Equilibrium concepts for time‐inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time

A new notion of equilibrium, which we call strong equilibrium, is introduced for time‐inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time. Compared to the existing notions introduced in Huang, Y.‐J., & Nguyen‐Huu, A. (2018, Jan 01). Time‐consistent stopping under decreasing impatience. Finance and Stochastics, 22(1), 69–95 and Christensen, S., & Lindensjö, K. (2018). On finding equilibrium stopping times for time‐inconsistent markovian problems. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 56(6), 4228–4255, which in this paper are called mild equilibrium and weak equilibrium, respectively, a strong equilibrium captures the idea of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium more accurately. When the state process is a continuous‐time Markov chain and the discount function is log subadditive, we show that an optimal mild equilibrium is always a strong equilibrium. Moreover, we provide a new iteration method that can directly construct an optimal mild equilibrium and thus also prove its existence.     

Equilibria of time-inconsistent stopping for one-dimensional diffusion processes

We consider three equilibrium concepts proposed in the literature for time-inconsistent stopping problems, including mild equilibria (introduced in Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018)), weak equilibria (introduced in Christensen and Lindensjö (2018)), and strong equilibria (introduced in Bayraktar et al. (2021)). The discount function is assumed to be log subadditive and the underlying process is one-dimensional diffusion. We first provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the characterization of weak equilibria. The smooth-fit condition is obtained as a by-product. Next, based on the characterization of weak equilibria, we show that an optimal mild equilibrium is also weak. Then we provide conditions under which a weak equilibrium is strong. We further show that an optimal mild equilibrium is also strong under a certain condition. Finally, we provide several examples including one showing a weak equilibrium may not be strong, and another one showing a strong equilibrium may not be optimal mild.     

A STATE‐CONSTRAINED DIFFERENTIAL GAME ARISING IN OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO LIQUIDATION

We consider n risk‐averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren–Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state constraints enter the problem as terminal boundary conditions for finite and infinite time horizons. We prove existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and give closed‐form solutions in some special cases. We also analyze qualitative properties of the equilibrium strategies and provide corresponding financial interpretations.     

Weak equilibria for time-inconsistent control: With applications to investment-withdrawal decisions

This paper considers time-inconsistent problems when control and stopping strategies are required to be made simultaneously (called stopping control problems by us). We first formulate the time-inconsistent stopping control problems under general multidimensional controlled diffusion model and propose a formal definition of their equilibria. We show that an admissible pair $(\widehat{u},C)$ of control-stopping policy is equilibrium if and only if the auxiliary function associated with it solves the extended HJB system, providing a methodology to verify or exclude equilibrium solutions. We provide several examples to illustrate applications to mathematical finance and control theory. For a problem whose reward function endogenously depends on the current wealth, the equilibrium is explicitly obtained. For another model with a nonexponential discount, we prove that any constant proportion strategy can not be equilibrium. We further show that general nonconstant equilibrium exists and is described by singular boundary value problems. This example shows that considering our combined problems is essentially different from investigating them separately. In the end, we also provide a two-dimensional example with a hyperbolic discount.     

A direct solution method for pricing options in regime‐switching models

Pricing financial or real options with arbitrary payoffs in regime‐switching models is an important problem in finance. Mathematically, it is to solve, under certain standard assumptions, a general form of optimal stopping problems in regime‐switching models. In this article, we reduce an optimal stopping problem with an arbitrary value function in a two‐regime environment to a pair of optimal stopping problems without regime switching. We then propose a method for finding optimal stopping rules using the techniques available for nonswitching problems. In contrast to other methods, our systematic solution procedure is more direct as we first obtain the explicit form of the value functions. In the end, we discuss an option pricing problem, which may not be dealt with by the conventional methods, demonstrating the simplicity of our approach.     

BUY‐LOW AND SELL‐HIGH INVESTMENT STRATEGIES

Buy‐low and sell‐high investment strategies are a recurrent theme in the considerations of many investors. In this paper, we consider an investor who aims at maximizing the expected discounted cash‐flow that can be generated by sequentially buying and selling one share of a given asset at fixed transaction costs. We model the underlying asset price by means of a general one‐dimensional Itô diffusion X , we solve the resulting stochastic control problem in a closed analytic form, and we completely characterize the optimal strategy. In particular, we show that, if 0 is a natural boundary point of X , e.g., if X is a geometric Brownian motion, then it is never optimal to sequentially buy and sell. On the other hand, we prove that, if 0 is an entrance point of X , e.g., if X is a mean‐reverting constant elasticity of variance (CEV) process, then it may be optimal to sequentially buy and sell, depending on the problem data.     

Distribution‐constrained optimal stopping

We solve the problem of optimal stopping of a Brownian motion subject to the constraint that the stopping time's distribution is a given measure consisting of finitely many atoms. In particular, we show that this problem can be converted to a finite sequence of state‐constrained optimal control problems with additional states corresponding to the conditional probability of stopping at each possible terminal time. The proof of this correspondence relies on a new variation of the dynamic programming principle for state‐constrained problems, which avoids measurable selections. We emphasize that distribution constraints lead to novel and interesting mathematical problems on their own, but also demonstrate an application in mathematical finance to model‐free superhedging with an outlook on volatility.     

General stopping behaviors of naïve and noncommitted sophisticated agents,with application to probability distortion

We consider the problem of stopping a diffusion process with a payoff functional that renders the problem time‐inconsistent. We study stopping decisions of naïve agents who reoptimize continuously in time, as well as equilibrium strategies of sophisticated agents who anticipate but lack control over their future selves' behaviors. When the state process is one dimensional and the payoff functional satisfies some regularity conditions, we prove that any equilibrium can be obtained as a fixed point of an operator. This operator represents strategic reasoning that takes the future selves' behaviors into account. We then apply the general results to the case when the agents distort probability and the diffusion process is a geometric Brownian motion. The problem is inherently time‐inconsistent as the level of distortion of a same event changes over time. We show how the strategic reasoning may turn a naïve agent into a sophisticated one. Moreover, we derive stopping strategies of the two types of agent for various parameter specifications of the problem, illustrating rich behaviors beyond the extreme ones such as “never‐stopping” or “never‐starting.”     

OPTIMAL SELLING RULES FOR MONETARY INVARIANT CRITERIA: TRACKING THE MAXIMUM OF A PORTFOLIO WITH NEGATIVE DRIFT

Considering a positive portfolio diffusion X with negative drift, we investigate optimal stopping problems of the form where f is a nonincreasing function, τ is the next random time where the portfolio X crosses zero and θ is any stopping time smaller than τ. Hereby, our motivation is the obtention of an optimal selling strategy minimizing the relative distance between the liquidation value of the portfolio and its highest possible value before it reaches zero. This paper unifies optimal selling rules observed for the quadratic absolute distance criteria in this stationary framework with bang–bang type ones observed for monetary invariant criteria but in finite horizon. More precisely, we provide a verification result for the general stopping problem of interest and derive the exact solution for two classical criteria f of the literature. For the power utility criterion with , instantaneous selling is always optimal, which is consistent with previous observations for the Black‐Scholes model in finite observation. On the contrary, for a relative quadratic error criterion, , selling is optimal as soon as the process X crosses a specified function φ of its running maximum . These results reinforce the idea that optimal stopping problems of similar type lead easily to selling rules of very different nature. Nevertheless, our numerical experiments suggest that the practical optimal selling rule for the relative quadratic error criterion is in fact very close to immediate selling.     

GAME CALL OPTIONS REVISITED

In this paper, having been inspired by the work of Kunita and Seko, we study the pricing of δ‐penalty game call options on a stock with a dividend payment. For the perpetual case, our result reveals that the optimal stopping region for the option seller depends crucially on the dividend rate d. More precisely, we show that when the penalty δ is small, there are two critical dividends 0 < d₁ < d₂ < ∞ such that the optimal stopping region for the option seller takes one of the following forms: (1) an interval if d < d₁; (2) a singleton if d∈ [d₁, d₂]; or (3) an empty set if d > d₂. When d∈ [d₁, d₂], the value function is not continuously differentiable at the optimal stopping boundary for the option seller, therefore our result in the perpetual case cannot be established by the free boundary approach with smooth‐fit conditions imposed on both free boundaries. For the finite time horizon case, the dependence of the optimal stopping region for the option seller on the time to maturity is exhibited; more precisely, when both δ and d are small, we show that there are two critical times 0 < T₁ < T₂ < T, such that the optimal stopping region for the option seller takes one of the following forms: (1) an interval if t < T₁; (2) a singleton if t∈ [T₁, T₂]; or (3) an empty set if t > T₂. In summary, for both the perpetual and the finite horizon cases, we characterize in terms of model parameters how the optimal stopping region for the option seller shrinks when the dividend rate d increases and the time to maturity decreases; these results complete the original work of Emmerling for the perpetual case and Kunita and Seko for the finite maturity case. In addition, for the finite time horizon case, we also extend the probabilistic method for the establishment of existence and regularity results of the classical American option pricing problem to the game option setting. Finally, we characterize the pair of optimal stopping boundaries for both the seller and the buyer as the unique pair of solutions to a couple of integral equations and provide numerical illustrations.     

EQUAL ORGANIC COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL AND REGULARITY

Equal organic composition of capital (EOCC) is shown to be a necessary and sufficient condition for constant relative prices in no‐joint production technologies with neoclassical production functions. It is then proved that such neoclassical technologies are regular (which implies that consumption is well behaved across steady‐state equilibria). Regularity is also a necessary and sufficient condition for near aggregation (which implies an aggregate production function with all but one of the usual neoclassical properties). Except perhaps for some fluke cases, the existence of an aggregate production function with all of the usual neoclassical properties (full aggregation) requires the stronger EOCC property.     

Arrow–Debreu equilibria for rank‐dependent utilities with heterogeneous probability weighting

We study Arrow–Debreu equilibria for a one‐period‐two‐date pure exchange economy with rank‐dependent utility agents having heterogeneous probability weighting and outcome utility functions. In particular, we allow the economy to have a mix of expected utility agents and rank‐dependent utility ones, with nonconvex probability weighting functions. The standard approach for convex economy equilibria fails due to the incompatibility with second‐order stochastic dominance. The representative agent approach devised in Xia and Zhou (2016) does not work either due to the heterogeneity of the weighting functions. We overcome these difficulties by considering the comonotone allocations, on which the rank‐dependent utilities become concave. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of comonotone Pareto optima, and derive their characterizing conditions. With the aid of the auxiliary problem of price equilibria with transfers, we provide a sufficient condition in terms of the model primitives under which an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium exists, along with the explicit expression of the state‐price density in equilibrium. This new, general sufficient condition distinguishes the paper from previous related studies with homogeneous and/or convex probability weightings.     

ARROW–DEBREU EQUILIBRIA FOR RANK‐DEPENDENT UTILITIES

We provide conditions on a one‐period‐two‐date pure exchange economy with rank‐dependent utility agents under which Arrow–Debreu equilibria exist. When such an equilibrium exists, we show that the state‐price density is a weighted marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of a representative agent, where the weight depends on the differential of the probability weighting function. Based on the result, we find that asset prices depend upon agents' subjective beliefs regarding overall consumption growth, and we offer a direction for possible resolution of the equity premium puzzle.     

Semitractability of optimal stopping problems via a weighted stochastic mesh algorithm

In this paper, we propose a Weighted Stochastic Mesh (WSM) algorithm for approximating the value of discrete‐ and continuous‐time optimal stopping problems. In this context, we consider tractability of such problems via a useful notion of semitractability and the introduction of a tractability index for a particular numerical solution algorithm. It is shown that in the discrete‐time case the WSM algorithm leads to semitractability of the corresponding optimal stopping problem in the sense that its complexity is bounded in order by with being the dimension of the underlying Markov chain. Furthermore, we study the WSM approach in the context of continuous‐time optimal stopping problems and derive the corresponding complexity bounds. Although we cannot prove semitractability in this case, our bounds turn out to be the tightest ones among the complexity bounds known in the literature. We illustrate our theoretical findings by a numerical example.     

POWER UTILITY MAXIMIZATION IN CONSTRAINED EXPONENTIAL LÉVY MODELS

We study power utility maximization for exponential Lévy models with portfolio constraints, where utility is obtained from consumption and/or terminal wealth. For convex constraints, an explicit solution in terms of the Lévy triplet is constructed under minimal assumptions by solving the Bellman equation. We use a novel transformation of the model to avoid technical conditions. The consequences for q‐optimal martingale measures are discussed as well as extensions to nonconvex constraints.     

A GENERALIZED OLIGOPOLY MODEL WITH CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS

This paper considers a generalization of the Stackelberg model to cover a T‐stage framework with several leaders and followers who compete on quantities. Assuming a linear demand function and constant marginal costs, we introduce constant conjectural variations in order to capture various structures of competition. First, we characterize the equilibrium market outcome. Second, we study the influence of conjectures on welfare. We notably propose a welfare comparison for six symmetric equilibria. Third, we consider convergence analysis, and we also show that the competitive equilibrium is a consistent oligopoly equilibrium.     

Capital Regulation,Bailout and Banking Asset Correlation

We study the effect of capital regulation on banking asset correlation. Banks are more efficient users of banking assets. This implies that it may be ex post optimal to bail out a failed bank. We show, under Basel 1 capital regulation, that the financial regulator is committed to a mixed bailout strategy in the state of systemic failure, which reduces banks’ incentive to choose highly correlated assets. The mixed strategy is not creditable under mark‐to‐market capital regulation. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, banking asset correlation increases, resulting in a high probability of systemic failure. We then discuss social losses under different capital regulations.     

REAL OPTIONS WITH COMPETITION AND REGIME SWITCHING

In this paper, we examine irreversible investment decisions in duopoly games with a variable economic climate. Integrating timing flexibility, competition, and changes in the economic environment in the form of a cash flow process with regime switching, the problem is formulated as a stopping‐time game under Stackelberg leader‐follower competition, in which both players determine their respective optimal market entry time. By extending the variational inequality approach, we solve for the free boundaries and obtain optimal investment strategies for each player. Despite the lack of regularity in the leader's obstacle and the cash flow regime uncertainty, the regime‐dependent optimal policies for both the leader and the follower are obtained. In addition, we perform comprehensive numerical experiments to demonstrate the properties of solutions and to gain insights into the implications of regime switching.     

A FIRST‐ORDER BSPDE FOR SWING OPTION PRICING: CLASSICAL SOLUTIONS

In a companion paper, we studied a control problem related to swing option pricing in a general non‐Markovian setting. The main result there shows that the value process of this control problem can uniquely be characterized in terms of a first‐order backward stochastic partial differential equation (BSPDE) and a pathwise differential inclusion. In this paper, we additionally assume that the cash flow process of the swing option is left‐continuous in expectation. Under this assumption, we show that the value process is continuously differentiable in the space variable that represents the volume in which the holder of the option can still exercise until maturity. This gives rise to an existence and uniqueness result for the corresponding BSPDE in a classical sense. We also explicitly represent the space derivative of the value process in terms of a nonstandard optimal stopping problem over a subset of predictable stopping times. This representation can be applied to derive a dual minimization problem in terms of martingales.     

Optimal portfolio under fractional stochastic environment

Rough stochastic volatility models have attracted a lot of attention recently, in particular for the linear option pricing problem. In this paper, starting with power utilities, we propose to use a martingale distortion representation of the optimal value function for the nonlinear asset allocation problem in a (non‐Markovian) fractional stochastic environment (for all values of the Hurst index ). We rigorously establish a first‐order approximation of the optimal value, when the return and volatility of the underlying asset are functions of a stationary slowly varying fractional Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process. We prove that this approximation can be also generated by a fixed zeroth‐ order trading strategy providing an explicit strategy which is asymptotically optimal in all admissible controls. Furthermore, we extend the discussion to general utility functions, and obtain the asymptotic optimality of this fixed strategy in a specific family of admissible strategies.