Voting power in municipal annexation elections

In many American states, municipal annexation and consolidation require concurrent majority votes of all affected jurisdictions. The effectiveness and fairness of this voting procedure have been criticized on the grounds that a small minority of voters can frustrate the preferences of the overall majority. This paper investigates the extent to which the relative ability of voters in large and small jurisdictions to influence voting outcomes in procedures requiring concurrent majorities is influenced by jurisdictional size. The Banzhaf index, which counts the number of case4s in which a given voter could reverse the overall group decision by changing positions on an issue, is applied to this problem of concurrent voting majorities. Mathematical analysis indicates that the ratio of power between voters in small and large jurisdictions approximately equals the inverse of the square root of the ratio of their population size.     

Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain a new characterization of Approval Voting.     

Maximin choice of voting rules for committees

In the context of a probabilistic voting model with dichotomous choice, we investigate the consequences of choosing among voting rules according to the maximin criterion. A voting rule is the minimum number of voters who vote favorably on a change from the status quo required for it to be adopted. We characterize the voting rules that satisfy the maximin criterion as a function of the distribution of voters’ probabilities to favor change from the status quo. We prove that there are at most two maximin voting rules, at least one is Pareto efficient and is often different to the simple majority rule. If a committee is formed only by “conservative voters” (i.e. voters who are more likely to prefer the status quo to change) then the maximin criterion recommends voting rules that require no more voters supporting change than the simple majority rule. If there are only “radical voters”, then this criterion recommends voting rules that require no less than half of the total number of votes.Received: June 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification: D71Salvador Barberá, Carmen Beviá, Mirko Cardinale, Wioletta Dziuda, Joan Esteban, Mahmut Erdem, Bernard Grofman, Matthew Jackson, Kai Konrad, Raul Lopez, Jordi Massó, Hugh Mullan, Shmuel Nitzan, Ana Pires do Prado, Elisabeth Schulte, Arnold Urken and two anonymous referees provided helpful comments. Finally, I also acknowledge financial support from Capes, Brazilian Ministry of Education and Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Project BEC2002-02130).     

Regional heterogeneity and U.S. presidential elections: Real-time 2020 forecasts and evaluation

This paper exploits cross-sectional variation at the level of U.S. counties to generate real-time forecasts for the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The forecasting models are trained on data covering the period 2000–2016, using high-dimensional variable selection techniques. Our county-based approach contrasts the literature that focuses on national and state level data but uses longer time periods to train their models. The paper reports forecasts of popular and electoral college vote outcomes and provides a detailed ex-post evaluation of the forecasts released in real time before the election. It is shown that all of these forecasts outperform autoregressive benchmarks. A pooled national model using One-Covariate-at-a-time-Multiple-Testing (OCMT) variable selection significantly outperformed all models in forecasting the U.S. mainland national vote share and electoral college outcomes (forecasting 236 electoral votes for the Republican party compared to 232 realized). This paper also shows that key determinants of voting outcomes at the county level include incumbency effects, unemployment, poverty, educational attainment, house price changes, and international competitiveness. The results are also supportive of myopic voting: economic fluctuations realized a few months before the election tend to be more powerful predictors of voting outcomes than their long-horizon analogs.     

The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges

We examine 20 partisan judicial elections over an 8-year period to determine whether judge specific information shows in election results. We find demand for judicial sanctions looks much like other voting processes. Among voters, Democratic incumbent judges, who tend to be lenient, are rewarded for being harsh, while Republican incumbent judges, who generally are harsh, are rewarded for being lenient. Voters are not found to be a random sample of the population, and we find that straight ticket votes obscure information from selective voters. This paper benefitted from comments received by participants at the Public Choice Meetings, and from useful comments from Aimee Chin, Janet Kohlhase, an anonymous referee and the editor.     

Election forecasts: Cracking the Danish case

Election forecasting models based on voting theories and estimated via regression analysis are routinely available for virtually all advanced industrial democracies. Denmark, however, offers an exception, for no such prediction equations have been published on the Danish case. This absence has sometimes been attributed to the puzzling nature of economic voting there, along with the complexity of its multi-party system, which renders formulation of the dependent variable problematic. We attempt to overcome these obstacles, offering a “synthetic” forecasting model for Danish national election outcomes, 1964–2015. The regression model, based on the variables of economic growth and vote intention, performs well, by various tests. Finally, we apply it, ex ante fashion, to the 2019 contest, where the prediction favored the Social Democratic led coalition, an outcome that came to pass.     

Co-voting democracy

We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The parliament also votes, and the two decisions are weighted according to a pre-defined key. The final decision is implemented. As this procedure gives the society—represented by the randomly-chosen subset—a better say for important decisions, the citizens might be more willing to accept the consequences of these decisions.     

Debating Immortality: Application of Data Envelopment Analysis to Voting for the Baseball Hall of Fame

This paper applies data envelopment analysis to voting for the Baseball Hall of Fame (HOF). The approach interprets a player's career statistics as inputs and the percentage of votes that he received for the HOF as the output. A constructed frontier based on past voting defines the maximum number of votes that a player should receive based on his statistical profile. Our results suggest that about a third of the current members of the HOF (excluding Negro League players, managers, umpires, and executives) should be replaced by more deserving players. Our conclusions, however, do not account for those aspects of a player's career (both positive and negative) not captured by statistics. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

累积投票制强制执行能否保护中小股东利益？——基于断点回归的实证检验

以2008—2020年A股上市公司为样本,运用精确断点回归方法检验累积投票制强制执行对控股股东利益侵占的影响,并进一步考察股权自由现金流水平在其中发挥的调节效应。研究发现：累积投票制强制执行政策能够显著抑制控股股东利益侵占,该政策能够促使上市公司累积投票制的实施,并通过制衡机制、抵御机制及预防机制改善公司治理,保护中小股东利益。进一步研究表明,在股权自由现金流水平越高的企业,累积投票制强制执行越有效。因此,累积投票制强制执行政策具有一定的合理性,应予以坚持并进一步推行。     

基于张量投票的图像超分辨率算法

张量投票算法在提取图像主观轮廓上具有良好的效果。文章提出了一种基于张量投票的图像超分辨率算法。首先,用二维张量矩阵存储低分辨率图像各像素点所处的位置特征信息,并利用稀疏张量投票将特征信息进行加强,再使用稠密张量投票产生高分辨率图像对应的二维张量矩阵,此张量矩阵包含了视觉特性强的边缘信息,最后利用该边缘信息指导高分辨率图像的重构。实验结果表明,该方法得到的高分辨率图像信噪比高、视觉效果好。     

A Statistical Approach to Assess Referendum Results: the Venezuelan Recall Referendum 2004

This article presents a statistical approach to assess the coherence of official results of referendum processes. The statistical analysis described is divided in four phases, according to the methodology used and the corresponding results: (1) Initial Study, (2) Quantification of irregular certificates of election, (3) Identification of irregular voting centers and (4) Estimation of recall referendum results.
The technique of cluster analysis is applied to address the issue of heterogeneity of the parishes with respect to their political preferences.
The Venezuelan recall referendum 2004 is the case study we used to apply the proposed methodology, based on the data published by the "Consejo Nacional Electoral" (CNE-National Electoral Council). Finally, we present the conclusions of the study which we summarize as follows: The percentage of irregular certificates of election is between 22.2% and 26.5% of the total; 18% of the voting centers show an irregular voting pattern in their certificates of election, the votes corresponding to this irregularity are around 2,550,000; The result estimate, using the unbiased votes as representative of the population for the percentage of YES votes against President Chávez is 56.4% as opposed to the official result of 41%.     

Selecting explanatory factors of voting decisions by means of fsQCA and ANN

This investigation applies fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and an artificial neural networks method (ANN) with the aim of addressing the determinants of votes regarding managerial proposals presented in corporate meetings. The data refer to companies in the United States banking industry and they cover the period from 2003 to 2013. The results show that the variables that contribute to explain the voting support have changed over time. Thus, during the 2003–2006 sub-period the number of funds voting appears as the most clearly outstanding variable. On the contrary, in the 2007–2009 sub-period there is a heterogeneous set of explanatory features that includes the total volume of assets, the leverage ratio and the return on assets ratio, among others, as the most remarkable factors. Finally, in the 2010–2013 sub-period, there are no specific features or combinations that contribute to voting support, indicating that the explanatory factors are yet to be consolidated after the financial downturn.     

Voting on welfare reform Stemming migration, assisting the needy, or promoting economic growth?

This paper examines the influences on voting by members of the House of Representatives on the Carter Administration's welfare reform legislation. The analysis finds some support for the hypothesis that voting by national legislators responded to the potential mobility of welfare recipients from low to high benefit states. Defining the public interest as promoting economic growth and the special interest as increasing redistribution, the results also provide evidence in support of the Stigler hypothesis that politically secure legislators are better able to vote the public, as opposed to the special, interest. Received: July 15, 1998 / Accepted: August 6, 1999     

Weighted representative democracy

We propose a new system of democratic representation. Any voter can choose any legislator as her representative; thus, different legislators can represent different numbers of voters. Decisions in the legislature are made by weighted majority voting, where the weight of each legislator is determined by the number of voters she represents. We show that, if the size of the electorate is very large, then with very high probability, the decisions obtained in the legislature agree with those which would have been reached by a popular referendum decided by simple majority vote.     

Local monotonicity of power: Axiom or just a property?

This paper discusses whether Local Monotonicity (LM) should be regarded as a property of the power distribution of a specific voting game under consideration, indicated by a power measure, or as a characteristic of power per se. The latter would require reasonable power measures to satisfy a corresponding LM axiom. The former suggests that measures which do not allow for a violation of LM fail to account for dimensions of power which can cause nonmonotonicity in voting weight. Only if a measure is able to indicate nonmonotonicity, it can help design voting games for which power turns out to be monotonic. The argument is discussed in the light of recent extensions of traditional power indices.     

Biases and Strategic Behaviour in Performance Evaluation: The Case of the FIFA's best soccer player award

In this paper, we study biases in performance evaluation by analysing votes for the FIFA Ballon d'Or award for best soccer player, the most prestigious award in the sport. Our findings suggest that ‘similarity’ biases are substantial, with jury members disproportionately voting for candidates from their own country, own national team, own continent and own league team. Further, we show that the impact of such biases on the total number of votes a candidate receives is fairly limited and hence is likely to affect the outcome of this competition only on rare occasions where the difference in quality between the leading candidates is small. Finally, analysing the incidence of ‘strategic voting’, we find jury members who vote for one leading candidate are more, rather than less, likely to also give points to his main competitor, as compared with neutral jury members. We discuss the implications of our findings for the design of awards, elections and performance evaluation systems in general and for the FIFA Ballon d'Or award in particular.     

Forecasting Austrian national elections: The Grand Coalition model

Forecasting the outcomes of national elections has become established practice in several democracies. In the present paper, we develop an economic voting model for forecasting the future success of the Austrian ‘grand coalition’, i.e., the joint electoral success of the two mainstream parties SPOE and OEVP, at the 2013 Austrian Parliamentary Elections. Our main argument is that the success of both parties is strongly tied to the accomplishments of the Austrian system of corporatism, that is, the Social Partnership (Sozialpartnerschaft  ), in providing economic prosperity. Using data from Austrian national elections between 1953 and 2008 (n=18$n=18$), we rely on the following predictors in our forecasting model: (1) unemployment rates, (2) previous incumbency of the two parties, and (3) dealignment over time. We conclude that, in general, the two mainstream parties benefit considerably from low unemployment rates, and are weakened whenever they have previously formed a coalition government. Further, we show that they have gradually been losing a good share of their voter basis over recent decades.     

On probability models in voting theory

This paper illustrates the use of probability models to study properties of voting rules. In particular, a simple occupancy distribution and its limiting Dlrichlet form are introduced, corresponding to simplifying assumptions about voters' preferences. We use as illustrations the occurrence probability of the Condorcet Paradox, a vintage problem in social choice theory, along with the related concept of Condorcet efficiency, a measure of goodness for voting rules. Further examples include properties of a lottery rule and the vulnerability of certain voting rules to strategic manipulation. Prospects for future work are indicated.     

Ecological Fallacy and Covariates: New Insights based on Multilevel Modelling of Individual Data

The paper provides a new and more explicit formulation of the assumptions needed by the ordinary ecological regression to provide unbiased estimates and clarifies why violations of these assumptions will affect any method of ecological inference. Empirical evidence is obtained by showing that estimates provided by three main ecological inference methods are heavily biased when compared with multilevel logistic regression applied to a unique set of individual data on voting behaviour. The main findings of our paper have two important implications that can be extended to all situations where the assumptions needed to apply ecological inference are violated in the data: (i) only ecological inference methods that allow one to model the effect of covariates have a chance to produce unbiased estimates, and (ii) there are certain data generating mechanisms producing a kind of bias in ecological estimates that cannot be corrected by modelling the effect of covariates.     

A Note on the Probability of Having a Strong Condorcet Winner

In an election, a strong Condorcet winner is a candidate who is top-ranked by more than 50% of the voters. The purpose of this note is to provide some algebraic representations for the probability of having a strong Condorcet winner in three-candidate elections. Three alternative procedures for generating voting situations are considered: the Impartial Culture condition, the Impartial Anonymous Culture condition and the Maximal Culture condition. It turns out that the conclusions we obtain strongly depend on the way for generating voting situations.