Firm Productivity,Innovation, and Financial Development

How do firm‐specific actions—in particular, innovation—affect firm productivity? What is the role of the financial sector in facilitating higher productivity? Using a rich firm‐level data set, we find that innovation is crucial for firm performance as it directly and measurably increases productivity. The impact of innovation on productivity is larger in less‐developed countries. Evidence of financial sector development influencing the innovation‐productivity link is weak, but the effect is difficult to identify due to correlation between indicators of a country's financial and nonfinancial development. Furthermore, we find evidence that the innovation effect on productivity is more significant for high‐tech firms than for low‐tech firms.     

Office Size of Big 4 Auditors and Client Restatements

Francis and Yu (2009) and Choi, Kim, Kim, and Zang (2010) report evidence that Big 4 audits are of higher quality when the engagement office is of larger size. Specifically, client earnings quality is higher and auditors in larger offices are more likely to issue going‐concern audit reports. We extend this line of research to test if larger Big 4 offices have fewer client restatements. A client restatement provides more direct evidence of a low‐quality audit than earnings quality metrics or going‐concern reports, because a restatement indicates the client's auditor did not effectively enforce the correct application of GAAP at the time the original financial statements were issued. We analyze 2,557 firm‐year restatements in a sample of 23,190 financial statements originally issued by U.S. firms from 2003 to 2008. We find that Big 4 office size is associated with fewer client restatements after controlling for innate client characteristics that may affect restatements (client size, financial performance, industry membership, nonfinancial measures, off‐balance sheet activities, and market‐related measures), and a set of controls for other auditor factors such as fees and industry expertise. The study raises important questions about the ability of smaller offices to deliver high‐quality audits for SEC registrants.     

Director Monitoring of Expense Misreporting in Nonprofit Organizations: The Effects of Expense Disclosure Transparency,Donor Evaluation Focus and Organization Performance

This study examines whether three factors—the transparency of expense disclosures, donor evaluation focus, and organization performance—influence how directors monitor management expense misreporting in nonprofit organizations. An experiment with 189 nonprofit directors finds that the enhanced transparency of expense disclosures increases director monitoring by reducing the tendency to accept management expense misreporting. Further, an organization's nonfinancial performance and the perceived fairness of donor evaluation focus interact to influence director monitoring practices. Specifically, when directors know an organization's nonfinancial performance is poor and understand that this performance will negatively influence the willingness of donors to contribute, directors monitor less if they think that donors are adopting a more balanced approach to organizational evaluation that focuses on both financial and nonfinancial performance; that is, there is a reverse fair process effect as this donor approach is perceived as being fairer than if donors focus solely on financial performance. However, monitoring is equally strong regardless of donor evaluation focus when directors know that an organization's nonfinancial performance is good and a donation is forthcoming.     

Analysts’ Use of Nonfinancial Information Disclosures*

In this study I examine how analysts process nonfinancial information and how this is affected by the patterns of firms’ nonfinancial information disclosures. More specifically, I examine the association between analyst earnings forecast errors and the persistence of nonfinancial disclosures, both across information content and over time. The study focuses on firms in the wireless industry for the period 1997–2007. The results show that analysts tend to underreact to the information contained in customer acquisition cost, average revenue per user, and the number of subscribers. These are the performance measures that have significant predictive ability for future earnings of wireless firms. Distinguishing between firms on the basis of their nonfinancial disclosure patterns reveals that the above findings are driven primarily by firms with irregular disclosures. There is no evidence of analysts’ inefficiency in evaluating the content of nonfinancial metrics provided by persistently disclosing firms. This implies that the lack of systematic disclosures of performance measures restricts financial analysts’ ability to fully analyze the contributions of these metrics for future earnings.     

Blockholder Exit Threats and Financial Reporting Quality

Recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that blockholders (shareholders with ownership ≥ 5 percent) exert governance through the threat of exit. Blockholders have strong incentives to gather private information and sell their shares when managers are perceived to underperform. To prevent blockholders from selling their shares and the firm from suffering a stock price decline, managers align their actions with the interests of shareholders. As a result of the greater manager‐shareholder alignment, managers' actions are more likely to be in shareholders' best interest, and consequently there is less need for managers to manipulate earnings. Consistent with these predictions from economic theory, we find evidence that as exit threat increases, firms have higher financial reporting quality. Theory also predicts that the impact of blockholders' exit threat on financial reporting quality (FRQ) should increase as the manager's wealth is tied more closely to the stock price, and this is what we find. Our study contributes to the research on the impact of shareholders on FRQ and to an emerging literature on the impact of blockholders in financial markets. Blockholders play an important role in managers' reporting outcomes through their actions as informed investors.     

Inferring Accounting Information from Corporate Financing Choices: An Examination of Security Issuances in the Banking Industry*

This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge‐offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital‐regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital‐management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance. We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge‐offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital‐increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital‐decreasing issuances. A cross‐sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year.     

决定中国企业海外并购绩效的因素分析

海外并购已经成为中国企业对外直接投资的主导模式,那么,哪些因素影响了中国企业的海外并购绩效？构建一个综合的研究框架,从国家、企业、交易这三个不同层面探究中国企业海外并购绩效的影响因素,通过对176家中国A股上市公司的269个海外并购样本进行实证研究,研究发现显著影响中国企业海外并购绩效的因素来自不同层面。具体而言,国家竞争力、营商环境、海外并购经验、管理层能力、账面市值比、企业规模、财务状况、关联属性等因素都显著地影响海外并购绩效。结合实证分析的结果,文章为中国企业海外并购良好绩效的取得提供了操作层面的启示。     

China's Nonfinancial Corporate Debt Dynamics

Since the global financial crisis broke out in 2008, China's nonfinancial corporate debt has been rising steadily and rapidly, posing serious threat to China's financial stability. China's rising corporate debt is mainly attributable to three factors: worsening capital efficiency, worsening corporate profitability and high funding costs. Based on a dynamic recursive model developed in the paper, we simulate the trajectories of China's corporate debt‐to‐GDP ratio, and find that if China fails to reverse the current trends in capital efficiency, corporate profitability and financing costs, China's nonfinancial corporate debt‐to‐GDP ratio will continue to rise without converging to a limit. Against most economists' intuition, given the current trends of changes in parameters, higher economic growth will not help China to escape the corporate debt trap. On the contrary, it will make China's corporate debt problem even worse. To avert a corporate debt crisis, China needs to speed up the structural reform and change the growth paradigm so as to enhance capital efficiency and firms' profitability, while reducing firms' financing costs.     

Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis*

Accounting discretion and the principle of conservatism are two salient features embedded in financial reporting systems. Arguably, the practice of conservative accounting choices can never be well understood without incorporating their effect on future periods (the intertemporal effect). This paper provides one explanation for managerial conservatism in a two‐period agency model with hidden information (a binary project type) and hidden actions (the agent's efforts). A piece‐wise linear incentive scheme with accounting earnings as the performance measure is employed. The agent's discretion is the choice of a depreciation method. Discretion is valuable if and only if the agent's marginal productivity of a “bad” project is greater than that of a “good” project, but not to an extreme degree. A conservative depreciation method decreases current compensation in exchange for a “bet” on future compensation and, hence, serves as a commitment device for the agent to signal that the prospect is indeed good. The accounting mechanism replicates the performance of the optimal direct mechanism.     

The Influence of Affect on Managers' Capital‐Budgeting Decisions*

In this paper, we propose that affective reactions are integral to accounting decision contexts like capital budgeting, and that researchers must jointly consider affect and cognition to better understand accounting decision makers' behavior. We argue that interpersonal relationships are characteristic of many capital‐budgeting contexts, and that these relationships can lead to emotional affective reactions. For example, reactions such as frustration and anger may result if a manager is treated unfairly by another individual involved in a capital project. Drawing on relevant work in neurobiology and psychology, we then predict that these affective reactions can influence managers' capital‐budgeting decisions. We report on four experimental scenarios that demonstrate the impact of affective reactions on capital‐budgeting decisions. Consistent with our predictions, the results indicate that managers consider both financial data and affective reactions when evaluating the utility of an investment alternative. Our results suggest that researchers should consider both affect and cognition to more fully understand decision making in accounting contexts.     

Looking good by doing good: CEO attractiveness and corporate philanthropy

We investigate the effect of male corporate managers' physical appearance—classified into unattractive, average-looking, and attractive—on the philanthropic decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that compared to average-looking managers, those who rated as attractive do not engage more actively in corporate donations. On the contrary, the probability of donating is approximately 5% higher for unattractive managers than for average-looking managers; further, unattractive managers donate 95% more in charitable giving. To explain these findings, we propose a psychological channel through which physical appearance may influence male managers' charitable donations: Because altruistic behaviors may aggrandize individuals, managers conscious of deficits in their own physical attractiveness may engage in prosocial behavior to increase their attractiveness in the eyes of others. We find consistent evidence that the effect of managers' unattractiveness on philanthropic decisions is stronger in firms with weaker corporate governance; further, we find that the positive impact of corporate donation on financial performance observed in firms led by attractive and average-looking managers is substantially weaker in those firms led by unattractive managers.     

Enterprise Risk Management Program Quality: Determinants,Value Relevance,and the Financial Crisis

This paper investigates factors associated with high‐quality Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) programs in financial services firms, and whether ERM quality enhances performance and signals credibility to the financial markets. ERM, developed with the assistance of the accounting profession, provides a framework and plan to integrate management of all sources of risk. Challenged by measurement difficulties common to research on management control systems, prior ERM studies present mixed findings. Using ERM quality ratings of financial companies by Standard & Poor's, we find that higher ERM quality is associated with greater complexity, less resource constraint, and better corporate governance. Controlling for such characteristics, we find that higher ERM quality is associated with improved accounting performance. Results show a market reaction to signals of enhanced management control from initial ERM quality ratings and rating revisions, and a stronger response to earnings surprises for firms with higher ERM quality. Focusing on the recent global financial crisis, our analysis suggests that there is no relation between ERM quality and market performance prior to and during the market collapse. However, returns of higher ERM quality companies are higher during the market rebound. Overall, results reveal that firm performance and value are enhanced by high‐quality controls that integrate risk management efforts across the firm, enabling better oversight of managers' risk‐taking behavior and aligning that behavior with the strategic direction of the company.     

Monetary policy and financial investments of nonfinancial firms: New evidence from China

This paper develops a portfolio choice model by incorporating monetary policy and analyzes the determinants of financial investments of nonfinancial firms in China. Unlike the literature assuming financial investments are riskless, we allow risks in both financial and real investments in firms' portfolio choice model. Our theoretical framework suggests that monetary policy, relative risk in fixed investment, and the risk-adjusted return gap between financial and fixed investments are determinants of firms' financial investments. Using firm-level panel data over the period from 2006 to 2016, we find that the relative risk in fixed investment and quantitative expansionary monetary policy have led to rising financial investments of nonfinancial firms in China over the post-2008 financial crisis period, whereas the rate of the risk-adjusted return gap between financial and fixed investments plays no role in firms' financial investments. The impact of monetary policy on firms' financial investments is also interlinked with their ownerships, with distinct impacts emerging between state-owned and non-state-owned firms.     

Asymmetric Inventory Management and the Direction of Sales Changes*

We study manufacturing firms' asymmetric inventory investment in response to sales changes. Focusing on the costs of resource adjustment and stockout that likely differ in sales‐increasing and sales‐decreasing periods, we predict and find that inventory investment declines less during periods with sales decreases than it rises during periods with sales increases. We validate this claim by showing that managers' expectations of future demand and desire to avoid inventory stockouts are important determinants of this asymmetry. In addition, we find that asymmetric inventory investment provides useful information for predicting future sales growth, and that both managers' and analysts' sales forecasts are positively associated with the asymmetry. Lastly, we document that forecasts of future sales growth that incorporate asymmetric inventory investment are associated with lower absolute forecast errors than benchmark forecasts. Overall, we highlight the importance of inventory information in understanding managers' resource adjustment and utilization decisions that have implications for forecasting future demand. Our findings on asymmetric inventory management provide new insights to fundamental analysis based on inventory signals.     

Career Concerns and Management Earnings Guidance

This study provides evidence that managers' career concerns affect their earnings guidance decisions. We hypothesize that CEOs who are relatively more concerned about assessments of their abilities have stronger incentives to guide the market expectations of earnings downwards to increase the likelihood of meeting or beating the expectations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that (i) short‐tenured CEOs, CEOs promoted from inside the firm, and nonfounder CEOs are more likely to provide downward earnings guidance when they have bad news, and (ii) their downward guidance tends to be more conservative. In response, analysts revise earnings forecasts less for the downward guidance provided by more career‐concerned CEOs. This indicates that analysts rationally incorporate these CEOs' stronger incentives to be conservative in their earnings guidance. Consequently, we find that CEOs with greater career concerns are not more likely to beat the market expectations, even when they provide more conservative downward guidance.     

Multinational banking and economic development: a case study

Evidence of inward foreign direct investment by commercial banks into two regions of China is used to examine the effect or relaxation of controls over inward investment on investment by nonfinancial firms. The existence of sophisticated intermediaries with experience in the international financial system creates conditions for a verifiable, sharp increase in the rate of inward investment by multinational corporations. Two explanations are advanced: the newly available expertise in the international financial system allows multinational firms to invest with the assurance that they will have sophisticated capability to hedge risks and, because the financial sector is a sensitive sector, permission for multinational banks to enter is a sign of a commitment to a policy of open industrialization.     

Common Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between earnings management and block ownership of same‐industry peer firms by a common set of institutional investors (common institutional ownership). This relation is important given the tremendous growth of common institutional ownership and the significant influence of blockholders on financial reporting. We hypothesize that common institutional ownership mitigates earnings management by enhancing institutions' monitoring efficiency and by encouraging institutions to internalize the negative externality of a firm's earnings management on peer firms' investments. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that higher common institutional ownership is related to less earnings management. Analyses of a quasi‐natural experiment based on financial institution mergers show that this negative relation is unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity of common institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests provide evidence that the negative relation is stronger among firms for which common institutional ownership is likely to generate a greater reduction in institutions' information acquisition and processing costs, and among firms whose severe financial misstatements are more likely to distort co‐owned peer firms' investments, supporting both mechanisms underlying our hypothesis. Our findings inform the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of common institutional ownership by highlighting an important benefit: the enhanced monitoring of financial reporting.     

Earnings Non‐Synchronicity and Voluntary Disclosure

Earnings non‐synchronicity reflects the extent to which firm‐specific factors determine a firm's earnings. Prior research suggests that high earnings non‐synchronicity impedes corporate outsiders' ability to process information. This study examines the impact of earnings non‐synchronicity on managers' decisions to provide earnings forecasts. We propose that high earnings non‐synchronicity motivates managers to issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors and to preempt costly information acquisition by outsiders. Consistently, we find a positive relation between earnings non‐synchronicity and managers' propensity to issue earnings forecasts, particularly long‐horizon forecasts. This positive relation is weaker when earnings are easier to predict based on the firm's earnings history and is stronger when the firm has higher institutional ownership and greater analyst following. We also find that the market's reaction to management forecasts increases with earnings non‐synchronicity. Overall, the evidence suggests that managers voluntarily provide earnings forecasts to alleviate the adverse consequences of earnings non‐synchronicity. These findings provide a more complete picture about the impact of earnings non‐synchronicity on a firm's information environment, and highlight the effect of the nature of information asymmetry on voluntary disclosures.     

Managers' Discretionary Adjustments: The Influence of Uncontrollable Events and Compensation Interdependence

Discretionary bonus adjustments allow managers to restore the alignment of employee effort and compensation when bonus amounts are based on noisy objective performance measures. The implications of discretionary adjustments for employees' future efforts and fairness perceptions present important trade‐offs for managers to consider. Adjustments may be used to motivate different types of effort in future periods, but may also create perceptions of unfairness among employees who are not affected by negative events. This study examines the joint influence of the likelihood of future negative uncontrollable events and compensation interdependence (i.e., the extent to which one employee's compensation influences others' compensation) on managers' willingness to make adjustments for the effect of a negative uncontrollable event on a single employee. In our experiment, we manipulate the likelihood of future uncontrollable events and whether bonuses are determined individually or are drawn from a shared bonus pool. Results show that managers are less willing to adjust when the likelihood of future events is high to avoid setting a precedent, thereby motivating employees to adapt to changing conditions. We also find that managers are less willing to adjust, regardless of event likelihood, when compensation interdependence is high, to avoid demotivating unaffected employees. Finally, we find that participants' general attitudes toward compensation significantly influence their adjustment decisions beyond the effects of our independent variables. Our results highlight the unique nature of discretionary adjustments, help explain findings from previous research, and demonstrate important considerations managers must make when using the flexibility provided to them in pay‐for‐performance contracts.     

The effects of the planning memorandum,time pressure and individual auditor characteristics on audit managers' review time judgments*

Abstract. This study examines audit managers' review time effort (as reflected in their time estimates for working paper review) and the extent to which this effort is directed by another important audit manager activity: initial audit planning. Initial audit planning is manipulated by identifying certain audit areas as critical in the planning memo. Time pressure and individual auditor characteristics also are examined because auditing literature suggests that they may affect managers' review. The analysis is based on the responses, to an audit case, of 73 audit managers from ten large accounting firms. The results indicate that: 1) the managers exhibit reasonable agreement in budgeting over half of audit management time to review, 2) the initial audit plan directs their subsequent review, 3) time pressure does not significantly affect their estimated review times, and 4) firm affiliation, auditor experience level, and initial planning effort are associated with differences in managers' review practices and perceptions. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these results for practice and further research.