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1.
Evidence reveals that there are more than 50% product innovation licensings applied within industries. We study product innovation licensing (quality-enhancing licensing) in both exclusive and non-exclusive schemes each under unit/revenue royalty and fixed fee in a vertically differentiated Cournot oligopoly, where a quality-leading firm is an internal licensor. We show that, under a non-exclusive licensing, royalty licensing is the superior policy for the licensor if quality difference within firms is small, regardless of whether a unit or revenue royalty scheme is offered. Under an exclusive licensing, a two-part tariff is optimal. If fixed fee licensing is practicable, the licensor favors an exclusive licensing. Furthermore, an increase in quality difference within firms increases the optimal rates. Using the simulated results, we examine that licensing improves social welfare in all schemes, and the number of licensees will influence the magnitude of welfare enhancement. 相似文献
2.
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent‐holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost‐reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view. 相似文献
3.
Minggao XueLili Su 《Economic Modelling》2011,28(3):1186-1194
Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing contract on a cost-reducing innovation. We find that both the optimal licensing contract and the innovator's licensing revenue are closely related to the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would be found valid if tested in court. It is shown that, for a relatively weak patent (patent's strength is low), it's optimal for the innovator to charge the royalty rate as high as possible coupled with a negative fixed fee. But for a relatively strong patent (patent's strength is high), contract involving the combination of a medium level royalty rate and a positive fixed fee is optimal. We also discuss how the patent's strength affects the social welfare of a patent. Finally we present two policy suggestions that may alleviate the social welfare loss raised by the licensing of weak patents. 相似文献
4.
Swapnendu Banerjee Arijit Mukherjee Sougata Poddar 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2023,25(3):624-648
We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products. 相似文献
5.
We construct a duopolistic trade model with technology transfer and consider two-part tariff licensing contracts. We show that a tariff on foreign products can influence the licensing strategy of the foreign firm. There is a trade-off between a tariff and a royalty license in affecting the product price. We show in particular that a tariff can be chosen so as to induce fee licensing and maximize both consumers’ surplus and domestic welfare. This resolves the so-called conflict between these two objectives in respect of the choice of a tariff. The paper provides a number of testable hypothesis. 相似文献
6.
《Research in Economics》2001,55(3):257-274
This paper considers technology transfer in a Cournot-duopoly market where the firms produce horizontally differentiated products. The patent licensing contract consists of up-front fixed fee and per-unit output royalty for products of neither close substitutes nor isolated. In case the goods are close substitutes then only per-unit output royalty is the optimal solution. However, whether the incentive for imitation increases with product differentiation is ambiguous. Further, in case of credible imitation threat, the relationship between better technology transfer and product differentiation may be ambiguous. We have briefly addressed the implications of multiple licensing. 相似文献
7.
This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot–Bertrand). If the two‐part tariff is applied, then the two‐part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot–Bertrand than under Bertrand–Cournot competition. 相似文献
8.
Licensing to a durable-good monopoly 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
This paper incorporates a durable-good monopoly model and re-examines the argument on licensing contracts. It shows that, from the perspective of the non-producing patent holder, the optimal licensing contract depends on the nature and the degree of the innovations. Specifically, for small cost-reducing or quality-improving innovations, charging a royalty is optimal. For large cost-reducing or quality-improving innovations, licensing by means of a fee and a royalty is superior to using either alone. However, for the case of horizontal product innovations, using a fee contract is optimal. 相似文献
9.
技术许可中道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制研究 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
本文利用现代契约经济学基本理论,对同一技术条件下、由技术使用者替代性投入行为而产生的道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制进行了分析。分析结果表明,技术所有者总可以设计一种分离价格契约治理道德风险问题,其中,对自己偏好的高成本投入行为采用纯固定费用,而对低成本投入行为采用“固定费用+提成费”。本文进一步认为,价格契约中提成费比率对成本效率较高的投入行为所造成的扭曲程度,要大干成本效率较低的投入行为。 相似文献
10.
Francisco Caballero-sanz José J. Sempere-monerris 《Economics of Innovation and New Technology》2013,22(8):697-713
This paper studies licensing policies for the owner of a new product and addresses their welfare impact in the assessment of market failures. We show that the best licensing policy for the patent holder is fixed fee licensing with an exclusive territory clause. Consumers are also better off with fixed fees but do not prefer the exclusive territory clause. Social welfare is higher under exclusive territories when fixed costs are not too large. As for efficiency, the number of licences in the private market equilibrium falls short of the socially optimal solution. Our analysis discloses that (i) any policy measures aimed at enhancing the diffusion of technology, in terms of the number of licences, would be welcomed and, (ii) the permissive treatment received by licensing agreements with exclusive territories is justified. 相似文献
11.
12.
We investigate the welfare effect of international technology transfer in a quality model. A foreign innovator with a new quality product can license its innovation to the domestic firm(s) via a fixed fee. Findings show that the foreign innovator will license exclusively to the high‐quality firm under Bertrand competition, whereas it may exclusively license to the high‐quality firm, the low‐quality firm, or non‐exclusively to both firms under Cournot competition. Non‐exclusive licensing is necessarily welfare‐enhancing whereas exclusive licensing is welfare‐reducing if the quality of the new technology is not sufficiently superior to that of the domestic ones. 相似文献
13.
Welfare reducing licensing 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous. 相似文献
14.
This paper finds that in a linear Stackelberg duopoly model, the follower is more likely to license a cost-reducing innovation to the leader than the leader is to the follower, regardless of whether licensing is in the form of a fixed fee or royalty per unit of output. Under fixed-fee licensing, the follower gains more from small innovations while the leader gains more from large non-drastic innovations. Under royalty licensing, the follower always gains more than the leader from an innovation. 相似文献
15.
分析了不完全信息下,拥有提高产品质量技术的创新企业,在(非)排他性授权策略下,向进行Cournot竞争生产低质量产品的生产企业技术授权的契约优化问题。研究表明,在排他性授权策略下,双重收费契约下信息不完全能使接受授权生产企业赢取更多的创新企业特许权补贴;在非排他性授权策略下,不完全信息能够削弱创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品间接市场的垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下,信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能,这不同于Li and Wang的研究结论。基于提高社会创新能力视角,政府应鼓励创新企业更多采用特许权收费授权契约,削弱信息不对称的影响,赢取更多研发投资利润回报。 相似文献
16.
Stefano Colombo Siyu Ma Debapriya Sen Yair Tauman 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2021,23(5):1052-1073
For an outside innovator with a finite number of buyers of the innovation, this paper compares two licensing schemes: (i) fixed fee, in which a licensee pays a fee to the innovator and (ii) ad valorem profit royalty, in which a licensee leaves a fraction of its profit with the innovator. We show these two schemes are equivalent in that for any number of licenses the innovator puts for sale, these two schemes give the same licensing revenue. We obtain this equivalence result in a general model with minimal structure. It is then applied in a Cournot oligopoly for an outside innovator. Finally, in a Cournot duopoly it is shown that when the innovator is one of the incumbent firms rather than an outsider, the equivalence result does not hold. 相似文献
17.
This paper examines a foreign technology holder’s licensing choices between royalty and fixed-fee scheme. We emphasize that foreign licensor chooses the quality of licensed technology when the licensee country does not implement perfect intellectual property protection for licensor’s technology. We study quality choice as the foreign licensor’s selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We further show it need not hold the general belief that welfare in the licensor country unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax. 相似文献
18.
跨国技术授权作为企业获得竞争优势的重要途径已经受到理论界的关注。与以往的内部技术授权研究不同,文章构建了一个外国拥有技术的企业与东道国企业的空间数量歧视竞争模型,考察多期技术授权存在技术泄露、关税内生及空间竞争对外国拥有技术的企业的最优授权策略选择以及东道国社会福利的影响。研究表明:(1)外国拥有技术的企业偏好双重收费方式,且固定收费方式优于特许权收费方式;(2)双重收费方式不能同时实现拥有技术的企业和社会福利的最优,但可以实现社会福利的次优;(3)外国企业应该通过双重收费方式或固定收费方式进行技术授权,而东道国政府不应一味地提高关税水平,适当地降低进口关税有利于跨国技术授权的实现。文章的结论对于发展中国家的技术引进以及技术出口政策的制定具有一定的现实意义。 相似文献
19.
This paper explores a vertical product differentiation model with a licensing arrangement between a multinational firm with superior technology and a domestic firm with obsolete technology. We find that a subsidy provided by the domestic country's government to the domestic firm to assist with the licensing arrangement is welfare enhancing for the domestic country. Furthermore, both the multinational firm and the domestic country are better off under royalty than under fixed fee licensing. These findings stand in contrast to earlier results in the literature. 相似文献
20.
We study various modes of technology transfer of an outside innovator in a spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. In addition to different licensing options, we also look into the option of selling the property rights of innovation and find the optimal mode of technology transfer. For licensing we find the optimal policy is to offer pure royalty contracts to both licensee firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small compared to the transportation cost, otherwise offer a fixed fee licensing contract to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling the innovation to any one of the firms who further licenses it to the rival firm. The result holds irrespective of the size of the innovation (drastic or non-drastic) and the degree of cost asymmetry between the licensees. Social welfare is greater under selling than licensing. 相似文献