UNION ORGANIZING AND THE REAGAN NLRB

President Reagan's appointees to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have issued many controversial decisions. This has caused a debate between liberals viewing the Reagan NLRB as anti-union and conservatives viewing the recent NLRB decisions as a return to proven and appropriate policies. This paper investigates Reagan NLRB decisions over the years 1982-1986 so as to shed some light on the facts underlying the debate. The analysis reveals that the Reagan NLRB decisions have been either favorable to employers or unfavorable to unions. The NLRB's decisions undoubtedly contribute to the organizing difficulties faced by unions.     

THE FED AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

This study asks whether the Federal Reserve has actively made monetary policy so as to aid the president's reelection. Using Shiller's smoothness "prior" to estimate the shape of cycles, the study finds a political business cycle in unemployment and a preelection increase in growth of the money supply. But the timing of these two cycles is inconsistent. Furthermore, little evidence exists of a cycle in the instruments of monetary policy. Thus, the Fed is not actively creating a political business cycle. Apparently, movements in real money that are not caused—but are not offset—by the Fed are an important cause of the political business cycle.
Elections influence Fed behavior. Monetary tightness occurs early in a presidential term, before reelection incentives become critical. This is due to the Fed's political weakness. Thus, the Fed's independence only partly insulates it from electoral pressures.     

THE FED AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

This study asks whether the Federal Reserve has actively made monetary policy so as to aid the president's reelection. Using Shiller's smoothness "prior" to estimate the shape of cycles, the study finds a political business cycle in unemployment and a preelection increase in growth of the money supply. But the timing of these two cycles is inconsistent. Furthermore, little evidence exists of a cycle in the instruments of monetary policy. Thus, the Fed is not actively creating a political business cycle. Apparently, movements in real money that are not caused—but are not offset—by the Fed are an important cause of the political business cycle.
Elections influence Fed behavior. Monetary tightness occurs early in a presidential term, before reelection incentives become critical. This is due to the Fed's political weakness. Thus, the Fed's independence only partly insulates it from electoral pressures.     

Measuring the Fed's revenue from money creation

The national accounts include the Fed's payments to the Treasury as a component of corporate taxes. These payments constituted 22% of reported corporate profits taxes in 1981. Alternative concepts of inflationary finance are considered, with measurements provided for the post-World War II period.     

REFORMING THE FED: ITS INDEPENDENCE AND LESSONS FROM HUMPHREY-HAWKINS

The last session of Congress witnessed renewed calls for reforming the Federal Reserve System so as to better coordinate monetary and fiscal policies. This paper examines how the current institutional structure, established by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, performed when the supply-side tax cuts were implemented during 1981 and 1982. The findings reveal that authorities barely discussed the necessary policy coordination at the Humphrey-Hawkins hearings. Further, the record reveals that Fed Chairman Volcker refused to utilize the Fed's independence to publicly oppose the supply-side tax cuts.     

Further evidence on monetary and fiscal policy coordination

The extent to which fiscal and monetary policies respond to inflation and unemployment and the degree to which policy makers coordinate their policies have important implications for their usefulness as instruments of economic stabilization. Using a framework of minimizing a policy maker's loss function, subject to the state of the economy, this paper tests for the joint determination of monetary and fiscal policies. Our results show that the pre-Reagan/Bush and pre-Volcker/Greenspan eras can be characterized by a noncooperative game between the two policies. For the Reagan/Bush and Volcker/Greenspan regimes, our results are consistent with a cooperative game in which fiscal policy dominates and monetary policy accommodates. Our results also have implications for the possibility of future cooperation by policy makers.Financial support from Southwest Texas State University and DePaul University is gratefully acknowledged.     

Bank competition and optimal monetary policies under alternative reserve accounting schemes

The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of the implications of increased competition among depository financial institutions for the optimal conduct of monetary policy with respect to the ultimate goals of price and output stability. In the context of a general equilibrium model which includes rational expectations and a market for bank deposits, it is shown that a rise in bank rivalry for deposits produces a more steeply sloped LM schedule. Under a system of lagged required reserve accounting, this fact has no effect on the optimal conduct of monetary policy, which requires an operating procesure designed to target a market interest rate. However, under a system of contemporaneous reserve accounting, this fact implies that less emphasis should be placed on a market interest rate as a variable upon which the Fed's setting of reserves should be conditioned.     

WORDS AND DEEDS: SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE

The Fed has often been accused of using ambiguity, concealment, and deception when it is subject to intense scrutiny and pressure. We investigate this issue by examining the relationship between the Fed's policy statements and its subsequent use of a key policy instrument, the federal funds rate. Our analysis shows that the Fed usually does what it says it will do during times of economic distress (recessions), but that its actions are more inclined to diverge from its stated intent when a sluggish economy coincides with presidential elections.     

Mumbling with great incoherence: Was it really so difficult to understand Alan Greenspan?

We show how most Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies by Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan were difficult to follow, implying the general public needs information through different, more accessible communications. Still, it is not obvious that Greenspan was increasingly ‘mumbling with great incoherence’.     

ASYMMETRIC PREFERENCES FOR INTEREST RATE VARIABILITY AND NON-LINEAR MONETARY POLICY INERTIA

Introducing in a central bank loss function asymmetric preferences for interest rate stabilization together with a (symmetric) smoothing goal could lead to asymmetric interest rate smoothing. An empirical analysis supports this theoretical result and finds for the disinflation (Volcker) period a more cautious adjustment of interest rates downwards than upwards, and for the 'price stability' (Greenspan) period a more inertial behaviour in the opposite direction.     

Policy credibility and alternative approaches to disinflation

This paper examines how central bank credibility affects the merits of a “gradualist” versus “cold turkey” approach to disinflation in a DSGE model in which private agents use optimal filtering to infer the central bank’s nominal anchor. Our analysis is applied to two episodes of sharp and deliberate monetary tightening in the United States – the post-WWI deflation and the Volcker disinflation. For a policy regime with relatively high credibility, our analysis highlights the benefits of a gradualist approach; thus, the aggressive tightening that occurred in 1920–21 did not seem warranted. In contrast, for a policy regime with relatively low credibility (such as the Federal Reserve in late 1980), an aggressive policy stance can play an important signalling role by making the policy shift more evident to private agents.     

美联储量化宽松政策对全球资产价格的非平衡溢出效应

本文采用全局向量自回归模型分析了美联储QE对采用不同货币政策框架、汇率制度和资本流动管理制度国家和地区的不同影响。“货币政策钉住货币供应量+宽松钉住汇率制度+资本账户可兑换”的国家其货币政策应兼顾本国物价水平稳定，同时加强宏观审慎政策对资产价格的逆周期调节，避免出现实体经济紧缩而金融繁荣的现象。“货币政策钉住通货膨胀+浮动汇率+资本账户可兑换”的国家应强化宏观审慎政策对资产价格的调节以应对金融资产泡沫。     

What does Monetary Policy Reveal about a Central Bank's Preferences?

The design of monetary policy depends on the targeting strategy adopted by the central bank. This strategy describes a set of policy preferences, which are actually the structural parameters to analyse monetary policy making. Accordingly, we develop a calibration method to estimate a central bank's preferences from the estimates of an optimal Taylor–type rule. The empirical analysis on US data shows that output stabilization has not been an independent argument in the Fed's objective function during the Greenspan's era. This suggests that the output gap has entered the policy rule only as leading indicator for future inflation, therefore being only instrumental (to stabilize inflation) rather than important per se .
(J.E.L.: C61, E52, E58).     

Limited asset markets participation, monetary policy and (inverted) aggregate demand logic

This paper incorporates limited asset markets participation in dynamic general equilibrium and develops a simple analytical framework for monetary policy analysis. Aggregate dynamics and stability properties of an otherwise standard business cycle model depend nonlinearly on the degree of asset market participation. While ‘moderate’ participation rates strengthen the role of monetary policy, low enough participation causes an inversion of results dictated by conventional wisdom. The slope of the ‘IS’ curve changes sign, the ‘Taylor principle’ is inverted, optimal welfare-maximizing discretionary monetary policy requires a passive policy rule and the effects and propagation of shocks are changed. However, a targeting rule implementing optimal policy under commitment delivers equilibrium determinacy regardless of the degree of asset market participation. Our results may justify Fed's behavior during the ‘Great Inflation’ period.     

Predictions of growth in U.S. corporate profits: Asymmetric vs. symmetric loss

This study evaluates the Federal Reserve and private forecasts of growth in corporate profits for 1984-2004. These forecasts are both rational and directionally accurate but suggest different loss structures. The Federal Reserve forecasts tend to significantly under-predict and imply asymmetric loss. The private forecasts, however, are free of such bias, suggesting symmetric loss. Given that the Federal Reserve forecasts are made to help with policymaking, our findings point to the Fed's cautiousness not to incorrectly predict the downward moves in growth in corporate profits. The private forecasts are made by experts who (with a strong profit-motivated interest) attempt to generate financial gain and thus predict the upward moves as accurately as the downward moves.     

Winners and losers from financial derivatives use: evidence from community banks

This article provides empirical evidence on how profitability of small community banks was affected by derivatives use before and after the 2008 crisis. We use an endogenous switching regressions model to estimate the sensitivity of bank profitability to risks and control for the endogenous choice to use or not to use derivatives. We then compute counterfactual effects and show how profitability would have looked without derivatives use for banks that used derivatives and how it would have looked with derivatives for banks that did not use derivatives. The results show that derivatives helped reduce the sensitivity of profitability to credit risks and improved profitability for most specialists. However, for the largest number of banks which are non-user non-specialists, devivates use would have resulted in lower return on assets had they used derivatives post 2008. Therefore, our evidence suggests that implementation of the Volcker Rule, imposing high compliance costs on community banks and, thus, discouraging hedging, may have a negative impact on profits of specialists banks but, overall, a neutral effect on profits in the community banks industry as a whole.     

A directional analysis of Federal Reserve predictions of growth in unit labor costs and productivity

Existing evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve forecasts of inflation imply asymmetric loss, as the Fed has significantly over‐predicted inflation for the post‐Volcker period. Consistent with such evidence, we show that the Federal Reserve forecasts of growth in both unit labor costs and productivity, while directionally accurate for 1983–2003, imply asymmetric loss. That is, the forecasts of growth in unit labor costs are more (less) accurate in predicting the upward (downward) moves. The forecasts of growth in productivity, however, are less (more) accurate in predicting the upward (downward) moves. The interpretation of our findings may be that, in achieving long‐term price stability, the Fed is cautious not to incorrectly predict the upward (downward) moves in growth in unit labor costs (productivity).     

US inflation and output since the 1970s: a P-star approach

US inflation and output developments since the 1970s are considered using the P-star model and the VAR-based Diebold–Yilmaz spillover index approach. Shocks to monetary variables explain a substantial share of US GDP deflator inflation shocks over time, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s but also in recent years, a time when quantitative easing was employed by the Federal Reserve. Monetary factors, and not oil shocks, underlie price developments in the 1970s and early 1980s. Monetary shocks’ influence on oil prices has become noticeably stronger over the past ten years or so, supporting the greater attention being paid of late to the impact of the monetary environment on commodity markets. Shocks to the velocity-of-money variable affect output developments, with the exception of the 1970s and early 1980s when inflation shocks and, to a lesser extent, oil inflation shocks dominate the cross-variance share of output gap shocks. After the Volcker disinflation, the influence of both inflation and oil price shocks on the output gap wane and those of velocity gap shocks increase.