A swing state theory of trade protection in the Electoral College

This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re‐election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.     

The Future of East Asia’s Trade: A Call for Better Globalization

This paper is about how East Asia should respond to the challenges of the external environment. The first challenge is the current slowdown in trade, which has been due to cyclical and structural factors such as the decline in productivity and the maturation of global value chains. The rise in protectionism as measured by rising trade restrictiveness has not impacted on trade, but political and policy uncertainty regarding the direction of trade policy seems to have begun to impact on trade growth. The policy stance of increased protectionism and a retreat from the multilateral rules‐based trading system is linked to the pockets of the population who have not seen their incomes improve and who have blamed their plight and increased inequality on globalization. In fact, the issue is more about the lack of effective responses to manage the costs of trade liberalization. East Asian economies need to respond to these challenges by upholding the multilateral rules‐based trading system, continuing the various pathways to regional economic integration, and ensuring better globalization through effective capacity building and policies to address the negative effects of trade liberalization.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

STRATEGIC TRADE AND DELEGATED COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY CHOICE: IS EXPORT POLICY NEEDED?

This paper introduces the relative‐performance contract into a vertically differentiated product market and examines how the optimal trade policy and quality choice respond to the incentive mechanism. We find that the high quality firm makes better use of the delegation than the low quality firm in a cross‐border decentralized model. The main difference between the present paper and the strategic trade theory literature is that in this paper the optimal policy is free trade, which does not depend on whether firms compete by prices or quantities, and on whether the goods are substitutes or full complements.     

A natural experiment for identifying the impact of ‘natural’ trade barriers on exports

The paper investigates the relative importance of trade policy and ‘natural’ sources of export taxation in Malawi, a landlocked African economy. These sources of export taxation are in turn used to explore how export supply would respond to trade liberalisation as opposed to measures which lower other international trade costs. The findings indicate that trade policy barriers are now only a limited source of ‘true’ export taxation and that trade policy reform needs to be complemented with reforms to reduce international trade, including transport, costs.     

Redistribution,state trading enterprises and ‘politically optimal’ tariffs

State trading enterprises (STEs) are widely used and can be viewed as instruments of trade policy. We analyse two aspects: the first is their potential trade distorting effect; the second is how they modify the case for the ‘politically optimal’ tariff. We show that the STE can reduce the need for a tariff designed for domestic redistribution. This result introduces some ambiguity about how STEs are interpreted: from a multilateralist perspective, they should be dealt with in the same way as other non‐tariff barriers; from a nationalistic perspective, they can reduce the need for ‘politically optimal.’     

DOMESTIC COMPETITION POLICY AND TARIFF POLICY COMPARED*

M. Yano and F. Dei have demonstrated that, by controlling the degree of competition in a non‐tradables market (competition policy), a country can influence the terms of trade so as to increase its welfare, relative to free trade. Using their model, this study compares the extent of this effect with that of a tariff policy. It demonstrates that a competition policy can achieve a higher utility than a tariff policy if tariff rates are at levels currently tolerated in the real world. This demonstrates that domestic competition policy may play an important role as a substitute for tariff policy.     

Spillovers from Foreign Exporters

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that accounts for productivity spillovers transmitted by foreign exporters. Everything else equal, stronger spillovers increase welfare. We embed the model framework into a trade policy scenario where countries strategically set inter‐country variable trade costs for the trading partner. In the strategic Nash‐equilibrium policy, governments trade‐off welfare gains from protectionism and those that are due to spillovers from foreign exporters. The equilibrium degree of protectionism is decreasing in the strength of the spillover. Policy coordination induces welfare gains but these gains can be hump‐shaped in the spillover strength.     

Hub‐and‐spoke free trade areas: theory and evidence from Israel

Abstract We study how the sequential formation of free trade areas affects trade flows between member countries. In a three‐country, three‐good model of comparative advantage if two countries have an FTA, and both sign a similar agreement with the third, trade between the two decreases. However, if only one of them signs an additional FTA, a hub‐ and‐spoke pattern arises, and trade between the initial members increases. Israel’s experience lends strong support to our model: trade between Israel and the EU, subject to an FTA since 1975, increased by an additional 29% after the introduction of the US‐Israel FTA in 1985.     

Trade, regulations, and income

We examine the relationship between openness and per-capita income using cross-country data from 126 countries. We find that trade leads to a higher standard of living in flexible economies, but not in rigid economies. Business regulation, especially on firm entry, is more important than financial development, higher education, or rule of law as a complementary policy to trade liberalization. Specifically, after controlling for the standard determinants of per-capita income, our results imply that a 1% increase in trade is associated with more than a one-half percent rise in per-capita income in economies that facilitate firm entry, but has no positive income effects in more rigid economies. The findings are consistent with Schumpeterian “creative destruction”, which highlights the importance of new business entry in economic performance, and with previous firm-level studies showing that the beneficial effects of trade liberalization come largely from an intra-sectoral reallocation of resources.     

Tariffs, market conduct and government commitment

We analyse a simple 'tariffs cum foreign competition' policy targeted at enhancing the competitive position of a domestic, developing country firm that competes with its developed country counterpart on the domestic market and that carries out an innovative (or imitative) effort. We evaluate this policy with respect to social welfare, type of oligopoly conduct, information requirement, time consistency and possibility of manipulative behaviour and conclude that the most robust policy setup is one in which the domestic government is unable to pre-commit to the level of its policy. We also study how the unit cost heterogeneity of the domestic firm affects trade protection.     

SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL*

Using a simple monopoly model, we examine the effects of economic integration. We show that the number of markets and the shapes of marginal revenue curves, are crucial in evaluating economic integration when the marginal cost is not constant. The effects of tariff reductions in a three‐country model contrast with those found in a two‐country model. Effects also depend on which trade policy the non‐member country adopts. When both importing countries simultaneously lower their tariffs, the Metzler paradox may arise.     

International Economic Interdependence and Exchange‐rate Adjustment under Persistent Stagnation

Using a two‐country, two‐commodity dynamic optimization model with general homothetic preference for the commodities, this paper examines the effects of a tariff and a quota on consumption and employment in the case where persistent unemployment arises due to a liquidity trap. A trade restriction improves the current account, which causes the home currency to appreciate and harms the competitiveness of home firms. Therefore, home employment and consumption decrease while foreign employment and consumption increase. Tariff‐quota equivalence is found to be valid. Preference, technological and policy parameter changes that improve the current account in general worsen home unemployment.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY*

This paper investigates the effect of a home firm's lobbying on a strategic export policy in a third market with a differentiated duopoly. We focus on its effect on domestic welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Regardless of the mode of competition, the strategic export policy cannot improve domestic welfare in the presence of lobbying if the degree of product differentiation is high or the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. Moreover, for the same degree of product differentiation, the lobbying‐induced export policy is more likely to deteriorate domestic welfare relative to free trade under Cournot competition.     

Industrial targeting in free trade areas with policy independence

Abstract.  We investigate the limits of a mechanism for free trade area (FTA) formation that simultaneously satisfies internal industrialization targets. For arbitrary targets, we find necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that the mechanism is efficient for member countries individually, even if other members do not implement the efficient policy. When the objective is conservative – designed to protect the level of industrialization previously achieved by the target industry – member countries are guaranteed gains from the efficient policy and their FTA participation. The analysis covers cases with transportation costs and explains why minimally restrictive rules of origin support efficiency and policy independence.     

Multilateral tariff cooperation under fairness and reciprocity

Abstract This paper explores the impact of fairness and reciprocity on multilateral tariff cooperation. Reciprocal countries reward kind behaviour (positive reciprocity), but retaliate against countries behaving unkindly (negative reciprocity). We demonstrate that reciprocal countries that are moderately demanding from their trading partners regarding their commercial policy can support a greater degree of cooperation than self‐interested ones. However, when only very liberal import policies are considered fair, then reciprocity could have a detrimental effect on multilateral tariff cooperation.Thus, our model provides a novel perspective on the role of expectations in trade negotiations.     

Trade Costs and the Open Macroeconomy

Trade costs are known to be a major obstacle to international economic integration. Following the approach of New Open Economy Macroeconomics, this paper explores the effects of international trade costs in a micro‐founded general equilibrium model that allows for different degrees of exchange rate pass‐through. Trade costs are shown to create an endogenous home bias in consumption and the model performs well in matching empirical trade shares for OECD countries. In addition, trade costs reduce cross‐country output and consumption correlations, and they magnify exchange rate volatility. Trade costs turn a monetary expansion into a beggar‐thy‐neighbor policy.     

Trade Wars and the World Trade Organization: Causes,Consequences, and Change

The rise in trade tensions and launch of a trade war by the USA is in part a result of World Trade Organization (WTO) working practices that have impeded the ability to use the organization to address the underlying sources of conflict through dialogue, analysis, and rule‐making. Open plurilateral agreements between the major protagonists offer an avenue for revitalizing the ability of the WTO to resolve trade conflicts. More generally, reform of WTO working practices is needed for the organization to be more effective in providing a platform for members to cooperate on trade policy matters.     

Second-best trade policies in Cournot oligopoly

In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits.     

Why ‘Buy American’ is a bad idea but politicians still like it

Abstract When the world economy was recently hit by a severe recession, governments all over the world reacted by initiating stimulus packages. Some countries (among them, most notably, China and the US) tried to put special emphasis on their home industries by including ‘Buy National’ clauses into the stimulus package. By analyzing the dynamics of transitory changes of trade barriers as a short‐run response to an economic downturn, we show that beggar‐thy‐neighbour policies do not work. We then come up with two rationales that help us understand why countries nevertheless consider protectionism to be a good response to a recession: (i) the lobbying of domestic, non‐exporting firms, and (ii) the relationship between vulnerability, the degree of openness and loss aversion of consumers.