Borrower credit access and credit performance after loan modifications

While the preventive effect of loan modifications on mortgage default has been well-documented, evidence on the broad consequences of modifications has been fairly limited. Based on two unique loan-level data sets with borrower credit profiles, this study reports novel empirical evidence on how homeowners manage their credit before and after receiving modifications. The paper has several main findings. First, loan modifications improve borrowers’ overall credit standing and access to credit. Modifications that provide principal reduction, rate reduction, or greater payment relief, as well as those received by borrowers not in financial catastrophe, lead to a larger improvement in borrowers’ credit rating than others. Second, loan modifications lead to a slight increase in borrowers’ debts, primarily on home equity line of credit accounts and auto loans. Third, borrowers’ performance on nonmortgage accounts, however, has not been negatively impacted by modifications. This study demonstrates that interventions designed to improve household balance sheets could have a direct and sizeable impact on borrower financial outcomes.     

Analysis of loan guarantees among the Korean Chaebol affiliates

This paper analyses corporate loan guarantees among the Korean chaebol affiliates. Loan guarantees are found to be efficiency‐neutral under a set of ideal conditions characterized by perfect and symmetric information, no agency problem, and no governmental interference in private financial contracts. In reality though, corporate loan guarantees have negative as well as positive effects. The negative effects of loan guarantees arise from the agency problem between the controlling minority shareholders and outside investors. Government's implicit support to financial institutions worsens the problem. Without such distortions, a loan guarantee by the guarantor firm may signal the quality of the investment project of the borrowing firm, if the guarantor firm has more information than the lending bank with regards to the type of the borrowing firm's investment project.     

Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to fully fund the resulting bailout via an explicit fiscal reform. These features of our model imply that government guarantees lead to self-fulfilling banking-currency crises.     

Market structure and credit procyclicality: Lessons from loan markets in the European Union banking sectors

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the market structure has an impact on procyclicality in the European Union bank loan markets. The cyclical responses of three types of bank loans (residential mortgage loans, consumer loans, and corporate loans) are quantified separately using the interacted panel vector autoregression model at the country level and the single-equation panel regression model at the bank level. Using a sample of 26 European Union countries, we find that the procyclical responses of residential mortgage loans and consumer loans are significantly stronger and prolonged when the banking sector is more concentrated or dominated by foreign banks. However, we find that there are nonlinear relationships between the market structure and credit procyclicality based on bank-level data. We also find some heterogeneities between advanced and transitioning European Union banking sectors. Finally, our findings confirm the leading role of residential mortgages in intensifying credit fluctuations.     

An analysis of government loan guarantees and direct investment through public-private partnerships

This paper compares two forms of government support: loan guarantee and direct investment through public-private partnerships (PPPs). With loan guarantee, government provides financial guarantees to enhance project creditworthiness. With direct investment, government invests capital directly in the project. In both forms of support, the government receives shares proportional to its financial commitment. We find that loan guarantees are more effective in reducing project borrowing costs. In a perfect information environment, loan guarantee support will yield more wealth to the government than a cost equivalent direct investment. But, in an informationally asymmetric environment where the government knows less about project quality than do private partners, in other words the so-called plum problem rather than the familiar lemon problem, this implication is mitigated. We show how the portion of shares given to the government can be a bargaining tool and can mitigate information asymmetry when structuring PPPs.     

中小企业信用担保:他国的模式及借鉴意义

建立中小企业信用担保体系,为中小企业间接融资进行信用担保,是解决中小企业融资难题的重要措施,这已经成为经济理论界的共识。然而,中小企业信用担保体系应该建立什么样的运营机制、监管机制和补偿机制则是我们面临的重要问题。我国中小企业信用担保体系存在的问题近年来,随着国家推进中小企业发展优惠政策的陆续出台,我国中小企业信用担保体系的建设取得了长足的进步,目前,我国已有1000多家信用担保机构为中小企业贷款提供信用担保,累计担保金额已突破千亿元,但只能满足极少部分中小企业的融资需求,绝大多数中小企业的资金瓶颈不但没有得…     

Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending

Online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending has emerged recently. This micro loan market could offer certain benefits to both borrowers and lenders. Using data from the Lending Club, which is one of the popular online P2P lending houses, this article explores the P2P loan characteristics, evaluates their credit risk and measures loan performances. We find that credit grade, debt-to-income ratio, FICO score and revolving line utilization play an important role in loan defaults. Loans with lower credit grade and longer duration are associated with high mortality rate. The result is consistent with the Cox Proportional Hazard test which suggests that the hazard rate or the likelihood of the loan default increases with the credit risk of the borrowers. Finally, we find that higher interest rates charged on the high-risk borrowers are not enough to compensate for higher probability of the loan default. The Lending Club must find ways to attract high FICO score and high-income borrowers in order to sustain their businesses.     

Cash flow vs. collateral‐based credit

We study factors affecting micro, small and medium‐sized enterprises (MSMEs) receiving loans and the effect of these loans on MSMEs performance. We study two types of loans – a new type based on cash flows and a traditional‐style loan based on collateral. We use unique surveys of MSMEs from Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine. We find that MSMEs receiving a cash flow or collateral loan in the past are more likely to receive the same type of loan (and larger sized) in the future and that cash flow loans may be the preferred form of credit. Both types of loans are related positively to most performance indicators, enabling the MSMEs for instance to be more profitable and expand production. The cash flow loans also appear to be particularly attractive credit delivery schemes for micro and small enterprises. Finally, the effects of the smallest loans are often negative, suggesting that the minimum loan size is an important policy issue.     

Optimal credit rationing in not‐for‐profit financial institutions*

We examine the dynamic optimization problem for not‐for‐profit financial institutions (NFPs) that maximize consumer surplus, not profits. We characterize the optimal dynamic policy and find that it involves credit rationing. Interest rates set by mature NFPs will typically be more favorable to customers than market rates, as any surplus is distributed in the form of interest rate subsidies, with credit rationing being required to prevent these subsidies from distorting loan volumes from their optimal levels. Rationing overcomes a fundamental problem in NFPs; it allows them to distribute the surplus without distorting the volume of activity from the efficient level.     

超计划政府投资现象的公共决策研究

出现超计划投资项目主要是人为原因造成的,政府投资项目决策法治化对超计划投资现象具有遏制作用,必须提供发挥其遏制作用的制度保证。     

Access to credit and investment decisions of small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises in China

Financial constraints are common in developing countries where financial systems are underdeveloped. In China, firms report that access to finance is the most important obstacle in the business environment. This is related to firms that fail to gain access to the credit market. We examine the likelihood of gaining access to credit by firms, and find that size and exporting appear to be the key characteristics. Credit constraints are significant for investment decisions. Together with size, access to credit is among the firm characteristics with the greatest impact on the likelihood to invest.     

Welfare‐improving adverse selection in credit markets*

A model of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard in a competitive credit market is developed and used to show that aggregate borrower welfare may be higher in the combined case than in the moral‐hazard‐only case. Adverse selection can be welfare improving because in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model, high‐quality borrowers cross subsidize low‐quality borrowers. The cross subsidization reduces the overall moral hazard effort effects, and the resulting gain in welfare may more than offset the welfare loss stemming from distorted investment choices. The analysis focuses on pooling equilibria because model structure precludes separating equilibria.     

Government Versus Non‐Government Schools: A Nation‐Wide Assessment Using Australian Naplan Data

There are considerable differences in school outcomes on the NAPLAN tests in Australia between Government and non‐Government schools. This paper documents these for four years of study (Years 3, 5, 7 and 9), and for the five NAPLAN domains (Grammar and Punctuation, Numeracy, Reading, Spelling and Writing). It then examines the extent to which the differences are due to characteristics of the schools, such as the socioeconomic status of the school and the gender mix of the total enrolment at the school. It is shown that a greater share of the difference in marks between Government and non‐Government schools in Year 9 than in Year 3 is due to the characteristics of the schools. This implies that, consistent with recent press coverage, the better outcomes of the non‐Government schools are due, in part at least, to a selection process that favours academically advantaged students.     

Government Partisanship and Property Rights: Cross‐Country Firm‐Level Evidence

Property rights are essential to economic development but vary with the political environment. We develop and test the claim that government partisanship influences the security of business firms' property rights: the perceived security of property rights increases when right‐wing parties take power and declines with the election of left‐leaning parties. Unlike research that uses country‐level aggregates to draw inferences about the determinants of secure property rights, we analyze survey responses of over 7,400 firm owners from 73 countries using a novel difference‐in‐differences approach. We find that the political partisanship of the government in power strongly affects individual perceptions of property rights: firm owners are more likely to perceive that their property rights are secure under right‐leaning governments. Our results are robust to firm‐ and country‐level economic performance as well as controls for political institutions that might induce more stability to property rights, such as the number of checks and balances (veto players) in a system. Overall, our results indicate that business owners' beliefs about the security of property rights are highly responsive to changes in government partisanship.     

Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*

In the body of literature concerning fiscal policy, a central result is that government spending might stimulate private consumption because only some households save, while others spend their entire income each period. Although such heterogeneity naturally causes inequality, this complication is commonly avoided by assuming that transfers redistribute steady‐state wealth. I show that this steady‐state assumption drives short‐run results. Without redistribution, the equilibrium is indeterminate, and the labor‐market structure that is imposed to support the expansive result is theoretically inconsistent. On a more positive note, I propose a labor‐market formulation under which the expansive effects of government spending might arise.     

Information production, banking industry structure and credit allocation

We analyse credit allocation when limited-liable banks can engage in costly information production about borrowers. When perfectly diversified credit portfolios cannot be constructed, we show that credit allocation depends on bank capital and the number of banks that can operate in the same market. A concentrated banking industry, one where bank capital is held by few banks, is shown to lead to credit allocation closer to the social optimum. Moreover, in the absence of banking industry consolidation, we find that the removal of intra-state entry barriers reduces welfare and not all independent banking organizations that were viable in formerly protected markets remain so when markets are integrated.     

Government intervention and the structure of social capital

Over the past decade, policymakers and scholars have devoted increasing attention to the nature and role of social capital in the functioning of society. We examine the implications of government attempts to manipulate the existing structure of social capital to create homogeneity among agents. We find that these attempts can weaken, erode or destroy existing social capital. We conclude with policy implications regarding government efforts to create or manipulate social capital.     

利益集团影响下的政府管制决策行为分析

管制政策的形成是政策需求和政策供给两种力量相互作用的结果,当社会各利益集团处于某一初始资源配置点时,追求公众利益最大化的政府采取什么样的管制政策,取决于该初始禀赋下利益集团的公平效用及管制所造成的净损益效用。     

Trans‐Tasman Transmission of Government Spending Shocks

This paper investigates the international transmission of fiscal shocks between two closely‐linked, open economies. We estimate impulse response functions using a semi‐structural vector auto regressive (VAR) model and quarterly data from Australia and New Zealand for the period 1973:3–2008:4. We compare our empirical results with impulse response functions from a calibrated two‐country international real business cycle model with habit formation and adjustment costs to investment. We show that a positive shock to Australian government consumption leads to an increase in Australian output initially and then to a decline in the medium term, while the New Zealand output is negatively affected both in the short and medium term. This result is in line with the recent literature that reports beggar‐thy‐neighbour effect of positive government spending shocks.     

Government Expenditure Financing in a Two‐Sector Cash‐In‐Advance Model of Endogenous Growth

We show that an expansion in the government size could be desirable from the viewpoint of the economy's long‐run growth, wherein factor intensity between the sectors, the mode of public spending financing, and the form of the cash‐in‐advance (CIA) constraint are crucial. We also show that when real balances are required only for consumption purchases, money financing is equivalent to consumption tax financing, but is not equivalent to income tax financing. If both consumption and gross investment are liquidity‐constrained, then the three financing methods are mutually not equivalent. The optimal financing scheme has the following features: (1) when the CIA constraint applies only to consumption purchases, any combination of the money growth rate and the consumption tax rate that satisfies the government budget constraint constitutes an optimal financing mix; (2) when the CIA constraint applies to both consumption and investment purchases, consumption tax financing only is optimal.