The price of power: Valuing the controlling position of owner–managers in French IPO firms

Going public often creates an agency conflict between the owner–manager and minority shareholders. This problem is especially severe in countries with poor legal investor protection, such as France. We examine the controlling position of owner–managers in French initial public offering (IPO) firms. We find that investors anticipate the increased agency conflict associated with a lock on control and lower firm value when the owner–manager is more powerful. Shareholder agreements in which the owner–manager agrees to share control with other pre-IPO owners enhance firm value. We also report that higher cash flow ownership by the owner–manager is positively related to firm value when he is not in full control. Finally, we document that the large (non-pecuniary) private benefits of control in France may motivate owner–managers to retain control after the IPO.     

Manager education and mutual fund performance

This paper examines the relationship between manager education and mutual fund performance, following Chevalier and Ellison [Chevalier, Judith, Ellison, Glenn, 1999. Are some mutual fund managers better than others? Cross-sectional patterns in behavior and performance. Journal of Finance 54, 3, 875–899]. We refine their analysis by investigating if the quality of the MBA program, as measured by the mean GMAT score and Business Week ranking, has any effect on performance. We find that the mean GMAT score of the MBA program is positively and significantly related to fund performance. Managers who hold MBAs from schools ranked in the top 30 of the Business Week rankings of MBA programs exhibit performance superior to the performance of both managers without MBA degrees and managers holding MBAs from unranked programs. We also find that other education variables, such as whether the manager attained a CFA designation or holds either a non-MBA masters-level graduate degree or Ph.D., are generally unrelated to mutual fund performance.     

Financing preferences and practices of Indian SMEs

Using survey data from 309 small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) from the northwest region of India, this study examines the financing preferences and practices of these SMEs. It also investigates the differences in the financing preferences across firm and owner/manager characteristics and documents the drivers of financing practices in India. Respondents prefer internal funds followed by bank financing mainly in the form of long-term loans and funds from government and financial institutions. Among informal sources, SMEs prefer trade credit followed by funds from family friends, relatives, and money lenders. The least preferred source of financing is external equity. The study contributes to the extant literature on SME financing by comparing the financing preferences and practices of SMEs and identifying a financing gap. By providing a holistic view of financing sources to SME owners and managers, the study can assist policymakers in designing appropriate policies for these individuals and help identify underutilized financing sources for SMEs.     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

Are Entrenched Managers’ Accounting Choices More Predictive of Future Cash Flows?

We examine the role manager entrenchment has on firms’ financial reporting quality. More specifically, we test whether entrenched managers’ reported accruals deviate from industry norms and whether entrenched managers’ abnormal accruals are more (or less) predictive of future cash flows. Consistent with implications from prior research, we find that firms with entrenched managers generally report lower levels of abnormal accruals (in an absolute sense), but the abnormal accruals utilized by entrenched managers are more predictive of future cash flows. Contrary to a more traditional view of manager entrenchment, our evidence suggests that entrenched managers report higher quality abnormal accruals. While prior research provides evidence that manager entrenchment is associated with negative economic outcomes, we argue that attempts to limit entrenchment are unlikely to improve financial reporting quality and may actually lower quality. Future corporate governance research should consider not only the level but also the quality of the association between accounting choices and manager entrenchment.     

Anticipating the Impact of IFRS on the Management of German Manufacturing Companies: Some Observations from a British Perspective

The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 marked a significant departure from Germany's traditional financial accounting practices. This paper questions whether this change may have consequential effects on the distinctive traditional management accounting practices in the field of Controlling. We examine the possible impact on manufacturing companies drawing upon perceptions and expectations of managers in three Bavarian companies and two management consultancy firms. We consider whether financial accounting will assume an increased importance within firms, and whether this may lead to abandonment of some traditional management accounting practices and the adoption of different techniques in internal reporting compatible with the new IFRS regime for external reporting. This prompts consideration of whether such changes would lead to financial accounting domination of management accounting in Germany analogous to that argued by Johnson and Kaplan in 1987 in their ‘Relevance Lost’ thesis. We conclude that, at this juncture in the development of their information systems, German managers face an important choice between integrating external and internal reporting in ways that might fundamentally change established Controlling practices, or of continuing to operate dual accounting systems in much the same way as in the past so that adoption of IFRS is restricted to external reporting.     

Reliability-Relevance Trade-Offs and the Efficiency of Aggregation

This paper studies how an accountant's method of aggregating information in a financial report is affected by differences in the reliability and relevance of components of the report. We study a firm that hires an accountant to produce a report that reveals information to investors regarding the returns to the firm's past investments. In constructing the report, the accountant must combine information elicited from the firm's manager with other information directly observable to the accountant. The manager's information is assumed to be directly observable only by the manager and to be of superior quality to the other information available to the accountant. Reliability‐relevance trade‐offs arise because as the accountant places more weight on the manager's report, potentially more useful information gets included in the report, at the cost of encouraging the manager to distort his or her information to a greater extent. Capital market participants anticipate this behavior and price the firm accordingly. We show how the market's price response to the release of the firm's aggregate report, the efficiency of the firm's investment decisions, and the manager's incentives to manipulate the soft information under his or her control are all affected by—and affect—the aggregation procedure the accountant adopts. In addition, we identify a broad range of circumstances under which aggregated reports are strictly more efficient than disaggregated reports because aggregation tempers the manager's misreporting incentives. We also demonstrate that, as any given component of the aggregated accounting report becomes softer, the equilibrium level of the firm's investment diminishes and the market places greater weight on the remaining components of the report.     

会计信息失真现象的思考与探索

会计信息失真给社会的发展造成了极大的伤害,究其原因,有外部原因：政府监督的不到位,法律和会计监督体系的不健全;也有内部原因：会计从业人员个人和企业领导为个人利益和企业利益所驱动,以及会计人员的整体素质相对低下。本文在此基础上从完善法律体制、加强内外部监督力度、提高会计从业人员的整体素质等方面治理会计信息失真的措施,并提出实现会计信息化对治理会计信息失真是有着重大意义的。     

Mutual Fund Managers’ Prior Work Experience and Their Investment Skill

This paper examines the relationship between mutual fund managers’ past professional backgrounds and their portfolio performance using Chinese mutual fund data from 2003 to 2016. We focus on managers with prior work experience either as industry analysts or as macroanalysts. We hypothesize that managers who worked as industry analysts exhibit superior stock picking skills, while managers with a background as macroanalysts time the market better. These hypotheses are supported by the data after controlling for observable fund and manager characteristics. Bootstrap analyses suggest that a significant difference in performance between these two types of managers cannot be attributed purely to luck.     

Brand value accounting: an international comparison of perceived managerial implications

Data concerned with the managerial implications of brand value accounting were collected from accountants and marketing managers working in strongly branded companies in New Zealand (N.Z.), the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States (U.S.). Since the external reporting climate in the U.S. prohibits the inclusion of brand value as a separate asset in the published balance sheet, it was anticipated that U.S. managers would be the least positively disposed to the potential of beneficial managerial implications deriving from brand valuation. Contrary to this expectation, managers in the U.K are the least positively disposed to potential managerial implications associated with brand value accounting. This result is particularly interesting as brand value accounting has commanded considerable attention from the U.K. accounting profession since the late 1980s when several large U.K. companies elected to capitalize brand values in their external financial statements. In addition to the international differences noted, the degree of commonality of findings across the three countries is also noteworthy. The data reported provide strong support for the view that there is considerable potential for positive managerial implications from brand value accounting.     

Does concurrent management of mutual and hedge funds create conflicts of interest?

This paper shows that conflicts of interest may exist in cases where a hedge fund manager starts a mutual fund but not in the opposite case. We compare performance, asset flows, and risk incentives to establish several key differences between these two scenarios: First, prior to concurrent management, hedge fund managers experience worse performance while mutual fund managers achieve better performance relative to their full-time peers. Second, hedge fund managers who choose concurrent management are disproportionately the ones with less experience. Their hedge funds tend to suffer a decline in performance after the event. By contrast, mutual fund managers who choose concurrent management tend to outperform their full-time peers. Based on our findings, we make important recommendations for policy makers and companies. The relevance of our recommendations extends beyond the small share of companies presently engaged in concurrent management.     

Communicating the economic value of customer ownership in insurance: A qualitative analysis of annual reports

Its distinctive ownership base leads to a customer‐owned mutual insurer representing a mission and purpose of existence that are very different from those of an investor‐owned insurer. While the owner value of the latter can be defined in terms of return on invested capital, in mutuals, the attention is shifted toward benefits and value for customers. Despite this major difference, scholars know little about mutual insurers' value‐creating processes. To begin filling this knowledge gap, the article explores and identifies how managers of mutual insurance companies understand and communicate the economic value of ownership to their customer–owners and other stakeholders. It reports on thematic analysis of annual reports of 18 mutuals, based in seven countries (England, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States), on the basis of which the authors offer a tentative framework for enhancing scholars' and practitioners' understanding of how the economic value of ownership is understood in a customer‐owned mutual insurance company.     

The performance of female hedge fund managers

Using data for the period 1994–2013, we examine the return and risk-taking behavior of hedge funds having at least one female portfolio manager and funds that have all female portfolio managers. Funds with all female managers perform no differently than all male-managed funds and have similar risk profiles. For single-style funds, those with mixed teams of both genders underperform male-only funds on both a raw and risk-adjusted basis, although mixed funds incur less risk and their Sharpe ratios do not differ. For funds of funds, both all-female and mixed funds have similar performance to male-managed funds. We then consider the failure rate across all fund styles. Funds with at least one female manager fail at higher rates, driven by difficulty in raising capital—these funds are smaller and are less likely to be closed to new investment. Surviving funds with at least one female manager have better performance than male-managed surviving funds, consistent with the idea that female managers need to perform better for their funds to survive. Yet, female-managed surviving funds have fewer assets under management than surviving male-managed funds. Using media mentions as a proxy for investor interest, female-managed funds receive proportionately less attention. Our results suggest that there are no inherent differences in skill between female and male managers, but that only the best performing female managers manage to survive.     

Budget-Emphasis in Performance Evaluation and Managers’ Job Related Tension: the Moderating Effect of Information Completeness

Research examining a budget-emphasis style of performance evaluation has led to insights about those situations where it is likely to increase a manager’s job related tension. However, less is known about how the management accountant can use the budget process to ameliorate this effect. This paper focuses on the part of the budget process where subordinate managers have to explain budget variances to their superiors and, in particular, the information subordinates have available to explain those variances. The paper argues that the completeness of this information affects subordinate managers’ ability to understand budget variances and explain them to their superiors which, in turn, affects subordinates’ level of job related tension, especially where superiors use a budget-emphasis style of performance evaluation. A cross-sectional study, using interview and questionnaire techniques, empirically tests, and finds support for, this hypothesis.     

Discretionary Accounting Choices: A Debt covenants Based Signalling Approach

This paper seeks to explain the discretionary accounting choices made by managers in a world characterised by asymmetric information between managers and investors. It considers a firm whose capital structure consists of both debt and equity, a manager who protects the interests of the firm's existing shareholders, and a financial market. The manager is committed to engage in an investment opportunity and needs to raise some equity to finance it. He is furthermore endowed with some private information about his firm's future earnings. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his accounting choices. In this equilibrium, the selection of balance sheet strengthening and income increasing accounting choices signals unfavourable information while the use of balance-sheet weakening and income- decreasing accounting choices signals favourable private information. The latter firms should thus experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates of their accounting choices.     

Portfolio manager ownership and fund performance

This paper documents the range of portfolio manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to managerial ownership, with performance improving by about 3 basis points for each basis point of managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making portfolio allocation decisions.     

Accounting information and managerial work

Despite calls to link management accounting more closely to management (Jonsson, 1998), much is still to be learned about the role of accounting information in managerial work. This lack of progress stems partly from a failure to incorporate in research efforts the findings regarding the nature of managerial work, as well as inadequate attention devoted to the detailed practices through which accounting information is actually used by managers in their work. In this paper I draw on prior research to develop a series of propositions focused on three primary insights into how and why managers use accounting information in their work. First, managers primarily use accounting information to develop knowledge of their work environment rather than as an input into specific decision-making scenarios. In this role, accounting information can help managers to develop knowledge to prepare for unknown future decisions and activities. Second, as accounting information is just one part of the wider information set that managers use to perform their work, it is imperative to consider its strengths and weaknesses not in isolation but relative to other sources of information at a manager’s disposal. Third, as managers interact with information and other managers utilising primarily verbal forms of communication, it is through talk rather than through written reports that accounting information becomes implicated in managerial work. These insights have important implications for how managers use accounting information, and, in particular, require reconsideration of the types accounting information that managers find, or could find, helpful. The paper also considers how existing experimental and field-based methods could fruitfully be adapted to focus on the detailed activities through which managers engage with accounting information.     

Inexperienced investors and bubbles

We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers’ investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run by younger managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks, relative to their style benchmarks, than their older colleagues. Furthermore, young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their technology stock investments. As a result, young managers increase their technology holdings during the run-up, and decrease them during the downturn. Both results are in line with the behavior of inexperienced investors in experimental asset markets. The economic significance of young managers’ actions is amplified by large inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices.     

Tailored versus Mass Produced: Portfolio Managers Concurrently Managing Separately Managed Accounts and Mutual Funds

Using a matched sample of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and mutual funds (MFs) with the same portfolio manager and investment style, we find that concurrently managed MFs consistently underperform their SMA counterparts and generate more negative return gaps. Fund characteristics and liquidity betas fail to fully explain the underperformance. An event‐study analysis finds that the weights placed into top (bottom)‐performing stocks increase for existing SMAs (MFs) and negative return gaps increase for the MFs after the onset of concurrent management. We find that higher compensation collected by SMA fund managers are associated with more unseen managerial actions which positively contribute to the SMA return gap. Our results suggest that when managers concurrently manage both SMAs and MFs, they favor SMA performance over their MF performance.     

Mutual Fund Manager Forecasting Behavior

I examine publicly released annual earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with stock recommendations by mutual fund managers of actively managed open-end mutual funds. I find that mutual fund manager annual earnings forecasts systematically overestimate the earnings number later disclosed at the annual earnings announcement. In further analyses, I attempt to distinguish between two explanations for this forecast bias: an untruthful reporting bias (market manipulation) and a truthful cognitive bias (optimism). These explanations generate different predictions about the timing of changes in fundholdings of forecasted securities between the forecast release and annual earnings announcement dates. I interpret my findings as more consistent with an optimism explanation for mutual fund manager annual forecast bias and less consistent with a market manipulation explanation for this bias. I am, however, unable to eliminate an unobservable selection bias either in the decision of the mutual fund manager to report a forecast publicly or in the media's decision to publish that forecast as an explanation for my finding that mutual fund manager forecasts are biased.