Policies and international trade agreements on technical compatibility for industries with network externalities

The paper considers a country (home) in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences over ex ante incompatible domestic and imported products and benefit from a network externality. We analyze the cases with trade under perfect competition and the international duopoly, in which both governments strategically use policies toward compatibility but cannot use conventional trade policies. In both cases, the equilibrium outcome of the non-cooperative game depends upon the strength of the network externality effect and involves either an excessively high equilibrium level of compatibility (in combination with either too much or too little trade) or very low equilibrium levels of both compatibility and trade. The paper concludes with the analysis of the international agreements on policies toward compatibility and evaluates the existing provisions in the WTO legal system aimed at minimizing the trade-inhibiting impact of standards and regulations in the area of technical compatibility.     

Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?

We analyze whether linking international cooperation in trade policy to environmental policy (or other issues with nonpecuniary externalities) promotes more cooperation in both policies, or whether cooperation in one is strengthened at the expense of the other. In the context of self-enforcing agreements, we show that if the policies are independent in the government's objective function, then linkage promotes cooperation in one policy at the expense of the policy that is easier to enforce under no-linkage. However, if the linked policies are not independent and if these policies are strategic complements, then linkage can sustain more cooperation in both issues than no-linkage. The policies are strategic complements only if (i) the production externality has cross-border effects; (ii) the weight on the externality cost is high; (iii) import competing lobbies are not “powerful”.     

Developing countries in competition for foreign investment

This study analyzes the competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) among countries at different stages of development. It is assumed that domestic companies in a more-developed country use more capital in production and that wages in a less-developed country are lower. Countries can compete for FDI by increasing the supply of public inputs in the economy, in addition to (or instead of) offering subsidies or tax reliefs to foreign investors. The results reveal that if governments of competing countries are not allowed to discriminate between domestic and foreign firms, there may be situations in which a less-developed economy will attract FDI depending on the labor cost differential and the responsiveness of foreign investor's and domestic companies' output to changes in the supply of public inputs. If tax discrimination between domestic and foreign firms is permitted, both countries will optimally raise the supply of public inputs, but the more-developed country will always win the foreign investment despite higher labor costs. Thus, governments of less-developed countries may have an incentive to work on an international agreement to disallow tax discrimination.     

Monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy

This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy featuring monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. It shows that the utility-based loss function for this economy can be written as a quadratic expression of domestic inflation, output gap and real exchange rate. The presence of an internal monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality drives optimal policy away from domestic inflation targeting and affects the optimal level of exchange rate volatility. When domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes for each other, the optimal policy rule implies lower real exchange rate volatility than a domestic inflation targeting regime. The reverse is true when the elasticity of substitution between goods is low.     

分级财政体制下纵向税收外部性研究

相对于横向税收外部性强调同一层级政府间税收调整所造成的相互影响,纵向税收外部性强调不同层级政府间税收调整由于税基交迭所导致的交互作用。传统理论认为中央和地方政府间纵向税收外部性呈反向关系,实际上它也可能成正向关系,这取决于政府征收的是从量税还是从价税以及税收缴纳主体处于竞争市场的哪一边即是劳动力或商品的供给方还是需求方。如果中央与地方政府都对劳动力供给从量征收工薪所得税或者都对生产者从价征收消费税,都有可能导致政府间纵向税收外部性成正向关系。     

Regulating the entry of multinational enterprises: Models and practices

This paper examines the policies adopted by host governments to regulate the entry of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The conflict between host governments and MNEs over the choice of entry strategies is demonstrated. The theoretical underpinnings of host governments’ regulations on MNEs’ entry are provided and the restrictive policies adopted by host governments are assessed. In general, prohibiting an MNE to sign a licensing agreement with its own partially owned subsidiary generates a higher level of national welfare. If the size of the host market is large enough to support several efficient plants, encouraging MNEs to license their technologies to several local firms will also increase national welfare.     

Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO

The Kyoto Protocol gives Annex 1 countries considerable flexibility in the choice of domestic policies to meet their emissions commitments. Possible climate policies include carbon/energy taxes, subsidies, energy efficiency standards, eco‐labels, and government procurement policies. In order to meet their targets with minimum adverse effects on their economies, Annex 1 governments with differentiated legal and political systems are highly likely to pursue these policies that may have the potential to bring them into conflict with their WTO obligations. This paper explores the potential interaction between these domestic climate policies and WTO rules. It argues that their potential conflicts can be avoided or at least minimised if WTO rules are carefully scrutinised, and efforts are made early on to ensure that the proposed climate policies comply with them. It suggests an early process of pursuing consultations between WTO members and the Parties to the Climate Change Convention and points to the need of further exploring ways to enhance synergies between the trade and climate regimes.     

Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?

We examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self-sustaining. We show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation; rather, efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre-commit to policy domestically. Moreover, the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are.     

转轨制国家国内横向资本税竞争的模型分析

本文分析了转轨制国家国内地方政府间的资本税竞争,认为一定条件下的地方政府间资本税竞争可以在一定程度上提高全国居民的福利水平;不过,经济转轨初期的各地方政府似乎更愿意采取协同一致的税收政策,因为实行这样的税收政策对地方政府的自身利益较为有利。     

Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

When and how should infant industries be protected?

This paper develops and analyzes a welfare maximizing model of infant industry protection. The domestic infant industry is competitive and experiences dynamic learning effects that are external to firms. The competitive foreign industry is mature and produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for the domestic good. A government planner can protect the infant industry using domestic production subsidies, tariffs, or quotas in order to maximize domestic welfare over time. As protection is not always optimal (although the domestic industry experiences a learning externality), the paper shows how the decision to protect the industry should depend on the industry's learning potential, the shape of the learning curve, and the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.Assuming some reasonable restrictions on the flexibility over time of the policy instruments, the paper subsequently compares the effectiveness of the different instruments. Given such restrictions, the paper shows that quotas induce higher welfare levels than tariffs. In some cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any amount of government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota (including the case of a voluntary export restraint, where no revenue is collected). In similar cases, the quota may even be preferred to a domestic production subsidy.     

不完全竞争下区际贸易政策选择

大国的国内区际贸易可以为该国产业和企业在国际市场提供竞争力支撑。我国作为一个大国,区际贸易因贸易壁垒的广泛存在而受阻,难以为我国产业和企业在国际市场提供竞争力支撑。本文分析了不完全竞争产业区际贸易壁垒存在的经济驱动力,其基本结论是:区际贸易壁垒不仅有利于本地区厂商在本地市场中获得较大的市场份额(即地方保护效应),而且还可以增加本地区厂商的利润(即利润转移效应),并增加本地区的福利;但当所有地方政府都采取贸易保护政策时,会导致所有区域福利水平的降低,从而导致一国整体国民福利的损失。这一结论为中央政府采取相应的措施协调国内区际贸易政策以消除国内市场分割提供了理论依据。     

Induced clean technology adoption and international trade with heterogeneous firms

This paper introduces an environmental externality and factor-biased technology adoption into a trade model with heterogeneous firms. This study explores how firms’ decisions of technology adoption and of exports are affected by openness to trade and the stringency of environmental regulations. It shows that: (1) these decisions induced by tightened environmental policies depend upon whether the upgraded technology is labor-biased or emission-biased; (2) the environmental impact of trade cost reductions on the aggregate emissions and price of emissions permits varies with the factor-biased feature; and (3) regardless of the factor-biased feature, the trade cost reduction induces firms to export and to upgrade the factor-biased technology, while it forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Moreover, the model is further calibrated to simulate policy scenarios of bilateral and unilateral variations in trade variable costs and environmental policies. The bilateral reduction of emissions cap may contribute to welfare gains in both home and foreign countries. The unilateral action of tightening environmental policy in the home country may hurt the home country, but makes the foreign country better off.     

A macroeconomics perspective on international coordination in sales taxes

This article investigates how international coordination vis-à-vis sales tax policies affects the welfare of participating countries. A country's tax policies have asymmetric effects on the pricing behaviors of domestic and overseas producers. International cooperation endogenizes the externality that improves the purchasing power of foreign residents, but at the cost of its own residents’ work efforts. The first-best taxes are lower than in the noncooperative case. When world welfare is utilitarian, smaller economies may experience welfare losses from cooperation under the weak income effect of sales tax. We propose a coordinated tax rule that all countries agree to employ.     

Grappling with Globalisation: Challenges for Economic Governance

This paper examines the key domestic institutional challenges posed by globalisation in terms of the following questions: how does economic globalisation differ from other types of economic integration, what is its impact on the extant national institutions of economic governance, what institutional innovations are required to cope with the challenges, and how can institutional change be made politically feasible? It identifies three perspectives on how national governments may respond – retreat, hold fort, or rearticulate. It concludes that though governments need to devise policies to attract MNEs, indulging in races‐to the‐bottom is not the only route, perhaps not even a desirable route. Second, to attract FDI, governments must afford labor flexibility. How they actually implement it will vary within and across countries, depending on the capacities and the willingness of governments to undertake institutional reform. Labour flexibility can be made politically feasible by increasing the levels of social insurance to protect displaced labour and by instituting programmes that increase their skills and employability.     

Strategic Trade Policies Under Monopsony and Uncertainty: The Exporter’s Non-Linear Responses Based on the Organization of Its Industry

Players’ access to information, their market power, and the timing and rationale of their decisions are important but often neglected in the making of strategic trade policies. I examine optimal decisions in a monopsonistic market with asymmetric information to determine an exporting country’s policy strategies. The large importing country first sets a producer subsidy and later imposes an import tariff after learning about the welfare-maximizing exporter’s reactions to the subsidy. I assume that at the time of their decisions, the n exporting firms have incomplete information and rely only on noisy signals from their own domestic market to account for the uncertainty in the international market. I find that import tariff and producer subsidy can be substitute rather than exclusively independent policies. Results also show that the exporting country’s optimal reaction is non-linear and is based on the structure of its export industry; the exporting country’s government facing a large importer subsidizes (or taxes) its export when the number of exporting firms is low (or high) relative to a threshold number of firms. More important, before giving out subsidies, the exporting country’s government requires more collusion of its firms especially when the large importer targets a fixed domestic price.     

SME Export Performance in Indonesia After the Crisis

Firms in export-oriented sectors with more exporters and more foreign investment, or firms with more access/use of credit, tend to export a higher share of their output, whether they are small or large. The latter points out that the benefits of size-neutral policies that improve the overall business and foreign investment climate and secure access to formal credit for all enterprises produce benefits for the entire economy. Small firms with higher use of machinery and higher use of domestic inputs displayed a higher likelihood to increase the share of their output exported. SMEs show rising productivity with access and use of appropriate production inputs. Decades of protective size-specific policies, such as the reservation scheme for SMEs still in place in Indonesia’s manufacturing may have distorted, more than supported, adoption of appropriate technologies among SMEs. These policies may need to be revisited and refocused on more size-neutral policies such as improved access to collateral or reduced cost of business registration and licensing.     

Locational Competition: A Neglected Paradigm in the International Division of Labour

Krugman's verdict that competitiveness of countries is a largely meaningless concept is a serious misjudgement of the economics profession. Countries compete for the mobile factors of production, most importantly for capital and technology. The exit‐option of these factors and of firms changes the calculus of national governments. This paper sets out the main elements of the concept of competition between locations – locational competition – and analyses its impact on welfare and employment of the capital‐exporting country. It also looks at whether competition between countries necessarily results in a race to the bottom or whether it can function as a controlling mechanism for governments and as a discovery device. The paper discusses under which conditions common rules are needed to reduce transaction costs and to prevent strategic, opportunistic behaviour of countries and which common rules thus reduce transaction costs. Finally, it deals with the question whether one institutional equilibrium in the world economy can be expected or whether many national equilibriums can coexist.     

International externalities and optimal tax structures

This paper develops a model of two trading countries which are related by a bilateral production externality. Necessary conditions which must characterize an optimal tax structure from the point of view of one country are solved for and interpreted. Second, the model serves as a vehicle to extend the theory of corrective taxation in the case where only one policy instrument is available to deal with several distortions simultaneously. It is pointed out that the ranking of alternate second best tax structures typically depends upon which good is imported and which good is exported.     

The Solar Panel Manufacturing Industry’s Boom,Bust, and Future

Solar panel manufacturing, while comprising a small role in the energy sector, illustrates the government’s ability to foster growth in nascent industries as well as its limits in protecting these industries from international competition. Environmental concerns over climate change have forced governments worldwide to establish targets and provide incentives for generating electricity from renewable energy sources. While leading to the rapid development of a global market for solar panels, these policies induced volatility by promoting a surge in production and international competition. Consequently, the domestic solar panel manufacturing industry has experienced a tremendous boom and bust over the past decade.