What drives the dating game of executive options exercise? Evidence from Taiwan

Examining Taiwanese firms from 2002 to 2008, this paper investigates the motivations behind backdating the exercising of executive stock options. The probability of suspect exercises (backdating) is positively related to the firm’s stock return, the value of the option, tax savings, institutional ownership and the extent of CEO equity ownership and negatively related to firm‐specific risk and the use of Big Four accounting firms. Tax incentives motivate executives to backdate the exercise date, implying that the greater the potential for larger tax savings, the greater the likelihood of backdating. Backdating usually occurs in firms that have heavy ownership by the CEO, have more claims to executive stock options and are not family‐run, confirming the presence of the agency cost problem.     

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.     

Silverback CEOs: Age,experience, and firm value

Approximately half of S&P 1500 firms have adopted policies mandating retirement based on age. This study investigates the merits of CEO mandatory retirement policies (MRPs) using a sample of 12,610 firm-year observations from 2143 unique firms. It also addresses the question of whether CEO age is relevant to the success of an organization. We fail to find consistent evidence that MRPs are intended to limit CEO entrenchment. MRPs are, however, positively associated with CEO age and negatively associated with firm-specific human capital. Further analysis reveals that CEO age is significantly negatively related to firm value, operating performance, and corporate deal-making activity. Splitting our sample according to whether an MRP is in place, we observe that the negative impact of age exists only for those firms which do not have MRPs. We therefore conclude that MRPs represent an effective form of firm governance designed to mitigate the underperformance of older CEOs.     

Overconfidence,CEO Awards,and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

Theory and prior research suggest that overconfidence leads managers to overestimate their own ability to generate returns, leading to riskier corporate policies. We use a novel dataset of media awards as an exogenous shock to overconfidence to test whether award‐winning CEOs adopt more aggressive corporate tax policies. Using propensity score matching and a difference‐in‐difference design, we find strong evidence that firms with an award‐winning CEO exhibit significantly greater tax aggressiveness following the award. Overall, our results suggest that CEO overconfidence has a meaningful impact on corporate tax policy.     

Earnings management following chief executive officer changes: the effect of contemporaneous chairperson and chief financial officer appointments

Using a sample of listed Australian firms from 1999 to 2007, we examine the relationship between discretionary accruals and concurrent senior management appointments. Employing panel data regression models and focusing on a measure of discretionary accruals that excludes the effect of transparent write‐downs such as restructuring charges, we find that chief executive officer (CEO) appointments, as a general phenomenon, are not significantly associated with opaque earnings management in the year of appointment or the following year. However, we find that CEO changes accompanied by a concurrent change in board chairperson are associated with significant income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of appointment. We detect no significant relationship between contemporaneous CEO and chief financial officer changes and discretionary accruals. We find no evidence of earnings management in the first compete financial period following CEO appointment, regardless of whether or not concurrent Chair or chief financial officer appointments occurred.     

The ability of deferred tax to predict future tax

We examine the usefulness of tax allocation accounting (deferred tax) for predicting future tax paid and future tax expense. Deferred taxes increase the explanatory power (R²) of regression models where future taxes paid or future tax expense is the dependent variable. However, the mean out‐of‐sample forecast errors for tax paid (future tax expense) is 30 (45.5) percent. Deferred tax increases predictive ability on pooled data, but is inconsistent on a year‐by‐year basis. We examine three explanations for poor predictive ability: losses, tax changes and asset growth. We discuss the policy and practical implications of our findings.     

Do Publicly Signalled Earnings Management Incentives Affect Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999–2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income‐decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present in current period financial statements. Consistent with prior literature, we find income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of CEO appointment. Earnings management, as a general phenomenon, is found to be significantly related to analyst forecast errors in the period in which the earnings management occurs. However, we present evidence that analyst forecasts for current year earnings are significantly more accurate with respect to earnings management in cases where a CEO is appointed during the current financial period.     

Government ownership,corporate governance and tax aggressiveness: evidence from China

This study investigates how government ownership and corporate governance influence a firm's tax aggressiveness. Using Chinese listed companies during 2003–2009, we find that compared with government‐controlled firms, non‐government‐controlled firms pursue a more aggressive tax strategy. In particular, non‐government‐controlled firms with a higher percentage of the board shareholdings and with a CEO who also serves as the board chairman are more aggressive. For government‐controlled firms, we find that board shareholding has an impact on tax aggressiveness and it does not differ between local and central government‐controlled firms. However, local government‐controlled firms in less developed regions where the implementation of corporate governance measures is generally less effective are more tax aggressive than those in other regions.     

CEO inside debt and investment‐cash flow sensitivity

This paper provides a new explanation for investment‐cash flow sensitivity from the perspective of CEO inside debt holdings. We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on investment‐cash flow sensitivity for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 2006 to 2012. We find that the firms with higher relative CEO leverage ratios (CEO's debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm's debt/equity ratio) generate higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the relative CEO leverage ratio enlarges investment‐cash flow sensitivity by 50 per cent. This positive relationship still holds even after we take account of endogeneity and financial constraints.     

When Taxation Changes the Course of the Year: Fiscal‐Year Adjustments and the German Tax Reform of 2000–01*

This paper examines 157 German listed corporations that had the option of changing their fiscal year to achieve a possible tax reduction in connection with the major tax reform of 2000—01. The tax reduction from a change was larger, the larger the expected profits. However, with costs of changing the fiscal year, not all firms that expect a tax reduction from a change may do so. The paper presents empirical evidence that the propensity to change the fiscal year was significantly related to the amount of expected tax savings. This suggests that the corporate tax reduction — in combination with the special German transitory provisions — induced a deadweight loss: corporations incurred a non‐tax cost to avoid a tax cost.     

Overconfidence and Corporate Tax Policy

Review of Accounting Studies - Using a sample of firms experiencing exogenous CEO departures, we investigate whether firms with overconfident CEOs avoid more tax. We find robust evidence of a...     

Deviations from Expected Stakeholder Management,Firm Value,and Corporate Governance

We propose that high‐quality corporate governance may mitigate agency costs related to value‐destroying investments in stakeholder management (SM). Using an unbalanced panel of 9,051 firm‐year observations for 1,631 firms, we find that deviations from expected stakeholder management (ESM) are increasing in chief executive officer (CEO) portfolio delta. We find, however, that deviations from ESM are negatively related to proxies for effective board monitoring. We also document that the effect of governance mechanisms varies by industry (consumer or industrial orientation) and SM dimension. The results indicate that corporations with good governance pursue shareholder value maximization while constraining unnecessary investment in stakeholders.     

The executive compensation implications of the tax component of earnings

We extend prior research by examining the weight applied to earnings generated by changes in ETRs (i.e., the tax component of earnings) in determining CEO and CFO compensation. We examine both bonus and total compensation and find that the predicted relationships between compensation and the tax component of earnings are largely limited to bonus compensation. This is not surprising since bonus compensation represents an unambiguous link between contemporaneous performance and compensation, while equity compensation is in part determined by agency considerations. Our evidence suggests that both CEOs and CFOs are compensated for the tax component of earnings. We find that CEOs are rewarded equally for the tax component of earnings relative to other components of earnings, while CFOs are rewarded more for the tax component of earnings relative to other components of earnings. Additionally, the weight applied to the tax component of earnings when determining CFO bonus compensation is greater when; (1) the tax component of earnings does not appear to be related to earnings management; (2) ETRs decrease rather than increase, (3) the firm pays bonus based on after-tax earnings rather than pre-tax earnings, and (4) the firm is tax aggressive rather than non-tax aggressive. The variations in the weighting of the tax component of earnings for CFO bonus compensation noted above in combination with evidence that CEO bonus compensation is indifferent to ETR-related earnings versus other components of earnings, suggests that the tax component of earnings is a contractual component of CFO bonus compensation.     

Measuring R&D curtailment among short-horizon CEOs

I review evidence produced by prior literature on CEO horizon problems and show that prior empirical findings are correlated with the research design employed. I find that evidence of R&D curtailment by CEOs as they approach retirement stems predominantly from cross-sectional correlations between CEO age or tenure and R&D spending. Using a broad sample of CEOs of S&P 1500 firms, I identify two factors that confound the cross-sectional relationship of firm R&D spending on CEO age or tenure which can lead to spurious inferences regarding the CEO horizon problem. I find that tracking R&D spending by the same CEOs over time produces no evidence of R&D curtailment. These results have research design implications for future researchers investigating the impact of shortened CEO career horizons on investment myopia.     

Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the empirical relation between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 403 CEO turnovers and 806 non‐turnover control firms during the period 2001–2010. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of the outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced and whether the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also control for the endogeneity of CEO turnover and a potential selection bias using 2SLS and Heckman's two‐stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following the peaceful departure of his predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO.     

The Propensity to Split and CEO Compensation

We analyze the relation between the delta and vega of a chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation and the propensity of the firm to engage in a split. Controlling for other well‐known factors, we find that CEOs with compensation that has higher levels of delta are more likely to split their shares. Furthermore, the choice of split factor is inversely related to delta. Our results are economically significant: for the average (median) firm in our sample, a stock split results in a CEO wealth gain of $4.9 million ($84,000).     

CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand‐collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90^th to the 10^th percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.     

The impact of bank merger growth on CEO compensation

We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links.     

What are the Capital Structure Determinants for Tax‐Exempt Organizations?

I study the determinants of capital structure in the absence of tax incentives. I find that debt use is positively related to asset tangibility, growth, and size, and negatively related to age, liquidity, and profitability. Tax‐exempt sector‐specific findings indicate that debt is also positively related to the efficacy of state laws against the misuse of assets and to the percentage of decision makers that are paid and negatively related to decision‐maker compensation and to charitable contributions. Religious organizations most commonly borrow from internal sources, those in education use tax‐exempt bonds, while human services organizations use mortgages and notes payable.     

Does stardom affect the informativeness of a CEO's insider trades?

This study examines whether the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) affects the informativeness of his insider trades. Using three different measures to identify star CEOs in a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that trades of non‐star CEOs predict future abnormal returns and earnings innovations and that trades of star CEOs do not. The predictive power of non‐star CEO trades is mostly attributable to opportunistic trades, not routine trades. We also find evidence suggesting that the abnormal returns associated with non‐star CEO insider trades are due to the lower visibility and consequently less scrutiny of non‐star CEOs compared with star CEOs.