Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting‐Based Debt Covenants*

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.     

Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis*

Accounting discretion and the principle of conservatism are two salient features embedded in financial reporting systems. Arguably, the practice of conservative accounting choices can never be well understood without incorporating their effect on future periods (the intertemporal effect). This paper provides one explanation for managerial conservatism in a two‐period agency model with hidden information (a binary project type) and hidden actions (the agent's efforts). A piece‐wise linear incentive scheme with accounting earnings as the performance measure is employed. The agent's discretion is the choice of a depreciation method. Discretion is valuable if and only if the agent's marginal productivity of a “bad” project is greater than that of a “good” project, but not to an extreme degree. A conservative depreciation method decreases current compensation in exchange for a “bet” on future compensation and, hence, serves as a commitment device for the agent to signal that the prospect is indeed good. The accounting mechanism replicates the performance of the optimal direct mechanism.     

The Effects of Exposure to Practice Risk on Tax Professionals' Judgements and Recommendations*

Tax professionals are responsible for objectively evaluating tax authorities and evidence relevant to their application and for serving as client advocates. We predict that practice risk — that is, exposure to monetary and nonmonetary costs of making inappropriate recommendations — will affect tax professionals' ability to meet these responsibilities by influencing the manner in which they process information about a tax situation as well as their resulting recommendations for clients. We conduct an experiment in which we manipulate practice risk through client characteristics. We also manipulate provision and nature of outcome information. We find that tax professionals process information differently for clients of different risk levels. Specifically, tax professionals weight negative outcome information more heavily when forming likelihood assessments underlying recommendations for a high‐risk client, relative to a low‐risk client. Further, risk directly affects recommendations in that tax professionals more strongly recommend an aggressive position for a low‐risk client. Differential processing of information for clients with identical transactions but different risk levels may protect the tax professional from the higher expected costs of making inappropriate recommendations to high‐risk clients. However, it indicates that tax professionals do not evaluate evidence objectively for all types of clients.     

On Commitment Toward Knowledge Templates in Global Standard Setting: The Case of the FASB‐IASB Revenue Project

This article explores commitment to knowledge templates, in this case competing measurement models, in global standard‐setting processes. In particular, I examine the positions of board members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) on a proposal to use fair value accounting in the measurement of revenue. The proposal to measure revenue at fair value was deliberated between 2002 and 2008 as part of the joint revenue project of the FASB and the IASB. I analyze narratives of the board proceedings on the revenue project, which reveal the positions of board members over the life of the proposal. To make sense of these positions, I use Durocher and Gendron's (2014) framework on epistemic commitment, which speaks to one's allegiance to knowledge templates. The analysis shows that individual board member commitment to different knowledge templates is fairly static despite dynamic and contentious debate on this particular proposal. While stable, board member reactions to the proposed shift toward fair value fall into recognizable patterns showing how commitment to different templates entails prioritizing of different core principles and appeals to higher authorities. Finally, the analysis shows how commitment to knowledge templates varies depending on the professional affiliations of board members. For instance, the analysis shows relatively greater consistency of commitment between board members affiliated with academia and corporate preparers than between auditors. Overall, the study indicates the importance of micro‐level features in explaining the development of macro‐level accounting policy. These features are crucial to enhancing our broader understanding of the way in which accounting standards and rules ultimately develop.     

The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.     

Credit Ratings and CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk‐taking incentives into their credit risk evaluation. We measure risk‐taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price (delta). We find that rating agencies impound managerial risk‐taking incentives in their credit risk assessments. Assuming other things equal, a one standard deviation increase in vega (delta) will lead to an approximately one‐notch (two‐notch) rating downgrade. In addition, we evaluate the significance of credit ratings in the design of CEO compensation. Our findings suggest that rating‐troubled firms will gear down managerial incentives of risk seeking. In particular, other things equal, a rating downgrade to the lower edge of the investment category (i.e., BBB?) in the immediate prior year will bring about an approximately 51 percent reduction of vega incentive from options newly granted to the CEO in the current year. However, we find no evidence that firms' rating concerns significantly affect delta. Given the significance of credit ratings in the marketplace and their close connection to accounting, the findings of the current study advance our understanding, not only of how sophisticated rating agencies are in incorporating forward‐looking information (i.e., vega and delta) into risk assessments, but of how influential the raters are in changing firms' compensation policies. The findings also have implications on the role of accounting in constraining excessive managerial risk taking with improved disclosures on managerial compensation.     

CEO Hedging Opportunities and the Weighting of Performance Measures in Compensation Contracts

This study examines the rather controversial practice of managerial hedging, which allows CEOs to delink their compensation from stock price performance. We presume that boards are aware of these practices and adjust the weights placed on accounting‐based and stock‐based performance measures in executive compensation contracts to mitigate the problem. Empirically, we find that, in the presence of managerial hedging opportunities, accounting‐based performance measures receive more weight, whereas stock‐based performance measures receive less weight in determining executive compensation. Moreover, these results are more pronounced when managerial hedging needs are high. Regarding the effects of earnings management resulting from accounting‐based incentives, we find that good auditing and strong governance mechanisms strengthen the benefit of placing more weight on accounting‐based performance measures. Taken together, our findings suggest that corporate boards shift the relative weights of performance measures in compensation contracts in response to managerial hedging opportunities, which is consistent with optimal contracting.     

Evidence of Choice Avoidance in Capital‐Investment Judgements*

Evaluating capital‐investment decisions is an important function of managerial accountants. There is anecdotal evidence, however, that managers avoid making decisions or delay decisions, which is costly in terms of time, effort, and lost opportunities. Prior research has shown that choice avoidance among nonprofessionals making personal decisions is associated with having to choose between alternatives with very different features or that require trade‐offs of very important goals (choice difficulty). It is unclear, however, whether experienced managers, using the analytical decision tools at their disposal, respond in the same way as nonprofessionals when making accounting decisions. Hence, this study examines whether increased choice difficulty increases negative affect in the capital‐investment decision‐making process and, as a result, the tendency of managers to avoid choice even when analytical decision tools are used. In an experiment with 120 executives, participants facing more difficult decisions reported they felt more worried, nervous, uneasy, and anxious and had a greater desire to postpone making the decision than participants in a control group. Participants provided with a decision aid designed to help them focus their cognitive effort reported a lower desire to postpone making the decision than participants in the choice‐difficulty conditions without the decision aid. I conclude by discussing the result's implications for managers and accountants.     

Discretionary Accounting Accruals,Managers' Incentives,and Audit Fees*

This paper examines the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees. It draws on the theory that managers of firms with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value‐relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting‐based compensation are likely to use DAs opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation. OLS regression results of 648 Australian firms show that (1) there is a positive association between DAs and audit fees; (2) managerial ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between DAs and audit fees; and (3) this negative impact is further found to be weaker for firms with high accounting‐based management compensation.     

The Effect of Humanizing Robo‐Advisors on Investor Judgments*

We examine the effect of humanizing (naming) robo‐advisors on investor judgments, which has taken on increased importance as robo‐advisors have become increasingly common and there is currently little SEC regulation governing key aspects of their use. In our first experiment, we predict and find that investors are more likely to rely on the investment recommendation of an unnamed robo‐advisor, whereas they are more likely to rely on the investment recommendation of a named human advisor. Theory suggests one reason that naming a robo‐advisor may have drawbacks pertains to the complexity of the task the robo‐advisor performs. We explore the importance of task complexity in our second experiment. We predict and find that investors are less likely to rely on a named robo‐advisor when the advisor is perceived to be performing a relatively complex task, consistent with our first experiment, and more likely to rely on a named robo‐advisor when the advisor is perceived to be performing a relatively simple task, consistent with prior research on human‐computer interactions. Our findings contribute to the literature examining how technology influences the acquisition and use of financial information and the general literature on human‐computer interactions. Our study also addresses a call by the SEC to learn more about robo‐advisors. Lastly, our study has practical implications for wealth management firms by demonstrating the potentially negative effects of making robo‐advisors more humanlike in an attempt to engage and attract users.     

The Influence of Affect on Managers' Capital‐Budgeting Decisions*

In this paper, we propose that affective reactions are integral to accounting decision contexts like capital budgeting, and that researchers must jointly consider affect and cognition to better understand accounting decision makers' behavior. We argue that interpersonal relationships are characteristic of many capital‐budgeting contexts, and that these relationships can lead to emotional affective reactions. For example, reactions such as frustration and anger may result if a manager is treated unfairly by another individual involved in a capital project. Drawing on relevant work in neurobiology and psychology, we then predict that these affective reactions can influence managers' capital‐budgeting decisions. We report on four experimental scenarios that demonstrate the impact of affective reactions on capital‐budgeting decisions. Consistent with our predictions, the results indicate that managers consider both financial data and affective reactions when evaluating the utility of an investment alternative. Our results suggest that researchers should consider both affect and cognition to more fully understand decision making in accounting contexts.     

论人力资本会计的困惑与出路

文章剖析了人力资本会计存在的固感,并就存在的问题提出了解决的思路。即建立人力资本成本会计与人力资本产权会计来构建完整的人力资本会计,通过人力资本会计来提供人力资本成本和当期人力资本价值的信息,为人力资本管理服务。     

The Effect of Information Systems on Honesty in Managerial Reporting: A Behavioral Perspective*

This study examines the behavioral impact of an information system, and how that impact varies with the information system's precision, in an internal reporting environment. We propose that a manager's reporting decisions are affected by his or her trade‐off of the benefits of appearing honest against the benefits of misrepresentation. The information system affects the manager's trade‐off by improving the owner's ability to make an inference regarding the manager's level of honesty. Thus, to the extent that the manager perceives benefits to appearing honest, the presence of an information system can increase managerial honesty. As the information system becomes more precise, however, the manager must forgo greater benefits of misrepresentation in order to achieve the same appearance of honesty. For managers under a precise system, this will shift the trade‐off decision toward the benefits of misrepresentation and away from the benefits of appearing honest. Notably, in our experiment, the only benefit of appearing honest is an intrinsically motivated desire for social approval. We find that, although the existence of an information system increases managerial honesty, honesty is lower under a precise than under a coarse information system. We also compare profit earned by the owners in our experiment, which relies on a behavioral role of an information system, with the maximum profit theoretically possible given a contractual use of the information system. This comparison suggests that, unless the available information system is sufficiently precise, the owner will obtain greater profits by not contracting on its output, even if that output is fully contractible.     

并购交易中的信息传递机制研究——基于业绩承诺的视角

由于并购具有金额大与标的资产质量难以辨别等特点，如何在并购交易中降低交易风险一直是学术界持续关注的话题。文章以中小板和创业板公司2015年至2016年审核通过的并购事件为样本，从业绩承诺视角探讨市场对于并购重组交易契约中信息传递机制的看法。研究表明，市场会对业绩承诺这一信息传递机制予以积极反应，业绩承诺越乐观，并购方在公告期间的超额收益越大。进一步研究发现，在非关联并购、投资者专业化程度较低或财务信息更稳健的情况下，业绩承诺所带来的财富效应更明显。文章以业绩承诺为切入点，为学术界了解如何降低并购交易中的信息风险提供了重要的视角与经验证据。     

Toward a theory of internal governance structure of China’s large SOEs

This research constructs a simple model to reveal the trade-off between decentralized and centralized governance structures of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Our model shows that delegating the decision-making authority to large SOE managers enhances their initiative in terms of local investment while also perhaps leading to the ex-post moral hazard problem. The managerial entrenchment effect causes a misalignment between large SOE managers’ personal interests and organizational interests. We construct a model by introducing a mechanism called the constrained-delegation governance structure approach to illustrate the issues, such that by eliminating some of large SOE managers’ managerial entrenchment investment choice through partially delegating SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council) officials’ decision-making authority to the party committee within large SOEs, the trade-off between centralization and decentralization with respect to loss of control versus the local initiative can be resolved. We also show and discuss how the efficiency of the constrained delegation governance structure within Chinese large SOEs delivered through party committee control is mitigated with the presence of collusion between the party committee secretary and large SOE managers. By eliminating the self-selection endogeneity issues, some further empirical evidence including the robustness check shows that (1) the existence of a party committee could reduce the overinvestment problem of listed large SOEs, and that (2) the monitoring effect of the party committee is more pronounced when the CEO herself is a party member.     

The Economic Impact of the Lack of Transparency in Financial Reporting

Off-balance-sheet amounts are in the trillions of dollars, not including all transactions with off-balance-sheet implications. Financial managers and consultants intentionally structure transactions that are abusive of off-balance sheet accounting rules, which leads to a lack of transparency in financial reporting. This paper explores several ways in which companies manipulate off-balance sheet transactions to satisfy personal and business objectives as well as the impact of such manipulations. It is time for regulatory bodies to close the loopholes, eliminate overly rules-based standards, clearly state the economic objective of each standard, and require firms to disclose the economic motivations for the accounting practices they adopt.      

Horizon‐Induced Optimism as a Gateway to Earnings Management

Recent work in accounting suggests that managerial optimism can lead managers to escalate income‐increasing earnings management. In this paper, I examine how a fundamental attribute of the earnings management setting—the amount of time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal—serves as one potential source of managerial optimism. I conduct two experiments to test whether the amount of time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal systematically induces optimism that increases participants’ propensity to engage in behavior that is analogous to accruals‐based earnings management and to real earnings management, holding constant incentives, agency frictions, and the information environment. My results indicate that, independent of their innate optimism, the time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal likely encourages managers to overestimate their ability to compensate for current‐period earnings management through strong future performance. This optimism, in turn, likely increases managers’ propensity to engage in both forms of earnings management.     

The Impact of Early Commitment on Games Played: Evidence from College Football Recruiting

We use data on athletic scholarship acceptance decisions to show that high school football players signal their ability level by delaying commitment. Although colleges can obtain information about student athletes, National Collegiate Athletic Association regulations limit information flow, making private information an important component of the scholarship market. Using ordinary least squares, censored regression, and negative binomial estimation, we show that for a given observed ability level, committing to a scholarship offer early is associated with less playing time after acceptance. In one season and at a typical average early signing date, early‐committing athletes played in 0.21 fewer games per season, or about 4% of the average number of games played.     

POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION AND KMT PARTY‐OWNED ENTERPRISES IN TAIWAN

This article will study how the existence of KMT party‐owned enterprises (POEs) and their development are related to Taiwan's democratization. POEs are profit‐making enterprises managed by the KMT, the former ruling party. All previous studies about the relationship between democratization and POEs only draw attention to the economic resource aspects of POEs. But the POEs were also KMT political resources in the form of enterprises and became policy tools to the ruling party. This study will argue that the existence of the POEs was a factor that maintained the KMT government and supported its stable management during the process of democratization. Moreover, POEs as political resources enabled Lee Teng‐hui as KMT chairman to demonstrate strong leadership and push ahead with the completion of democratization. But Lee's political mobilization of POEs expanded money politics and perpetuated these enterprises as one of the “authoritarian legacies” in Taiwan's democratic politics.     

Example‐Based Reasoning and Fact‐Weighting Guidance in Accounting Standards

The provision of examples as implementation guidance is pervasive in accounting standards. Prior research has established that preparers engage in “example‐based reasoning,” a tendency to favor the accounting treatment in an example, even when the example does not exactly match the transaction at hand. In this paper, we investigate whether fact‐weighting guidance counteracts this tendency. Such guidance, now found in some accounting standards, indicates whether particular transaction facts are more important than others in determining the appropriate accounting treatment. Using an experiment, we find that fact‐weighting guidance does reduce preparers' tendency to favor the accounting treatment in an example. However, results also suggest that some degree of example‐based reasoning persists even with fact‐weighting guidance, and that preparers are not fully aware of how fact‐weighting guidance affects their judgments. Our findings have practical implications. They suggest to standard setters a potential remedy—namely, fact‐weighting guidance—for the misuse of accounting examples. They also provide insights to accounting preparers regarding how fact‐weighting guidance influences their judgments in ways they may not anticipate.