Learning to organise risk management in organisations: what future for enterprise risk management?

This paper identifies recurring issues in the regulation of new technologies through an historical review of the risk management of automobiles in the 1800s. Parallels are drawn between the regulation of early automobiles and that of the regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) today. It is found that many of the regulatory challenges facing UASs are analogous to those which faced the automobile industry more than a century and half ago and that the need for informed and objective decision making in policy development is reinforced. A systems engineering approach, based on general systems theory and decision‐based design principles, is then proposed as a means for improving the objectivity, transparency and rationality in the risk management decision making process. An example risk management decision making scenario is given within the context of a small UAS operating over a populated area. The results obtained from this case study illustrate how even simple analysis can support the decision making process and highlights some of the potential challenges in the regulatory approach currently applied to UASs.     

How did enterprise risk management first appear in the Korean public sector?

This research addresses the rise and fall of the Crisis Management Guideline of Public Organizations (CMGPO) from a historical perspective. In the Korean public sector, as a form of enterprise risk management (ERM), CMGPO is not designed to be merely a tool of financial risk management but also to be a policy tool for crisis management. CMGPO emerged within the conflict between integrated crisis management and dispersed crisis management. The purpose of CMGPO is to bureaucratically integrate the crisis management of public organizations with the governmental crisis management system. ERM as a form of self-regulation is entangled with the pre-existing command and control of the Korean government over integrated crisis management. As a result, CMGPO is characterized as ‘enforced self-regulation’ rather than self-regulation; this is a fundamental idea in ERM.     

Is assurance on risk management systems relevant for bankers’ decisions?

Risk management systems (RMS) are an essential element of corporate governance and support companies in managing the omnipresent internal and external risks. Assurance on such systems can support such efforts and add further benefits. This study investigates the impact of RMS assurance on the perceptions and decisions of German bankers, and analyzes whether the assurance provider and the assurance level are relevant to them. We conducted an experiment with 145 bankers, using ANOVA to analyze their reliance on the hypothetical company’s RMS and their decisions regarding lending, recommending investments, and investing in stocks. A 2×2+1 between-subjects design was chosen, and we manipulated the assurance provider (audit firm vs. third-party provider) and the assurance level (limited vs. reasonable), and added a control condition with no assurance. Our results indicate that RMS assurance positively influences banker perceptions and decisions, whereas the assurance provider and assurance level has no statistically significant impact on them.     

Do auditors react to real earnings management?

Prior research has documented an association between audit effort and real earnings management [REM]. Specifically, audit report lags have been shown to be positively associated with REM. We investigate the auditor and firm characteristics underlying this association. Our results indicate that overall, REM is associated with longer abnormal audit report lags [ARLs]. We find, however, that this association is driven largely by non-accelerated filers. This result holds for both suspect firms (those firms just meeting earnings benchmarks) and non-suspect firms, for specialist as well as non-specialist auditors, and for profit as well as loss firms. Together our results indicate that when auditors are not constrained by the time pressure of accelerated filing, encountering REM is associated with greater audit effort. Our results may indicate, however, that with respect to accelerated filers, abnormal ARLs may be an imperfect proxy for additional effort. These results have implications for both future research and for the impact of accelerated filing deadlines on audit quality.     

Is it real? Can we win? Is it worth doing? Managing risk and reward in an innovation portfolio

Minor innovations make up most of a company's development portfolio, on average, but they never generate the growth companies seek. The solution, says Day--the Geoffrey T. Boisi Professor of Marketing and a codirector of the Mack Center for Technological Innovation at Wharton--is for companies to undertake a systematic, disciplined review of their innovation portfolios and increase the number of major innovations at an acceptable level of risk. Two tools can help them do this. The first, called the risk matrix, graphically reveals the distribution of risk across a company's entire innovation portfolio. The matrix allows companies to estimate each project's probability of success or failure, based on how big a stretch it is for the firm to undertake. The less familiar the product or technology and the intended market, the higher the risk. The second tool, dubbed the R-W-W (real-win-worth it) screen, allows companies to evaluate the risks and potential of individual projects by answering six fundamental questions about each one: Is the market real? Explores customers' needs, their willingness to buy, and the size of the potential market. Is the product real? Looks at the feasibility of producing the innovation. Can the product be competitive? and Can our company be competitive? Investigate how well suited the company's resources and management are to compete in the marketplace with the product. Will the product be profitable at an acceptable risk? Explores the financial analysis needed to assess an innovation's commercial viability. Last, Does launching the product make strategic sense? examines the project's fit with company strategy and whether management supports it.     

Is recovery risk priced?

Recovery risk to explain corporate debt premia has not received much attention so far, most likely due to the difficulties around decomposing the expected loss. We exploit the fact that differently-ranking debt instruments of the same issuer face identical default risk but different default-conditional recovery rates. This allows us to isolate implied recovery under the T-forward measure without any of the rigid assumptions employed by prior studies. We find a pronounced systematic component in recovery rates for which investors should receive a premium. Comparisons to physical realizations show that the premium is quite time-stable and similar for different debt seniorities.     

Is PIN priced risk?

Several recent papers assume that private information (PIN), proposed by Easley et al. [2002. Is information risk a determinant of asset returns? Journal of Finance 57, 2185–2221; 2004. Factoring information into returns. Working Paper, Cornell University], is a determinant of stock returns. We replicate Easley et al. (2002) and show that while PIN does predict future returns in the sample they analyze, the effect is not robust to alternative specifications and time periods. There is no evidence that PIN factor loadings predict returns or that PIN factor returns reflect future GDP growth. PIN exhibits no association with implied cost of capital derived from analysts’ earnings forecasts. Overall, our findings cast doubt on whether PIN reflects information risk systematically priced by investors.     

Is management still a science?

New technologies are transforming products, markets, and entire industries. Yet the more science and technology reshape the essence of business, the less useful the concept of management itself as a science seems to be. On reflection, this paradox is not so surprising. The traditional scientific approach to management promised to provide managers with the capacity to analyze, predict, and control the behavior of the complex organizations they led. But the world most managers currently inhabit often appears to be unpredictable, uncertain, and even uncontrollable. In the face of this more volatile business environment, the old-style mechanisms of "scientific management" seem positively counterproductive. And science itself appears less and less relevant to the practical concerns of managers. In this article, science journalist David Freedman argues that the problem lies less in the shortcomings of a scientific approach to management than in managers' understanding of science. What most managers think of as scientific management is based on a conception of science that few current scientists would defend. What's more, just as managers have become more preoccupied with the volatility of the business environment, scientists have also become preoccupied with the inherent volatility--the "chaos" and "complexity"--of nature. They are developing new rules for complex behavior in physical systems that have intriguing parallels to the kind of organizational behaviors companies are trying to encourage. In fact, science, long esteemed by business as a source of technological innovation, may ultimately prove of greatest value to managers as a source of something else: useful ways of looking at the world.     

Is bank default risk systematic?

We evaluate the impact of commonly used indicators of bank distress on broad (i.e. sector and country) risks. This issue deserves special attention in the banking industry where there is a strong degree of interconnectedness among institutions and the default of a single bank may cause a cascading failure, which could potentially bankrupt the entire system. Using several measures of individual bank risk our results show that these measures have a direct impact on European banking (i.e. systemic) stock market risk. We also provide strong evidence suggesting that, for listed banks, default risk tends to be systematic (i.e. non-diversifiable).     

Is gold a safe haven or a hedge for the US dollar? Implications for risk management

We assess the role of gold as a safe haven or hedge against the US dollar (USD) using copulas to characterize average and extreme market dependence between gold and the USD. For a wide set of currencies, our empirical evidence revealed (1) positive and significant average dependence between gold and USD depreciation, consistent with the fact that gold can act as hedge against USD rate movements, and (2) symmetric tail dependence between gold and USD exchange rates, indicating that gold can act as an effective safe haven against extreme USD rate movements. We evaluate the implications for mixed gold-currency portfolios, finding evidence of diversification benefits and downside risk reduction that confirms the usefulness of gold in currency portfolio risk management.     

Is exchange rate risk priced in microfinance?

High microcredit interest rates have often been a source of criticism against the microfinance movement. Research has focused attention on the cost structure of interest rates and more recently on the macroeconomic and macro-institutional factors. While cost structure is probably the most important determinant of interest rates, other factors can also matter. This paper uses an innovative measure of foreign exchange risk to explore its impact on microcredit interest rates. We show that microfinance institutions that operate in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes tend to charge lower interest rates than those operating in countries with floating exchange rate regimes.     

Is information risk priced for NASDAQ-listed stocks?

Easley et al. (J Finance 57:2185–2221, 2002), building upon the asset pricing model of Fama and French (J Finance 47:427–465, 1992), show that the probability of informed trading (PIN) is a determinant of asset returns for NYSE-listed securities. We extend this work by examining whether the PIN is a predictive factor for NASDAQ stocks, as many studies document significant differences between NYSE and NASDAQ listed securities. In the process we examine whether the use of PIN is appropriate for NASDAQ-listed securities. We find that PIN and certain stock characteristics correlate differently for our sample of NASDAQ stocks than that of Easley et al. sample of NYSE stocks. We also determine that the risk of informed trading is only weakly priced for NASDAQ stocks. Contrary to Easley et al. we do not find evidence that excess returns increases as PIN increases.     

Do risk management practices work? Evidence from hedge funds

We examine hedge fund risk management practices and their association with left-tail risk during the 2008 financial crisis. Consistent with risk management practices reducing left-tail risk, funds in our sample that use formal risk models performed significantly better in the extreme down months of 2008. We find no evidence that having either position limits or a dedicated head of risk management is associated with reduced left-tail risk. Funds employing value at risk models had more accurate expectations of how they would perform in a short-term equity bear market.     

Is a pure TIPS strategy truly risk free?

A Treasury Inflation-Protected Security (TIPS) is virtually risk free. As an obligation of the U.S. Treasury, it is mostly free of default risk. As an inflation-indexed security held to maturity, it is risk free in terms of purchasing power. However, investing in a TIPS-only portfolio for retirement is not risk free. This paper presents the results of a simulation analysis designed to evaluate the performance of a portfolio of inflation-indexed Treasury coupon bonds. This study demonstrates that significant shortfall risk exists for TIPS-only portfolios across a range of savings plans and the securities selection rules.     

Is sovereign risk related to the banking sector?

We examine whether the banking sector within a nation is related to sovereign risk. We hypothesize that more competitive and sophisticated financial systems are less prone to panics or bank runs, and consequently will be associated with superior sovereign credit ratings. Using Ordered Probit with Aggregate Time Effects methodology, our results show that banking sector characteristics such as concentration in the banking system, liquidity of bank assets, and size of financial system are significantly related to sovereign credit ratings. Since the use of these sovereign ratings is ubiquitous in international finance in varied applications such as determination of the cost of international borrowing by governments, international cost of capital for FDI, and others, the relationships identified in this paper have important public policy implications.     

Is consumption risk priced in the stock market?

The paper examines whether the risk in the consumption of stockholders caused by incomplete consumption insurance is priced in the cross-section of average stock returns. Using Taylor series expansion of the average marginal utility of consumption, we show that the risk in the consumption of stock market participants can be decomposed into two components, insurable (hedgeable using financial assets) and uninsurable (caused by incomplete consumption insurance) consumption risks. We argue that the growth rate of average consumption may be viewed as a proxy for the insurable component of consumption risk, while the growth rates of the rescaled higher-order cross-sectional consumption distribution moments may be regarded as a multivariate proxy for uninsurable risk in consumption. Exploiting microlevel household quarterly consumption data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey, we find that both components of consumption risk are significantly priced when the limited stock market participation is taken into account. Neither the insurable and uninsurable components of consumption risk nor the Fama–French risk factors are rejected as capturing important components of systematic risk when tested against each other in an integrated multifactor asset pricing model.     

Is performance measurement and management fit for the future?

Performance measurement and management (PMM) is a management and research paradox. On one hand, it provides management with many critical, useful, and needed functions. Yet, there is evidence that it can adversely affect performance. This paper attempts to resolve this paradox by focusing on the issue of “fit”. That is, in today's dynamic and turbulent environment, changes in either the business environment or the business strategy can lead to the need for new or revised measures and metrics. Yet, if these measures and metrics are either not revised or incorrectly revised, then we can encounter situations where what the firm wants to achieve (as communicated by its strategy) and what the firm measures and rewards are not synchronised with each other (i.e., there is a lack of “fit”). This situation can adversely affect the ability of the firm to compete. The issue of fit is explored using a three phase Delphi approach. Initially intended to resolve this first paradox, the Delphi study identified another paradox – one in which the researchers found that in a dynamic environment, firms do revise their strategies, yet, often the PMM system is not changed. To resolve this second paradox, the paper proposes a new framework – one that shows that under certain conditions, the observed metrics “lag” is not only explainable but also desirable. The findings suggest a need to recast the accepted relationship between strategy and PMM system and the output included the Performance Alignment Matrix that had utility for managers.     

Do foreign institutional investors monitor opportunistic managerial behaviour? Evidence from real earnings management

Employing a large sample of 13,860 firms in 41 economies from 2000 to 2017, we document that the ownership by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) is negatively associated with firms' real earnings management (REM) but unrelated to their accrual earnings management (AEM). We adopt a few identification strategies to tackle the endogeneity issues, including firm- and year-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, and difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation based on the passage of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA). In addition, we show that the role of FIIs in curbing REM is achieved through the expertise channel and the monitoring channel. These results suggest that when facing disadvantages in curbing AEM, FIIs make the most of their monitoring strengths by curbing firms' REM, where they have both incentives and capabilities to monitor. Overall, this study highlights the important role of FIIs in monitoring opportunistic managerial behaviour.     

How do stock-for-stock acquirers manage earnings? The accruals feature of real earnings management

This paper investigates whether stock-for-stock acquirers undertake real activities to manage earnings before merger announcements. Our results show that stock-for-stock acquirers present unusually high levels of credit sales and overproduction in the quarter immediately before the merger announcement. We also find that the accruals feature of real earnings management can explain the stock-for-stock acquirers’ high discretionary current accruals. In addition, stock-for-stock acquirer firms that accelerate their credit sales experience subsequent market underperformance. Overall, we provide a novel insight into the accruals feature of real earnings management.     

Does SEC FRR No. 48 disclosure communicate risk management effectiveness?

We hypothesize that the quality of market risk disclosure mandated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR No. 48) provides useful information for assessing risk management effectiveness. Measuring risk disclosure quality as the degree of modification, we find that higher-than-expected disclosure modification is associated with lower future cash flow volatility. On average, an increase in risk disclosure modification from the lowest to the highest decile is associated with a 5.34 percent decrease in cash flow volatility. Given the significant impact of cash flow volatility on firm value and capital investment, our results highlight the importance of market risk disclosures and should be of interest to investors and analysts.