Direct Marketing in Oligopoly

We consider a game in which symmetric manufacturers decide whether to set up sites (e.g., web sites) where consumers can buy their products directly. Following this decision, the manufacturers choose quantities to sell to the retailers, and then the manufacturers with direct‐sales sites and retailers choose quantities to sell to the consumers. We show that since an increase in the number of retailers may drive the direct‐selling manufacturers from the retail market, it may raise the retailers’ profit and reduce social welfare. Finally, we discuss two cases: an oligopolistic wholesale market and a market with price competition and differentiated products.     

Confronting Price Endogeneity in a Duration Model of Residential Subdivision Development

Spatial equilibrium implies that distant factors are correlated with local prices through market mechanisms. Using this logic, we develop a novel approach for handling price endogeneity in land use models. We combine a control function approach with a duration model to identify the impact of prices in influencing land conversion. We find that failure to control for endogeneity results in large differences in elasticities. Specifically, we find an elasticity of 2.06 compared to 0.67 in a model without instrumentation. This difference is significant as it suggests that price‐based policies, such as ‘green taxes’, are likely more effective in altering development patterns than would be expected from a naïve estimation that ignores price endogeneity. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Advance selling of new products to strategic consumers on flash sale platforms*

Flash sale (FS) is a new business model that offers discounted products in limited numbers over a short period. In this paper we discuss the impact of strategic consumers on advance selling (AS) of new products on FS platforms. We first study the impact of strategic consumers on competing retailers adopting AS to sell a homogeneous new product. And find that the retailers’ AS profits and inventory quantities decrease with the strategic customers’ valuation and valuation decreasing rate. Then we analyse whether FS can mitigate the impact of strategic customers on retailers adopting AS for new products. We consider a newsvendor model involving only one retailer adopting AS to sell a new product. We derive the results by comparing this model with two counterpart models, namely the classical newsvendor model with no strategic customers and a newsvendor model with strategic customers where the retailer does not use FS under AS.     

考虑强势零售商压价和投资行为的供应链协调

中国流通产业的零供矛盾日益凸显,针对强势零售商的压价问题构建博弈模型并分析其对供应链协调的影响。在由单制造商和单零售商构成的二级供应链中,考虑零售商在主导产品零售价格的同时,通过增加广告投入或提高服务水平等市场投资措施刺激产品需求,探讨当零售商运用其较强的议价能力对制造商提出的批发价进行强制压价时,双方如何通过合作博弈寻找最佳策略。发现在一定的条件下,强势零售商的压价行为不仅可以提升品牌商誉,更能帮助实现供应链协调。     

Retail market structure and the threat by the manufacturer to sell goods directly to the consumer

When a manufacturer and its retailers and consumers are spatially separated, the retailers’ market size may be limited by the manufacturer who provides consumers with an option to purchase goods directly from them. The manufacturer uses this tactic to increase profit when a few retailers dominate the market. The mill price of a manufacturer, that is, the price of the good at delivery from a manufacturer’s factory, is critical under these circumstances.If the manufacturer charges a franchise fee, thus absorbing the retailer’s profit, this fee is a function of the mill price. Mill price policy can be used to maximize profit on the sale of goods and collection of the franchise fee. The resulting retail market structure becomes preferable for the manufacturer and consumers since the manufacturer’s profit is larger, as is the quantity purchased, compared with a competitive equilibrium in which every firm entering the market area is assumed to move its location instantly without cost.     

具有价格干预的单产品流网络均衡

研究了由具有产能约束的多个相互竞争制造商以及面临随机需求和商品限制性价格上限的多个相互竞争零售商组成的供应链网络均衡问题。借助变分不等式理论,刻画了制造商、零售商以及消费者的最优行为,建立了供应链网络均衡模型。结合数值算例,分析了产能约束和限制性价格上限对网络均衡的影响。结果表明当政府对竞争市场实行限制性价格上限时,将造成消费市场中的商品短缺,并导致制造商和零售商的总利润减少;当存在产能限制时,将导致无价格限制的商品均衡价格更高以及消费市场中商品短缺量更大。     

When to haggle,when to hold firm? Lessons from the used‐car retail market

Though haggling has been the conventional way for auto retailers to sell cars, the last two decades have witnessed the systematic adoption of no‐haggle prices by many large dealerships, including the largest new‐ and used‐car dealership chains. This paper develops a structural empirical model to estimate sellers' profits under posted price and haggling, and investigates how market conditions affect sellers' optimal pricing formats. The model incorporates a simple class of bargaining mechanisms into a standard random‐coefficient discrete‐choice model. With the extension, the product‐level demand system is estimated using data with only list prices, and the unobserved price discounts are also recovered in the estimation. The counterfactual experiments yield a few interesting findings. First, dealers' adopted pricing formats seem superior to the alternative ones. Second, dealers enjoying larger market power through vertical differentiation and carrying a large number of models are more likely to have posted price as their optimal pricing format.     

不对称信息的供应链激励机制研究

研究由单个制造商和单个零售商组成二级供应链,基于市场需求是线性的,且受价格与销售努力的影响。首先,研究在对称信息下,集中模式和分散模式两种情况下的供应链,求出制造商和零售商使得利润达到最优时的最优批发价及销售价;其次,研究了在信息不对称情况下,制造商的机制设计问题,得到了制造商激励批发价的表达式以及零售商的最优零售价的公式;最后利用实例仿真对模型进行分析,结果表明该激励机制对整个供应链的收益有改善作用。     

Joint inventory and transshipment decisions with consumer behavioral heterogeneity

Transshipment is an effective method for reducing mismatches between supply and demand among retailers. Consumers attempting to purchase out-of-stock items may wait for transshipment, purchase at another store, or choose not to buy. In this paper, the consumer behavioral heterogeneity is characterized using the transshipment request rate and consumer switching rate. It affects the replenishment and transshipment decisions, as well as the system profits. The inventory replenishment and transshipment decisions are studied in both centralized and decentralized two-location inventory systems with consumer behavioral heterogeneity. We characterize optimal replenishment decisions in a centralized system, prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in a decentralized system with a specific demand distribution, and determine the coordinating transshipment price for some decentralized systems. In numerical studies, the performance of various systems is analyzed for consumers with identical (symmetric) or differing (asymmetric) behavior between retailers. For scenarios with symmetric consumers, a higher transshipment request rate and consumer switching rate resulted in increased total profit in all systems. For scenarios with asymmetric consumers, the retailer with the higher consumer switching rate should reduce ordering in a centralized system but increase ordering in a decentralized system. Moreover, the retailer with the higher transshipment request rate reduces ordering to increase profit, whereas the other retailer increases order quantity yet earns less profit.     

Coupons and price discrimination in vertically‐correlated markets

This research analyzes the non‐cooperative and cooperative strategies with respect to manufacturer and retailer coupons. In a model with one manufacturer selling its product to one retailer, it is found that the retailer can achieve third‐degree price discrimination equilibrium in retail markets by issuing coupons to demanders with higher elasticity. Although facing only one retailer, the manufacturer can also achieve the same third‐degree price discrimination equilibrium by issuing coupons directly to demanders of higher elasticity. However, when only one firm issues the coupon, both manufacturer and retailer coupons can help alleviate the channel profit loss due to double marginalization. If the manufacturer and the retailer non‐cooperatively issue coupons, then the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to those under the successive third‐degree price discrimination. Moreover, cooperative strategies between the manufacturer and the retailer can eliminate double marginalization, achieve the vertical integration effect, and lead to higher profits, consumer surpluses, and social surpluses than non‐cooperative coupon strategies. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Maximum likelihood estimation of a binomial proportion using one‐sample misclassified binary data

In this article, we construct two likelihood‐based confidence intervals (CIs) for a binomial proportion parameter using a double‐sampling scheme with misclassified binary data. We utilize an easy‐to‐implement closed‐form algorithm to obtain maximum likelihood estimators of the model parameters by maximizing the full‐likelihood function. The two CIs are a naïve Wald interval and a modified Wald interval. Using simulations, we assess and compare the coverage probabilities and average widths of our two CIs. Finally, we conclude that the modified Wald interval, unlike the naïve Wald interval, produces close‐to‐nominal CIs under various simulations and, thus, is preferred in practice. Utilizing the expressions derived, we also illustrate our two CIs for a binomial proportion parameter using real‐data example.     

The impact of corporate social responsibility associations on trust in organic products marketed by mainstream retailers: a study of Italian consumers

This paper investigates the determinants of consumer attitudes toward organic products marketed by mainstream retailers under a private label. Since organic products are credence goods, consumers cannot directly verify whether these products comply with official standards. Organic labels are the primary source of consumer trust in organics, but these labels must be noticed and understood before consumers will actively seek them out. In that some consumers may not prioritize product labels when they shop, it is sometimes up to retailers to strengthen consumer trust. Within the antecedents of this trust, we isolated the contribution of the corporate social responsibility associations held by consumers about retailers. We surveyed Italian customers interested in organics and found that they are more likely to trust the private‐label organic products sold by a retailer when it is considered socially responsible. Our results also show that consumer trust translates into brand loyalty and a willingness to pay a premium price for organic products. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

On the Performance of Naïve, Analyst and Composite Earnings Forecasts: Evidence from Hong Kong

In this paper, we compare the information content and performance of naïve, analyst and composite forecasts in Hong Kong. Empirical evidence shows that superior performance can be obtained by a composite measure combining both analyst and naïve forecasts. In addition, analyst forecasts become more conditionally efficient over the naïve model as the actual announcement approaches. The superiority and timing advantage of analyst forecasts suggest that more emphasis should be placed on the services of analysts for predicting future earnings figures, particularly when the announcement is approaching.     

Reputation and Managerial Truth-Telling as Self-Insurance

We investigate truth-telling by an informed insider, or manager, who repeatedly forecasts cash flows to competitive investors in a standard message game. The insider cannot trade on or sell private information, but faces imperfectly hedgeable nonwage income shocks. When compensation depends on the current stock price, a partially revealing equilibrium may exist in which the manager manipulates his reports, and hence the stock price, to reduce consumption variance. Intuitively, the manager builds reputation in good times when honesty is affordable, and exploits reputation in times of need. Endogenous reputation for honesty thus follows from a self-insurance motive.     

Sales by multi‐product retailers

This paper examines the rationale underlying periodic price promotions, or sales, for perishable food products by supermarket retailers. Whereas previous studies explain sales in a single‐product context as arising from informational, storage cost, or demand heterogeneity, this study focuses on the central role of retailers as multi‐product sellers of complementary goods. By offering a larger number of discounted products within a particular category, retailers are able to attract a sufficient number of customers to offset the effect of lower margins on sale items by selling more high‐margin items. The implications that emerge from the resulting mixed‐strategy equilibrium are tested in a product‐level, retail‐scanner data set of fresh fruit sales. Hypotheses regarding the rationale and effectiveness of sales are tested by estimating econometric models that describe (1) the number of sales items per store, (2) the depth of a given sale, and (3) promotion effectiveness on store‐level demand. The results of this econometric analysis support the hypothesis that the breadth and depth of price promotions are complementary marketing tools, thus explaining how EDLP and HI‐LO store formats can exist in the same monopolistically competitive market equilibrium. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Efficient Consumer Altruism and Fair Trade Products

Consumers have shown a willingness to pay a premium for products labeled as “FT” and a preference for retailers that are seen to be more generous to their suppliers/employees. A FT product is essentially a bundle of a base product and a donation to the supplier (e.g., a coffee farmer). An altruistic rational consumer will only choose this bundle if doing so is less expensive than buying the base product and making a direct donation. For FT to be sustainable either in a competitive equilibrium or in a monopolistic environment this bundling must yield an efficiency. This efficiency is generated in the following context. A supplier’s investment reduces the retailer’s cost or boosts the final product’s quality, but this investment is not immediately observable and cannot be enforced, hence there exists a moral hazard problem. In this environment, the altruism of the consumer can facilitate a more efficient contract: by paying the supplier more the retailer can both extract more consumer surplus and increase the level of contracted investment, while preserving the supplier’s incentive compatibility constraint. We assess our model in the context of the coffee industry.     

两供应商单零售商的货架展示量与定价决策模型

本文从零售商的角度,首先分析了零售商自身利润最大化的分散式决策,然后分别研究了供应链系统利润最大化、供应商和零售商联盟下的渠道利润最大化的集中式决策模型。进而提出了与展示量和零售价格相关的批发价加补贴合同,得到协调零售商的分散式决策,达到与系统利润最大化决策一致的结果。     

Product Differentiation by Competing Vertical Hierarchies

We revisit the choice of product differentiation in the Hotelling model, by assuming that competing firms are vertically separated, and that retailers choose products' characteristics. The “principle of differentiation” does not hold because retailers with private information about their marginal costs produce less differentiated products in order to increase their information rents. Hence, information asymmetry within vertical hierarchies may increase social welfare by inducing them to sell products that appeal to a larger number of consumers. We show that the socially optimal level of transparency between manufacturers and retailers depends on the weight assigned to consumers' surplus and trades off two effects: higher transparency reduces price distortion but induces retailers to produce excessively similar products.     

When (not) to indulge in ‘puffery’: the role of consumer expectations and brand goodwill in determining advertised and actual product quality

We analyze why some firms advertise product quality at a level different from the actual quality of a product. By considering the interacting effects of product quality and advertising, we develop a dynamic model of consumer expectations about product quality and the development of brand goodwill to determine the optimal values for the decision variables. The model parameters are determined based on prior literature and we use numerical techniques to arrive at the solution. We then derive conditions under which a firm will find it optimal to overstate or understate product quality. The results suggest that quality may be overstated in markets characterized by high price sensitivity, low quality sensitivity, low brand loyalty, and high source credibility, suggesting the need for vigilance on the part of consumers, upper level managers and regulatory authorities in such market conditions. This is important because current regulatory resources are insufficient to reduce deceptive advertising practices (Davis JJ. 1994. Ethics in advertising decision‐making: implications for reducing the incidence of deceptive advertising. Journal of Consumer Affairs 28 : 380–402). Further, the law of deceptive advertising prohibits some advertising claims on the ground that they are likely to harm consumers or competitors (Preston IL, Richards JI. 1993. A role for consumer belief in FTC and Lanham Act deceptive advertising cases. American Business Law Journal 31 : 1–29). Also, Nagler (1993. Rather bait than switch: deceptive advertising with bounded consumer rationality. Journal of Public Economics 51 : 359–378) shows that deceptive advertising causes a net social welfare loss and a public policy effectively preventing deception will improve social welfare. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete

We study a model of competing manufacturer/retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with promotional externalities at the downstream level. In contrast to earlier models mainly focusing on a bilateral monopoly setting, we show that with competing brands a ‘laissez‐faire’ approach towards vertical price control might not always promote productive efficiency. Giving manufacturers freedom to control retail prices is more likely to harm consumers when retailers impose positive promotional externalities on each other, and the converse is true otherwise. Our simple model also suggests that, with competing supply chains, consumers and manufacturers might prefer different contractual modes if promotional externalities have substantial effects on demands.