Occupation pension for public employees in the People's Republic of China: A new approach with defined benefit underpin pension plan

The State Council of the People's Republic of China announced a reformed pension plan for public employees with the occupation pension plan in January 2015, officially disclosing that the social pension systems for private and public employees will be unified. Our proposed occupation pension plan for public employees is one of the important components in transiting from a dual‐track pension system to a sustainable and unified system. We aim at providing a pension design, that is, the defined benefit (DB ) underpin pension with estimates of the costs and benefits. We have used a financial engineering approach to calculate the hedge contribution for a DB underpin hybrid pension plan benefit. We also treat pension benefit and salaries in aggregate. Therefore, we propose a stochastic and exogenous salary model. Employees’ total benefits can be determined by multiple factors, such as inflation, economic environment, and employer's preference. However, the expectation of employees’ total benefits should not be affected by the change of salary and pension benefits. Our results could facilitate the ongoing pension reform in the People's Republic of China, providing a rigorous benchmark with public policy implications as to plan design, cost estimation, as well as risk management approach.     

Should income transfers be targeted or universal? Insights from public pension influences on elderly mortality in Canada, 1921–1966

Abstract. We investigate the impact of Canada's means‐tested and universal public pension programs on the mortality rates of age groups eligible for pension benefits for the period 1921–1966. We find that only the universal program significantly reduced pension eligible age group mortality rates. The implied social value of the mortality risk reduction from this program is one‐tenth of the value per statistical life associated with contemporary government policy, meaning that Canadians did not need to place a high value on the life of a senior to justify the higher cost of the universal program. JEL classification: I3, J1     

The funding for a Defined Benefit (DB) pension plan based on the fair valuation of the plan's insolvency risk

This study provides a contingent claims valuation approach model to value a sponsor's claim on a salary-related, defined benefit (DB) pension plan. The model is further developed to numerically estimate a suggested optimal contribution cost that allows the sponsor to fairly bear the risk of the plan's insolvency. The results demonstrate that the traditional actuarial valuation underestimates the cost of pension benefits, and that the normal contribution cost is not enough for the sponsor to fairly charge the value of bearing the plan's insolvency.     

Pension expectations,reforms and macroeconomic downturn in Italy. What can microdata tell us?

We use different years of the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to explore how Italian workers’ expectations regarding their future level of pension benefits and retirement age changed from 2000 to 2014. Comparing expected and statutory values for future pension benefits and retirement ages, we find that knowledge of the pension system and its rules are not evenly distributed among workers. Some sections of the population, in particular, younger workers, women and the self-employed, are less precise in estimating their future pension benefits. As for retirement age, a large share of the working population still has not completely assimilated the implications of the linkage with the evolution of lifetime expectations at 65. Expectations in the final part of the period observed are dominated by increasing pessimism, which may be related to the macroeconomic crisis of the Italian economy and to the approval of a severe pension reform in 2011. Checking whether a household’s total wealth is consistent with lifetime consumption, we find that households where the head overestimates the future value of the pension benefit accumulate fewer resources than the remaining part of the population.     

Voluntary participation and intergenerational risk sharing in a funded pension system

We explore the feasibility of a funded pension system with intergenerational risk sharing when participation in the system is voluntary. Typically, the willingness of the young to participate depends on their belief about the future young's willingness to do so. We characterise equilibria with voluntary participation and show that the likelihood of their existence increases with risk aversion and financial market uncertainty. We find that mandatory participation is often necessary to sustain a funded pension pillar and to let participants benefit from intergenerational risk sharing.     

The Gender Pension Gap in China

ABSTRACT

China has had a large gender gap in labor force participation, sectors of employment, and earnings. This study shows that disadvantages in the labor market for women are the primary drivers of the gender pension gap. Among people age 60 and older, women receive about half of the amount of men's social pensions. Using the 2013 wave of China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) and the CHARLS Life History Survey of 2014, this contribution has three main findings. First, about three-quarters of the deficit in women's pensions is explained by women's lower likelihood of receiving occupational pensions, and one-third is due to smaller benefits when they do receive them. Second, the gender deficit in receiving an occupational pension can be explained by education level and employment sector. Third, among pension recipients, nearly one-third of the gender benefit gap is explained by women's fewer years of employment and lower salaries.     

Modeling longevity risk transfers as Nash bargaining problems: Methodology and insights

The problem of longevity risk has recently received considerable attention. In this paper, we apply economic modeling methods to longevity risk securitization, which is now regarded by pension and insurance industries as a solution to the problem. Specifically, we model the trade of a longevity security as a two-player bargaining game, and use Nash's bargaining solution to determine the outcome of it. Our work not only offers an alternative method for pricing longevity securities, but also reveals several properties about the market for longevity securities. First, a trade would occur if the longevity security is an effective hedging instrument, and the trade would benefit all agents involved. Second, a trade of longevity risk can reduce pension plans' bankruptcy risk, safeguarding the financial security of pension plan members. Finally, compared to the competitive equilibrium, Nash's bargaining solution yields higher trading prices. Therefore, as the market becomes more competitive, pension plans may hedge longevity risk at a lower cost.     

Life Expectancy and Claiming Behavior in a Flexible Pension System

We study the relationship between early claiming of pensions and incentives in the highly flexible Norwegian public pension system, measuring incentives to claim based on an estimated model for expected longevity. Despite a strong correlation between incentives and claiming decisions, the additional costs to public budgets arising from this selection turn out to be modest. Based on analyses exploiting only variation in expected pensions generated by variation in parental longevities and only claiming of pensions not in conjunction with retirement, we conclude that part of the selection is active: some individuals claim pensions early because they gain from doing so.     

Public Pensions: To What Extent Do They Account for Swedish Wealth Inequality?

Sweden's distribution of disposable income is very even, with a Gini coefficient of just 0.31. Yet its wealth distribution is extremely unequal, with a Gini coefficient of 0.79. Moreover, Swedish wealth inequality is, to a large extent, driven by the large fraction of households with zero or negative wealth. In this paper, we investigate to what extent the redistributive public pension scheme is responsible for these features of the data. To address this problem, we study the properties of two overlapping generations economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. The first has a pension system modeled on the actual system; the second has no public pension scheme at all. Our findings support the view that the public pension scheme is, to a large extent, responsible for the features of the data that we focus on. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E13, D31, H55.     

Pension,possible phaseout,and endogenous fertility in general equilibrium

The rich literature on Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG)-type pensions provides a notion that when pension return is dominated by the market return, generally it is impossible to phase pension out without hurting any generation. We show that PAYG pensions can indeed be phased out in a much richer framework where fertility is endogenous and general equilibrium effects are present. Interestingly, the factor that helps us to phase the pension out in a Pareto way is hidden in the structure of PAYG pension itself. Individualistic agents fail to recognize the benefits of their fertility decision on these programs and, therefore, end up in an allocation that is strictly dominated by the allocations that internalize this externality. Exploiting this positive externality, competitive economy can improve its allocations and can reach the planner's steady-state in finite time where each generation secures as much utility as in the competitive equilibrium. Clearly, it is possible to transition in a Pareto way to an economy either with no pension or with pensions whose return is not dominated by market return.     

Corporate financial policy with pension accounts: an extension of the Modigliani–Miller theorem

We build a model of an incomplete market economy with a firm, which we apply to the study of corporate financial policies with pension accounts. We show that prior to ERISA, even though the sponsoring firm's integral financial policy is neutral for its market value, it may affect the economy by creating a pension call option. On the other hand, in the post‐ERISA periods, the firm's financial policy is not only neutral for its value but also has no real effect on the economy. Thus, the Modigliani–Miller theorem is valid in this sense.     

On the optimal design of pension systems

The present paper aims to quantify efficiency properties of flat and earnings-related pay-as-you-go financed social security systems of various institutional designs in order to identify an optimal pension design. Starting from a benchmark economy without social security, we introduce alternative pension systems and compare the costs arising from liquidity constraints as well as distortions of labor supply versus the benefits from insurance provision against income and lifespan uncertainty. Our findings suggest an optimal replacement rate of about 50 % of average earnings. In our model a single-tier earnings-related pension system yields the highest efficiency gains dominating flat benefits as well as two-tier systems of any form. We also show that the negative correlation between pension progressivity and pension generosity of real-world social security systems can be justified on efficiency grounds. Finally, our results indicate a positive impact of means-testing flat benefits against earnings-related benefits within multi-pillar pension systems.     

Aging,Savings, and Public Pensions in Japan*

We analyze the impact of population aging on Japan's household savings rate and on its public pension system and the impact of that system on Japan's household savings rate and obtain the following results: first, the age structure of Japan's population can explain the level of, and past and future trends in, its household savings rate; second, the rapid aging of Japan's population is causing Japan's household savings rate to decline and this decline can be expected to continue; third, the pay‐as‐you‐go nature of the public pension system, combined with rapid population aging, created considerable intergenerational inequities and increased the savings rates of cohorts born after 1965, which in turn slowed the decline in Japan's household savings rate; and fourth, the 2004 public pension reform alleviated the intergenerational inequities of Japan's public pension system somewhat but will in the long run exacerbate the downward trend in Japan's household savings rate.     

CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES, PREFERENCE CHANGES AND THE 'SAMARITAN'S DILEMMA'

This paper examines the desirability of an exogenously induced change in the preferences of individuals in an economy characterized by (i) asymmetrical, localized positive consumption externalities, (ii) private, non-market, negotiation-free transfers, and (iii) the ‘Samaritan's dilemma.’ A model is analysed in which a benefactor (individual 1) makes an unrestricted voluntary transfer to a beneficiary (individual 2) who ran use the transfer to increase 2's consumption of either a purely private good x or a good y that generates external benefits for 1. Once 1 makes a transfer to 2, 1 cannot control how 2 spends it. If 2 fails to take into account this externality, then good y is under consumed and a loss in social welfare results. When such externalities and their concomitant welfare losses arise, conventional solutions are frequently inappropriate, impractical or impossible. This power shows that exogenously inducing the adoption of new externality internalizing preferences by the benefactor and the beneficiary not only increases the benefactor's transfer and the beneficiary's consumption of good y but also produces a ‘socially superior’ state. The welfare improvement is measured in terms of a welfare criterion that is based on the initial and new preferences of each individual     

The portable guarantee to exchange back an old defined benefit for a new defined contribution (DC) pension plan

As a defined contribution (DC) pension plan is introduced to replace a defined benefit (DB) pension plan, the portability benefit from a DC pension plan costs the employees to bear the investment risk from managing the pension fund. To protect the retirement income and maintain the portability benefit, a guarantee to exchange back the old defined benefit is supposed to be demanded for the new DC plan's participants in the guarantee market. In light of such a demand, this article applies a claim-terminating insurance pricing model to offer a contingent claims pricing model for a portable pension guarantee. Using the new labor pension plan of Taiwan as an illustration, a guaranteed DC pension will carry an extra cost of almost 50% up to over 100% of the plan's contributions over the participant's work life, given the current mandatory minimum requirement of a contribution rate of 6%.     

TAXES,INCOME, AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS: DIFFERENCES BY PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY INCOME

This article examines the determinants of and benefits from saving for retirement in tax‐preferred accounts by permanent and transitory income levels. We find that higher incomes (both permanent and transitory) are associated with a greater probability to contribute and larger contributions. We also find that tax benefits for retirement savings increase strongly with income, although the increase is slightly smaller when taxpayers are ranked by their permanent (rather than current) income. In addition, we find that a large portion of the benefits from the Saver's Credit go to taxpayers who would not be eligible based on their permanent income. Finally, we find that recent tax changes (including the introduction of the Saver's Credit) significantly increased contributions among low‐income households, although the effect was centered among those with only transitorily low income. (JEL H24, H31, E21)     

Reforming occupational pension schemes: the case of the Netherlands

In many countries, occupational plans are being reformed away from defined-benefit (DB) to defined-contribution (DC) designs. This paper explores the case of the Netherlands, which features a particularly high ratio of occupational pension assets to GDP. Dutch occupational DB plans suffer from a number of serious weaknesses, including ambiguous ownership of assets, back-loading of benefits, and lack of tailor-made risk management. To address these weaknesses, we propose collective individual DC plans that are actuarially fair. These schemes maintain important strengths of collective schemes, such as mandatory saving, collective procurement, and pooling of biometric risks. At the same time, they eliminate intergenerational conflicts about risk management and distribution through transparent individual property rights on financial assets and tailor-made risk profiles in individual accounts. We show how the transitional burden due to phasing out the back-loading of pension benefits can be addressed without a substantial increase in contributions.     

Aching to retire? The rise in the full retirement age and its impact on the social security disability rolls

The Social Security Amendments of 1983 reduced the generosity of Social Security retired worker benefits in the U.S. by increasing the program's full retirement age from 65 to 67 and increasing the penalty for claiming benefits at the early retirement age of 62. These changes were phased in gradually, so that individuals born in or before 1937 were unaffected and those born in 1960 or later were fully affected. No corresponding changes were made to the program's disabled worker benefits, and thus the relative generosity of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits increased. In this paper, we investigate the effect of the Amendments on SSDI enrollment by exploiting variation across birth cohorts in the policy-induced reduction in the present value of retired worker benefits. Our findings indicate that the Amendments significantly increased SSDI enrollment since 1983, with an additional 0.6% of men and 0.9% of women between the ages of 45 and 64 receiving SSDI benefits in 2005 as a result of the changes. Our results further indicate that these effects will continue to increase during the next two decades, as those fully exposed to the reduction in retirement benefit generosity reach their fifties and early sixties.     

X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension fund administration and investment

Pension funds’ operating costs impair pension benefits, so it is crucial for pension funds to operate at the lowest cost possible. In practice, we observe substantial differences in costs per member for Dutch pension funds, both across and within pension fund size classes. This article presents new estimates of scale economies of pension funds and is the first that also measures pension fund X-inefficiency. We use a unique supervisory data set which distinguishes between administrative and investment costs and apply various approaches and models. Our estimates show large economies of scale for pension fund administrations, but modest diseconomies of scale for investment activities. We also found that many pension funds have substantial X-inefficiencies for both administrative and investment activities. The two kinds of inefficiency differ across types of pension funds. Therefore, most pension funds should be able to improve their cost performance, and hence increase pension benefits.