Teams,Teamwork and Absence*

We argue that firms with interdependent worker productivity, team production, have a higher cost of absence and, as a consequence, spend additional resources on monitoring absence. As a result, firms with team production should have lower absence rates. We estimate the determinants of absence for blue‐collar workers using a sample of German manufacturing establishments. Workplace teams are used as a proxy for team production. The estimates reveal that firms with teams have lower absence rates, as do smaller establishments. The size effect, however, is unique to establishments with teams, which fits prior theoretical work that has not been previously tested.     

Flexible Hours,Workplace Authority,and Compensating Wage Differentials in the US

The theory of compensating differentials suggests that workers with flexible schedules will earn less than other workers. Some authors have also contended that the concentration of women in jobs with flexible hours explains a significant part of the gender pay gap. This paper uses data from the US subset of the Comparative Project in Class Analysis to test these hypotheses. These data first indicate that, contrary to popular wisdom, women workers do not have more flexible schedules than men. Second, the really striking differential is by race: black workers have much more rigid schedules than white workers. Third, workers with more authority at the workplace typically have more flexibility than subordinate workers. Finally, the data show that any compensating differentials for flexible hours are small and are offset by returns to workplace authority.     

Social interaction,co-worker altruism,and incentives

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate.     

Technology choice,relative performance pay,and worker heterogeneity

We identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous workers are motivated by relative performance pay: if workers’ abilities and the production technology are complements, the firm may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though this technology would costlessly increase each worker’s productivity. Due to the complementarity between ability and technology, under technology adoption the productivity of a more able worker increases more strongly than the productivity of a less able colleague. As a consequence, both workers’ motivation to exert effort is reduced. We show that this adverse incentive effect is dominant and, consequently, keeps the firm from introducing a better production technology if talent uncertainty is sufficiently high and/or monitoring of workers is sufficiently precise.     

A microfoundation for increasing returns in human capital accumulation and the under-participation trap

This paper considers educational investment, wages and hours of market work in an imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production. It investigates the degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour market and underinvestment in education. A central insight is that the ex post participation decision of workers endogeneously generates increasing marginal returns to education. Although equilibrium implies underinvestment in education, optimal policy is not to subsidise education. Instead it is to subsidise labour market participation which we argue might be efficiently targeted as state-provided childcare support.     

Firm heterogeneity and trade-induced layoffs: An empirical investigation

We use a novel data set with verified observations of trade-induced layoffs by U.S. firms to study the interaction between firm productivity and trade liberalization as key determinants of firm-level job destruction due to trade. We find that patterns of trade-induced layoffs are broadly consistent with the predictions for firm-level employment generated by the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms theory – the number of trade-induced layoffs increases with firm productivity for non-exporting firms but decreases with firm productivity for exporting firms. The fact that exporting firms incur trade-induced layoffs at all invites a refined interpretation of the theory. Our findings suggest that exporting firms may lay off some workers who work in production for their shrinking domestic segments, while also engaging in some within-firm reallocation of workers. We also find that, even after controlling for productivity and export status, larger firms lay off more workers due to trade competition.     

A Downward‐Sloping Labor Supply Curve: The Case of Peru

The author finds evidence of a downward‐sloping labor supply curve for urban areas in Peru from cross‐sectional household data for 2002 and pooled data for available years from 1985 to 2000. Individuals respond to lower hourly earnings with an increase in the quantity supplied of work hours. This behavior would help to explain the increasing trend in average work hours in Peru (this average for male workers in Lima, the capital city, rose from 50.5 to 53.9 weekly hours between 1985 and 2000; meanwhile, 33.4% of workers had weekly schedules above 60 hours in 2002). Another finding is the increase in hours supplied due to pressure from the more numerous cohorts recently entering the Peruvian labor market.     

Teams, Firms and the Evolution of Profit Seeking Behavior

Even as advances in information theory over the last quarter century have cast increasing doubt on the proposition that firms successfully maximize profits, the objective of profit maximization continues to be an axiomatic feature of the neoclassical theory of the firm. This paper attempts to improve our understanding firms by treating the objective function as an open question. Specifically, an ontogenetic thought experiment is undertaken to address the question of what differentiates production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges endogenously as a more fit alternative than the objective of value maximization, which is less capable of coping with uncertainty through purposive adaptation.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence

Punishment of shirkers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems and sustaining coordination in work teams. Explanations of the motivation to punish generally rely either on small group size or on a Folk theorem that requires coordinated punishment and, hence, highly accurate information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the punishment of shirkers depends on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to contribute altruistically to a joint project and also to bear costs in order to discipline fellow members who do not contribute. This alternative does not require small group size, complex coordinated punishing activities, or implausible informational assumptions. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity and how it differs from unconditional altruism.     

Foreign Firms,Domestic Wages*

Three types of theories have been used to explain the wage premium in foreign firms: the theories of heterogeneous workers, heterogeneous learning, and heterogeneous firms. We set up a model that explicitly encompasses two of these theories, and that can illustrate the third. This unifying framework allows us to rigorously compare the predictions of the different theories. Thus, it is a useful tool for interpreting new and existing empirical evidence. We illustrate the usefulness of the model on matched employer?employee data, and we find considerable support for all three theories. In particular, the theory of heterogeneous workers can explain up to 75 percent of the premium.     

Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely “selfish” preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are “close”. This result holds for a broad class and distribution of social preferences.     

Labor matching behavior and trade adjustment

This paper develops a model of costly trade and team production to examine the matching behavior of skilled workers in an open economy. Trade liberalization changes the supply of skilled production teams available for hire, even when firm production techniques remain fixed. As trade barriers fall, some workers choose to quit small firms in order to accept less skill intensive jobs at large firms that participate in foreign markets. Changes in worker matching behavior can explain several stylized features of firm-level adjustments to trade, with effects that are not limited to firms on the margin of exit or exporting. Trade is shown to rationalize the matching behavior of workers, leading to aggregate gains in productivity and lower prices. Openness benefits workers employed at exporting firms, however the likelihood of gaining from trade is not necessarily increasing in skill. Wages in the open economy are tied to both worker skill and job type.     

PARTICIPATION IN WORKPLACE EMPLOYER‐SPONSORED TRAINING IN CANADA: ROLE OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND WORKER ATTRIBUTES

In this work, we study the role of firm characteristics and worker attributes in determining participation in workplace employer‐sponsored training in Canada using the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) of Statistics Canada. We attempt to answer the following questions using the rich information of firms that are available in WES data: Does firms' provision of workplace training encourage workers' participation in Canada? How do changes in market competition, organizational changes, and technological innovation affect workers' participation in workplace training in Canada? We find that firms' training provision significantly affects workers' participation in Canada. We also find that increased international competition, organizational changes, and technological innovation are significantly correlated with workers' training participation at workplaces. We note that workers in some sectors and in smaller firms have lower workplace training incidence and older, part‐time, production and marketing/sales workers and workers with preschool children participate less in workplace training. (JEL J080, J240, J290)     

Free automotive unions,industrial work and precariousness in provincial Russia

This article draws on ethnographic work carried out since 2009 on workers and automotive unions in Kaluga, Russia. The contrast between secure and temporary contract workers in foreign-owned car plants is a focus of activism among emerging alternative trade unions in Kaluga. Workers in both the ‘new’ production-scape of high-tech foreign-owned automotive assembly, and the ‘old’ low-tech Soviet production contexts articulate similar interpretive understandings of what constitutes ‘precarious’ work: lack of autonomy and the lack of a ‘social wage’ generally in labour. We interrogate this through in-depth interviews with unionised and non-unionised workers in the auto sector and other industries locally. A divide emerges between workers who go to work for the car plants, and those who remain in Soviet-types firms and who reject the labour relations model that it offers and which they understand to contrast with a traditional ‘paternalistic’ Russian model.     

Skills,Tasks and the Scarcity of Talent in a Global Economy

The scarcity of talent is a tremendous challenge for firms in the globalized world. This paper investigates the role of labor market imperfection in open economies for the usage of talent in the production process of firms. For this purpose, I set up a heterogeneous firms model, where production consists of a continuum of tasks that differ in complexity. Firms hire low‐skilled and high‐skilled workers to perform these tasks. How firms assign workers to tasks depends on factor prices for the two skill types and the productivity advantage of high‐skilled workers in the performance of complex tasks. I study the firms’ assignment problem under two labor market regimes, which capture the polar cases of fully flexible wages and a binding minimum wage for low‐skilled workers. Since the minimum wage lowers the skill premium, it increases the range of tasks performed by high‐skilled workers, which enhances the stock of knowledge within firms to solve complex tasks and reduces the mass of active firms. In a setting with fully flexible wages trade does not affect the firm‐internal assignment of workers to tasks. On the contrary, if low‐skilled wages are fixed by a minimum wage, trade renders high‐skilled workers a scarce resource and reduces the range of tasks performed by this skill type with negative consequences for the human capital stock within firms. In this case, trade leads to higher per‐capita income for both skill types and thus to higher welfare in the open than in the closed economy, whereas – somewhat counter‐intuitive – inequality between the two skill types decreases, as more low‐skilled workers find employment in the production process.     

The impact of working conditions on sickness absence: a theoretical model and an empirical application to work schedules

This paper explores how poor working conditions impact sickness absence through their effect on health. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we develop a static theoretical model based on the concept of health capital, wherein poor working conditions are partially compensated by higher wages. According to our model, the effect of working conditions on sickness absence is ambiguous. Second, we apply our model to the case of working time arrangements and test the effect of working irregular schedules or work around the clock on sickness absence, using data from the French Labor Force Survey on a specific population (male manual workers in private sector). As heterogeneity may lead to severe bias, we use propensity score matching methods. Our estimates show that working irregular schedules has a significant impact on sickness absence. The results are more mitigated for work around the clock. In any case, the extent crucially depends on age.     

Teamwork,monitoring and absence

We present a model showing that firms with interdependent worker productivity (team production) have a higher cost of absence and as a consequence will spend additional resources on monitoring absence. As a result, firms with team production should have lower absence rates, all else equal. Using the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (UK), we are the first to estimate each of these related associations showing that absence has a greater cost in the face of team production, that firms with team production engage in greater monitoring and that firms with team production have reduced absence.     

Advertising and labour supply: why do Americans work such long hours?

This paper advances the view that the intensity of creation of wants through advertising and marketing might be an influence on decisions made by Americans about how much time they should devote to paid work and how much time to leisure. In exploring this argument, we employ vector auto‐regression analysis to estimate long‐run supply schedules for US workers in the twentieth century. We find that advertising expenditure is significant in determining US hours of work, thus providing support for the hypothesis that preferences over work–leisure choices are malleable and are manipulated by the marketing effort.     

The effect of unemployment insurance on weekly hours of work in Canada

Major revisions to the Canadian unemployment insurance program in 1997 created a benefit structure that effectively provides more insurance to workers who are employed for longer workweeks. This anomaly creates an incentive for workers and firms to tailor their weekly work schedules to maximize net program benefits. Analysis of Labour Force Survey data shows that workers and firms responded to these changes by altering weekly hours as expected. This behavioural response demonstrates the sensitivity of hours of work decisions to labour market policies. JEL classification: J65
Les effets de l'assurance-chômage sur le nombre hebdomadaire d'heures de travail au Canada. Des changements majeurs dans le programme canadien d'assurance-chômage en 1997 ont mis en place une structure de prestations qui fournissait un support additionnel aux travailleurs qui travaillaient de plus longues heures dans la semaine. Cette anomalie a créé une incitation pour travailleurs et entreprises à ajuster leur cédule hebdomadaire de travail de manière à maximiser les bénéfices nets du programme. L'analyse des données de l'Enquête sur la population active montre que travailleurs et entreprises ont répondu à ces changements en ajustant les heures hebdomadaires de travail comme prévu. Cette réaction montre bien la sensitivité des heures de travail aux politiques du marché du travail.