Factors Affecting Retirement Mortality

Abstract

As many countries consider mandatory individual retirement accounts as their answer to a secure social security system, the question arises as to whether all workers can get true “market value” annuities when they retire. It is clear today that private-sector life annuities are priced assuming that the applicant is healthy—very healthy. Very little underwriting or risk classification now exists in the individual annuity marketplace. However, if a large percentage of the population were looking to annuitize their social security accounts upon retirement, there would be strong pressure for more risk classes in the annuity-pricing structure.

Even without the advent of individual accounts for social security, the authors of this paper feel there may be real market opportunities for more risk classification in the individual annuity market and the offering of “impaired life annuities.” Given that this pressure does or might soon exist, this paper reviews 45 recent research papers that look at factors that affect mortality after retirement. In particular, factors that seem to be important in predicting retirement mortality include age, gender, race and ethnicity, education, income, occupation, marital status, religion, health behaviors, smoking, alcohol, and obesity. for each factor, this paper gives highlights relative to the named factor of the impact expected from that variable as described in the 45 reviewed research papers.

The authors believe there is a wealth of information contained in the summaries that follow, and it is our sincere hope that this paper will cause an increased interest in a more broadly based risk classification structure for individual annuities.

Summaries of the 45 papers can be found at www.soa.org/sections/farm/farm.html.     

THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A DECADE OF INNOVATIONS IN PROCESS AND PRODUCTS

The explosion of corporate risk management programs in the early 1990s was a hasty and ill‐conceived reaction by U.S. corporations to the great “derivatives disasters” of that period. Anxious to avoid the fate of Barings and Procter & Gamble, most top executives were more concerned about crisis management than risk management. Many companies quickly installed (often outrageously priced) value‐at‐risk (VaR) systems without paying much attention to how such systems fit their specific business requirements. Focused myopically on loss avoidance and technical risk measurement issues, the corporate risk management revolution of the '90s thus got underway in a disorganized, ad hoc fashion, producing a curious amalgam of policies and procedures with no clear link to the corporate mission of maximizing value. But as the risk management revolution unfolded over the last decade, the result has been the “convergence” of different risk management perspectives, processes, and products. The most visible sign of such convergence is a fairly recent development called “alternative risk transfer,” or ART. ART forms consist of the large and growing collection of new risk transfer and financing products now being offered by insurance and reinsurance companies. As just one example, a new class of security known as “contingent capital” gives a company the option over a specified period—say, the next five years—to issue new equity or debt at a pre‐negotiated price. And to hold down their cost, such “pre‐loss” financing options are typically designed to be “triggered” only when the firm is most likely to need an infusion of new capital to avoid underinvestment or financial distress. But underlying—and to a large extent driving—this convergence of insurance and capital markets is a more fundamental kind of convergence: the integration of risk management with corporate financing decisions. As first corporate finance theorists and now practitioners have come to realize, decisions about a company's optimal capital structure and the design of its securities cannot be made without first taking account of the firm's risks and its opportunities for managing them. Indeed, this article argues that a comprehensive, value‐maximizing approach to corporate finance must begin with a risk management strategy that incorporates the full range of available risk management products, including the new risk finance products as well as established risk transfer instruments like interest rate and currency derivatives. The challenge confronting today's CFO is to maximize firm value by choosing the mixture of securities and risk management products and solutions that gives the company access to capital at the lowest possible cost.     

A Stability Approach to Mean‐Variance Optimization

I jointly treat two critical issues in the application of mean‐variance portfolios, that is, estimation risk and portfolio instability. I find that theory‐based portfolio strategies, which are known to outperform naive diversification () in the absence of transaction costs, heavily underperform it under transaction costs. This is because they are highly unstable over time. I propose a generic method to stabilize any given portfolio strategy while maintaining or improving its efficiency. My empirical analysis confirms that the new method leads to stable and efficient portfolios that offer equal or lower turnover than and larger Sharpe ratio, even under high transaction costs.     

THE HISTORY OF FINANCE: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

In this account of the evolution of finance theory, the “father of modern finance” uses the series of Nobel Prizes awarded finance scholars in the 1990s as the organizing principle for a discus‐sion of the major developments of the past 50 years. Starting with Harry Markowitz's 1952 Journal of Finance paper on “Portfolio Selection,” which provided the mean‐variance frame‐work that underlies modern portfolio theory (and for which Markowitz re‐ceived the Nobel Prize in 1990), the paper moves on to consider the Capi‐tal Asset Pricing Model, efficient mar‐ket theory, and the M & M irrelevance propositions. In describing these ad‐vances, Miller's major emphasis falls on the “tension” between the two main streams in finance scholarship: (1) the Business School (or “micro normative”) approach, which focuses on investors ‘attempts to maximize returns and cor‐porate managers’ efforts to maximize shareholder value, while taking the prices of securities in the market as given; and (2) the Economics Depart‐ment (or “macro normative”) approach, which assumes a “world of micro optimizers” and deduces from that assumption how the market prices actually evolve. The tension between the two ap‐proaches is resolved, and the two streams converge, in the final episode of Miller's history–the breakthrough in option pricing accomplished by Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, and Rob‐ert Merton in the early 1970s (for which Merton and Scholes were awarded the Nobel Prize in 1998, “with the late Fischer Black everywhere ac‐knowledged as the third pivotal fig‐ure”). As Miller says, the Black‐Scholes option pricing model and its many successors “mean that, for the first time in its close to 50‐year history, the field of finance can be built, or…rebuilt, on the basis of ‘observable’ magnitudes.” That option values can be calculated (almost entirely) with observable vari‐ables has made possible the spectacu‐lar growth in financial engineering, a highly lucrative activity where the prac‐tice of finance has come closest to attaining the precision of a hard sci‐ence. Option pricing has also helped give rise to a relatively new field called “real options” that promises to revolu‐tionize corporate strategy and capital budgeting. But if the practical applications of option pricing are impressive, the op‐portunities for further extensions of the theory by the “macro normative” wing of the profession are “vast,” in‐cluding the prospect of viewing all securities as options. Thus, it comes as no surprise that when Miller asks in closing, “What would I specialize in if I were starting over and entering the field today?,” the answer is: “At the risk of sounding like the character in ‘The Graduate,’ I reduce my advice to a single word: options.”     

Getting the Right Mix of Capital and Cash Requirements in Prudential Bank Regulation*

Cash reserve requirements are useful as a broadly conceived prudential tool, not just as a narrowly focused means of limiting the risks associated with illiquidity. Indeed, illiquidity risk is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing bank liquidity requirements. The primary means of mitigating the systemic costs of bank illiquidity risk is the creation of an effective lender of last resort (LOLR). But instead of focusing narrowly on bank funding risks when designing liquidity requirements, regulators should consider tradeoffs among capital requirements, liquidity requirements, and LOLR policies for achieving the broader prudential goal of limiting bank default risk. When considering the optimal tradeoff between capital ratios and cash ratios as prudential requirements, five “frictions” are identified that favor the use of one or the other: (1) the adverse‐selection costs of raising equity (which favors the use of cash); (2) the opportunity cost of forgone abnormal profits (or “quasi rents”) from lending (which favors the use of capital); (3) the limited verifiability of loan outcomes (which favors the use of cash); (4) the moral hazard that results from costly or postponed loss recognition, given the incentive for risk shifting in bad states (which favors the use of cash); and (5) the prospect of changes in the risk environment (which favors cash since it creates greater option value for maintaining targeted default risk with lower adjustment costs in the face of changing loan risk or illiquidity risk). When viewed from the perspective of achieving the main prudential goal of controlling default risk at a minimum social cost, capital requirements have some limitations that favor liquidity requirements, and vice versa. And thus the optimal regulatory policy will combine liquidity and capital requirements.     

A Look Back at Modern Finance: Accomplishments and Limitations

In a conversation held in June 2016 between Nobel laureate Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago and Joel Stern, chairman and CEO of Stern Value Management, Professor Fama revisited some of the landmarks of “modern finance,” a movement that was launched in the early 1960s at Chicago and other leading business schools, and that gave rise to Efficient Markets Theory, the Modigliani‐Miller “irrelevance” propositions, and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. These concepts and models are still taught at prestigious business schools, whose graduates continue to make use of them in corporations and investment firms throughout the world. But while acknowledging the staying power of “modern finance,” Fama also notes that, even after a half‐century of research and refinements, most asset‐pricing models have failed empirically. Estimating something as apparently simple as the cost of capital remains fraught with difficulty. He dismisses betas for individual stocks as “garbage,” and even industry betas are said to be unstable, “too dynamic through time.” What's more, the wide range of estimates for the market risk premium—anywhere from 2% to 10%—casts doubt on their reliability and practical usefulness. And as if to reaffirm the fundamental insight of the M&M “irrelevance” propositions—namely, that what companies do with the right‐hand sides of their balance sheets “doesn't matter”—Fama observes that “we still have no real resolution on the key questions of debt and taxes, or dividends and taxes.” But if he has reservations about much of modern finance, Professor Fama is even more skeptical about subfields now in vogue such as behavioral finance, which he describes as “mostly just dredging for anomalies,” with no underlying theory and no testable predictions. Although he does not dispute that a number of well‐documented traits from cognitive psychology show up in individual behavior, Fama says that behavioral economists have thus far failed to come up with a testable theory that links cognitive psychology to market prices. And he continues to defend the concept of “efficient markets” with which his name has long been closely associated, while noting that empirically based asset pricing models such as his (with Ken French) “three‐factor” CAPM have produced much better results than the standard CAPM.     

What's in a “China” Name? A Test of Investor Attention Hypothesis

We study whether a firm's name affects investor attention and firm valuation. Some Chinese firms listed on US stock exchanges have the word “China” included in their company names (“China‐name stocks”), while others do not (“non‐China‐name stocks”). During the 2007 China stock market boom, we find that China‐name stocks significantly outperform non‐China‐name stocks. This is not due to differences in firm characteristics, risk, or liquidity. The “China‐name effect” is largely consistent with the investor attention hypothesis that price pressure caused by increased investor attention on China‐name stocks during the boom period drives up China‐name stocks more than non‐China‐name stocks.     

Sustainability at Dow Chemical

Dow Chemical Company, which was founded in 1894, is now the second‐largest chemical company in the world. From the outset, the company has been committed to high‐technology research and commercial innovation in chemistry, advanced materials, and agro‐sciences. But if Dow's long history of innovation is impressive, the greatest change in the past few years has been the company's use of innovation to reinforce its commitment to sustainability. In 1996, the company produced its first set of 10‐year sustainability‐related goals. In an effort to meet such goals, the company invested a total of $1 billion in environmentally beneficial products such as new seeds and traits in Dow's AgroSciences business, solar shingles, and advanced battery technologies. Along with the social benefit of higher crop yields and reduced carbon emissions, the company's return on this investment has been estimated at $5 billion. The company was even more ambitious when setting its next set of 10‐year goals in 2006. In this statement, Dow's leadership aimed to create a culture that saw sustainability as a business opportunity from the perspective of a “triple bottom line”—a performance evaluation scheme focused on “people, planet, and profit” that construes success in terms of social benefits, environmental stewardship, and economic prosperity. Dow is now starting the process of developing its third set of 10‐year goals, with the aim of producing a plan that will ensure the viability of the company 50 years from now. With this end in mind, Dow's leaders understand their obligation to continue investing in the health and well‐being of their employees, their communities, and the environment while still creating value for their shareholders.     

Governance and Climate Change: A Success Story in Mobilizing Investor Support for Corporate Responses to Climate Change

Until fairly recently, the main approach to getting business to respond to climate change has been top‐down efforts to regulate emissions and enact various forms of “carbon pricing.” The aim of such efforts has been to make businesses “internalize” the costs associated with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Governments are expected to set the environmental protection rules for companies in their respective countries, and markets are expected to adjust to the new regulations and carbon prices. But this classical approach to economic policy does not work when applied to a global “public goods” challenge like trying to limit the extent and effects of climate change. Instead of a top‐down approach, in which economic actors are forced to respond to regulations imposed on them, the Paris climate agreement of 2015 was reached using a bottom‐up approach centered on the concept of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)—along with a process that ended up encouraging the participation of all economic actors, not just governments. The authors provide an account of how the Paris agreement was reached, and why the “Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition” under the auspices of the United Nations is the most important of several private‐sector initiatives that are changing the way corporations operate. Thanks in large part to the PDC, investors can now undertake meaningful corporate governance action on climate change. With GHG emissions from a particular companies’ operations now much easier to measure, objective performance metrics on GHG emissions can now be set by boards and verified by shareholders. And current decarbonized indexes can be used as performance benchmarks for asset managers’ compensation, which can be tied to return outperformance relative to a “decarbonized” index.     

iNTeg-Risk project: concept and first results

In 2012, the iNTeg-Risk project (www.integrisk.eu-vri.eu) has successfully finished its first 3?years of work. At this point, the project has already yielded a part of large set of results envisaged for its 4.5?years long work plan. This paper recalls the main goals of the project and analyzes the results delivered; as for instance, the work done in single emerging risk representative applications, the work on the development on the iNTeg-Risk paradigm, framework and methodologies of/for emerging risk management, the work on ‘iNTeg-Risk 1StopShop’ (the platform for integrating project results) and its main elements –Risk Atlas, RiskEars (the database of early emerging risk indications/notions), the database of key performance indicators, the work on Safetypedia, etc. The work on harmonization of practices when dealing with emerging risks is certainly the most relevant result in the first years of work on the project. The work has been based on (a) the comparison of different application areas and (b) definition of the elements needed for building the ‘common European approach’ to emerging risks. Some real-life events which took place in the first 2?years of the project (e.g. oil spill in Gulf of Mexico, Fukushima disaster accident in Viareggio, incidents caused by unmanned devices, natural hazards in populated areas, …) have clearly justified some of the choices made in the definition phase of the project. In addition, they have confirmed the need to strengthen the efforts needed to achieve a common understanding about principles of dealing with emerging risks on the broader level – e.g. in the area of EU standardization where the respective preparatory work has started, too.     

Using Digital Storytelling to Engage Student Learning

No one really knows what the first story ever told in human history was, but storytelling is an art that spans many civilizations and cultures, and continues to be a major part of our modern lives. More recently, storytelling has gone digital with advances in technology and connectivity. Educators have also rediscovered how storytelling can be an effective teaching pedagogy for engaged student learning. A digital story can engage students' visual and auditory senses in a way that the written word alone cannot. This article describes such an effort. The Movie-Door-2-Door.com (MD2D) is a digital story spanning 12 episodes. The story revolves around three young business graduates who started their own business and discovered the role of financial information in managing a business along the way. An independent survey by the University's teaching unit showed that the use of such digital stories can be an appropriate pedagogy to help student contextualize accounting and its role in helping management make decisions. The first four episodes of the MD2D digital story are available for viewing at www.research.smu.edu.sg/faculty/MD2D/.     

True Markowitz or assumptions we break and why it matters

Markowitz (1952, 1959) underlies modern corporate finance literature, from modern portfolio theory, option theory, to risk management (especially value at risk type methodologies). From it, Diversify has entered all languages, such is its power. Terms such as “the only free lunch” have become a way to give praise to Markowitz work. And, just as with all fundamental breakthroughs in the literature it has been extended many directions, sometimes not necessarily to the benefit of the original work, which often gets blamed when one rendition or another breaks down. With almost every MBA graduated believing they know what Markowitz optimization or portfolio theory means, it behooves us to step back and look at some of the basics, the assumptions that are made, the costs of breaking assumptions, and the potential disasters that can occur when those basics behind all of the theories dependent upon Markowitz' original work are ignored.This paper lays out many of the basic underlying assumptions behind creation of Markowitz type portfolios, why they matter, and where those assumptions are ignored and/or broken. Breaking model assumptions is common in actual application of theory. Not understanding the implications of broken assumptions is almost a guarantee of failure for a money manager; it is just a matter of time. As one often hears, “Wall Street (or the City if in Europe) is littered with great ideas that do not work in practice.” Some people throw Markowitz and portfolio optimization into that litter bin. We discuss several basic assumptions of modern portfolio theory, when and why they are commonly broken by the best of us in academia and in practice, and discuss the implications for breaking them under trying circumstances.     

Aquaculture: an emerging issue for public concern

The present paper reviews the literature on the risks and benefits of aquaculture. By bringing together sources from both natural sciences and social sciences, we provide a synthesis of perspectives on the relatively novel activity of modern aquaculture. This review consists of three parts: first, a background to aquaculture; second, an overview of the scientific risks and benefits; and third, an introduction to the related public perception issues. We establish five main risk‐related areas: human health, environment, organizational, fish welfare, and social issues and utilize these to highlight potential divergences in expert and lay perceptions. Drawing on findings from the risk perception literature, particularly those related to previous food‐related controversies, it is argued that aquaculture incorporates a range of issues, which have already been shown to be a catalyst for public concern. As such, we conclude that, in addition to natural science studies, aquaculture requires a social science approach in order to be able to anticipate and address future controversies in a timely and efficient manner. However, to date, only few articles address aquaculture from a social science perspective, and the present paper is offered as a step in this direction.     

Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions

This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm‐level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into “label” and “serious” adopters using firm‐level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital‐market effects are different across “serious” and “label” firms. While on average liquidity and cost of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable heterogeneity: “Serious” adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, whereas “label” adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when interpreting capital‐market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in reporting incentives or in firms’ broader reporting strategies, and not just the standards.     

University education in futures studies: A Mark III survey

Following two earlier analyses (1970 and 1972), the Mark III survey of 1974 explores the extent and quality of university education in disciplines identifiable as future-oriented. The initial research revealed a somewhat stagnant situation. There is a decline in systematic futures courses at the university level, while there is now a stronger trend towards “futurisation” of conventional subjects on one hand, and to practice-oriented non-university educational activities on the other. The most significant developments appeared in long-range planning, policy studies and peace research. Representation of methodologies shows systems research as perhaps the most, and social sciences as a less important contributor. Identification of “futurism” and clarification of the concept remains the dominant problem.     

Social Interaction and Stock-Market Participation

We propose that stock‐market participation is influenced by social interaction. In our model, any given “social” investor finds the market more attractive when more of his peers participate. We test this theory using data from the Health and Retirement Study, and find that social households—those who interact with their neighbors, or attend church—are substantially more likely to invest in the market than non‐social households, controlling for wealth, race, education, and risk tolerance. Moreover, consistent with a peer‐effects story, the impact of sociability is stronger in states where stock‐market participation rates are higher.     

Efficient market hypothesis and fraud on the market theory a new perspective for class actions

Following recent judgment of the Supreme Court of US (June 2014), several commentators had declared that “Securities class actions are here to stay” (insidecounsel.com—September 2014, 11). This paper provides a critical perspective on this judgment, which “implicates substantive issues at the intersection of economic theory, financial markets, and securities regulation” (128Harv. L. Rev. 291 2014–2015, 291), and shows that we must be much more careful. This recent judgment is based on the Fraud on the Market Doctrine, which was introduced in 1973 in order to preserve the class action procedure in securities fraud litigation. The characteristic of the Fraud on the Market Doctrine is to have been structured from one of the most popular financial theory: Efficient Market Hypothesis. In this paper, by analysing the implementation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in Fraud on the Market Theory, we argue that if the Supreme Court had to take position for a second time about the Fraud on the Market Doctrine it is due to the practical difficulties inherited from Efficient Market Hypothesis and that have raised several problems to the US courts, including the Supreme Court. This issue is illustrated by the definition of Efficient Market Hypothesis lawyers used (“most” vs “all”/“fully”). As this paper shows, if “Securities class actions are here to stay”, the opportunity to open such a class action is strongly reduced in the facts.     

Retracted: The inter‐relationship between intellectual property and international insolvency

The following article from International Insolvency Review, “The inter‐relationship between intellectual property and international insolvency” by Bashar H. Malkawi, published online on 13 Jan 2010 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com), has been retracted by agreement between the author, the journal editor, and John Wiley & Sons. The retraction has been agreed due to significant overlap between this and another paper: “The fate of intellectual property assets in cross‐border insolvency proceedings” by Nadine Farid published in Gonzaga Law Review, 44(1). Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and the Potential Competitive Impact of Basel II in the Market for Residential Mortgages

U.S. banking regulators have proposed a bifurcated system of capital regulation where the largest, internationally active banking organizations would be subject to significantly more risk sensitive regulatory capital requirements than are currently in place, while most others would remain subject to the current rules. The proposed new capital regime has the potential to affect the competitive landscape among banking institutions, particularly in the area of residential mortgage lending. We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed, bifurcated regulatory capital system on competition in the residential mortgage market from the perspective of the theory of regulatory capital arbitrage. We then apply the theory and available evidence to perform some benchmark calculations that suggest a significant, potential shift of market share and income to the largest banking institutions in the mortgage market.

Economic prediction and human action

Empirical prediction entails syllogistic reasoning, the major premise being a “proposition of regularity”. This latter can itself be tested empirically, as the hypothesis “Past regularity implies future regularity”. In the social sciences (in contrast to the physical sciences), the deterministic version of this hypothesis is demonstrably untrue. Though the “statistical” version of the hypothesis stands, the likelihood of its truth has never been expressed in probability terms. Thus empirical prediction in economics confronts not only uncertainty, which can be expressed in statistical terms, but an added element of “ignorance” which (at least as yet) cannot be so expressed.