the difference in total firm value with callable and non-callable debt. This agency cost provides a rationale for the existence of callable debt. By examining the determinants of the magnitude of this agency cost, the conditions that make callable debt more attractive (to the issuing firm) relative to non-callable debt are identified. This allows certain predictions to be made regarding the likelihood of a call feature in a corporate bond. The model's implications are supported by existing empirical studies.     

Sovereign debt and the London Club: A precommitment device for limiting punishment for default

In this paper, we examine the role that institutions may play in enabling banks to write contracts whereby sovereign debt is not forgiven ex post. Our model provides a rationale for the emergence of a centralized forum for debt renegotiation, such as the London Club, as well as for bank syndicates. These bank syndicates arise as part of a pre-commitment device rather than for risk sharing purposes. We propose a debt contract under which only involuntary default is forgiven ex post. Our main findings are that under this contract, debt forgiveness after voluntary (strategic) default is avoided. When voluntary default occurs, access to the credit market is denied only for a limited number of periods, rather than forever. In contrast to a voluntary default, involuntary default is forgiven immediately.     

The non-neutrality of debt in investment timing: a new NPV rule

Summary Limited liability debt financing of irreversible investments can affect investment timing through an entrepreneur’s option value, even after compensating a lender for expected default losses. This non-neutrality of debt arises from an entrepreneur’s unique investment opportunity, and it is shown in a standard model of irreversible investment that includes the equilibrium effect of a competitive lending sector. The analysis is partial, in that it takes as exogenously given an entrepreneur’s use of debt. Intuitively, limited liability lowers downside risk for the entrepreneur by truncating the lower tail of risks, and lowers the investment threshold. Compensating the lender for expected default losses reduces project profitability to the entrepreneur, and increases the investment threshold. The net effect is negative, because lower downside risk has an additional impact on the option value of delaying investment. The standard NPV rule in real options theory implicitly assumes debt to be neutral. With non-neutrality of debt, an investment threshold is higher than investment cost, but lower than the standard NPV rule. Comparisons with other standard investment thresholds show similar relationships.