A Voluntary Subsidy Scheme for the Accounting Rate System in International Telecommunications Industries

This paper proposes a new scheme complementing the current accounting rate system for international telecommunications industries. From an economic standpoint, the current accounting rate system results in high service charges as well as inefficient production. This is a source of contention between developed countries and less developed countries. Although there have been discussions concerning the disadvantages of the accounting rate system, a concrete and workable alternative has not yet been proposed. In this paper, we shall propose a method, taking into account the utilization of a subsidy from a developed country to a less developed country to reduce the accounting rate in international telecommunications, and this scheme brings a second-best solution.     

Externalities,entry bias,and optimal subsidy policy for cleaner environment

This paper analyses alternative subsidy schemes and long-run entry bias in a new industry that creates positive environmental externalities (both generation externalities and externalities associated with interindustry technology spillovers). It demonstrates that per-unit subsidy scheme, despite attracting fewer firms, results in higher industry output and economic surplus in the equilibrium compared with the expenditure equivalent lump-sum subsidy scheme. However, the later leads to higher total surplus, unless spillover externalities are sufficiently small. Further, the free-entry equilibrium number of firms may be excessive or insufficient. A key finding of this paper is that the first-best equilibrium outcome can be implemented through a unique combination of per-unit subsidy and lump-sum subsidy/tax, which involves positive government expenditure in the presence of positive externalities.     

An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets

This paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are discussed.     

退耕还林的目标体系与合作生产过程

本文从生态经济学出发分析了退耕还林工程的目标体系以及合作生产过程属性,提出了有待探讨的理论问题：在环境经济学框架中,既有的研究将外部性内部化作为问题的核心,忽略了生态的系统性以及合作性。本文对退耕还林工程的目标体系、阶段性,以及工程的合作生产过程属性进行了描述,认为生态建设的资金分配制度、财政补贴与生态建设长效机制的关系以及生态补贴的监督机制应该作为理论研究的重点。     

Higher Education: Subsidizing Tuition versus Subsidizing Student Loans

We use a simple two‐period equilibrium framework to explore the effects of two different subsidization regimes for higher education on the formation of human capital and on the distribution of incomes. Individuals finance their investments in higher education through income‐contingent education loans as well as subsidies from the government. The subsidy is tax‐financed. We compare an egalitarian subsidy scheme, which reduces by a uniform amount the tuition charged to students, with a student loan subsidy which is proportional to the student's debt service obligation. We show that both types of subsidies reduce the economy‐wide underinvestment in higher education and lead to a more equal income distribution. Furthermore, according to some social welfare criterion, the student loan subsidy regime dominates the tuition subsidy regime if the subsidy level is predetermined, while the converse is true if the subsidy level constitutes a choice variable of the government.     

ON THE ROLE OF TAX SUBSIDY SCHEME IN MONEY SEARCH MODELS*

This article investigates the roles of policy in search models with divisible money. Recently, real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria has been found in both specific and general search models with divisible money. Thus if we assume the divisibility of money, it would be quite difficult to make accurate predictions of the effects of simple monetary policies. Therefore, in this article, we introduce a certain tax subsidy scheme and show that this is effective in selecting a determinate efficient equilibrium. In other words, for a given efficient equilibrium and for any real number δ > 0 , a certain tax subsidy scheme induces a locally determinate equilibrium within the δ‐neighborhood of the given equilibrium. Moreover, the size of the tax subsidy can be arbitrarily small.     

First-best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities

This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free-riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two-part per-unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first-best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first-best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first-best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.     

A CLASS OF PERFORMANCE‐BASED SUBSIDY RULES*

We consider a benchmark static incentive scheme, i.e. a per unit subsidy, that induces a monopoly to produce a target output level. We show that the same output level can be achieved by a continuum of dynamic subsidy rules based on a performance indicator. The rules require only local information. The present value of the subsidies paid is smaller than the amount paid under the static subsidy. Each of the dynamic subsidy rules results at each moment in a lower per unit subsidy than the static subsidy. The subsidy rate depends on a state variable that reflects the monopolist's performance history.     

GROWTH, R&D AND WELFARE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY

This paper analyzes the normative side of an R&D growth model in which market structure and growth are jointly determined in the equilibrium of a one‐sector economy under monopolistic competition. We find that a distortion in the allocation of R&D, namely the presence of technological spillovers between firms, generates two market failures: insufficient growth and excessive entry of firms. We show that this result is driven by the interplay between market structure and growth. A simple tax/subsidy scheme to support the efficient solution is proposed.     

A Note on Regulating a Multiproduct Monopolist

In a 1995 paper, Kim and Jung designed an optimal tax scheme for regulating a multiproduct monopolist in a situation of doubly asymmetric information. This paper points out the similarity of their scheme to the incremental surplus subsidy scheme of Sappington and Sibley (1988), examines the possibility of the abusive expenditures by the regulated firm, as discussed in Blackmon (1992), and provides one potential remedy for eliminating abuse.     

Foreign direct investment subsidy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms

This study analyzes the macroeconomic impacts of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are determining whether to enter or how to serve foreign markets. We show that a small FDI subsidy scheme induces consumption gains and delivers short‐term welfare improvement for the FDI host country if firms differ in productivity. However, the subsidy generates a new problem and results in the wealth reallocation effect, leading to welfare deterioration for the host country in the long run. Moreover, we find that a subsidy program induces a welfare improvement for the host country if it is offered to all domestic producers instead of foreign producers only in the host country.     

A Note on Regulating Oligopolistic Industries: A Hierarchical Model

In a 1994 paper, extending the well-known incremental surplus subsidy scheme of Sappington and Sibley, Schwermer presented a non-Bayesian incentive scheme for regulating a Cournot oligopoly industry. This note designs an oligopolistic incentive scheme for a hierarchical Stackelberg model in which firms choose outputs sequentially.     

Determinants of farmers’ willingness to participate in subsidy schemes for pesticide-free buffer zones—A choice experiment study

Danish farmers have been far less interested in agri-environmental subsidy schemes (AES) than anticipated. In order to examine how to improve the appeal of such schemes, a choice experiment was conducted concerning 444 Danish farmers’ preferences for subsidy schemes for pesticide-free buffer zones. A random parameter logit framework was used to capture heterogeneity among farmers. Our results indicate that 1) the vast majority of farmers are willing to trade off the size of the subsidy for less restrictive scheme requirements and that 2) the amount of the subsidy they are willing to trade off varies with specific scheme requirements, suggesting which features are most important for successful policy design. Our results suggest that farmers value flexible contract terms higher than reduced administrative burdens. Finally, we suggest a practical approach to estimating a monetary value of farmers’ reluctance to participate in AES. While the trade off's that farmers are willing to make between subsidy size and individual scheme requirements are case specific, our results concerning increased use of farm advisors, farmers ability of valuing different types of flexibility, and our attempt to place a monetary value on farmers’ reluctance to engage in regulatory subsidy schemes have a potentially broader application platform.     

Crowding-out effect of the current food stamp subsidy scheme

We construct a model to illustrate that the current food stamp subsidy scheme fails to achieve its stated aim due to the crowding-out effect. More specifically, if the household income is sufficiently low, only a corner solution exists, and a full subsidy is needed.     

Incentive mechanisms for environmental protection under asymmetric information: a case study

The purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of some instruments of environmental policy, using data for a coal-fired power plant. Each decentralized scheme coverages towards the social optimum, chosen by a regulator. We look at the performance of a changing tax rate on emission, of an announcement of the tax formula, of an announcement of the tax formula with a tax refund possibility, and of a tax-cum subsidy scheme. Our emphasis is on full information concerning the tax and subsidy formulas and on the opportunity for the firm to optimize intertemporally. We also test two performance schemes which combine social optimal pricing with optimal abatement decisions. Our interest is to compare the speed of convergence of the schemes, the monetary side payments (subsidy, bonus) required, and to look for self-financing schemes.     

Subsidies for renewable energy in inflexible power markets

This paper analyses how short-term operational efficiency and the \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions of a power system depend on different subsidies for wind power and on the flexibility of the power system. This is analysed in the framework of a numerical power market model, calibrated to Danish data, where the start-up costs and other constraints in fossil-fuelled power plants are taken into account. The main conclusion is that flexibility is crucial for the costs of integrating wind power in an existing system. If thermal power plants are inflexible, subsidies for wind power should strive to increase the flexibility of the market by passing market signals to wind power. A subsidy that conceals market signals from wind power producers (a production subsidy) or disconnects wind power incentives from the market signals altogether (a fixed price) increases costs considerably. An inflexible power system should aim to introduce optimal subsidies (an investment subsidy) instead of production subsidies or a fixed price. The design of the subsidy scheme should take into account both the characteristics of the existing system and the characteristics of renewables.     

Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation

In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas.     

Local Pollution in Federal Systems

It is widely accepted that decentralized control of local pollution is inefficient if the central and the local authorities are imperfectly informed. This paper shows how the central authority can introduce a flexible grant-in-aid system that induces the local authority to use a weighted combination of local and central information when the local authority suffers from confirmatory bias. If the central authority is highly uncertain about the environmental effects of a specific pollutant, the tax/subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information to play an essential role in the environmental policy. If the central authority is certain that a pollutant must not exceed a specific limit, the tax/subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information little influence on the environmental policy.     

An integrated tax-subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction

A carbon tax is often cited by economists as an effective instrument to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, but there is little political interest in the United States. In light of this political unpopularity, we develop and examine a net-revenue constrained carbon tax and subsidy program. The optimal revenue constrained tax and subsidy schedule based on our utility maximization model taxes energy sources with high emissions to energy price ratio, and subsidizes sources with low emissions to energy price ratios. This approach may be more palatable than a traditional carbon tax because it can change the relative price of low and high emissions energy sources while providing a mechanism to limit net tax increases and energy price increases. We find that a constrained tax/subsidy program provides welfare gains relative to a no-tax scenario. Welfare gains are estimated to be 1% and 36% of the welfare gains from a Pigouvian tax for the motor fuels industry and electric power industry, respectively. In contrast, subsidies for low-emitting energy sources funded from general tax funds rather than from high-emission energy tax revenues lead to welfare decreases substantially below our proposed tax/subsidy policy approach.     

Macroeconomic implications of a sharing compensation scheme in a model of endogenous growth

This paper develops an endogenous growth model that sheds light on the roles of the revenue-sharing scheme in a macro-economy. We show that a higher sharing ratio attributable to labor unambiguously promotes the equilibrium working time, but has an ambiguous effect on the balanced-growth rate. Of interest, if the economy is characterized by a higher degree of monopoly, a sharing compensation system is more likely to boost the balanced growth rate. In a normative analysis, we show that to remedy the distortions caused by the sharing scheme and market imperfections, the government should provide a subsidy to capital incomes, while it may either tax or subsidize labor incomes.