Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence

Using a wide sample of international publicly traded firms, this paper studies the rapidly increasing practice of incorporating Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that this compensation practice varies at the country, industry, and firm levels in ways that are consistent with efficient incentive contracting. We also observe that reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation arrangements is associated with engagement, voting, and trading by institutional investors, which suggests that firms could be adopting this practice to align their management's objectives with the preferences of certain shareholder groups. Finally, we find that the adoption of ESG Pay is accompanied by improvements in key ESG outcomes, but not by improvements in financial performance.     

Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence

We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance-based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.     

Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation

Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model that examines the effects of institutional monitoring on executive compensation. The model predicts that institutions' influence on managers' pay-for-performance sensitivity and level of compensation is enhanced when institutions have lower implied costs of monitoring, but that these effects are attenuated when the firm-specific cost of monitoring is high. Our empirical results are broadly consistent with these implications, suggesting that independent investment advisors and investment company managers have advantages in monitoring firms' management.     

The Relevance of Non-financial Performance Measures for CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Airline Industry

This paper investigates the role of non-financial performance measures in executive compensation. Using a sample of airline firms we document that passenger load factor, an important non-financial measure for firms in this industry, is positively associated with CEO cash compensation. This association is significant after controlling for traditional accounting performance measures (return on assets) and financial performance measures (stock returns). This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that non-financial measures provide incremental information about CEOs actions over financial measures and hence, receive a positive weight in compensation contracts. We also explore cross-sectional differences in the importance of non-financial performance measures. We find weak evidence that CEO power and the noise of financial performance measures impact the relationship between non-financial performance measures and cash compensation.JEL Classification: J33, L25, L93, M41, M52     

金融行业上市公司高管薪酬问题：公平与效率

金融行业上市公司高管薪酬问题一直是社会关注的焦点。目前,金融行业上市公司高管薪酬存在显著的效率与公平问题,主要表现为高管薪酬与业绩缺乏相关性,以及高管薪酬水平差距过大。金融行业上市公司高管薪酬问题表面来看是一个管理问题和经济问题,但究其深层次原因则是一个社会政治问题。剖析和解决这些问题需要进行顶层设计,兼顾公平和效率,注重社会公平。     

会计信息可比性与高管薪酬契约有效性

会计信息在高管激励契约中的作用历来是理论与实务中关注的重要问题。本文以2006～2016年我国上市公司为对象,研究会计信息可比性与高管薪酬契约有效性之间的关系,结果发现,会计信息可比性与公司高管薪酬-业绩敏感度之间存在显著正相关关系。与国有企业相比,会计信息可比性对薪酬契约有效性的影响在非国有企业中更为显著。进一步分析发现,会计信息可比性与高管薪酬-业绩敏感度之间的正相关关系在信息复杂程度较高、内部控制质量较差、外部监督较弱的企业中更为显著。总体而言,本文的研究结果表明会计信息可比性特征对薪酬契约有效性具有重要影响。     

Financial Constraints,Institutions, and Firm Productivity: Evidence from China

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates whether Chinese firms utilize trade credit as an alternative financial intermediation to alleviate financial constraints, and whether trade credit matters for firm productivity. The results show that trade credit significantly affects firm productivity in private and foreign-owned firms but not state-owned enterprises, indicating that trade credit is an efficient financial intermediation for non-state firms. Second, trade credit better helps firms that have severe financial constraints grow. Third, the mechanism of trade credit and TFP is by the substitution effect of cash flow, the smoothing effect of working capital and the drive of innovation. Finally, the impact of trade credit on productivity is driven by the regions under a more institutionally developed environment.     

Boards,Executive Excess Compensation,and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms

We investigate how executives, the board, and excess compensation jointly affect the performance of nonprofits. Since the common measure of nonprofit performance often includes salaries, we also use expenses that directly benefit the targeted population. Our results suggest that above average compensation for executives is associated with poor firm performance. However, the negative relation of CEO pay to performance occurs for firms with only one executive, the CEO. We conclude that a powerful CEO with autonomy can harm firm performance, but other executives can mitigate these agency problems. The board also appears to monitor direct community benefits more than indirect benefits.     

朝阳市微小金融机构面临的问题与对策

作为新兴农村金融机构,小额贷款公司和村镇银行(以下简称微小金融机构)的发展设立,旨在有效配置金融资源,支持小型企业发展,引导资金流向农村和欠发达地区,改善农村地区金融服务,推进社会主义新农村建设。但对朝阳市调查发现,由于缺乏相关配套政策支持,微小金融机构普遍面临经营管理水平低下、资金来源不足、有效创新乏力、抗风险能力弱等诸多问题,降低了其服务"三农"的政策效果。     

Determination of Executive Compensation in an Emerging Economy. Evidence from India

Most studies of the determination of executive compensation are based on the experience of developed countries, and mainly focus on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation. Determination of board compensation is relatively ignored in the literature. This paper examines the effect of corporate governance, firm performance, and corporate diversification on the board, as well as CEO compensation and its components, in the context of an emerging economy-India-where a managerial market has yet to develop. Data for 462 firms for 1997-2002 in the Indian manufacturing sector have been used. This paper finds that board compensation largely depends on current- and past-year performance and diversification of the firm, whereas CEO compensation depends on current-year firm performance only. Among the personal attributes of the CEO, only in-firm experience has significant influence on CEO compensation. This finding contradicts the existing studies, where current- and past-year firm performance, as well as age, experience, and education of the CEO are important factors in determining CEO compensation.     

Performance Regularity: A New Class of Executive Compensation Packages

The ability of standard executive stock options to incite managers to adequately select the assets of their firm has been extensively questioned by academics and practitioners. However, very few alternatives exist or have been proposed to better control the investment strategies of top managers. The present article studies the evaluation and sensitivity of a new class of executive stock options well designed for the control of managers. Such packages are aimed at giving incentives to CEOs to maintain a regular performance over time and a stable volatility level. The importance and implications of the choice of the different parameters as well as their robustness with respect to standard financial criteria are examined. In brief, this article studies in a utility-based framework a new type of executive stock options that can be useful to protect and enhance the economic performance of corporations.     

我国农村金融机构小额信贷供给绩效分析——基于普惠金融视角

我国正在推动农村金融体制改革,普惠制应该是改革方案中的一个重点.因此,有必要对我国农村小额信贷的绩效进行分析,以更好地指导实际工作,让农村金融服务惠及所有的农民.普惠制金融着重强调金融服务的广覆盖面和机构的可持续发展.笔者从小额信贷对农村经济发展的效应以及其覆盖面和可持续性三方面,实证分析我因农村金融机构小额信贷的绩效状况及存在的主要问题.并提出相应建议.     

Financial Architecture and Economic Performance: International Evidence

The paper examines the relation between the architecture of an economy's financial system—its degree of market orientation—and economic performance in the real sector. I find that while market-based systems outperform bank-based systems among countries with developed financial sectors, bank-based systems fare better among countries with underdeveloped financial sectors. Countries dominated by small firms grow faster in bank-based systems and those dominated by larger firms in market-based systems. The findings suggest that recent trends in financial development policies that indiscriminately prescribe market-oriented financial-system architecture to emerging and transition economies might be misguided because suitable financial architecture, in and of itself, could be a source of value. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G1, G21, O1, 04.     

Corporate Social Performance and Stock Returns: UK Evidence from Disaggregate Measures

This study examines the relation between corporate social performance and stock returns in the UK. We closely evaluate the interactions between social and financial performance with a set of disaggregated social performance indicators for environment, employment, and community activities instead of using an aggregate measure. While scores on a composite social performance indicator are negatively related to stock returns, we find the poor financial reward offered by such firms is attributable to their good social performance on the environment and, to a lesser extent, the community aspects. Considerable abnormal returns are available from holding a portfolio of the socially least desirable stocks. These relationships between social and financial performance can be rationalized by multi-factor models for explaining the cross-sectional variation in returns, but not by industry effects.     

金融企业高管薪酬监管的最新进展及其思考

本文在介绍国内外金融高管管制的最新动态的基础上,对我国目前的金融企业薪酬监管政策进行了思考,认为我国金融企业的高管年薪应当受到监管,尤其在目前金融危机下的非常时期,更需要政府采取措施,约束金融企业负责人的薪酬;薪酬监管对象应扩大到所有的金融企业的高管和其他主要岗位的人员;并且,作为高管收入中的一个重要组成部分的中长期激励收益应当成为今后监管工作的重点;同时加强相关信息的披露和提高金融企业自身的自律性。     

利率衍生产品需求研究——来自中国金融机构的证据

文章首先从理论上分析了金融机构对利率衍生产品的需求特性,得出了关于资产负债久期错配程度、规模和资本水平等因素影响金融机构的利率衍生产品需求的结论.在此基础上,利用有关数据对中国金融机构的利率衍生产品需求进行了实证分析,结果发现,上述因素的影响也体现在中国金融机构对利率衍生产品的需求上,但与理论分析及国外的相关实证结果存在较大差异,文章对此进行了相应的解释.     

Financial Leverage,CEO Compensation,and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper studies the determinants of corporate hedging practices in the REIT industry between 1999 and 2001. We find a positive significant relation between hedging and financial leverage, indicating the financial distress costs motive for using derivatives in the REIT industry. Using estimates of the Black–Scholes sensitivity of CEO’s stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of CEO’s stock and stock option portfolios to stock price, we find evidence to support managerial risk aversion motive for corporate hedging in the REIT industry. Our results indicate that CEO’s cash compensation and the CEO’s wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility are significant determinants of derivative use in REITs. We also document a significant positive relation between institutional ownership and hedging activity. Further, we find that probability of hedging is related to economies of scale in hedging costs.

Wealth and Executive Compensation

Using new data on the wealth of Swedish CEOs, I show that higher wealth CEOs receive stronger incentives. Since high wealth (excluding own‐firm holdings) implies low absolute risk aversion, this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation. To examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power, I use lagged wealth (typically measured before the CEO was hired), and the results remain for one of two incentive measures. Also, the wealth–incentive result is not stronger for CEOs likely to face limited owner oversight. Finally, wealth is unrelated to pay levels, and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill.     

公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬实证研究

本文以中国深、沪两市在2004年上市公司样本作为公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬研究对象,从公司绩效、股权结构的安排以及董事会治理三个方面,通过构建最小二乘模型进行多元线性回归,来研究公司内部治理机制对公司管理层报酬的影响。研究结果表明:公司绩效、国有股比例、董事会规模、两职兼任均对管理者报酬产生显著的影响。     

新型农村金融机构经营绩效与扶持政策

正新型农村金融机构的出现,增加了农村金融供给,提高了农村金融市场的竞争程度和运行效率,引导民间资本服务农户和小微企业,填补了部分地区农村金融服务空白,对提升农村金融服务水平和构建普惠金融体系发挥了积极作用。截至2011年底,全国242家银行业金融机构共发起设立786家新型农村金融机构,其中村镇银行726家(已开业635家),贷款公司10家,农村资金互助社50家(已开业46家);473家分布在中西部地区,占60.2%,313家分布在东部地区,占39.8%。新型农村金融机构累计吸引各类资本369亿元,各项贷款余额1316亿元,其中小企业贷款余额620亿元,农户贷款余额432亿元,两者合计占各项贷款