Impacts of fiscal decentralization on local development in Vietnam: A disaggregated analysis

After the Doi Moi reforms, Vietnam pursued fiscal decentralization to strengthen the autonomy and governance capacity of local governments. While several empirical studies analysed the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economic growth of Vietnamese provinces, very few studies examined its impact on their social development. This study represents an initial effort to fill this gap. The empirical analysis applied the panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to an updated panel data of 63 Vietnamese provinces, spanning the period from 2011 to 2019. The results indicate a positive impact of fiscal decentralization on both economic and social development as well as efficiency of resource utilization for development targets. However, realizing the full potential of fiscal decentralization requires the fulfilment of certain conditions.     

Decentralization and political institutions

Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth? This paper tests Riker's [Riker, W. (1964) “Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance,” Little, Brown and Co, Boston, MA.] theory that the results of fiscal decentralization depend on the level of countries' political centralization. We analyze cross-section and panel data from up to 75 developing and transition countries for 25 years. Two of Riker's predictions about the role of political institutions in disciplining fiscally-autonomous local politicians are confirmed by the data. 1) Strength of national political parties significantly improves outcomes of fiscal decentralization such as economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision. 2) In contrast, administrative subordination (i.e., appointing local politicians rather than electing them) does not improve the results of fiscal decentralization.     

税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效

中国的财政分权改革激发了地方政府推进本地区经济发展的积极性,但不恰当的分权路径也加剧了地区间的税收竞争。本文运用空间滞后模型,对中国省际间的税收竞争与博弈行为进行检验。研究显示,省际间税收竞争反应函数斜率为负,这说明省际间在税收竞争中采取的是差异化竞争策略;同时也意味着地方政府目前对公共产品的偏好较低。而对省际间税收竞争增长绩效的格兰杰因果检验则显示,公共服务水平对地区经济增长率具有显著的促进作用,并且地方政府的征税努力与其财政充裕状况直接相关。为此,本文提出应加快地区基本公共服务的均等化和转移支付的法制化进程,努力打破数量型增长的政绩观,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

中国的财政分权与经济增长——基于省级面板数据的实证

在Barro、Davoodi和Zou模型的基础上,本文构造了一个财政分权与经济增长关系的模型,并利用1980-2004年省级面板数据,采用随机效应回归方法,分阶段实证研究了我国财政分权对经济增长的影响.实证研究发现,财政分权总体上促进了我国的经济增长,而且我国财政分权的经济增长效应存在显著的跨区差异,东部地区的财政分权经济增长优势高于中西部地区.作者认为,财政分权体制下地方政府财政行为的差异与公共支出构成的差异是造成我国财政分权经济增长效应跨区差异的重要原因.     

财政分权的中国模式与OECD模式——分税制是财政集权吗

本文在完整的财政分权内涵上比较分析了1995—2009年中国与OECD国家的财政分权情况,结果发现,不管是收入还是支出,中国中央与地方政府的财政分权程度都远远高于发达国家,呈现出中国政治集权下的财政分权和OECD政治分权下的财政集权两种模式。中国的财政支出分权程度与经济增长和财政均等化存在显著的正向相关关系,而这在OECD国家是不显著的。在中国的财政分权结构中,结构偏向的经济性支出成为地方政府财政支出重点和经济增长的重要推动力量;扩张的预算外支出成为增加财政收入的重要途径。所谓“事权与财权匹配”问题的实质是公共职责不清晰和预算软约束的地方政府收支扩张的财政机会主义倾向。财政分权改革的后续深化方向是在明确规范化地方政府公共职责和硬化预算约束的基础上适度财政集权化。     

China's Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Economic Growth

The present paper applies Lucas's theory of endogenous growth and Stiglitz's theory of local public goods to build an econometric model consisting of five simultaneous equations to study China's fiscal decentralization effects on regional economic growth. The model is estimated by two‐stage least squares using a set of panel data on 31 Chinese provinces during 1996–2005. The estimated results show that China's fiscal decentralization increased the local governments' expenditure on physical infrastructure and education, which led to the rising local physical capital stock and human capital levels, respectively, and then resulted in the growth of regional economies.     

中国式分权下的区域创新绩效研究---基于资源获取与资源配置视角的分析

依据资源基础理论,财政自主权作为一种有价值、稀缺、不可完全模仿、组织可利用的财政资源,是地方政府取得良好区域创新绩效的来源;使用2007—2016年中国分省(自治区、直辖市)的面板数据,实证检验了财政分权对区域创新绩效的影响。研究发现:①财政分权对区域创新绩效具有显著的正向影响,在考虑财政分权异质性、创新绩效异质性、创新强度、内生性等问题后,结果依然稳健;②地方政府在运用支出自主权为获取良好的区域创新绩效时,存在"软约束"问题,即收入分权对支出分权与区域创新绩效之间的关系具有约束作用但不显著,可能的原因在于转移支付的"公共池"效应与创新锁定效应。     

收入分成、竞争与中国的省份内经济差距

中国的地区差距问题已逐渐成为制约经济发展的重要因素，并受到学术界的广泛关注。然而，作为其主要构成部分的省份内经济差距，现有研究却尚未深入。本文立足于省级以下财政分权体制，从地方政府竞争的角度梳理了政府间收入分成作用于省份内经济差距的具体机制，进而运用1995—2014年县级面板数据构建了省份内经济差距和省级以下收入分成指标，并展开实证检验。研究发现：省级以下收入分成比例的提高，扩大了省份内各县有效税率的差异，进而带来了要素在空间上的不均衡分布和省份内经济差距的扩大。同时，这一作用在经济欠发达省份的效果更为明显。这些发现为理解中国财政分权体制下地区经济差距的形成，以及完善当前财政体制以推动国家治理现代化提供了良好启示。     

财政分权与中国省域经济关系的空间计量检验

笔者利用2000年～2009年中国省域经济统计数据,借助地理加权回归方法,对财政分权与中国省域经济的关系进行了考察,结果表明:中国省域经济间存在显著空间相关关系。研究中,财政分权与经济之间的二次曲线关系得到了部分证实,但这一关系在不同省份、不同年份间均存在较大差异,从而导致最优财政分权度频繁变化;对于各省而言,确定合理的财政分权度范围,尚需更多未来数据支持。     

Decentralization and local pollution activities: New quasi evidence from China

Traditional fiscal federalism theory holds that decentralization may improve the provision of public goods and services. However, the social welfare field with strong externalities may face different incentives and behavioural logics. This paper provides novel empirical evidence for the causal relationship between decentralization and local pollution. In this paper, we focussed on China's widely spread decentralization reform, which substantially expanded the economic and social management autonomy of county governments. Using the difference-in-differences method and a panel dataset from 1998 to 2007, we found that the reform would compel affected counties to loosen environmental regulation, adopt financial and fiscal policies that would actually support heavy-pollution industries' rapid economic growth. Overall, the reform led to a significant increase in local pollution, thus worsening the overall environmental quality. Moreover, cost-benefit analysis indicated that the reforms generated net gains in social welfare, but the substantial environmental costs cannot be ignored.     

分权、区域竞争与倒U形分权效应曲线研究

财政分权能够促进区域经济增长吗?分权能够一视同仁地促进不同地区相同程度的经济增长吗?文章通过构建区域间追赶模型指出:(1)财政分权在带来区域竞争激励并促进增长的同时,也导致了地方政府行为的异化,从而使得分权的增长效应呈现"倒U形"曲线状.曲线背后的逻辑在于"政治锦标赛"下的竞争压力对不同发展阶段的地区并不一样,不同压力来源可能诱发出地方政府的不同努力水平.(2)利用全国县级面板数据,通过构造四类财政分权指标,证实了分权促进区域内经济增长且依据收入水平的变化呈现倒U形曲线的基本推论.     

The impact of decentralization of health services on health outcomes: evidence from Canada

This article contributes to the limited empirical literature on the impact of decentralization on economic welfare by investigating the hypothesis that shifts towards more fiscal decentralization in health services would be accompanied by improvements in population health. Building on a conventional public finance model applied to health care, this hypothesis is tested on a panel data of the highly decentralized Canadian provinces during the period 1979 to 1995. The results of the exploratory empirical analysis presented in this article suggest that fiscal decentralization of health services in Canada has had a positive and substantial influence on the effectiveness of public policy in improving a population's health over the period studied.     

政府关注视角下财政分权对社会参与研发积极度的影响——一个中介效应模型检验

揭示财政分权影响社会参与研发投入的规律对于我国加强和完善地方政府研发投入管理具有重要意义。理论研究表明,财政分权对社会参与研发积极性的影响存在一条由地方政府研发关注度作为中介变量的中介路径。基于此,以2009—2017年中国内地31个省市面板数据为样本,选取地方政府研发关注度作为中介变量,运用基于Bootstrap方法改进的中介效应模型,就全国、分地区、分时段的财政分权对地方政府引导社会参与研发投入的影响进行实证研究。结果表明：从全国和分地区看,财政分权对地方政府引导社会参与研发投入的影响均存在不同程度的中介效应或直接作用,财政分权程度提高会对地方政府引导社会参与研发投入产生不同程度的正向影响。从分时段看,财政分权对社会研发积极度影响的中介效应不存在时段差异。     

分权的“悖论”：“省管县”改革对居民医疗服务满意度的影响

财政分权是否有助于提高与本地居民偏好更加匹配的公共服务水平未有定论。借助“省管县”改革这一准自然实验,文章旨在从微观需求角度考察地方分权对公共服务改善的效果。采用2005年的县级宏观数据和 CG S S2005居民调查数据,本文对“省管县”改革与公共医疗服务满意度的关系进行了实证分析。 Logit模型结果表明,“省管县”财政体制的实施未能使当地政府提供让居民更加合意的医疗服务,反而恶化了居民对公共医疗服务的满意度。在排除了“改革错觉”、“预期效应”以及“滞后效应”的干扰后,这一结论依旧稳健。文章认为,财权扩大加剧了地方政府间竞争,使得县级政府有更大的激励将财政资金投入到基建领域而非民生领域,这将导致医疗服务供给相对不足,进而引起满意度的下降。中介分析证实了这一推理。文章研究有助于从微观视角评析分权改革的公共福利效应。     

中国财政分权、金融发展、 工业化与经济增长的省际差异

本文采用1978-2006年中国28个地区的省际面板数据建立了检验财政分权、金融发展、工业化与经济增长之间长期关系的协整模型（co integration model）,并采用完全修正的最小二乘法（FMOLS）对模型进行估计。本文把地方政府官员参与政治晋升锦标赛竞争的行为影响经济绩效的假设引入对分权化改革过程的分析,对中国改革开放以来地方政府之间的竞争何以在促成经济总量高速增长的同时又导致各地区在财政分权、金融发展、工业化和经济增长方面呈现出差异的原因进行了分析,进而得出本文的分析结论并对其政策含义进行了讨论。     

The political economy of direct legislation: direct democracy and local decision–making

Local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and, given the decentralization trend in OECD nations, this is likely to increase. How should this spending be governed? This article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision–making at the state and local level. To support this, we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes. The basic argument concerns voter control. Under representative democracy, citizens only have direct control at election time. With referenda and initiatives, citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens' preferences. As a result, fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences. We empirically test this on Swiss data since Switzerland provides a 'natural laboratory' for local governance. The governance structures of Swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy, and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels. Specifically, we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 Swiss cantons, and 1990 data on 134 local communities. It is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue, and at the local level also on public debt. Combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result, namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances, better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens.     

财政分权对全要素生产率的影响--基于“省直管县”改革的准自然实验

"省直管县"改革一改以往"省-市-县"的管理模式,有助于提高县级政府的财政分权水平。为缓解内生性,将"省直管县"改革视为一项准自然实验,构建双重差分模型检验了财政分权对全要素生产率的因果效应。研究发现:①财政分权对全要素生产率的正向促进作用高于负面阻碍作用,但不同形式的分权影响有异质性,具体来说财权的下放有利于全要素生产率的提高,经济社会事务管理权限的下放则不利于。②当地方政府自主权提高时,其"重生产、轻服务"的支出偏好,使得当地基础设施供给增加,而能够增强地方软实力、加快创新要素集聚的公共服务供给相应减少,造成了全要素生产率的损失,导致在经济高质量高效益增长中政府"有形之手"的作用发挥不够。③随着改革的推进,财政分权对全要素生产率的正向作用逐渐减弱,并不再显著。据此,从合理划分省以下政府的事权与支出责任,充实基层政府财力;提高公共服务类指标在政府官员政绩考核中的权重,加强各县(市)政府间的合作,实现各自为政的地方经济向统一市场整合等方面提出政策建议。     

转型中的分权与公共品供给:基于中国经验的实证研究

文章首先从理论上阐述了中国转型中分权与公共品供给的内在联系;进而利用中国省级面板数据,构建动态结构模型,在控制住财政分权与公共品内生关系基础上,运用系统广义矩估计方法(SYS GMM)检验证实了理论分析的推论:分权对"硬"公共品供给有明显加速作用,时"软"公共品供给有明显抑制作用;经济较差的地区,分权速度会加快,其中人口密度较高的地区分权速度要比人口密度低的地区快;人口密度较高、经济较好的地区分权速度会减弱;分权程度变化与政府行政效率间存在显著正相关关系."发展型政府"更偏好"硬"公共品供给,因而更偏好高分权.     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀

结合财政分权的理论文献,本文描述了中国最近10多年来政府间财政关系的演变,并分析了财政集权过程中转移支付增加对地方财政供养人口的影响。利用中国1994—2003年县级面板数据和工具变量方法,我们从实证角度确立了转移支付增加与财政供养人口规模膨胀的因果关系,并指出在我国目前的政府管理体制下,上级政府面临着无论增加哪种转移支付都可能带来问题的两难处境。要在控制政府冗员增长的同时促进公共服务的有效提供,中国需要建立一个财政上更加分权和行政管理上更有基层参与性的政府管理体制。