Capital Commitment and Illiquidity in Corporate Bonds

We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.     

Analyzing the effect of derivatives on the financial soundness of commercial banks in Italy: An approach based on the CAMELS framework

Italian economy is among the biggest economies in the Europe which suffered from the repercussions of the global financial crisis during this last decade. The weakness of Italian banking system coincides with the common debate about the implication of derivatives in the distress of banks’ soundness. Thus, the aim of our research is to examine the effect of derivative instruments on the banks’ soundness in Italy. To reach our goal, the CAMELS approach is employed to define the soundness of Italian commercial banks. To overcome the endogeneity issue of variables, an appropriate econometric procedure, namely the dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM system) is applied using data from 22 commercial banks in Italy over the period 2005–2015. Explanatory variables are defined by derivative instruments (forwards, swaps, options, and futures), bank‐specific variable (bank's size as non‐CAMELS variable), industry‐specific variables (CR3, CR5, and HHI as indicators of bank's sector and market concentrations), and country‐specific variables (GDP and inflation). The main results reveal that the majority of the CAMELS indicators are favorably affected by derivative instruments especially forwards and options. The most important conclusion is that using derivative instruments does not threaten the financial soundness of commercial banks in Italy. As major implication decision‐makers and experts—after the global financial crisis—should not consider derivatives in part as responsible of the fragility of the Italian banking system.     

Comparative advantages of regional versus national banks in alleviating SME's financial constraints

This paper provides new evidence on the impact of local banking market structure on SME's access to credit and emphasize the comparative advantages of regional versus national banks in alleviating SME's financial constraints. Matching a unique dataset on bank branch-level and firm-level information for a sample of 33,165 French manufacturing firms over the 2005–2013 period, we rely on two alternative indicators to capture different dimensions of SMEs financial constraints and find significant differences in the drivers of these constraints. While higher market share of regional banks or stronger presence of geographically-focused banks helps to alleviate SMEs' short-term credit constraint, higher market share of national banks or stronger presence of geographically-diversified banks is beneficial to reduce SMEs investment cash-flow sensitivity. Moreover, in both cases, SMEs' financial constraints are strengthened in functionally-distant markets. In addition, during crisis times, the benefits of relationship banking on short-term credit constraint remain and, in some cases, are reinforced. We also find that these benefits differ according to SMEs pre-crisis financial health. Regional banks facilitate access to short term credit for firms which were more profitable before the global financial crisis and particularly those who experienced a sharp decline in profitability in troubled times, supporting the hypothesis of continuation lending by relationship banks during economic downturns.     

Are credit default swaps still a sideshow? How information flow between equity and CDS markets has changed since the financial crisis

We examine the information flow between equity and credit default swap (CDS) markets using firm-level returns data before and after the global financial crisis. Before the crisis, the information flow was unidirectional, with equity returns leading CDS returns. While equity returns continue to lead CDS returns after the crisis, we find that the speed of adjustment of the CDS market to equity markets has increased during this period. We also find evidence of a bidirectional flow of information between these markets, with equity returns responding to credit protection returns in the postcrisis period. The quicker response of CDS spreads to equity returns during the postcrisis period primarily occurs among entities with lower credit ratings. In contrast, the response of equity returns to lagged CDS returns during the postcrisis period is observed among firms across different credit rating categories; however, the magnitude of the response is higher among those with lower credit ratings.     

欧洲金融一体化波折与单一银行监管机制的构建

文章以翔实的数据比较分析了金融危机前后（包括欧债危机以来）欧元区金融运行格局的变化,探讨欧盟推动建立单一监管机制的原因及前景。文章指出2008年以前,欧洲的金融一体化进程快速推进,银行业市场和金融市场不断融合。金融危机爆发后,监管制度缺位的问题暴露出来,欧洲银行业面临巨大的信心危机,金融一体化进程停滞,货币政策传导遇阻。欧盟反思危机教训,推动建立单一监管机制,重塑银行业信心,重启一体化进程,但实现这一目标任重而道远。     

Corporate social responsibility: An umbrella or a puddle on a rainy day? Evidence surrounding corporate financial misconduct

We examine the way a fraudulent firm's pre‐ and post‐misconduct corporate social responsibility engagement is associated with its stock performance to investigate the reputational role of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In the short term, firms with good CSR performance suffer smaller market penalties upon the revelation of financial wrongdoing, supporting the buffer effect, as opposed to the backfire effect, of a good social image. We also find that the misbehaving firms’ post‐misconduct CSR efforts are negatively associated with delisting probabilities, and positively with stock returns. These findings support the argument that increasing post‐crisis CSR engagement can be an effective remedy for a damaged reputation.     

Bank Panics,Government Guarantees,and the Long‐Run Size of the Financial Sector: Evidence from Free‐Banking America

Governments attempt to increase the confidence of financial market participants by making implicit or explicit guarantees of uncertain credibility. Confidence in these guarantees presumably alters the size of the financial sector, but observing the long‐run consequences of failed guarantees is difficult. We look to America's free‐banking era and compare the consequences of a broken guarantee during the Indiana‐centered Panic of 1854 to the Panic of 1857 in which guarantees were honored. Our estimates of a model of endogenous market structure indicate substantial negative long‐run consequences to financial depth when panics cast doubt upon a government's ability to honor its guarantees.       

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Market power in CEE banking sectors and the impact of the global financial crisis

The aim of this study is to undertake an up-to-date assessment of market power in Central and Eastern European banking markets and explore how the global financial crisis has affected market power and what has been the impact of foreign ownership. Three main results emerge. First, while there is some convergence in country-level market power during the pre-crisis period, the onset of the global crisis has put an end to this process. Second, bank-level market power appears to vary significantly with respect to ownership characteristics. Third, asset quality and capitalization affect differently the margins in the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. While in the pre-crisis period the impacts are similar for all banks regardless of ownership status, in the crisis period non-performing loans have a negative effect and capitalization a positive effect only for domestically-owned banks.     

Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide

This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis, we find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Further exploration suggests that this is because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Overall, our findings add to the literature by examining the corporate governance determinants of financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 crisis.     

Korean bank governance reform after the Asian financial crisis

We discuss corporate governance reforms in the Korean banking sector, which include reforms in board composition and executive compensation, implemented after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and examine the stock market's response to the reforms. We find that the banking returns and volatilities became more Granger-causally prior to both KOSPI and finance sector returns after 1998. The announcements of banking governance reforms are generally associated with significant increases in banking sector stock returns. The KIF survey finds that board governance is considered essential in assessing the value of the firm. The participants in the McKinsey survey indicate that they are willing to pay a premium of 24% on average for firms with outstanding corporate governance systems.     

Stock market risk in the financial crisis

In this paper, we look at the effect of the financial crisis from an angle overlooked to date in the finance literature by investigating composition effects arising from the financial crisis. A composition effect is a change in the market risk of a sector that is caused not by a direct change in that sector but by a change in another sector that affects the composition of the stock market. In the paper we investigate the pre and during crisis market risk of the industrial, banking and utilities sectors. Amongst other results, we find a positive relationship across the G12 countries between the increase in the market risk of industrials during the crisis and both the pre-crisis market risk of the banking sector and the scale of the systemic crisis in a country. The six G12 countries that experienced a major systematic banking crisis are amongst the seven countries with the largest increases in the market risk for industrials. Results drawn from our detailed analysis using US data are consistent with these findings. Finally, we show how the results add to our understanding of the linkages between the financial and real sector and conclude that composition effects of the financial crisis could have a significant chilling effect on investment in industrials, which is in addition to the effect of other linkages already documented.     

Corporate investment during the financial crisis: Evidence from China

China's growth model suggests that the 2008 financial crisis may have affected the Chinese economy differently from what one observes in mature market economies. In this paper, we examine how Chinese corporate investment responded to the financial crisis by using 1689 listed nonfinancial firms during Q12006–Q32010. We document that (1) the overall impact of the financial crisis on Chinese corporate investment is negative; (2) among three channels conveying the effect of the financial crisis, namely, the demand channel, the financial constraints channel, and the uncertainty channel, the demand channel dominates; (3) financial assets held by a nonfinancial firm are important in explaining the firm's fixed investment behaviour; (4) as compared to non-state firms, state-controlled firms are less affected by the financial crisis and more active in engaging in financial assets investment; and (5) foreign ownership can be seen as a buffer against the negative effect of the financial crisis and foreign-involved Chinese firms are less active in financial assets investment as compared to domestic firms.     

Banking industry performance in the wake of the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the performance of the banking industry both prior to and during the global financial crisis (GFC). Through the application of a panel regime-switching model designed to capture heterogeneity, our findings suggest that global banking performance can be grouped into two distinctive clusters, each with its own specific regime dynamics. Before the crisis, a cluster of banking institutions pertaining to advanced economies stood out for its buoyant stock market performance, whereas a second cluster, mainly composed of banking indexes that belong to emerging economies, exhibited a more subdued performance. Further, this differentiation was accompanied by low regime synchronization between the clusters. During the crisis, banking institutions behaved similarly, regime synchronization increased, and the differences in the regime dynamics vanished. Finally, the GFC constituted a highly synchronized and systemic extreme financial event, as evidenced by our findings depicting the onset of severe underlying international financial contagion processes.     

Role of financial regulation and innovation in the financial crisis

Using the financial and macroeconomic dataset of 132 countries, this study empirically analyzes the effects of financial regulations and innovations on the global financial crisis. It shows that regulatory measures such as restrictions on bank activities and entry requirements have decreased the likelihood of a banking crisis, while capital regulation and government ownership of banks have increased the likelihood of a currency crisis. Financial innovation has contributed to the banking crisis but contained the currency crisis. This study also shows that judicious implementation of regulatory measures is critical to financial stability because some regulations, if implemented simultaneously, can further aggravate or alleviate a crisis.     

Competition and financial stability in European cooperative banks

Cooperative banks are a driving force for socially committed business at the local level, accounting for around one fifth of the European Union (EU) bank deposits and loans. Despite their importance, little is known about the relationship between bank stability and competition for these small credit institutions. Does competition affect the stability of cooperative banks? Does the financial stability of banks increase/decrease when competition is higher? We assess the dynamic relationship between competition and bank soundness (both in the short and long run) among European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009. We obtain three main results. First, we provide evidence in line with the competition-stability view proposed by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). Bank market power negatively “Granger-causes” banks' soundness, meaning that there is a positive relationship between competition and stability. Second, we find that this fundamental relationship does not change during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Third, we show that increased homogeneity in the cooperative banking sector positively affects bank soundness. Our findings have important policy implications for designing and implementing regulations that enhance the overall stability of the financial system and in particular of the cooperative banking sector.     

Testing the fire-sale FDI hypothesis for the European financial crisis

Using a panel of corporate transactions in 27 EU countries from 1999 to 2012, we investigate the impact of the financial crisis on the market for corporate assets. In particular, we test the ‘fire-sale FDI’ hypothesis by analyzing the number of cross-border transactions, the price of corporate assets and the impact of credit and macroeconomic conditions. According to the fire-sale FDI hypothesis, countries affected by a crisis attract foreign buyers selling assets at a discount. We find a dampening effect of the crisis on cross-border transactions in all EU countries. Although countries with higher sovereign default risk and lower economic demand attracted more foreign buyers in the crisis, lower domestic credit is associated with less cross-border transactions. Corporate assets in crisis countries are cheaper, particularly if domestic credit is low; however, these findings are not limited to the crisis period. This pattern is strikingly different from the East Asian and Latin American financial crises. Overall, we find little evidence for ‘fire-sale FDI’ suggesting an integrated European market without significant frictions.     

Orderbook demand for corporate bonds

We examine the determinants of investor demand for corporate bond offerings using novel data on the primary market orderbook size. We find that credit risk and bond market presence are significant in explaining investor demand. These effects are more pronounced during the crisis periods including the global financial crisis and eurozone crisis as well as during the postcrisis periods. Our results also highlight the size of the bond investor order depends on information asymmetry costs and the benefit of diversifications, as investor demand is lower for new issuers as well as very frequent issuers. The levels of investor demand have important economic consequences for bond issuers as high investor demand shortens the time to subsequent bond issues and potentially reduces the firm's cost of capital at issuance.     

Economic value,competition and financial distress in the European banking system

In this paper we examine the impact of a large number of factors at the bank level (liquidity and credit risks, asset size, income diversification and market power), at the industry level (banking concentration) and macro-level (real GDP growth) on bank financial distress using an unbalanced panel of 308 European commercial banks between 1996 and 2009. The observations falling below a given threshold of the empirical distribution of the Shareholder Value Ratio proxy bank financial distress. We employ a panel probit regression and, given the presence of overlapping data giving rise to residual autocorrelation, we use the Bertschek and Lechner (1998) robust estimator of the covariance matrix of parameters. We show that credit risk, liquidity risk and bank market power are the most influential determinants of distressed Shareholder Value Ratio. Finally we evaluate the model out-sample forecasting performance over the 2008–2009 crisis period.